FESTA v. FLOWERS et al
Filing
56
OPINION & ORDER; that Plaintiff's motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 48) is GRANTED; that Defendants' first motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 49) is GRANTED; that Defendants' second motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 50) is GRANTED; t hat Defendants' third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; that, as to the challenge to Plaintiff's negligent hiring claim, Defendants' third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is DENIED; th at, as to the challenge to Crandall's testimony regarding Flowers' prior driving incidents, Defendants' third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is GRANTED; that Defendants' fourth motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 52) is GRANTED; that the expert testimony of Robert Crandall will not be admitted at trial.. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 6/22/2022. (ld, )
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JESSICA FESTA,
v.
DETRAI FLOWERS et al.,
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:
:
Plaintiff, :
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:
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Defendants. :
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Civil Action No. 17-5327 (SRC)
OPINION & ORDER
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter has come before the Court on the motions in limine filed by both Plaintiff,
Jessica Festa (“Festa”), and Defendants, Detrai Flowers (“Flowers”) and First Fleet Inc. (“FFI”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ third in limine motion
will be granted in part and denied in part, and all other in limine motions will be granted.
I. Plaintiff’s motion in limine
Plaintiff filed one in limine motion which raises four issues. First, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants have no evidence that that Plaintiff fell asleep at the wheel and should not be allowed
to argue that she did. In opposition, Defendants agree that there is no evidence that Plaintiff was
intoxicated, and they will not argue differently at trial. Defendants argue that there is, however,
evidence that Plaintiff was fatigued at the time of the accident, which they will argue at trial.
Defendants point to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she had been awake for approximately
20 hours at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argues that this evidence is more prejudicial than
probative of the issue of whether Plaintiff had fallen asleep at the wheel, and that there is no
evidence that Plaintiff had fallen asleep at the wheel at the time of the accident. This Court
agrees with Plaintiff: there is no evidence that Plaintiff had fallen asleep at the wheel at the time
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of the accident, and Defendants may not argue to the jury that she had fallen asleep. As to
Plaintiff’s first issue, the motion in limine will be granted.
The parties have reached agreement on the second through fourth issues raised in
Plaintiff’s motion in limine: 2) Defendants agree that their accident reconstruction expert cannot
offer opinion or testimony about statements heard on dashcam video taken by the police, nor
opinions on Plaintiff being intoxicated; 3) unpaid medical expenses will be calculated using the
UCR schedule; and 4) Defendants will not argue to the jury that Plaintiff had a collateral source
able to pay her medical bills. Therefore, as to all four issues, Plaintiff’s motion in limine will be
granted.
II. Defendants’ motions in limine
Defendants filed four separate in limine motions. The parties have resolved the dispute
as to the second motion: in the second motion, Defendants moved to bar Plaintiff’s expert
Andrew Gluck from testifying, and Plaintiff has stated that Gluck will not testify at trial. This
leaves three motions which address the testimony by Plaintiff’s expert, Robert Crandall.
In Defendants’ first motion, Defendants moved to bar Crandall’s testimony as to his
conclusions about Flowers. On page 27 of Crandall’s expert report, Crandall states nine
conclusions about Flowers. Defendants move to bar Crandall’s testimony as to all nine
conclusions, on three grounds: 1) his inferences about Flowers are not based on facts; 2) his
expert opinions about Flowers would not be helpful to the jury; and 3) he should not be allowed
to introduce Flower’s previous accidents and conclude that Flowers is “often careless.”
The Court has reviewed Crandall’s expert report and agrees that, as to the nine
conclusions about Flowers, Crandall’s testimony is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, which states:
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A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
As Defendants contend, Crandall’s opinions about Flowers’ role in causing the accident are not
based on sufficient facts or data. Crandall’s first five conclusions about Flowers generally relate
to the theory that the accident was caused by Flowers’ distracted and/or fatigued driving.
Crandall arrives at these conclusions largely by assuming that Festa’s account of the accident is
true, while Flowers’ account of the accident is false. Such information does not constitute
sufficient facts or data, nor are Crandall’s conclusions the product of a reliable method. Rather,
as to these five conclusions, Crandall’s method appears to be entirely biased and non-scientific.
Crandall’s testimony as to the first five conclusions about Flowers is inadmissible under Rule
702.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with Defendants that, as to the first five conclusions, the
real issue for the jury will be whether to believe Festa or Flowers as to the circumstances of the
accident, and that the jury will be able to hear the evidence and understand it without Crandall’s
assistance. The jury can decide who to believe by hearing the witnesses and applying common
sense; Crandall’s biased testimony will not help them determine this. To the extent that
Crandall offers testimony about relevant driving regulations, the jury is capable of understanding
the relevant driving regulations without the assistance of an expert.
