TELFAIR v. ORTIZ

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 2/10/2020. (lag, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TOMMIE TELFAIR,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID E. ORTIZ,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 17-5065 (SDW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On July 11, 2017, Petitioner, Tommie Telfair, filed his purported habeas petition in this
matter. (ECF No. 2).
2.

On September 28, 2017, this Court dismissed that petition.

(ECF Nos. 2-3).

Petitioner appealed (ECF No. 6), and the Third Circuit dismissed that appeal in November 2017.
(ECF No. 10).
3. In December 2019, Petitioner filed in the Third Circuit a petition seeking leave to file
a second or successive § 2255 motion. (See In re Tommie Telfair, Third Circuit Docket No. 193944). Because of certain deficiencies in Petitioner’s filing, the Third Circuit ordered him on
December 20, 2019, to cure those deficiencies within twenty-one days. (Third Circuit Docket
No. 19-3944 at Document No. 3113439848). On January 15, 2020, Petitioner filed his response
to that order, and the Third Circuit deemed him to have complied with their order. (Third Circuit
Docket No. 19-3944 Docket Sheet).

On January 23, 2020, after having reviewed all of

Petitioner’s filings, the Third Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for authorization to file a second
or successive § 2255 motion. (Third Circuit Docket No. 19-3944 at Document No. 6).
4. On or about January 31, 2020, Petitioner submitted to this Court a motion in which he
purports to seek “urgent” injunctive relief. (ECF No. 11). In that motion, Petitioner essentially
recounts how he received the Third Circuit’s notice in In re Tommie Telfair1 late – on December
30, 2019, specifically, was then transferred to a different wing of the prison in which he is housed
over his objection, and how he believes this transfer interfered with his ability to pursue his
“appeal” in the In re Tommie Telfair matter, and how he believes that he should therefore be
entitled to injunctive relief in the form of an order directing his prison to undo the transfer, return
to him his papers and other property which he previously abandoned during the transfer, and not
“retaliate” against him by placing him in disciplinary proceedings. (Id.). Petitioner argues that
his entitlement to relief arises out of his belief that his transfer denied him access to the courts or
otherwise denied him substantive due process. Petitioner does not in any way connect this
“urgent” request for injunctive relief to his underlying and long since dismissed habeas petition in
this matter.
5. Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited
circumstances.” Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson & Johnson – Merck Consumer Pharms.
Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002). In order to show that he is entitled to such relief, a
petitioner must

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Petitioner does not clearly identify the In re Tommie Telfair matter in his filing, but the dates
he includes in his discussion of his woes before the Third Circuit matches only one of his many
appeals – the In re Tommie Telfair matter.
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demonstrate that “(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial
will result in irreparable harm; (3) granting the injunction will not
result in irreparable harm to the defendants; and (4) granting the
injunction is in the public interest.” Maldonado v. Houston, 157
F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (as to preliminary injunction); see also
Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 1999) (as to
temporary restraining order). A [petitioner] must establish that all
four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians Ass’n of America v.
Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990).
Ward v. Aviles, No. 11-6252, 2012 WL 2341499, at *1 (D.N.J. June 18, 2012).
6. Petitioner has failed to show an entitlement to injunctive relief in this matter. As
previously noted, this matter was dismissed in 2017, and Petitioner’s appeal was also dismissed
well over two years ago. Petitioner therefore cannot show that he has a likelihood of success on
the merits in his underlying habeas claims, which have already failed. Petitioner has likewise
failed to show that he would suffer any irreparable harm absent an injunction, or that an injunction
would be in the interests of the public – he instead seeks to use the fact that he had a petition before
the Third Circuit at the time of an intra-prison transfer to transfer a dispute over his prison
assignment into a constitutional claim wholly divorced from the matter in which he has filed his
motion. As Petitioner’s underlying habeas petition has long since been dismissed, as Petitioner
has not in any way shown how his current motion is related to his underlying habeas petition, and
as Petitioner has failed to show an entitlement to injunctive relief in this matter, Petitioner’s motion
is denied. To the extent Petitioner wishes to pursue due process or denial of access to the courts
claims, he must do so by filing a separate civil rights matter and paying the appropriate filing fee.

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7. In conclusion, Petitioner’s motion seeking “urgent” injunctive relief is denied. An
appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 10, 2020

s/ Susan D. Wigenton___
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge

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