INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY v. SCHNELLBACHER-SENDON GROUP, LLC et al
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION that the 16 Motion for Reconsideration is denied and that this action is Closed. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 7/11/2018. (sm)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY
INTERSTATE FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-11305 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
OPINION & ORDER
V.
SCHNELLBACHER-SENDON
GROUP, LLC; and AMERICAN
EMPIRE SURPLUS LINES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
LINARES, Chief District Judge
IT APPEARING THAT:
1.
The plaintiff insurer, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company (hereinafter,
“IFCC”), moves in effect pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(1) for reconsideration of an
Opinion and Order entered by this Court on January 29, 2018 (hereinafter, “the January
2018 Order”). (See ECF Nos. 16— 16-6.) IfCC’s insured, Schnellbacher-Sendon Group,
LLC (hereinafter, “the Insured”), opposes the motion. (ECF Nos. 17, 17-1, 19.) IFCC
has not filed a reply to the Insured’s opposition papers.
2.
This Court resolves the motion for reconsideration upon a review of the
papers and without oral argument. See L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, the
motion for reconsideration is denied.
3.
IFCC brought the instant action (hereinafter, “the Declaratory Judgment
Action”) in this Court for a judgment declaring that: (a) it need not defend or indemnify
the Insured in a New Jersey State Court action (hereinafter, “the State Construction
Action”) brought against the Insured to recover damages for alleged deficient
construction work; and (b) American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company
(hereinafter, “AESLIC”) is obligated to contribute to the Insured’s defense in the State
Construction Action. (ECF No. 1 (the complaint in the Declaratory Judgment Action);
ECF No. 1-2 (the complaint in the underlying State Construction Action filed under No.
L-13-4994 (N.J. Superior Court, Hudson County)).)
4.
The January 2018 Order dismissed the complaint without prejudice based
upon the doctrine of Brilihart abstention. (ECF No. 15 (discussing Wi/ton v. Seven falls
Company, 515 U.S. 277, 280—90 (1995), which reaffirmed the holding in Brilihart v.
Excess Insttrance Company, 316 U.S. 491 (1942)).) In doing so, this Court concluded
that any determination that it would issue in the Declaratory Judgment Action could
directly interfere and conflict with the decisions rendered by the New Jersey State Court
assigned to the State Construction Action. (Id.)
5.
This Court’s review of the New Jersey State Court docket reveals that IFCC
indeed reinstated the Declaratory Judgment Action against the Insured and AESLIC in
New Jersey State Court on February 15, 2018, and that the Declaratory Judgment Action
is being actively litigated there. See No. L- 18-651 (N.J. Superior Court, Hudson
County).
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6.
More than four months after this Court issued the January 2018 Order, and
more than three months after IFCC reinstated its Declaratory Judgment Action in New
Jersey State Court, IFCC moved for reconsideration of the January 2018 Order. (ECF
No. 16.)
7.
Pursuant to this Court’s Local Civil Rules, a motion for reconsideration
must be made within fourteen days of the entry of the order at issue. See L. Civ. R.
7.1(i). Here, IFCC did not file its motion for reconsideration until one hundred and thirty
days after the entry of the January 2018 Order. (ECF No. 16.) As a result, this Court is
authorized to deny the motion for being untimely. See D. Russo Inc. v. Chiesa, No. 122397, 2018 WL 2303790, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21, 2018) (denying a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds of being untimely).
8.
Notwithstanding this untimeliness, this Court nevertheless finds IFCC’s
motion for reconsideration to be without merit.
9.
A motion for reconsideration of a district court’s previous decision is meant
to be an extremely limited procedural vehicle. See Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
Ill F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000). District courts, which have the discretion to
consider motions for reconsideration, must grant such motions sparingly. See Caver v.
City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 258 (3d Cir. 2005); Cataldo v. Moses, 361 F. Supp. 2d
420, 433 (D.NJ. 2004). A movant seeking reconsideration must show: (a) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (b) the availability of new evidence that was previously
unavailable; or (c) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
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injustice. See Arrington v. McRae, 683 F. App’x 108, 109 (3d Cir. 2017); Max’s Seafood
Café ex ret. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
10.
