DODARD v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 12/12/17. (cm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH ARUANNO,
Civil Action No. 15-7982 (MCA)
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DR. MERRILL MAIN, et al.,
Defendants.
ARLEO, United States District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter has been opened to the Court by Plaintiff Joseph
Aruanno’s filing of a
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) in the above-titled
action. (ECF No. 7.) He currently
resides at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in Avene
l, New Jersey. He has sued the Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey and Dr. Merrill Main,
alleging violations of his constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to alleged inadeq
uacy of sex offender treatment and other
conditions at the STU. For the reasons explained in this
Memorandum Opinion, the Court will
dismiss the SAC in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Because the Court
previously dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 8,
and in light of Plaintiffs pro se status,
the Court will provide Plaintiff with a final opportunity
to amend his complaint before the Court
dismisses his
II.
§ 1983 claims with prejudice.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGR
OUND
This is Plaintiff’s second attempt to amend his Complaint.
The Court previously granted
Plaintiff’s application for informa pauperis status pursua
nt to 28 U. S.C.
§ 1915. (ECF No. 3.)
In that same Order and accompanying Memorandum, the
Court also screened the Complaint for
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sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B) and determined that the Complaint failed
to provide a short and plain statement of his claims or plead
enough facts, accepted as true, to
plausibly suggest that he entitled to relief. (ECF No. 2, Memo
randum Opinion at 3 (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a); Gibney v. Fiizgibbon, 547 F. Appx 111, 113
(3d Cir. 2013)). The Court
therefore dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and
permitted Plaintiff to submit an
amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of the
Order accompanying the Court’s
Memorandum Opinion. (See Id; see also ECF No. 3.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No.
4), which the Court again
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
191 5(e)(2)(B) for failure to comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and for failure to provide sufficient facts
to suggest that he is entitled to
relief. (ECF Nos. 5-6.) The Court again provided Plaintiff
with the opportunity to file a Second
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has filed a SAC (ECF No. 7),
which the Court now screens for
dismissal.
The SAC raises four ‘Points” that appear to respond to the
Court’s Memorandum
Opinion dismissing his Amended Complaint. In Points I and
IV, Plaintiff states that he is
attempting to bring a
§
1983 claim and requests the appointment of counsel. (ECF No.
7, SAC at
3-4. 7.) In Point II, Plaintiff states that the State decided to
commit him to the STU two years
before he completed his sentence, but failed to provide him
with sex offender treatment during
the last two years of his prison sentence. (SAC at 4.) In Point
III, Plaintiff states that he is
attempting to bring a claim pursuant to Thomas v. Adams,
55 F. Supp.3d 552 (2014). He also
states that he has been denied treatment “many times.” As
an example of the denial of treatment,
Plaintiff states that at his sentencing in the Superior Court,
the state argued that he needed
treatment, but it was not ordered by the sentencing court. The
sentencing court then
2
“contradicted itself’ by placing Plaintiff in the
STU at the end of his sentence. Plaintiff furth
er
states that “there is not any valid treatment at
the STU” and that his confinement is “purely
punitive[.J” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff has also submitted a typewritten Exhi
bit A, which lists 10 points for the Court’s
consideration.
In Point 1, Plaintiff states that he has requested
one-on-one treatment but has been told in
writing that it is not available at the STU. (ECF
No. 7-I, at 1.)
In Point 2. Plaintiff states that he won a trivia
tournament and a female staff member at
the STU gave Plaintiffs prize a watch to a
person with whom she was having a sexual
relationship. Plaintiff states that this discourag
es him from participating. (Id.)
—
—
In Point 3, Plaintiff states that he attempted to
participate in recreation, by playing in the
band and buying his own drum set, which was
broken by unnamed “Defendants”. At some poin
t
in 2014, Plaintiff played on “BANDNIGHT”
but the snacks that were to be provided were give
n
to others. (Id.)
In Point 4, Plaintiff states that he is unable to parti
cipate in in educational programs
because he is allegedly in treatment refusal. (Id.)
