BRYANT v. NOGAN et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 4/12/18. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JERlIAINE L. BRYANT,

Civil Action No. 18-2701 (JLL)

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

v.
PATRICK NOGAN, et al.,
Respondents.

IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On or about february 26, 2018, Petitioner, Jermaine L. Bryant, filed the instant petition
for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (ECF No. 1).

2. On March 14, 2018, this Court entered an order and memorandum opinion dismissing
that petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction as it was a second or successive habeas
petition brought without leave of the Court of Appeals. (ECF Nos. 4—5).
3. On March 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a response to that Order, which this Court construes
to be a motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to either Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) or Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (ECF No. 6). In his response, Petitioner does not state that he has
sought or received permission to file this successive habeas petition from the Court of Appeals,
but instead argues that he should be permitted a hearing so that he can prove that he is innocent of
the crime for which he is imprisoned. (Id.).
4. Whether brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Local
Civil Rule 7.1(i), the scope of a motion for reconsideration is extremely limited, and courts will
grant such motions only sparingly. Detanov v. Iip. of Ocean, No. 13-1555, 2015 WL 2235103,
at *2 (D.N.J. May 12, 2015) (as to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)); see also Btystone v.

Horn,

664 F.3d

397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (as to Rule 59(e)). An order of the Court may be altered or amended
pursuant to such a motion oniy where the moving party establishes one of the following grounds
for relief: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence
that was not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact to prevent manifest injustice.” Delanoy, 2015 WL 2235103 at *2 (quoting Max’s
Seafood café v. Qitinteros. 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Blvstone. 664 F.3d at 415
(applying same standard to 59(e) motions). In the reconsideration context, a manifest injustice
will generally arise only where “the Court overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that
was presented to it,” or committed a “direct, obvious, and observable” error. See Brown v.
Zickefoose, No. 11-3330, 2011 WL 5007829, at *2, n.3 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011) (citations and
quotations omitted). Reconsideration motions may not be used to relitigate old matters or to raise

arguments or present evidence or allegations that could have been raised prior
original order, and courts should only

grant

to entry of

the

such a motion where its prior decision “overlooked a

factual or legal issue that may alter the disposition of the matter.” Delanov, 2015 WL 2235103 at
*2.
5. While Petitioner argues at length in his motion that he should be granted a hearing to
prove his innocence, Petitioner utterly fails to address the fact that his current petition is a second
or successive habeas petition brought without leave of the Court of Appeals.

previously explained to Petitioner,
Because Petitioner has filed a previous habeas petition which was
previously dismissed with prejudice as time barred, Petitioner’s
current habeas petition is a second or successive habeas petition
filed without leave from the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(“AEDPA”), this Court’s jurisdiction over second and successive
habeas petitions brought under § 2254 is limited. See 2$ U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A). Under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner may not file a
2

As this Court

second or successive habeas petition in this Court without first
receiving authorization from the appropriate court of appeals, in this
case the Third Circuit. Id. Absent a grant of authorization from the
Court of Appeals, this Court lacks jurisdiction over a second or
successive habeas petition. Id.; see also Bttrton v. Stewart, 549 U.s.
147, 152 (2007) (district court “never had jurisdiction to consider”
successive petition where the petitioner “did not seek or obtain
authorization to file in the District Court”); Btystone v. Horn, 664
F.3d 397, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner’s failure to seek such
authorization from the appropriate appellate court before filing a
second or successive habeas petition acts as a jurisdictional bar”).
“When a second or successive habeas petition is erroneously filed
in a district court without the permission of a court of appeals, the
district court’s only option is to dismiss the petition or transfer it to
the court of appeals pursuant to 2$ U.S.C. § 1631.” Robinson v.
Johnson, 313 F.3d 12$, 139 (3d Cir. 2002).
(ECF No. 4 at 2—3).
6. Because Petitioner has previously had a habeas petition dismissed with prejudice as
time barred, his petition is a second or successive habeas petition, and this Court has no jurisdiction
to hear any of his claims

—

including his claim of innocence

—

unless and until Petitioner seeks and

obtains leave from the Third Circuit. Blystone, 664 f.3d at 4 11—12. Because Petitioner’s motion
in no way disputes that his habeas petition is a successive petition, nor shows that Petitioner has
secured the permission of the Court of Appeals, he has failed to show that this Court erred in
dismissing his habeas petition, and Petitioner has thus failed to show any valid basis for
reconsideration. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration must therefore be denied.
7. In conclusion, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, (ECF No. 6), is denied. An
appropriate order follows.

United States District Court

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