REYES v. WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A. et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 2 Motion for TRO, and dismissing Complaint w/out prejudice to the extent the pleading deficiencies identified by the Court in this Memorandum Opinion and Order can be cured by way of amendment, Plaintiff is GRANTED 30 days to file an amended pleading. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 2/27/18. (sr, )(N/M)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No.: 2:18-cv-02638

LOUISA L REYES,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, f.A., et al.,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
WHEREAS on February 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants with
this Court, (ECF No. 1), and a motion for temporary restraining order and injunction (“TRO”).
(ECF No. 2); and
WHEREAS Plaintiffs TRO asks this Court to prevent “Defendants from proceeding with
eviction or any other proceedings to enforce their state court judgment against the Plaintiff or her
home.” (Id. at 1); and
WHEREAS the home at issue is subject to a default judgment that was issued in the state
foreclosure action. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Reyes Heirs Jose, No. F-014972-09 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (default judgment entered August 19, 2016); see also (ECF No. 1 at 2
(Plaintiff explaining that Defendants were “granted sunmiary judgment against Plaintiff for
foreclosure in a state court proceeding in the Superior Court of Passaic County, New Jersey, case
number F014972”); ECF No. 2 at 1 (Plaintiff asking this Court to prevent “Defendants from
proceeding with eviction or any other proceedings to enforce their state court judgment against
the Plaintiff or her home”)); and

WHEREAS adjudicating the claims in Plaintiffs complaint or granting Plaintiffs TRO
would be barred by the Rooker-Feidman doctrine, because Plaintiff is seeking to avoid the
default judgment that was issued in the state foreclosure action by bringing this federal action.
See D.C. Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923); see also Colahar v. Wells Fargo Bank NA., 56 F. Supp. 3d 603, 607
(D. Del. 2014) (“In addition, the Rooker-Feidman doctrine prohibits this court from maintaining
subject matter jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs] motion [for a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order,] which effectively seeks to vacate orders of the Superior Court.”).

The

Rooker-feidman doctrine bars this Court from adjudicating the claims in Plaintiffs complaint or
granting Plaintiffs TRO because: (1) Plaintiff was unsuccessful in state court and is complaining
of injuries caused by the default judgment; (2) the default judgment was rendered in 2016, before
Plaintiff initially sought relief in federal court in February 2018; and (3) Plaintiff invites this
Court to review and reject the default judgment. See Biertey v. Abate, 661 F. App’x 208, 209 (3d
Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of claims based upon Rooker-Feidman
grounds); Colahar, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 607 (denying motion for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order based upon Rooker-Feidman grounds); and
WHEREAS it is now well-settled law that the proper way for Plaintiff to proceed
concerning her alleged injuries caused by the default judgment would be to seek review and
relief through the state appellate process, and then to seek certiorari directly to the United States
Supreme Court. This Court is prohibited from providing relief that would effectively reverse the
decisions, directly or indirectly invalidate the determinations, prevent the enforcement of the
default judgment, or void the rulings issued by the state court in the state foreclosure action. See
Francis v. TD Bank, NA., 597 F. App’x 58, 60-61 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming a district court’s
2

dismissal of the claims that were brought in connection with a state foreclosure action as being
barred by the Rooker-Feidman doctrine, because the plaintiff sought redress from a state court
judgment); see also Shipley v. New Castle Cry., No. 08-554, 2008 WL 4330424, at *2 n.2 (D.
Del. Sept. 19, 2008) (denying motion for injunctive relief and temporary restraining order based
on Rooker-Feidman where “Plaintiffs allege[d] injury based upon the actions taken by Superior
Court judges and the Sheriff with regard to the sale of his real estate at a sheriffs sa[1]e”); and
WHEREAS a final determination in the form of a default judgment has been entered in
the state foreclosure action. However, to the extent that the state foreclosure action may be
considered to be ongoing, and to the extent that Plaintiff requests that this Court intervene in the
state foreclosure action, that relief is barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See Middlesex
Cry. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass ‘n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). This Court simply has no authority to interfere with the state foreclosure
action if it is indeed ongoing, because important state interests are implicated therein, and
because there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims therein. See Cunningham v.
Mortg. Contracting Servs. LLC, 634 F. App’x 361, 362 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming a district
court’s dismissal of claims brought in connection with a state foreclosure action for being barred
by Younger abstention); Shipley, 2008 WL 4330424, at *2..3 (denying motion for injunctive
relief and temporary restraining order under Younger abstention doctrine where “there [we]re
prior pending state court proceedings that directly relate[d] to Plaintiffs dispute,” the state
“ha[d] an important interest in resolving real estate tax and lien issues,” a “ruling in the Superior
Court proceeding implicate{d] the important interest of preserving the authority of the state’s
judicial system,” and there was “an adequate opportunity to raise
court”).
3

.

.

.

due process claims in state

Accordingly, IT IS on this

2_i day of

2018, in the interests of

justice and for good cause shown:
ORDERED that Plaintiffs TRO, (ECF No. 2), is hereby DENIED; it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint, (ECF No. 1), is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; it is further
ORDERED that to the extent the pleading deficiencies identified by the Court in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order can be cured by way of amendment, Plaintiff is hereby
GRANTED thirty (30) days to file an amended pleading; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff by regular
mail and shall CLOSE the file.
SO ORDERED.

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

4