PRUNKEL v. COUNTY OF BERGEN et al

Filing 75

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 8/23/2018. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No.: 17-5154 (JLL)
STEVEN PRUNKEL,
OPINION

Plaintiff,
V.

COUNTY OF BERGEN, et a!.,
Defendants.

LINARES, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants William E. Morton, IV and the
Village of Ridgefield Park’s (collectively, “Ridgefield Park Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Defendant N.
DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2). (ECF Nos. 46, 47). Defendant DeSantis also filed a separate Motion to
Dismiss all Cross-Claims against him for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (ECF No. 68). Plaintiff has opposed both motions filed against him,
and Ridgefield Park Defendants and Defendant DeSantis have replied thereto. (ECF Nos. 65, 66,
67, 69). Defendants and Cross-Claimants County of Bergen, Sheriff Michael Saudino, Detective
Sergeant Granata, and Detective Dilkes (collectively, “Cross-Claimants”) have not responded to
Defendant DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss their Cross-Claims within the time permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules.’ The Court decides this matter without

Defendant DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss the Cross-Claims against him was filed on May 14. 201$. making it
originally returnable on June 16, 2018 and Cross-Claimants Opposition due on June 4. 2018.

oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court denies Ridgefield Park Defendants and Defendant DeSantis’ Motions to Dismiss, with the
exception that Plaintiffs claim for excessive bail shall be dismissed as time-barred.
I.

BACKGROUND2

On July 29, 2013, Plaintiff was shot by a man named Kevin Lasch in Pennsylvania. (FAC

¶JJ

24—26). Months later, Lasch was interviewed by the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) in

connection with the shooting. (FAC ¶ 28). However, allegedly instead of questioning Lasch about
the shooting, the PSP “asked him only about alleged gun purchases he made at gun shows over the
course of several months,” and the prosecutor’s office apparently granted him use and derivative
use immunity for the statements he made during the aforesaid interview.

(FAC

¶

29—30).

Plaintiff claimed that Lasch allegedly told the PSP that he filled out applications and purchased
guns at gun shows for Plaintiff. (FAC

¶ 31).

Lasch further explained that the guns were bought

with money provided by Plaintiff and that the guns belonged solely to Plaintiff. (FAC

¶J 31—32).

Despite being aware that Lasch shot and nearly killed Plaintiff, the PSP allegedly did not ask Lasch
a single question regarding same. (FAC

¶J 34—3 8).

After receiving this information, the PSP contacted the Bergen County Sheriffs
Department (“BCSD”), which Plaintiff claims violated the standard procedure of first contacting
the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. (FAC

¶J 41,

47—50). According to Plaintiff, the PSP

coordinated with the BCSD to “move guns from Lasch’s possession in Pennsylvania to the Star
Candle facility,” where Plaintiff worked. (FAC

2

¶ 68).

The PSP then allegedly directed Lasch to

This background is derived from Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), (ECE No. 45), which the Court must
accept as true at this stage of the proceedings. See Aiston i’. Countmiide fin. Coip., 585 F.3d 753. 758 (3d Cir.
2009). The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to file the last twelve pages of his Amended Complaint, though the full
Amended Complaint was sent to all parties prior to its filing. (See ECF Nos. 45. 54). Upon realizing this error,
Plaintiff filed the complete Amended Complaint on the docket. (ECF No. 54). Therefore, the Court will cite to
“FAC” and the relevant paragraph as they appear in ECf No. 54-1.
2

send them an “anonymous” email tip, stating that Plaintiff was storing a crate full of assault
firearms at his work station in the New Jersey based Star Candle factory. (FAC

¶ 53,

66, 73).

The PSP and other Defendants, according to Plaintiff, hid the fact that the tip was actually provided
by Lasch, who clearly had animus against Plaintiff, in order to make it appear that they had
probable cause for Plaintiffs arrest. (FAC

¶J 40,

66, 129).

On or around August 6, 2014, Defendant DeSantis, a PSP Trooper, reported to Defendant
Morton, a Ridgefield Park Police Detective, that the PSP had received an anonymous email tip,
which stated that Plaintiff was storing weapons in the factory where he worked. (FAC

¶ 52—5 5).

Plaintiff alleges that without investigating the validity of the anonymous email tip or contacting
the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, the Ridgefield Park Police sent several units to the Star
Candle factory. (FAC

¶

57—61). The owner of the Star Candle factory gave consent for the

Ridgefield Park Police to search the facility. (FAC

¶ 74).

The officers went directly to Plaintiffs

work station, where they discovered a crate containing rifles and handguns. (FAC

¶ 75—78).