In Point 5, Plaintiff states that one of his regular
groups is run by a doctor who is a
defendant in a personal lawsuit Plaintiff has filed
. Plaintiff states that he informed the
Administration, but they continue to assign Plain
tiff to groups with Dr. Eiser. This individual
allegedly interviewed Plaintiff about an incident
where Plaintiff warned he was being threatened
and permitted another assault to happen. (Id.)
In Point 6, Plaintiff alleges that the construction
of four therapy rooms should have taken
place before Plaintiff and other patients arrived
at the STU because there was noise and smoke
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from welding for an entire year. Plaintiff state
s that this environment was disruptive and harm
ful
psychologically. Plaintiff also states that he
was attempting to participate in a weekly trivia
event, the guards were watching television at
“full volume”. The guards allegedly refused to
turn down the television when asked, stating
IT WAS THE DAYROOM’. (Id. at 1-2.)
In Point 7, Plaintiff alleges that the new thera
py rooms are “barely used” despite the
settlement, which included an increase in week
ly groups. (Id. at 2.)
In Point 8, Plaintiff states that when he attempted
to reach the ombudsman appointed to
oversee the terms of the settlement, Plaintiff wait
ed almost a month with no response. When
Plaintiff confronted the ombudsman, he told
Plaintiff he did not receive his communications.
When Plaintiff brought unspecified issues to the
ombudsman’s attention, the ombudsman also
allegedly stated that there is “NOTHING HE
CAN DO” and he has failed to remedy unspecified
problems. (Id. at 2.)
In Point 9, Plaintiff states that he wrote to the appo
inted monitor, who replied but stated
that he could not contact Plaintiffs directly. The
appointed monitor forwarded Plaintiffs
complaints to an attorney who is allegedly respo
nsible for the settlement, which Plaintiff
describes as “flawed.” (Jd. at 2.)
Finally, in Point 10, Plaintiff states that from Dece
mber 2014-April 2015, recreational
activities were canceled at the STU while certain
staff members were being replaced. Plaintiff
states that there should have been no gap in recre
ational activities. (Id. at 2.)
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Here, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is subject
to screening under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing a motion to dism
iss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts first
separate the factual and legal elements of the claim
s, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as
4
true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210—11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable
inferences must be made in the plaintiffs favor.
See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The complaint mus
t also allege “sufficient factual matter” to show
that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPM
S Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings
drafted by pro se parties. Tucker v.
Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699 (RBKJKMW
), 2015 WL 6560645. at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29,
2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)). Such pleadings are “held to less
strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Id. Nevertheless, pro se litigants must
still allege facts, which if taken as true, will sugg
est the required elements of any claim that is
asserted. Id. (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). To do
so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted
as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to
relief” Gibney v. Firzgibbon. 547 F. Appx 111,
113 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)).
IV.
ANALYSIS
The Court construes Plaintiff’s SAC to attempt to raise
claims for relief under 28 U.S.C.
§
1983.1
142
Principally, Plaintiff appears to allege that he has
been denied the right to minimally
U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordin
ance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State..., subj
ects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or othe
r person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights,
5
adequate sex offender treatment while in prison and at the
STU and complains about other
conditions and incidents at the STU. The Court addresses
these claims below.
Plaintiff’s right to receive sex offender treatment is ground
ed in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Learner v. Fauver, 288
F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002). Tn
Learner, the Third Circuit held that, since the New Jersey’s
statutory scheme for sex offenders
was predicated on the inmate’s response to treatment, that
statutory regime created a
fundamental due process liberty interest in treatment. Id. at
545; accord Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.k. 346, 368—69 (1997) (inmates housed in prison-like
conditions must be afforded a
treatment comparable to that provided to other civilly commi
tted persons confined in treatment
units). Thus, under Third Circuit law, Plaintiff has a substa
ntive due process right in a treatment
facilitating his release prospects. See Roberts v. Velez, No.
