JACKMON v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Filing 14

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 07/20/2018. (ek)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MORRIS JACKMON,

Civ. No. 18-149 (KM)

Plaintiff,
OPINION

N.J. DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS.
Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Morris Jackmon. a state prisoner at East Jersey State Prison, filed a civil rights
complaint against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“Department”) alleging violations
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc et

seq. (ECF No. 1-1.) currently pending before this Court is the Department’s motion to dismiss
the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons,
the motion to dismiss is denied.
II.

BACKGROUND
In October 2017, Mr. Jackmon filed a complaint in New Jersey state court, alleging

violations under RLUIPA and seeking injunctive relief against the Department. On January 5,
2018, the Department filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court. (ECF No. 1.)
Thereafter, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing
that Mr. Jackmon faiLs to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 3.) Jackmon

filed a brief in opposition to the Department’s motion. (ECF No. 6.) The Department flied a
reply, and Jackmon filed a response. (ECF Nos. 10 & 1.)
In his complaint, Jackmon alleges that he isa sincere member of the Nation of Gods and
Earths (“Nation”). (ECF No. I-I at 2.) As a member of the Nation. Jackmon states that he is
compelLed to practice various religious activities, including:
(a) teaching others about the knowledge of who God is, (b) study
the Supreme Mathematics, Supreme Alphabets, 120 Degrees,
Universal Flag, monthly National Statements, and “The Five
Percenter” newspaper periodicals, (c) observe holy days, which
include the anniversaries of the birth and death of our founder,
Clarence 13X Smith, also known as Father Allah, and the birthdays
of Elijah Muhammad and Fard Muhammad, (d) conduct Civilization
Classes, in which senior members educate newer members about the
lessons and how they can be applied, and (e) gather monthLy for
“Parliaments” and “Rallies”, during which members make
collective decisions and help one another learn their lessons.
(Id. at 3—4.)
Jackmon explains that the Department enacted a policy in 1998 which designated the
Nation as a Security Threat Group. (Id. at 5.) According to Jackmon, activities of all designated
Security Threat Groups are restricted:
These activities include but are not limited to: Possession of
[Security Threat Group] STG literature such as, lessons,
membership lists, manuals and artwork; Possession of STG
paraphernalia such as, beads, artwork, medallions and clothing
articles; Observation bystaff of known STG hand-signs andlor
signals; Participation in STG related assaults, disturbances,
meetings, gatherings, incidents and events; Sending or receiving
STG related correspondence; Recruiting of other inmates to join
an STG.
(Id. at 4.)
Because of this designation, Jackmon states that he is unable to exercise his religious
beliefs and a substantial burden has been placed on his religious exercise. (Id. at 5.) Jackmon

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seeks injunctive relief requiring the Department to remove the Nation from the list of Security
Threat Groups and permit him and others to engage in its religious practice. (Id. at 6.)
The Department moves to dismiss Jackmon’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure I 2(b)(6). (ECF No. 3-I.) The Department responds that Jackmon fails to state a claim
under RLUIPA because the Department’s policy designating the Nation as a security threat is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. (Id. at 5—11.)
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule I 2(b)(6). “courts accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled
to relief.” Fm;’ler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation
omitted). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Ad. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Asheroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a fonnulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id at 678 (citation omitted). In addition, prose pleadings are liberally construed. See Clunk

v Noone, 689 F. App’x. 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Flowever, “prose litigants still
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

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ANALYSTS

IV.

Mr. Jackmon alleges that his rights have been violated under RLUIPA. RLUIPA prevents
the government from placing a “substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious exercise. RLUIPA
provides:
(a) No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
even if the burden results from a rule of general
institution
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition
of the burden on that person-( I) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
.

42 U.S.C.

.

.

§ 2000cc-I.