At

the time the weapons were discovered, Plaintiff was still suffering injuries as a result of the
shooting perpetrated by Lasch, and claims that he was unable to lifi the heavyweight crate filled
with guns. (F AC

¶ 79).

detained Plaintiff. (FAC

Upon discovering the weapons, the Ridgefield Park Police immediately

¶ 81).

After Plaintiff was detained, Defendant Morton contacted the PSP for further information
relating to Plaintiff (FAC

¶f 83,

86). Defendant DeSantis informed Defendant Morton that there

was an investigation into Plaintiff and another individual for illegal firearm purchases, and that
Plaintiff was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior conviction. (FAC

¶J 84—85,

87).

Defendant DeSantis further advised Defendant Morton that Plaintiff used a straw buyer—Lasch——
to purchase the guns, and that Lasch had previously shot Plaintiff (FAC

3

¶

88—91). Defendant

DeSantjs also advised Defendant Morton that Lasch was the source of the tip.

(FAC

¶

$8).

Allegedly based solely on this information, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with multiple
weapons offenses, including possession of firearms by a felon. (FAC

¶ 93).

Following his arrest, the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office indicted Plaintiff, relying on
the information provided by the PSP and Ridgefield Park Police. (FAC

¶

111, 114). According

to Plaintiff, the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office was unaware that Lasch was the source of the
anonymous tip. (FAC ¶ 112). After his initial appearance in the Superior Court of Bergen County,
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Bergen County Jail from August 6, 2014 to September 2015. (FAC

¶J

116, 118). Plaintiff claims to have suffered physical and psychological pain during his time at

the Bergen County Jail, in part because he was still recovering from the injuries he sustained when
he was shot by Lasch. (FAC

¶J

118—19). Plaintiff was hospitalized on two occasions while in

jail, but did not receive psychological counseling. (FAC

¶J 120—21).

During his confinement,

Plaintiff requested discovery related to his case, including the source of the anonymous tip that led
to his arrest, but the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office did not provide him with said information.
(FAC

¶J

122—24). Allegedly the only evidence that was produced to Plaintiff was the serial

numbers of the guns, which were registered to Lasch and not to Plaintiff. (FAC

¶ 95—96,

127).

In September 2015, Plaintiff appeared before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen
County, and was advised that all charges against him had been dropped by the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office, without further explanation. (FAC

¶

133—34). According to Plaintiff, the

only evidence that linked him to the crate of guns was the “anonymous” tip which was actually
provided by Lasch, a noncredible source who previously attempted to murder Plaintiff. (FAC
¶J 114, 129). Plaintiff further claims that Defendants named in this case intentionally withheld
this potentially exonerating information.

(FAC

4

¶ 40,

132).

Moreover, Plaintiff claims that

Defendants in this case placed the crate of guns near his work station in an attempt to frame him
and hide their lack of probable cause. (FAC

¶J 68—70).

Accordingly, Plaintiff broLtght this action on July 13, 2017. (ECF No. 1). On February 2$,
2018, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, asserting the following causes of action: Supervisory
Liability (Count II); Abuse of Process (Count III); Malicious Prosecution (Count IV); failure to
Intervene (Count V); Conspiracy (Count VI); Unlawful Policy, Custom, and Supervision (Count
VII); Excessive Bail/Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Count VIII); and Due Process (Count IX).
(FAC

¶

l39—202). Cross-Claimants answered the Amended Complaint and filed cross-claims

against Defendant DeSantis for contribution and indemnification. (ECF No. 62 at 24).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Failure to State a Claim

To withstand a i-notion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcro/i v. Iqbat, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Belt At!. Corp. v. Twomble, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombty and Iqbal in the Third Circuit,
the Court must take three steps. “first, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead

Plaintiffs first cause of action for false arrestimprisonment (formerly. Count I) was dismissed in the Courts
November 15. 2017 Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant DeSantis Motion to Dismiss
the Initial Complaint. (ECf Nos. 39. 40).

to state a claim.

Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connetty v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787
(3d Cir. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court
must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as
well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these
documents.” Mayer

i

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(2), the Court must dismiss a cause of action
if it does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. “A federal court sitting in New Jersey
has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New Jersey state law.” Miller Yacht
Sates, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)). New Jersey’s longarm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the frill

extent allowed under the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. IMO Inthts.,
Inc. v. KiekertAG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Mesatic v. fiber/bat Corp., 897 F. 2d
696, 698, n.5 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4 (authorizing personal jurisdiction
“consistent with due process of law”). Under the United States Constitution, personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant is permitted only when “the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Accordingly, it

is not necessary for

the defendant

to be physically present in the forum for personal jurisdiction to exist, rather “[p]ersonal

6

jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause depends

upon

‘the relationship among the defendant,

the forum, and the litigation.” IMO Inthis., 155 F.3d at 259 (quoting Sha/jr v. Heitner, 433 U.s.
186, 204 (1977)).
There are two situations where personal jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident
defendant. Dollar Say. Bank v. first Sec. Bank, NA., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984). First,
“general jurisdiction’ is present when the cause of action does not arise out of or is unrelated to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8—9 (1984)). General jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to “hear
any and all claims” against an out-of-state entity or person when its “affiliations with the State are
so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover,
this requires that the plaintiff demonstrate “significantly more than mere minimum contacts.”
Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cat. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass

‘ii,

819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations

omitted).
Second, “specific jurisdiction,” by contrast to general jurisdiction, refers to a court’s power
to hear claims that “arise[

]

out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros, 466

U.S. at 414 (quoting Schaffer, 433 U.S. at 204). Specific jurisdiction satisfies due process when
the defendant “has certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 414 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotations
omitted). Therefore, in order for the Court to properly exercise specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff
must first establish the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum and, assuming the plaintiff
fulfills this burden, the Court must next inquire into whether “the assertion of personal jurisdiction

7

would

comport

with ‘fair play and substantial justice.”

Burger

King Coip., 471 U.S. at 476

(quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320).
In establishing minimum

contacts, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s

minimum contacts with the forum are sufficient for the defendant to “reasonably anticipate being

haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Coip. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(citations omitted). What constitutes minimum contacts depends on “the quality and nature of the
defendant’s activit[ies].” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. Next, in determining if the exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice, a court must assess if it
is reasonable to require the defendant to defend suit in the forum state. World- Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292 (citing hit ‘1 Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). To evaluate reasonableness, a court accounts
for the following considerations: “the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
interstate judicial systern’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and
the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies.” Knierim v.
Siemens Corp., Civ. Action No. 06-4935, 2008 WL 906244, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
Once defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, “the plaintiff bears the
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.” CarteretSav. Bankv. Shttshan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, Plaintiff must prove that personal jurisdiction exists “by affidavits or other competent
evidence.” DayhoffInc. v. Ff1 Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
However, if the District Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the appropriateness
of exercising personal jurisdiction, “the plaintiff need only establish aprimafacie case of personal

8

jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all factual disputes
drawn in its favor.” Miller Yacht Sales, 384 f.3d at 97 (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292
F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)).
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Ridgefleld Park Defendants

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
.

.

.

.

42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (I)

a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42,48(1988); Piecknickv. Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1255—56 (3d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff also
asserts claims under the NJCRA. (See generally FAC). A person may bring a civil action under
the NJCRA in two circumstances: “(I) when he’s deprived of a right, or (2) when his rights are
interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion, or force.” felicioni v. Admin. OffIce of Courts,
404 N.J. Super. 382, 400 (App. Div. 2008). The NJCRA was modeled after

§ 1983, and thus

courts in New Jersey have generally looked at claims under the NJCRA “through the lens of
1983.”

§

Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443—44 (D.N.J. 2011); see also

Chapman v. New Jersey, Civil No. 08-4130, 2009 WL 2634888, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2009)
(“Courts have repeatedly construed the NJCRA in terms nearly identical to its federal counterpart

9

•

.

. .“);

Armstrong v. Sherman, Civ. No. 09-716, 2010 WL 2483911, at *5 (D.N.J.

June

4, 2010)

(“[T]he New Jersey Civil Rights Act is a kind of analog to section 1983.”). Accordingly, the Court
will apply the same analysis for both Plaintiffs

§ 1983 and NJCRA claims.

Here, Ridgefield Park Defendants raise three arguments in support of their Motion to
Dismiss: (1) that Plaintiffs claims are time-barred; (2) that they were only involved in Plaintiffs
alTest

and therefore Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them; and (3) that they are entitled

to qualified immunity. (See general/v ECF No. 46-2). With the exception of Plaintiffs claim for
excessive bail, which the Court finds is time-barred, the Court rejects Ridgefield Park Defendants’
arauments for the reasons articulated below.
1. Statute of Limitations
A cause of action arising under

§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knew, or should have

known, of the injury forming the basis of [the] action.” Sameric Coip. v. CTh’ ofPhi/a., 142 F.3d
582, 599 (3d Cir. 1988). While

§ 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, the Supreme Court

in Wilson explained that the statute of limitations for

§ 1983 claims is governed by the forum

State’s statute of limitations governing tort actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985).
Moreover, the personal injury statute of limitation applies even if the forum State has a different
statute of limitations for intentional torts. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). In New
Jersey, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which the Third
Circuit has held is applicable to

§ 1983 claims brought in New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a; see

a/so Cito v. Bridgewater Tvtp. Police Dep

‘t,

$92 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989).

