SHAH v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. et al
Filing
189
OPINION. Signed by Judge Julien Xavier Neals on 6/29/2022. (ld, )
Case 2:17-cv-06298-JXN-MAH Document 189 Filed 06/29/22 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 8432
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FARKHAN MAHMOOD SHAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 17-6298 (JXN) (MAH)
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on an appeal from Magistrate Judge Michael A.
Hammer’s Order [ECF No. 168] denying Vano I. Haroutunian’s and Ballon Stoll P.C.’s
(collectively, “Plaintiff’s counsel”) motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff Farkhan Mahmood
Shah (“Plaintiff”) [ECF No. 152]. The Court reviewed all submissions and considered the motion
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule
78.1(b). For the reasons discussed herein, Judge Hammer’s Order [ECF No. 168] is AFFIRMED
and Plaintiff’s appeal [ECF No. 169] is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual background and procedural
history in this matter and summarizes only those facts necessary to decide the instant appeal. 1 On
October 8, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel filed the instant motion to be relieved as counsel, ECF No.
152, which was not opposed by Plaintiff or Defendant American Airlines, see ECF Nos. 160-61,
1
For a fuller recitation of the facts and procedural history, please see Judge Hammer’s Order at
ECF No. 168.
Case 2:17-cv-06298-JXN-MAH Document 189 Filed 06/29/22 Page 2 of 4 PageID: 8433
163. On December 6, 2021, Judge Hammer denied Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion without prejudice.
See ECF No. 168. In so doing, Judge Hammer held that “Plaintiff will be substantially and
materially prejudiced if Counsel is permitted to withdraw because it is unclear Plaintiff will be
able to retain new counsel at this stage in the litigation[.]” See id. (citing McDaniel v. Daiichi
Sankyo, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 427, 431 (D.N.J. 2018); see also Rusinow, 920 F. Supp. at 72). Judge
Hammer also determined that “withdrawal may cause a lengthy delay in the resolution of
Plaintiff’s claims, even if Plaintiff is able to find new counsel, due to Plaintiff’s new
representatives having to familiarize themselves with the factual and procedural background of
this now four-year-old case[.]” Id. (citing Cuadra v. Univision Commc’ns, Inc., Civ. No. 09-4946,
2012 WL 1150833, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2012)).
Plaintiff timely appealed Judge Hammer’s Order asserting, among other things, that his
motion will provide proof that Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant American Airlines, and the “Clerk
of Court Peter” conspired to “deprive due process under Color of Law.” See ECF No. 169-1 at 5.
Defendants have not opposed this motion, which is ripe for the Court to decide.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Magistrate judges may hear non-dispositive motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).
A district court may reverse a magistrate judge’s
determination of a non-dispositive motion only where it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1992). A ruling is
clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Dome
Petroleum Ltd. v. Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 131 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.N.J. 1990) (quoting
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (internal quotations omitted). An
2
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order is contrary to law “when the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied the applicable
law.” Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 548 (D.N.J. 2006). “A district
judge’s simple disagreement with the magistrate judge’s findings is insufficient to meet the clearly
erroneous standard of review.” Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 59, 68
(D.N.J. 2000).
III.
DISCUSSION
Unless other counsel is substituted, counsel may withdraw only with leave of court. L.
Civ. R. 102.1. 2 Permission to withdraw is entirely within the discretion of the court, and a court
may, therefore, refuse to allow withdrawal despite a showing of good cause. See McKowan Lowe
& Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., No. CIV. 94-5522RBK, 2005 WL 6269793, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2005)
(citing Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(c)). In deciding whether to permit withdraw of counsel,
the court should look to four guiding factors: (1) the reasons withdrawal is sought; (2) the prejudice
withdrawal may cause to other litigants; (3) the harm withdrawal might cause to the administration
of justice; and (4) the degree to which withdrawal will delay the resolution of a case. Rusinow v.
Kamara, 920 F.Supp. 69 (D.N.J. 1996).
Judge Hammer carefully evaluated each of these four criteria to determine that Plaintiff’s
counsel’s reasons for withdrawal were inadequate, particularly in light of the relevant equitable
considerations. As Judge Hammer noted, “Plaintiff’s counsel’s withdrawal, at this time, would
significantly impair Plaintiff’s ability to defend the already fully briefed summary judgment
motion, and his ability to maintain the action because of the complexity of Plaintiff’s claims and
the disputed legal issues.” ECF No. 168 at 4. The Court agrees. Moreover, Judge Hammer found
Local Civil Rule 102.1 reads in full: “Unless other counsel is substituted, no attorney may withdraw an appearance
except by leave of Court. After a case has been first set for trial, substitution and withdrawal shall not be permitted
except by leave of Court.” L. Civ. R. 102.1.
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that these considerations weighed strongly against granting Plaintiff’s counsel’s leave to withdraw.
This determination was well within the court’s discretion and was neither clearly erroneous nor
contrary to law. Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that this
decision was clearly erroneous, Judge Hammer’s Order is affirmed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal [ECF No. 169] from the decision of the Magistrate
Judge is DENIED, and the order of the Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 168] is AFFIRMED. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
s/ Julien Xavier Neals
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
DATED: June 29, 2022
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