The Supreme Court in Molt v. Hobbs has explained that “RLUIPA protects ‘any exercise
oCreligion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious beliefl.]” 135 S. Ct.
853, 862 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc—5(7)(A)). RLUIPA provides “‘greater protection’

for religious liberty than is provided by the First Amendment.” Payne v. Doe, 636 F. App’x 120,
124 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hobbs, 135 5. Ct. at 863).
In assessing whether a prison’s policy has substantially burdened the practice of the
inmate’s religion, “we carmot ‘inquir[e] into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to
a prisoner’s religion,’ Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005), or question the ‘truth’
of his assertion of what his sincerely held religious beliefs require, Gillette

i’.

United States, 401

U.S. 437, 457 (1971)”. Robinson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 693 F. App’x 111, 115 (3d
Cir. 2017). If a plaintiff shows that a policy substantially burdens a sincerely held religious
belief, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the policy or practice furthers a compelling
government interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 863.

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Under the facts as alleged in this complaint, Mr. Jackmon is a follower of the Nation.
(ECF No. 1-I at 3.) The Department has enacted a zero-tolerance policy prohibiting all Nation
literature, activities, and holy day observances, which are compelled by the religion. (Id. at 4—5);
(see also ECF No.6 at 10.) Nation adherents may not associate with any other Nation members,
and may not possess any symbols, drawings, photographs, or texts that refer to the Nation’s
beliefs. (Id. at 9—10.) Prisoners who violate that policy are subject to significant disciplinary
punishments or may face criminal prosecution. (Id.) Based on these facts, this Court is satisfied
that Jackmon has pled facts sufficient to show that the Department’s policy substantially burdens
his sincerely held religious beliefs.
The Department appears to concede that Mr. Jackmon’s religious observances are
substantially burdened by the Department’s policy. The Department argues, however, that the
policy is the least restrictive means of pursuing a compelling government interest. This, however.
is not a proper argument at the pleading stage. A District Court, in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, cannot conclude “on the basis of the pleadings alone” whether the government has met
its burden under RLUIPA: “[tjhe feasibility of a religious accommodation usually is a factintensive inquiry.

.

.

the defendants cannot meet their burden of proof without at least creating a

summary judgment record.” Robinson, 693 F. App’x at 117. At this stage, Mr. Jackmon is not
required to established that he is entitled to relief; his burden is only to plead sufficient factual
matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. He has
done so.
The Department cites the Third Circuit case of Praise v Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513 (3d
Cir. 2002). Fraise, however, upheld summary judgment for defendant, not the grant of a motion
to dismiss; in addition, it was not decided under RLUIPA, but under the Free Exercise clause of

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the First Amendment. See 283 F.3d at 513 (citing Turner

i&

Sfley, 482 U.S. 78(1987)

(interpreting the Free Exercise clause).) The scope of RLUIPA, however, is not identical to that
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, so Free Exercise cases must be applied with
care, if at all. See Payne, 636 F. App’x at 124 (“[un applying Ho/i. courts must be careful not to

import reasoning from cases such as Turner involving First Amendment rights.”).
RLUIPA, moreover, emphasizes the particular burden on the particular plaintiffs’
beliefs: “RLUIPA requires the defendant

.

.

.

to demonstrate that the ‘compelling government

interest’ and ‘least restrictive means’ test is satisfied with respect to the particular claimant
.and should be addressed on a case-by-case basis..

.“.

Robinson, 693 F. App’x 118 (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Thus even RLUIPA precedents relating to the Nation’s
religious practices must be applied cautiously.
For all of the above reasons, then, the motion to dismiss will be denied)
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Department’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

DATED: July 20, 2018
K VIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

It also appears that Mr. Jackmon filed a motion for class action certification in state court,
the Department attached as Exhibit B in their notice of removal. (ECF No. 1-2.) To the
which
extent Mr. Jackmon is still seeking class certification, that motion is denied, Prose plaintiffs
cannot adequately represent a proposed class. See Ali v.Jersey City Parking Auth., No. 13-2678,
2014 WL 1494578, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 16,2014) (explaining that “[ujnder Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, apro se plaintiff cannot represent a class because a class of similarly situated
individuals must be represented by counsel.”), affd, 594 F. App’x 730 (3d Cir. 2014).

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