CIV.A. 1 1—i 198 SDW, 2011 WL
2745939, at *8 (D.N.J. July 12, 2011); Miller v. Christie,
No. CIV.A. 10—2397 KSH, 2011 WL
941328, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2011) (finding that the Third
Circuit’s holding in Learner extends
to an involuntarily committed sex offender under New Jersey’
s SVPA); see also Thomas, 55 F.
Supp. 3d at 552 (finding that plaintiffs stated a Fourteenth Amend
ment claim against supervisory
officials). Under this standard, however, Defendants’ actions
in denying Plaintiff his statutory
right to treatment will be found unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment only if they
are so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience. See Wolfe
v. Christie, No. CIV.A. 10—
2083 PGS, 2010 WL 2925145, at *14 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010)
(citing Learner, 288 F.3d at 546—47
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress....
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violati
on of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that
the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
6
(substantive due process claim alleging inadequate treatment for committed sex offender “must
focus on the challenged abuse of power by officials in denying [the plaintiff] the treatment
regimen that was statutorily mandated and was necessary in order for his condition to improve,
and thus for him to advance toward release”); Traylor v. Lanigan, No. CV 16-7691(MCA), 2017
WL 2364189, at *6 (D.N.J. May 31, 2017) (same).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim based on the failure to provide him sex offender treatment
prison is barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions under
§ 1983. It is
well established that there is no independent statute of limitations for bringing a claim under 42
U.S.C.
§ 1983 in federal court. Instead, “the [forum] state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury” applies to claims filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Sameric Corp. ofDelaware, Inc. v.
Guy
ofPhiladelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1988). In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for a
civil rights claim under
§ 1983 is two years. Disque v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181,
1 89 (3d Cir. 2009).
Petitioner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and community supervision for life as
a sex offender on February 5, 1999. See Aruanno v. Sherrer, No. CIV.A.02-2446 JBS, 2005 WL
3588548, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2005), affd, 277 F. App’x 155 (3d Cir. 2008). In April 2004,
while Aruanno was still serving his prison sentence, the State of New Jersey filed a petition to
involuntarily commit Aruanno pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act
(“SVPA”), N.J.S.A.
§ 30:4-27.24 et seq. See Aruanno v. Hayman, 384 F. App’x 144, 145 (3d
Cir. 2010). Any claim based on the failure to provide him with sex offender treatment while in
prison is plainly time barred. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim related to the
failure to provide him with sex offender treatment when he was serving his prison sentence, the
Court will dismiss that claim with prejudice.
7
Petitioner may be able to bring a claim based on the denial of sex offender treatment in
the STU. Here, however, the SAC does not allege any plausible facts to suggest that Plaintiff has
been denied sex offender treatment altogether for any period(s)of time; nor does he allege that
his prescribed treatment has been denied, reduced, or changed for non-medical reasons. See e.g.,
Thomas v. Adams, 55 F. Supp. 3d 552, 576 (D.N.J. 2014) (“when a prescribed medical treatment
is denied, reduced, or changed for non-medical reasons, including financial, administrative or
logistical, the [denied or reducedi treatment suggests an act of deliberate indifference and
amounts to a violation of
...
substantive due process with regard to those mental patients whose
sole hope for release hinges on obtaining their prescribed” treatment); Cooper v. Sharp, No.
CIV.A. 10—5245 FSH, 2011 WL 1045234, at
*
15 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2011) (dismissing claim for
relief where Plaintiff alleged mere disagreement with treatment program rather than “a
categorical denial of therapy and treatment sessions”); see also Banda v. Adams, No. 16—1582,
2017 WL 76943, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2017) (“No claim of deliberate indifference is made out
where a significant level of care has been provided and all that is shown is that the civil detainee
disagrees with the health care provider’s professional judgment about what constitutes proper
care.”).
Plaintiffs SAC states in a conclusory manner that he has been denied treatment “many
times” and that “there is no valid treatment here[.]” (ECF No. 7, SAC at 6.) Because these
allegations are wholly conclusory in nature, the Court need not afford them the presumption of
truth. Plaintiff then provides “ten recent points” which are attached as Exhibit A to his SAC.
