CALABRESE et al v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 52

OPINION AND ORDER granting 43 Motion to Dismiss; granting 43 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; that he Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Matos-Wilson with prejudice ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/30/2019. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THEODORE S. CALABRESE,

Civil Action No.: 17-4987 (CCC-$CM)

Plaintiff,
V.

OPINION and ORDER

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,

Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of the Hon. Marcella Matos-Wilson (“Matos
Wilson,” (ECF No. 43) to dismiss the second amended complaint (the “SAC”) of Theodore S. Calabrese
(“Plaintiff’). The Court has considered the submissions made in support of and in opposition to the instant
motions. ECF Nos. 43, 44, 4$.’ Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b), no oral argument was heard. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
II.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns a custody dispute between Plaintiff and his ex-wife. Plaintiff filed the initial
complaint in this case on July 7, 2017 alleging that Matos-Wilson and the state of New Jersey violated his
rights by depriving him of access to his children without adequate procedural protections. Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 2$, 2017 naming additional defendants who
allegedly interfered with his parental rights. Am. CompL, ECF No. 4 at 1-2. Defendants filed motions

1

Plaintiff improperly filed a sur-reply (ECF No. 50) to Matos-Wilson’s reply in support of her
motion to dismiss without leave of the Court as required by Local Rule 7.1 (d)(6). Nevertheless,
given Plaintiffs pro se status the Court has considered Plaintiffs sur-reply in deciding the
motion to dismiss.
I

to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF Nos. 14, 15, 20, and 29) and the Court issued an opinion on May
31, 2018 granting all defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice. Op., ECF No. 37 at 1. Mindful
of Plaintiffs pro se status, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within
thirty days “to the extent the pleading deficiencies identified by the Court can be cured by way of
amendment.” Order, ECF No. 38 at 2. Plaintiff subsequently filed the SAC on June 15, 2018, naming
only Matos-Wilson as a defendant.
III.

DISCUSSION

In this Court’s prior opinion, Plaintiffs claims against Matos-Wilson were dismissed because the
Eleventh Amendment bars any direct claims against the State of New Jersey and Matos-Wilson was being
sued in her official capacity as a state official. Op., ECF No. 37 at 5-6. This Court additionally found that
Matos-Wilson was subject to the doctrine ofjudicial immunity and that Plaintiff failed to show that Matos
Wilson’s complained of acts were not judicial and thus fell outside the scope of the doctrine of judicial
immunity. The SAC fails due to these deficiencies and Plaintiffs claims against Matos-Wilson are again
barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of judicial immunity. Plaintiff continues to allege
that his claims against Matos-Wilson are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because he is seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief and “it is substantially likely the harm Defendant is causing wi[11] continue
in the future considering she keeps doing it.” SAC, ECF No. 39 at 32. This Court has already rejected
the same meritless and conclusory argument from Plaintiff. Op., ECF No. 37 at 7 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (“The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of
showing a substantial likelihood that he was likely to suffer some future injury at the hands of a named
party by merely alleging that he seeks injunctive relief against Defendant Matos-Wilson for prospectively
creating the opportunity for the violation of Plaintiffs rights.”). Similarly, Plaintiff continues to allege that
the doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to his claims against Matos-Wilson as “Constitutional
violations of parties cannot be said to be a function normally performed by a judge” and therefore he is
2

7

not challenging Matos-Wilson’s judicial acts. SAC, ECF No. 39 at 2. These allegations, too, have already
been rejected. 0p., ECF No. 37 at 9 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“The Court,
however, declines to find that Plaintiff has shown that Defendant Matos-Wilson’ s alleged acts were not
judicial through conclusory averments that she acted unconstitutionally..

..

Rather, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs allegations concerning Defendant Matos Wilson solely concern judicial acts or omissions that
Defendant Matos-Wilson undertook in her judicial capacity as the presiding judge in the underlying state
court litigation.”). As in the original complaint, Plaintiffs SAC brings claims against Matos-Wilson for
her prior actions as a New Jersey state court judge overseeing his custody dispute. These claims again
fail and cannot proceed in this Court.2
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and enumerated in this court’s prior opinion at length, Plaintiffs

claims are barred and will be dismissed.

Op., ECF No. 37 at 5-10.

Given Plaintiffs inability to overcome

his pleading deficiencies again, the SAC is dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of the Court is directed
to close this matter. For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Matos
Wilson with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May30, 2019

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

2

Matos-Wilson also argues that even if she is not inmiune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine ofjudicial immunity, Plaintiffs claims against her are barred under
the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feidman doctrines. Def. Br., ECF No. 43-3 at 21. The
Court’s previous opinion addressed these issues and made clear that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to “interfere with the ongoing state proceedings by issuing any injunctive relief’ or
reviewing any “final judgments issued by the state court.” Op., ECF No. 37 at 7 n.2. The Court
sees no reason to deviate from its prior ruling on these alternative arguments as the SAC has not
cured the relevant pleading deficiencies previously identified.
3