ARGEN et al v. KESSLER et al

Filing 97

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 8/5/2021. (dc, )

Case 2:18-cv-00963-SDW-LDW Document 97 Filed 08/05/21 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 2198

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-5903

SUSAN D. WIGENTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

August 5, 2021

Paul A. Clark, Esq.
10 Huron Ave., #1N
Jersey City, NJ 07306
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Robert J. McGuire, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625
Attorney Defendant David Katz
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re:

Argen v. Katz
Civil Action No. 18-963 (SDW) (LDW)

Counsel:
Before this Court is Plaintiff Paul Argen’s (“Argen”) Motion for Reconsideration of this
Court’s July 8, 2021 Opinion and Order (“July 8th Decision”) which granted Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment. 1 (D.E. 93, 94.) This Court having considered the parties’ submissions,
having reached its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78,
and for the reasons discussed below, DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
A.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not expressly authorize motions for
reconsideration, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides for such review.” Sch. Specialty, Inc. v.
Although all prior motions have been brought on behalf of both Argen and his co-plaintiff Surrender Malhan
(“Malhan”), this motion appears to be brought solely by Argen, and does not seek reconsideration of the July 8th
Decision as it pertains to Malhan.
1

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Ferrentino, Civ. No. 14-4507, 2015 WL 4602995, at *2-3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015). A party moving
for reconsideration must set “forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party
believes the . . . Judge has overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). A motion for reconsideration is “an
extremely limited procedural vehicle,” Ferrentino, 2015 WL 4602995 at *2 (internal citations
omitted), which is to be granted “sparingly.” A.K. Stamping Co., Inc. v. Instrument Specialties
Co., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 627, 662 (D.N.J. 2000). Motions to reconsider are only proper where
the moving party shows “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence that was not available when the court [reached its original decision]; or (3) the need
to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Mere disagreement with a court’s decision is not an
appropriate basis upon which to bring a motion for reconsideration as such disagreement should
“be raised through the appellate process.” U.S. v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345
(D.N.J. 1999).
B.
The July 8th Decision identified and applied the proper legal standards for motions for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and held that this Court should
abstain from hearing Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, which requires
federal courts “to abstain in certain circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim where
resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” (D.E. 93 at 4 (citing
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010).) Argen does not identify any intervening
change in the relevant law or new evidence that was unavailable at the time this Court entered its
decision, consequently, his motion rests solely on the contention that this Court’s decision contains
an error of fact or law that, if left uncorrected, would result in manifest injustice. Specifically,
Argen argues that because he is not a party to the underlying family court suit, Younger abstention
does not apply to his claims and the July 8th Decision improperly precludes him from adjudicating
his claims. (See D.E. 95-1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff’s argument, however, is not a basis upon which to
reconsider the July 8th Decision.
Argen contends that he has a right under the First Amendment to publish information that
Malhan shares with him regarding the underlying custody dispute. However, as this Court noted
in the July 8th Decision, any right Argen may have is completely dependent upon and derivative
of Malhan’s ability to share that information. (See D.E. 93 at 6 n.1.) So long as Malhan remains
subject to the Gag Order, he is precluded from providing information to Argen. 2 Because this
Court must abstain from reviewing the validity of the Gag Order pursuant to Younger, it also must
abstain from reviewing Argen’s claims. Although this Court recognizes the unusual facts of this
case, any other outcome would be untenable, requiring this Court to simultaneously abstain from
reviewing the validity of the Gag Order while reviewing the validity of the Gag Order. Having
already addressed the applicability of Younger to Argen’s claims, the current motion merely
encourages this Court to “analyze the same facts and cases it already considered” to come to a
different conclusion. Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., 11 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000).
This does not, of course, infringe on Argen’s right to publish other information about the case, it simply prevents
Argen from using Malhan as a source.

2

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Asking this Court to “rethink” its holding is not an appropriate basis upon which to seek
reconsideration. See Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 744 F. Supp. 1311,
1314 (D.N.J. 1990). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. An
appropriate order follows.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Orig:
cc:

Clerk
Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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