On the other hand, federal law governs what constitutes accrual for purposes of the statute
of limitations.

Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace v.

Kato. 549 U.S. 384. 388 (2007)). Accrual occurs when a plaintiff has “a complete and present

10

cause of action,” or put differently, “when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id.
(quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).

Therefore, Plaintiffs claim accrues, and the statute of

limitations begins to run, at the time that Plaintiff suffered damages from Defendant’s wrongful
conduct. Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391). This accrual date differs depending on the claim
asserted. For example, a cause of action under

§ 1983 for abuse of process accrues at the time of

Plaintiffs arrest, while a cause of action under

§ 1983 for malicious prosecution or conspiracy to

commit same accrues when the prosecution resolves in Plaintiffs favor. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d
331, 351—52 (3d Cir. 1989).
Ridgefield Park Defendants argue that the two-year statute of limitations for all of
Plaintiffs claims accrued when he was arrested, on August 6, 2014. (ECF No. 46-2 at 4—5).
Therefore, Ridgefield Park Defendants assert that the statute of limitation expired before the
Complaint was filed on July 13, 2017. (Id.). However, several of Plaintiffs claims, such as his
claims for malicious prosecution or conspiracy to commit same, did not accrue until after the
prosecution against Plaintiff ended in his favor, which was in September of 2015 and within the
two-year statute of limitations period, (FAC ¶J 133—34). Rose, 871 f.2d at 351. Furthermore, and
as discussed in more depth below, infta Section 111.2., Plaintiffs claims for supervisory liability,
failure to intervene, unlawful policy, and due process require an underlying violation of Plaintiffs
constitutionally protected rights. See A.Ivf cx rd. 1YK. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002); Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servis., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Washington v. Gtucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997). In as much as these claims relate to the harms Plaintiff suffered due to his prosecution,
the Court finds that they did not accrue until Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim accrued, i.e.,
when Plaintiffs prosecution was favorably resolved. See Rose, $71 F.2d at 352 (applying similar

11

logic to a claim for conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims of
malicious prosecution, conspiracy, supervisory liability, failure to intervene, unlawful policy, and
due process are not time-barred.
However, the Court agrees with Ridgefield Park Defendants that Plaintiffs abuse of
process and excessive bail claims have expired. As stated above, Plaintiffs claim for abuse of
process accrued when he was arrested on August 6, 2014. See Rose, 871 F.2d at 351. Plaintiffs
arrest was more than two years before Plaintiff brought this suit on July 13, 2017, and thus is
outside the statute of limitations. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to bail in an
excessive amount in August 2014 in violation of the Eight Amendment, which is also outside of
the two-year statute of limitations period. (FAC

¶f 116—18). Therefore, excluding the application

of any equitable tolling, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs abuse of process and excessive bail
claims as time-barred.
Plaintiff argues that, in the event the Court finds that any of his claims are time-barred, said
claims should be equitably tolled through the discovery rule.
equitable tolling can be applied to

§ 1983 claims arising in New

(ECF No. 65 at 12).

Indeed,

Jersey. Dique, 603 F.3d at 185.

One way a court can toll the accrual date for purposes of the statute of limitations is through the
discovery nile, which delays “the accrual of a cause of action until the injured party discovers, or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, that the elements of a claim exist.”
Michaels v. State ofNi, 955 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). The elements
for an abuse of process claim are that Defendant initiated process with an ulterior motive and took
some further act “representing the perversion of the legitimate use of the process.” Sirnone v.
Golden Nugget Hotel & Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1036—37 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal citations
omitted). To state an excessive bail claim under

12

§ 1983 Plaintiff must allege facts showing that

his bail was excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment. McKnight v. Taylor, No. 12-1684
(RMB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166143, *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2012).
Here, Plaintiff could not have known that the elements for his abuse of process claim had
accrued, as he alleges that he was unaware of Defendants’ malicious intent and ulterior motive to
frame, arrest, and prosecute him until, at the very least, the prosecution ended in his favor and he
determined that allegedly the only evidence against him was the “anonymous” email tip provided
by Lasch.4 (FAC

¶

123, 129—135). Because Plaintiff first discovered he potentially had a cause

of action for abuse of process at the earliest in September 2015, said claim is within the two-year
statute of limitations. However, it appears obvious to the Court that Plaintiff had reason to know
that his bail was allegedly excessive at the same time as said claim accrued, i.e. when he received
the bail determination in August 2014 that he claims was disproportionate.

