ST. CLAIRE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.

Filing 5

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 1/25/18. (cm, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHARIF ST. CLAIRE,

Civil Action No. 17-11848 (JLL)

Plaintiff,
OPINION

V.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et a!.,
Defendants.

LINARES, Chief District Judge
Currently before the Court is the amended complaint (ECF No. 4) of Plaintiff Sharif St.
Claire raising claims against various prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. As the Court

has previously granted Plaintiff informapauperis status (see ECF No. 3), this Court is required to
screen his amended complaint pursuant to 2$ U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(3). Pursuant to the statute, this

Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims if they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief,
or seek damages from a defendant who is immune. For the reasons set forth below, this Court
will dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint as time barred.

I.

BACKGROUND

This Court summarized the Plaintiffs basic factual contentions in its previous opinion as
follows:
Plaintiff, Sharif St. Claire, is a former state prisoner. (ECF
No. 1 at 2-3). According to Plaintiff, he was placed back into prison
based on a violation of parole on August 25, 2012. (Id. at 3).

Plaintiff asserts that, upon his incarceration, he informed prison
officials of mental health issues which he had suffered throughout his
life, which apparently included depression and schizophrenia. (Id.).
In September 2012, Plaintiff began to hear voices whose commands
were “uncontrollable,” leading to him fighting with other inmates.
(Id.). Plaintiff told medical staff about the voices, but received no
treatment. (Id.). He was thereafter moved to solitary confinement
While there, Plaintiff
(Id.).
following the fighting charge.
continued to tell prison officials that he was hearing voices, and
began to display odd behavior, ultimately resulting in his being
moved to a different facility and placed under video monitoring.
(Id.).
Plaintiff thereafter suffered a further mental break, repeatedly
asked for help and received none, and began exhibiting serious
psychological issues, resulting in his being moved to the Anne Klein
forensic Center in October 2012. (Id. at 5). While in Anne Klein,
Plaintiff continued to deteriorate and received little in the way of real
treatment. (Id. at 6-7). Plaintiff states that, after his mental issues
went untreated, he was sent back to prison in November 2012, where
he was threatened and mistreated by guards, continued to receive no
medication or treatment for his mental issues, and continued to
deteriorate mentally. (Id. at 7-8). A week later, he was moved to a
dry cell, abused, and attacked by prison guards. (Id. at 8).
According to Plaintiff, the abuse he suffered and lack of treatment
resulted in his suffering a stroke, after which he was moved to a
hospital for treatment including emergency brain surgery. (Id. at 9).
At the hospital, he was apparently told that he was badly dehydrated,
and was lucky to have survived. (Id.).
Plaintiff was thereafter sent back to prison in Trenton. (Id.
at 9-10). Plaintiff continued to be mistreated and to not receive
proper mental health treatment, but was moved to Northern State
Prison ninety days later. (Id. at 10). In April 2013, Plaintiff again
reported hearing voices and suffered a mental breakdown, resulting
in his being placed back under video monitoring. (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff continued to act out based on his mental problems for
another twenty five days. (Id.). Because Plaintiffs issues did not
abate, he was then moved back to Anne Klein, where he finally
7

received mental health treatment and medication, which apparently
caused his mental health issues to abate. (Id.). Based on the facts
alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, it appears that all of the mistreatment
and abuse he alleges he suffered occurred in 2012 and 2013, and that
he began receiving proper treatment in mid-2013. (Id. at 11-13).
(ECF No. 2 at 1-3).
On November 2$, 2017, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs original complaint in this matter
without prejudice as time barred. (ECF No. 2-3). A month later, Plaintiff filed his amended
complaint.

(ECF No. 4).

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff essentially repeats the factual

assertions of his original complaint.

(Id.).