On pages 24 and 25 of the Crandall Report, Crandall refers to two previous driving
incidents involving Flowers – an accident in 2013 and a driving violation in 2015, prior to
employment with FFI –, as well as a driving incident at work that occurred after Flowers was
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hired in 2016. Crandall relies on this evidence to make inferences about both Flowers and FFI.
Defendants argue that Crandall did not investigate the three previous incidents and has no
detailed information about the circumstances, beyond the fact that the incidents occurred. As
such, Defendants argue that Crandall lacks sufficient facts or data to make any inferences based
on these incidents. Moreover, Crandall uses these incidents to make assessments of Flowers’
character, concluding that Flowers is “often careless.” (Crandall Rpt. at 27.) Such an
assessment is a statement about Flowers’ character, offered to prove that Flowers acted in
accordance with this character in the accident at issue; this is prohibited by Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(a)(1). This Court agrees with Defendants that: 1) Crandall’s use of the three
driving incidents must be barred because Crandall lacks sufficient facts or data about the
incidents, and so his opinion does not meet the requirements of Rule 702(b); and 2) Crandall’s
inferences about Flowers’ character for carelessness are prohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a)(1).
None of Crandall’s conclusions about Flowers are admissible, and Crandall is barred
from giving opinions about Flowers.
Crandall’s Report next presents eight conclusions about Defendant First Fleet Inc. In
brief, these conclusions assert that FFI was negligent in hiring and supervising Flowers.
Crandall presents essentially two theories: 1) FFI was negligent in failing to investigate Flowers
and in failing to discover his previous driving incidents and felony convictions; and 2) FFI failed
to adequately supervise Flowers’ driving during his employment.
Defendants move to exclude Crandall’s conclusions about FFI on several grounds. In
their third in limine motion, Defendants raise two challenges: 1) Crandall’s conclusions about
negligent hiring should be excluded because Plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim fails to state a
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valid claim for relief; and 2) evidence about Flowers’ past accidents is inadmissible as character
evidence.
As to the first challenge in the third in limine motion, in opposition, Plaintiff argues
persuasively that such an argument is improper in a motion in limine and should be made as a
dispositive motion. This Court agrees. Should Defendants wish to pursue this argument, they
should raise it in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a motion for summary judgment. As to Defendants’
challenge to the negligent hiring claim itself, the third in limine motion will be denied.
As to the second challenge in the third in limine motion, concerning Crandall’s use of
Flowers’ previous driving incidents, Plaintiff’s opposition brief does not address or oppose the
argument. This Court construes this to be a concession that Defendants are correct and that
evidence about Flowers’ past driving incidents is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a)(1). As already discussed, Crandall lacks sufficient facts or data to make any inferences
about Flowers’ role or fault in these incidents, and thus has insufficient data to make inferences
based on them, which includes his inferences about FFI’s hiring of Flowers in the absence of an
investigation into these incidents. As to the second challenge in the third in limine motion,
concerning Crandall’s use of Flowers’ previous driving incidents, the third in limine motion will
be granted.
In their fourth in limine motion, Defendants move to exclude Crandall’s conclusions
based on Flowers’ past felony convictions. Flowers has admitted that he was convicted of
weapons possession in 2001 and drug distribution in 2002. Defendants argue that evidence of
these convictions should be excluded because it is more prejudicial than probative, and this
Court agrees: convictions for weapons possession and drug distribution from twenty years ago
have no relevance to the accident at issue, but would likely prejudice the jury against Flowers.
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Evidence of Flowers’ past felony convictions is inadmissible.
The combined effect of this Court’s decisions on Defendants’ first, third, and fourth in
limine motion excludes all of the conclusions stated in Crandall’s expert report. Crandall based
his conclusions on evidence that is either insufficient or inadmissible or both: Plaintiff’s account
of the accident, assumed to be true, and Flowers’ prior convictions and driving incidents. All of
the conclusions offered by Crandall are therefore inadmissible as well. The Court finds that this
leaves Crandall with nothing helpful to offer the jury. While Crandall may have knowledge of
various driving regulations, the jury does not need expert explanation of driving regulations to
understand the accident. Crandall is barred from offering opinions about any of the conclusions
stated in his expert report, and he will not be permitted to offer expert testimony at trial.
For these reasons,
IT IS on this 22nd day of June, 2022
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 48) is GRANTED; and
it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ first motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 49) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ second motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 50) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that, as to the challenge to Plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim, Defendants’
third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that, as to the challenge to Crandall’s testimony regarding Flowers’ prior
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driving incidents, Defendants’ third motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 51) is GRANTED; and
it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ fourth motion in limine (Docket Entry No. 52) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the expert testimony of Robert Crandall will not be admitted at trial.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J
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