(FAC

¶

116).

Therefore, the Court will apply the discovery rule to Plaintiffs abuse of process claim, but shall
not apply same to his excessive bail claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs excessive bail claim must be
dismissed.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs other claims are timely and Ridgefield Park Defendants’

motion is denied to the extent it seeks to dismiss same.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Ridgefield Park Defendants then argue that their involvement in this matter was limited to
Plaintiffs arrest and, because the Court already dismissed Plaintiffs false arrest/imprisonment
claim, Plaintiffs remaining claims do

not

apply to them. (See ECF No. 46-2 at 5—14). The Court

disagrees, in part because Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserts a broad conspiracy whereby

This discovery rule analysis was not applicable to Plaintiffs previous false arrest/imprisonment claim, as Plaintiff
was supposedly aware that the crate of guns allegedly did not belong to him and that there was allegedly no basis
for his arrest. (FAC jf 77—8 1, 99). Furthermore, Courts in the Third Circuit have found that the discovery rule is
inapplicable to cases of false arrest/imprisonment, as a plaintiff will know both of the injury and those responsible
at the time of his or her arrest. See Rolax v. Whitman, 175 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727 (D.N.J. 2001).
13

Defendants, including Ridgefield Park Defendants, were fully aware that they lacked probable
cause for Plaintiffs arrest but framed, arrested, and prosecuted him regardless. (See generally
FAC). As described in more detail below, and for reasons similar to those articulated in the Court’s
previous Opinion denying dismissal of these claims, (ECF No. 39 at 12—19), Plaintiffs assertions
are sufficient to plead each of his claims under

§

1983 and NJCRA.

a. Sttpervisoiy Liability
For supervisory liability, government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676. However, a defendant may be held liable for actions taken in their individual capacity
if: (1) as policymakers, they, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm”; or (2)
they “participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person
in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] subordinates’ violations.” A.M cx rd.

1MK., 372 F.3d at 586. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Morton was a supervising officer
and that Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park controlled, trained, or designed policies for law
enforcement officers. (FAC

¶]

140—41). Plaintiff further alleges that the policies created by

Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park, and enforced by Defendant Morton, failed to properly
discipline officers who violated the rights of individuals and gave rise to the harms suffered by
Plaintiff. (FAC

¶]

142—44). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Ridgefield Park Defendants, and their

subordinates, participated in the framing, arresting, and prosecution of Plaintiff in violation of his
constitutional rights. (See generally FAC). Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged aprirnaflicie case for
supervisory liability, and Count II survives dismissal.

14

b. Abuse ofProcess
As stated above, an abuse of process claim requires a defendant to initiate process with an
ulterior motive and take some further act “representing the perversion of the legitimate use of the
process.” Simone, $44 F.2d at 1036—37 (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs claim meets
this criterion, as he has alleged that Ridgefield Park Defendants arrested him, thus initiating
process; took the further action of maliciously and intentionally misrepresenting the facts
surrounding his arrest; and withheld information regarding the source of the anonymous tip from
court officials and prosecutors in order to detain and prosecute Plaintiff. (FAC

¶

132, 147).

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Ridgefield Park Defendants acted with the ulterior motive of

framing Plaintiff and hiding their own allegedly unlawful conduct and lack of probable cause.
(FAC

¶JJ

132, 14$). These allegations, when accepted as true at this stage of the proceedings, are

sufficient to show aprimafacie case of abuse of process, and for Count III to survive dismissal.
c. Malicious Prosecution
In order to state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish that: “(I) the
defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiffs favor;
(3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75. $2 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate ofSmith v. Marasco,
31$ F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003)). The initiation of a proceeding can be shown by a police officer
providing misleading or false information to a prosecutor or court official. Hector v. Watt, 235
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 13$, 147 (2d Cir.
1999)); see also At-Mohammedi v. City of Buffrito, 13-CV-1020, 2016 WL 1748264, at *8

15

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (“Initiation or continuation of a proceeding may also be shown where
an arresting officer creates false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forwards that
information to prosecutors, or withholds relevant and material information.”) (citing Townes, 176
f.3d at 147).
Here, Plaintiff has pled all the elements for aprimafacie claim for malicious prosecution.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his prosecution was initiated without probable cause because
Lasch’s information was biased against Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned pending
trial as a result of the prosecution. (FAC

¶

114, 118, 129, 132). Plaintiff also alleges that the

criminal proceedings in the Bergen County Superior Court ended in his favor when the charges
were dismissed without explanation. (FAC

¶J 133—34).