In addition to these factual allegations, however,

Plaintiff also uses his amended complaint to assert that he has suffered from various mental
illnesses throughout his life, has continued to suffer mental illness since he became cogent again
in 2013, and was hospitalized for a few weeks in late 2017 because of his mental illness. (ECF
No. 4 at 3-5). Plaintiff provides various documents that he asserts establish his continual state of
mental illness, and through these documents argues that his statute of limitations should be tolled
because of mental illness. (Id.; see also Documents 1-2 attached to ECf No. 4). Unfortunately
for Plaintiff, the documents he has submitted only concern two periods of time

—

when he was in

prison during the events in question, and during the period between May and December 2017
during which he was attending therapy and eventually became hospitalized. (Id.). Although the
documents do suggest that Plaintiff suffers from schizophrenia, and has suffered for many years,
they also state that his symptoms abate to some extent when he is properly medicated, and are
silent as to his mental state and ability to understand his rights between 2013 and May 2017.
(Documents 1-2 attached to ECF No. 4). Only two documents that Plaintiff has submitted cover

3

the period between 2013 and May 2017. In one, a doctor in East Orange states that Plaintiff has
received treatment since 2015, but is otherwise silent as to Plaintiffs ability to understand his
rights and recourses, and the other is a letter from Plaintiffs sister providing her personal opinion
that Plaintiff is “Mentally Incompetent.” (Id.). Although Plaintiff provides records showing that
he has been on medications since 2014, he provides no information that would suggest that his
being medicated affected his ability to understand his rights. (Id.).

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, district courts must review complaints in
those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma paztperis, see 2$ U.S.C.
1915(e)(2)(B), or seeks damages from a state employee, see 2$ U.S.C.

§

§ 1915A. The PLRA

directs district courts to sea sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. This action is subject to stia sponte screening for dismissal under 2$ U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff has been granted informapauperis status.
According to the United States Supreme Court’s decision inAshcroft v. Iqbal, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a fonnulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” 556 U.S. 662, 67$ (2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Corp.

V.

Twombty, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). To survive sea sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.

4

fouler v. UPiIv1C

Shadside, 57$ F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).’

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factttal content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” fair Wind Sailing,

Inc.

v. Dempster. 764 F.3d

303, 30$ n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67$). Moreover, while pro se pleadings
are liberally construed,

“pro se

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

B.

Analysis

As this Court explained in its prior opinion,
Plaintiff’s [amended] complaint presents various claims
arising under the Eighth Amendment including excessive force,
deliberate indifference to medical needs, and claims for failure to
treat his mental health issues. All of Plaintiff’s claims, however,
arise out of events which occurred between August 2012 and mid
2013. Actionsbroughtpursuantto42 U.S.C. § 1983 inNewJersey
are subject to a two year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Patvrak v.
Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013). “Under federal law,
a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run
when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon
which its action is based.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d
Cir. 2009).
In this matter, Plaintiff raises claims based on abuse and
failed treatments he received in 2012 and 2013. According to
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 2$
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
5

Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff recovered his faculties almost
“immediately” upon being transferred back to Anne Klein in mid20 13, and all of the events giving rise to his claims occurred before
that point. Plaintiff, then, was aware of his injuries at the latest in
mid-2013. Plaintiffs various claims had therefore accrued at that
time. Plaintiff, however, did not file his current complaint tintil
November 20, 2017, some four years later. (ECF No. 1; ECF
Docket Sheet). Because Plaintiffs claims accrued in 2013, his two
year limitations period expired more than two years before he filed
his complaint.
Because Plaintiffs claims accrued in 2013, Plaintiffs current amended

(ECF No. 2 at 4-5).

complaint would be time barred unless Plaintiff could establish some basis for the tolling of the
statute of limitations.
Because Section 1983 actions receive their limitations period from the forum state in which
the events in question occurred, in this case New Jersey, the “general nile is that state tolling
principles also govern

§ 1983 claims.” Kach, 589 f.3d at 639. Thus, state tolling principles are

applied unless those principles “contradict federal law or policy.” Id.: see also Lake v. Arnold,
232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff has presented no evidence that New Jersey’s
tolling principles are contrary to federal law or policy, this Court must apply state tolling principles
to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to tolling based on his rriental illness.