(Id.) Plaintiffs Exhibit A repeatedly mentions “the settlement”, presumably referring to A/yes v.
Main, Civil Action No. 01—789 (DMC), and appears to allege that the certain aspects of the
8
settlement have been violated. The Third Circuit, in its unpublished opinion affirming the
approval of the settlement, summarized Alves v. Main as follows:
[Alvesj commenced in 2001 when Plaintiff Raymond Alves filed a
pro se complaint against various New Jersey officials responsible
for his treatment at the STU. Alves argued, inter alia, that the STU
was unconstitutionally punitive because it failed to provide the
minimally adequate treatment that is required by Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 3 19—322, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28
(1982) and is necessary for a legitimate opportunity for release.
Over the course of the litigation, the case has evolved from Alves’
2001 pro se complaint into a class action. Further, different
individuals and groups of STU residents have joined the litigation,
such as groups represented by, respectively, Plaintiffs Alves,
Richard Bagarozy, and Michael Rasher.
Settlement negotiations began in 2005, after three years of
discovery, and in 2008 all parties were consolidated under the
Alves case. That same year, the parties reached an impasse in
settlement talks on the issue of adequate treatment. Counsel for
both the Plaintiffs and the State proposed their own preferred
experts. From this pooi the parties jointly recommended Dr. Judith
Becker, an expert proposed by the State. On April 3, 2008, the
District Court issued an order appointing Dr. Becker to serve as
Joint Neutral Expert and assist in the negotiations, and Dr. Becker
then submitted an extensive report suggesting a number of changes
to improve the treatment at the STU, based on her professional
opinion. The parties executed a formal Settlement Agreement in
February 2012, and the Settlement was approved by the District
Court on December 4, 2012. While the Agreement implements
many of Dr. Becker’s recommendations, it does not address certain
of her concerns.
A/yes v. Main, 559 F. App’x 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2014). The Plaintiffs who opposed the
settlement wanted certain recommendations from Dr. Becker’s report to be implemented. See
A/yes, 559 F. App’x at 154-55. Mr. Aruanno individually opposed the settlement. See id. at 156.
As the Third Circuit noted in affirming the settlement, there was “no determination of any
constitutional violations with regard to the STU” in connection with the settlement. Id. at 155.
Many of Plaintiff’s allegations relate to his dissatisfaction with the Alves settlement
and/or his belief that the settlement’s terms are not being implemented properly. (See ECF No.
9
7-1, Exhibit A at ¶j 1. 4, 7-9.) For instance, Plaintiff alleges that he has requested one-on-one
treatment, but has been told it is not available, despite the recommendation in Dr. Becker’s
report. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that he is not permitted to participate in educational
programs “addressed by Dr. Becker and the settlement” because he is in treatment refusal. (Id. at
¶ 4.)
Plaintiff also alleges that the therapy rooms are underutilized, despite the settlement, which
required an increase in group therapy. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Finally, Plaintiff explains that he has
contacted the ombudsman and the monitor overseeing the settlement regarding his complaints,
but has not received relief. (Id. at ¶J 8-9.)
Here, Plaintiffs dissatisfaction with the Alves settlement does not provide a basis for
relief under
§
1983 or amount to a denial of sex offender treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although Plaintiff appears to disagree with the treatment he is receiving at the
STU, he has not provided facts suggesting that his prescribed sex offender treatment has been
denied, reduced, or changed for non-medical reasons. Plaintiffs additional allegations regarding
diversion of snacks and prizes during recreational activities, denial of educational programs due
to his treatment refusal, underuse of new group therapy rooms, his assignment to group therapy
with a doctor he has sued in a personal lawsuit, and construction noise likewise do violate the
Constitution, and thus do not state claims for relief under
§
1983.
For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will dismiss the SAC
for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B). In light of Plaintiffs
pro se status, the Court will provide Plaintiff with a final opportunity to amend his complaint.
To the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his SAC, as described in this Memorandum
Opinion, Plaintiff may submit a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of the Order
accompanying this Memorandum Opinion. An Appropriate Order follows.
10
Made1ine
Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
Date:
11
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