Plaintiff further alleges that Ridgefield

Park Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs arrest was based on a noncredible source, and that
they maliciously and intentionally did not reveal this fact to the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office. (FAC

¶J 40, 66,

88, 112, 129). Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all the elements

for aprimafacie claim of malicious prosecution, the Court will not dismiss Count IV.
d. Failure to Intervene
“If a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a
constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer is
directly liable under Section 1983.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986)). An officer is liable only “if there is a realistic
and reasonable opportunity to intervene.” Id. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint meets this standard.
Ridgefield Defendants were police officers at the time of Plaintiffs arrest and prosecution. (FAC

¶J

8—9).

Plaintiff alleges that Ridgefield Park Defendants knew that they lacked sufficient

probable cause which imposed a duty on them to intervene in his unjustified arrest and prosecution.

16

(FAC

¶] 67,

161). Plaintiff fm-ther alleges his unjustified arrest and prosecution was in violation

of his constitutional rights, and Ridgefield Park Defendants’ participation in the investigation gave
them a reasonable opportunity to intervene. (FAC

¶J 92—93,

99). finally, at no time did the

Ridgefield Park Defendants actually intervene in the supposedly unjustified arrest and prosecution
of Plaintiff. (FAC ¶Jj 92—93. 132). Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all the necessary
elements for aprimaftcie case of failure to intervene.
e.

Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff also alleges a cause of action for conspiracy under federal and state law. (FAC
164—172). “To demonstrate a conspiracy under

§

¶J

1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more

conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of
law.” Par/c-way Garage, Inc. v. CTh’ ofPhi/a., 5 f.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotingAdickes v.
S.ff Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), abrogated on other grounds hr United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Titp. of Warrington, PA. 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003). Under New
Jersey law, a civil conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit
an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principle element of which is
an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt
act that results in damage.” Banco Poptdar

iM

Am. v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 263 (N.J. 2005)

(quoting Morgan v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen freeholders, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 364 (App. Div.
1993), superseded by stcttute on other grounds as stated in Michaets v. State ofNi, 955 F. Supp.
315

).

Due to the circumstantial nature of the evidence in such cases, “the question whether an

agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a
possibility that the jury can infer from the circumstances [that the alleged conspirators] had a

17

meeting of the minds and tluis reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.”
Morgan,

26$ N.J. Super. at 365 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the PSP, BCDS, and Ridgefield Park Defendants acted in
concert to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant DeSantis informed Ridgefield Park Defendants that the anonymous tip was actually
based on the statements of Lasch, a non-credible source. (FAC

¶

67, 8$, 107). Despite this

knowledge, Ridgefield Park Defendants acted in concert with the PSP and BCDS to arrest Plaintiff,
and hide their lack of probable cause from the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office by claiming that
the improper information was obtained through an anonymous email tip. (FAC

¶ 40,

112, 116,

132). Plaintiff also alleges that Ridgefield Park Defendants were complicit in framing Plaintiff
(ECf No. 65 at 19; see also FAC

¶J 75,

92, 94 (stating that the Ridgefield Park Defendants did

not obtain other evidence and knew where the crate of guns was located)). These actions led to
Plaintiffs prosecution and deprived him of constitutionally protected rights, including his right to
liberty. (FAC

¶J

118—19, 171). Thus, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that

Ridgefield Park Defendants and at least one other Defendant jointly decided to deprive Plaintiff of
his rights by unlawful means and took overt actions to accomplish their goal.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff has pled a prima facie cause of action for conspiracy.

f Untawfid Policy, Custom, and Supervision
Plaintiff asserts a claim of unlawful policy, custom, and supervision against Defendant
Village of Ridgefield Park but not against Defendant Morton, (FAC at p. 31), and therefore the
Court will discuss only Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park in this section. For Count VII,
[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those

18

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the govermnent as an entity is responsible under § 1 983.
Monell v. Dep ‘t of Soc. Serv. of Cite ofA’ Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Supreme Court has
stated that Monell liability oniy attaches “where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 482 (1986).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park is vested with supervisory
authority and is responsible for the policy and training of its officers. (FAC

¶

174). Furthenuore,

Plaintiff alleges that the policies and training provided by Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park
permitted Defendants in this case to engage in improper and/or unlawful conduct by arresting and
framing Plaintiff, and that Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park does not have an adequate policy
regarding the investigation of said conduct. (FAC

¶

176—77). Defendant Village of Ridgefield

Park supposedly cultivated and enforced a policy and culture that allowed its officers to abuse the
rights of civilians, based on Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park’s failure to discipline, sanction,
and/or terminate offending officers. (FAC

JJ

178—80).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park was “aware of
numerous police-citizen encounters” in which its officers “customarily and frequently subjected
citizens to baseless arrests,
investigation[s]

.