A movant seeking reconsideration of a district court’s order may not seek to
relitigate old matters and may not raise arguments or present evidence that could have
been raised before the entry of the original order. See Borestsky v. Governor of7’.Li, 433
F. App’x 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2011); Dtcnktey v. Mellon mv ‘r Servs., 378 F. App’x 169, 172
(3d Cir. 2010).
11.
IFCC’s motion for reconsideration does not raise an intervening change in
the controlling law, any previously unavailable evidence, a clear error of law or fact, or
an instance of manifest injustice. Indeed, IFCC has duplicated most of its previous
arguments that were already addressed by this Court in the January 2018 Order. For
instance, IFCC argues again that this Court was barred from initially raising the issue of
Britihart abstention in a sita sponte Order to Show Cause. (Compare ECF No. 16-5 at 9—
18 (IFCC so arguing in support of its motion for reconsideration), with ECF No. 10 at
10—19 (IFCC so arguing in opposition to this Court’s earlier Order to Show Cause).)
Again, this Court holds that the exercise of Britthart abstention in a declaratory-judgment
action is discretionary. (ECF No. 15 at 2—4 (the Court holding the same in the January
2018 Order).) See also State Aatto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that discretionary authority to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a
declaratory-judgment action has been conferred upon the district courts, and that an
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absolute right to proceed in federal court with such an action has not been conferred upon
litigants).
12.
In addition, the Insured has made this Court aware of yet another related
action that is proceeding in New Jersey State Court, wherein the same Insured is seeking
insurance coverage from insurance companies other than IfCC pursuant to certain
indemnification agreements. (ECF No. 19 at 1—5 (the Insured arguing the same); see also
Id. at 7 (the complaint in the Insured’s separate New Jersey State Court action that is
proceeding under No. L-18-1154 (N.J. Superior Court, Hudson County)).) This state of
affairs further buttresses this Court’s conclusion that a detenriination by this Court in the
Declaratory Judgment Action could easily interfere or conflict with a decision issued by a
New Jersey State Court in a related case.
13.
IFCC raises one arguably new piece of evidence that was previously
unavailable. Specifically, IFCC argues that although this Court found that a trial in the
State Construction Action was imminent, said trial has yet to occur because the Insured
has surprisingly asserted certain defenses and counterclaims in the Declaratory Judgment
Action that have slowed the progress of the State Construction Action. (ECF No. 16 at
2—6 (IFCC arguing the same, and further contending that the Insured has raised defenses
such as failure to state a claim, failure to join necessary parties, estoppel, waiver, and
laches); ECF No. 16-5 at 4—8 (IFCC arguing the same); Id. at 13 (IFCC contending that
“[t]his Court should not reward [the Insured] for hiding in the weeds and remaining silent
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about its claims and defense[s]”); see also ECf No. 16-4 at 9—12 (the
portion of the
Insured’s answer setting forth its defenses).)
14.
However, the Insured counters in its opposition
notably, without
contradiction by IFCC in its brief in support of the motion for reconsideration or in a
reply
—
that the parties agreed to a delay in the filing of responsive pleadings in the
Declaratory Judgment Action as it proceeded in New Jersey State Court until after a
scheduled mediation conference. (ECF No. 17 at 8; see also ECF No. 17-1 at 26 (a soordered stipulation acknowledging that the parties agreed to delay the filing of responsive
pleadings pending the outcome of mediation).) In light of this agreement, this Court
holds that IFCC cannot reasonably argue that the Insured’s later-filed responsive
pleadings contained information that was surprising or newly available. Indeed, the
Insured’s choice to defend itself in the Declaratory Judgment Action by asserting
common defenses after IFCC reinstated the action in New Jersey State Court should have
been expected, and that choice can hardly be construed as being tantamount to a surprise.
15.
This Court’s own review of the docket for the State Construction Action
also reveals that although the trial therein had been adjourned, the trial has been
rescheduled for September 2018. See No. L-4994-l3 (N.J. Superior Court, Hudson
County). Thus, a trial still remains imminent.
16.
Therefore, this Court denies IFCC’s motion for reconsideration. See
Jackson v. CTh’ ofPhi/a., 535 F. App’x 64, 69 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the propriety of the
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district court’s denial of a reconsideration motion because the movant “did not argue any
of the limited grounds for reconsideration”). For good cause shown:
IT IS THEREFORE on this
//_
day of July, 2018, ORDERED
that the motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 16) is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that this action is CLOSED.
JO EL. LIN’ARES V
/efJude United States District Court
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