UNIVERSITY SPINE CENTER v. ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 5/24/18. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNIVERSITY SPINE CENTER o/a/o
EDWARD C.,
Civ. No.: 18-01103
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
ANTHEM BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD,
Defendant.
Plaintiff University Spine Center, on assignment of Edward C. (“Patient”), brings
this action against Defendant Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, alleging failure to make all
payments under Patient’s medical plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), and breach of fiduciary duty. This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). There was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a healthcare provider in the Passaic County, New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 1,
ECF No. 1. Defendant administers health insurance plans to individuals in New Jersey,
among other states. See id. ¶ 2; Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss
(“Def.’s Mem.”) 4–5, ECF No. 6-1. At all relevant times, Patient was a plan participant
in the Ascena Retail Group Inc., Benefits Plan (the “Plan”), which Defendant
administered. See Def.’s Mem. 5, Ex. A. In addition, at all relevant times, Plaintiff was
an out-of-network healthcare provider and did not have a contract with Defendant. See
id. at 4.
On November 17, 2015, Plaintiff provided Patient with medical services,
including surgery to remove and fuse cervical disks. See Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. Patient
transferred his rights to benefit payments under the Plan to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a claim with Defendant for $170,082.00 in reimbursement for services
rendered. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant paid $15,621.95 of that claim. See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to
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Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) 12 n.2, ECF No. 8. On January 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit,
alleging that Defendant failed to make all payments as required by ERISA and breach of
fiduciary duty. See Compl. ¶¶ 17–34.
Defendant now moves to dismiss, arguing first that Plaintiff lacks standing to
assert its ERISA claim because the Plan contains a valid and enforceable anti-assignment
clause. See Def.’s Mem. at 8–12. Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s complaint
insufficiently describes the alleged assignment. See id. at 12–17. Defendant further
argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under ERISA for additional benefits, that
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is duplicative, and that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies. See id. at 17–25.
Plaintiff opposes, arguing that the anti-assignment clause does not preclude its
standing to sue. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17–28. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s
reliance on Rule 12(b)(1) is erroneous, that Plaintiff adequately alleged the existence of
the assignment, that its breach of fiduciary duty claim is non-duplicative pursuant to
Supreme Court precedent, and that Defendant’s failure to comply with reasonable claims
procedures prevents dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies. See id. at 12–15, 28–34. Defendant filed a reply, largely reiterating its
previous arguments, including Plaintiff’s lack of standing. See Def.’s Reply Mem. of
Law in Further Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of a complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There are two types of
challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction: (1) facial attacks, which challenge the
allegations of the complaint on their face; and (2) factual attacks, which challenge the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, quite apart from any pleadings. Mortensen v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In reviewing a factual
attack, as Defendant presents here, the court may consider evidence outside the
pleadings, and no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations. Gould
Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Gotha v. United States,
115 F.3d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
jurisdiction exists. Gould Elecs., 220 F.3d at 178.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975);
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.
1998).
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Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations
must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, such that it
is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc.,
542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s]
from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible
and without exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95
(1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s standing to sue based on the anti-assignment clause
located in the Plan documents, restraining Patient from assigning his benefits. See Def.’s
Mem. at 9–12. Plaintiff argues that the anti-assignment clause is invalid for multiple
reasons. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17–28. The anti-assignment clause in question reads as
follows:
You cannot assign your right to receive payment to anyone else, except
as required by a “Qualified Medical Child Support order” as defined by
ERISA or any applicable Federal law.
Certification of A. Genovese, Ex. A 66, ECF No. 6-3 (emphasis added).1
The Third Circuit recently determined that anti-assignment clauses in ERISA
plans are enforceable. See Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Independence Blue Cross
Blue Shield, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-1663, 2018 WL 2224394, at *6 (3d Cir. May 16, 2018)
(“We now . . . hold that anti-assignment clauses in ERISA-governed health insurance
plans as a general matter are enforceable.”). The anti-assignment clause in that case read,
“[t]he right of a Member to receive benefit payments under this Program is personal to
the Member and is not assignable in whole or in part to any person, Hospital, or other
entity[.]” Id. at *1 (emphasis original).
Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant erroneously relied on the Summary Plan Description is meritless. See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 14. The Plan unequivocally states: “The benefits offered under the Benefit Plans are described in and are
subject to separate plan documents, summary plan descriptions, trust agreements, insurance policies and contracts of
different kinds, . . . and are incorporated into the Plan by reference . . . .” See Reply Certification of A. Genovese,
Ex. F 96 (ECF pagination) (emphasis added), ECF No. 9-7.
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Plaintiff argues that the instant anti-assignment clause is unenforceable because
the language therein “simply does not manifest the intent to limit the Patients’ power to
assign . . . because it does not use the words void or invalid or any of the other language”
found in the case law Plaintiff cites to. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. The anti-assignment clause
in American Orthopedic also did not contain the words “void” or “invalid,” and yet the
Third Circuit still determined that the clause was enforceable and that plaintiff, therefore,
lacked standing to sue. See Am. Orthopedic, 2018 WL 2224394, at *6–7.
The Court finds that the clause in question here is unambiguous and plainly states
that Patient could not assign his right to receive reimbursement to Plaintiff or anyone
else. In light of the Third Circuit’s recent holding, the Court finds that the antiassignment clause is valid and enforceable and that Plaintiff, therefore, lacks standing to
bring its claims against Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: May 21, 2018
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