.

.

.

.

.

intentionally, recklessly and/or negligently misrepresented facts of

falsified police and/or other official reports,” and made “false or misleading

statements to judges, prosecutors and court personnel.” (FAC ¶ 178. 180). Despite its awareness
of this conduct, Defendant Village of Ridgefield Park had a custom or practice of failing to
investigate, covering up, or otherwise ignoring said conduct. (FAC

¶

1 76). Though the Court is

aware that Plaintiffs allegations are broad, they sufficiently support the kind of systemic violation
required for a Monet! claim, and any further inquiry into their validity should be reserved for a
19

later stage of the litigation, i.e., summary judgment. Therefore, when taking these alLegations as
true at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a

prima

fctcie claim for

unlawful policy, custom, and supervision in order to survive dismissal.
g. Substantive Due Process
The fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 1, guarantees that
“[n]o State shall

.

.

.

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

A substantive due process violation is the deprivation of a protected interest involving an abuse of
official power that “shocks the conscience.” See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v.

iip.

of

Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2003). One such protected interest is fundamental rights,
which include those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as well as certain liberty and privacy interests
implicitly protected by the Due Process Clause.

Washington, 521 U.S. at 720. n this case,

Plaintiff asserts that he was deprived his fundamental right to liberty by being falsely arrested and
prosecuted for an offense he did

not commit.

(FAC

¶J

170—71, 198—200). furthermore, Plaintiff

claims that Ridgefield Park Defendants acted in a way that “shocks the conscious” by participating
in a conspiracy to hide their lack of probable cause and fabricating evidence to support Plaintiffs
arrest and prosecution. (FAC

¶ 40,

132, 200). These allegations are sufficient to support a claim

that Plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest in violation of his due process rights, and for the
Court to conclude that Count IX should survive dismissal.
3. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendant Morton asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 462 at 14). Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established

...

constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Ha;-low v. fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For qualified

20

immunity to

attach, an official must demonstrate his conduct was objectively reasonable. Id. at

818—19.
At this juncture, Plaintiffs allegations in support of his claims under

§

1983 and the

NJCRA are sufficient at this time to overcome Defendant Morton’s assertion of qualified
irnmttnity.

At all times alleged, Defendant Morton was a detective with the Ridgefield Park Police

and, therefore, was acting under color of law. (FAC

¶ 8).

As established above, supra Section

111.2, Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted that he was framed, alTested, detained, and prosecuted
based on Defendant Morton hiding the fact that the anonymous tip was actually provided by a
known and noncredible source who was biased against Plaintiff, in violation of various
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. These rights, including but
not limited to Plaintiffs right to liberty, were clearly established at the time of the alleged
violations. (FAC

¶J

197—98). Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that Defendant Morton,

as a police officer, was aware of Plaintiffs right not to be arrested without probable cause or
prosecuted based on improper evidence.

Regardless of this knowledge, Defendant Morton

allegedly purposefully hid the noncredible source of the anonymous tip from the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office in order to detain Plaintiff. (FAC

¶ 40,

112, 116, 132). These allegations,

when taken as true, are sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that DeSantis acted in an
unreasonable manner toward Plaintiff and beyond the scope of his role as a police officer.
Therefore, the Court finds that such allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendant Morton’s
Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity.
B. Defendant DeSantis

As an initial matter, neither party asserts that general personal jurisdiction can be satisfied
in this case. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has made a prima fricie

21

showing of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant DeSantis. Defendant DeSantis argues
that, as a nonresident of New Jersey, the mere act of passing along information to police in the
fonun state, with no further contact, is not enough to subject him to specific personal jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 47-2 at 9). Plaintiff responds that Defendant DeSantis’ communication of false and
misleading information and participation in a conspiracy to frame Plainti ff at the very least satisfies
the alternative test for personal jurisdiction originally expressed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
790 (1984) (“Catder effects test”). (ECf No. 66 at 1).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to show that the Court has
personal jurisdiction over Defendant DeSantis pursuant to the C’cttder effects test. Under the
Colder effects test, a court can be found to have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
if the plaintiff establishes:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the
forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by
the plaintiff as a result of that tort;
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the
tortious activity.
IMO Inthis., 155 F.3d at 265—66. The Calder effects test can be applied to

§ 1983 claims. See

Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2007); see also CTh’ of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (“there can be no doubt that claims brought pursuant
to