In New Jersey,

personal injury actions may have their statute of limitations tolled if the plaintiff “has a mental
disability that prevents the person from understanding his legal rights or commencing a legal action
at the time the cause of action.

.

.

accrues.” N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. Under those circumstances, the

statute does not resume running until the person has “the mental capacity to pursue the person’s
lawful rights.” Id.

Thus, it is not enough that a person suffers from mental illness, as he will

only be entitled to tolling where his mental illness is so severe that it deprives him of the ability to
6

understand his legal rights. Id.; see also Kelsey v. Cohen, No. A-5051-10T2, 2012 WL 1672889,
at *2 (N.J. App. Div. May 15, 2012) (to warrant tolling, a plaintiff must demonstrate “such a
condition of mental derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal
rights or instituting legal action”) (quoting Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 113
(1965)).
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that shows that he was so
mentally ill during the period between 2013 and November 2017 that he could not understand his
legal rights or institute legal action. Although Plaintiffs sister understandably may well believe
him to be mentally incompetent, her statement to that effect in her letter is little more than a bald
assertion, unsupported by explanation or sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff could not understand
his legal rights. The only factual assertions her letters provide are that she ensures Plaintiff takes
his medicines, that she helps him take care of his personal hygiene and diet, and that she believes
his mental state is worse now than before he entered prison. No real explanation is provided for
this conclusion, nor does this conclusion explain how Plaintiffs mental state deprives him of an
ability to understand his legal rights. Likewise, that Plaintiff continues to suffer from mental
illness, while regrettable, is insufficient in and of itself to show that he is entitled to tolling of the
limitations period

—

he must actually show that his illness inhibited his ability to understand his

rights and thus prevented him from filing. The information Plaintiff has provided fails to show
that Plaintiff was incapable of understanding his legal rights during the period between 2013 and
2017, indeed, the record Plaintiff has provided is devoid of information regarding Plaintiffs
mental capacity to understand his legal rights or institute an action during this approximately four

7

year period.

Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that he is so mentally ill that he cannot

understand his rights, and thus has not shown his entitlement to statutory tolling.
New Jersey law, however, also permits equitable tolling of the personal injury limitations
period. See Gttnset v. Marsh, No. 12-4735, 2013 WL 706195, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2013). The
New Jersey courts permit equitable tolling only where “the complainant has been induced or
tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing a filing deadline to pass,” the plaintiff was “in
some extraordinary way” prevented from asserting his rights, or where a plaintiff asserted his rights
in a timely fashion in either a defective manner or the wrong forum. Id.; see also freeman v.
State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 31 (N.J. App. Div. 2002), certif denied, 172 NJ. 17$ (2002).
“However, absent a showing of intentional inducement or trickery by a defendant, the doctrine of

equitable tolling should be applied sparingly and only in the rare situation where it is demanded
by sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice.” Gunset, 2013 WL 706195, at *3
(quoting freeman, 347 N.J. Super. at 31).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown trickery or the like.

Instead, he relies entirely on his claim

of mental illness. That claim, however, is insufficient to warrant tolling under the New Jersey
statute that directly deals with such claims, and thus in turn is insufficient to warrant equitable
tolling, as Plaintiff has not shown that his mental illness prevented him from understanding or
asserting his rights between 2013 and 2017. Plaintiff has thus failed to establish his entitlement
to tolling, and his amended complaint is therefore time barred and shall be dismissed as such.
Because this Court is dismissing all of the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction as

time barred, this Court will also decline to exercise jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff

8

also sought to bring in his amended complaint, such as negligence or negligent supervision claims
raised tinder state law. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3).

III. CONCLUSION

F or the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs amended complaint (ECF No. 4) is dismissed as
time barred. An appropriate order follows.

JOS L. LINARES,
C ef Judge, United States District Court
Dated: January5, 2018

9