§ 1983 sound in tort.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant DeSantis participated in a conspiracy to hide his

lack of probable cause for Plaintiffs arrest and prosecution, and is therefore liable for several
violations of § 1983 and NJLAD. including but not limited to malicious prosecution, conspiracy,
failure to intervene, and due process. (FAC ¶ 139—202). New Jersey appears to be the focal point

of the ham-i suffered by Plaintiff, as he was arrested, prosecuted, detained, denied information, and
had his charges dismissed in New Jersey. (FAC ¶j 81, 116, 11$, 133—34). Defendant DeSantis
aimed his conduct at the forum state by reaching out to the Ridgefleld Park Police and forwarding
the information that led to the investigation and eventual prosecution of Plaintiff. (FAC ¶j 52—
55). Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant DeSantis intentionally misrepresented the
forwarded information and withheld the source of the anonymous tip from the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office, despite having multiple interactions with the BCDS and the Ridgefield Park
Police during the course of the investigation. (FAC

¶ 40—41,

47—50, 52—55, 66, 111—112, 132).

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the guns were planted at his work station in New Jersey by the
BCSD and Ridgefield Park Police, which scheme Defendant DeSantis supposedly orchestrated
and supervised. (FAC

¶J 68—70).

Defendant DeSantis argues that courts in the Third Circuit have ruled against a finding of
personal jurisdiction in cases that involved more contact with the forum state than the contact
alleged here. (ECF No. 47-2 at 10—il). In the first case Defendant DeSantis cites to, Turner v.
Boyle, Civil Action No. 12-7224(SRC), 2013 WL 1409903, at *12 (D.N.J. April 8, 2013), the
plaintiff, Turner, was held in a New Jersey jail for five days without bail before being tried in
Connecticut for inciting injury to persons or property based on comments he made about
Connecticut governi-nent officials on his New Jersey radio show. Turner brought suit in New
Jersey for the five days he spent in a New Jerseyj all without bail against, inter a/ia, the Connecticut
police officers who faxed the arrest warrant to New Jersey, but the District Court found that faxing
the arrest warrant to New Jersey did not establish minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Id.
at *4 In the second case Defendant DeSantis relies

on,

Bush

i.

Adams, Civil Action No. 07-4936,

200$ WL 4791647, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 200$), the Court found that “[m]erely obtaining an

23

alTest walTant for someone who is known to be in another state is not sufficient to subject the
officer obtaining the warrant to personal jurisdiction in that state.” InBttsh, Virginia potice officers
obtained an arrest walTant based on false information from a Virginia Court on Virginia charges,
and contacted Pennsylvania authorities to execute the atTest warrant in Pennsylvania. 2008 WL
4791647, at *13
Contrary to Defendant DeSantis’ argument, and unlike the case currently before the Court,
the majority of the conduct in Turner and Bits/i took place outside of the forum states. In Turner,
2013 WL 1409903, at *l_2, the charges, warrant, court proceedings, and confinement all

commenced not in the forum state but rather in Connecticut.

Similarly, in Bush, 2008 WL

4791647, at *13, the false infonnation was received, the walTant was obtained, and the charges
were brought in Virginia, not the forum state of Pennsylvania. As discussed above, all of the

activity in the current case arose in the forum state (i.e., New Jersey), including the investigation,
arrest, charges, detention, and prosecution of Plaintiff (FAC

¶

81, 116—118, 133—34). Unlike

the defendants in Turner and Bush, Defendant DeSantis did not obtain an arrest warrant for
Pennsylvania charges, but assisted the Ridgefield Park Police and BCSD in allegedly framing,
arresting, and prosecuting Plaintiff in New Jersey for charges brought pursuant to New Jersey law,
and misrepresented the information which gave rise to same. (See generally FAC). Insomuch as
the above conduct was aimed at and arose in New Jersey, the Court concludes that Defendant

DeSantis could have reasonably anticipated being brought into a court in this forum to litigate
Plaintiffs claims. See World-Wide Volkswagen Coip. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established personal jurisdiction over Defendant
DeSantIs, and denies both of Defendant DeSantis’ motions.5

Although Cross-Claimants did not respond to Defendant DeSantis Motion to Dismiss their Cross-Claims, said
motion is based on the same reasoning as Defendant DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
24

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Ridgefield Park Defendants and Defendant DeSantis’
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Defendant DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss
the Cross-Claims against him are hereby denied, with the exception that Plaintiffs excessive bail
claim shall be dismissed as time-barred. An appropriate Order follows this

Dated: August

Opinion.

S, 2018.

United States District Court

(See general/v ECE No. 6$). Therefore, both of Defendant DeSantis’ Motions are denied for the reasons already
expressed by the Court.

25