MARRAZZO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 20

OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 4/23/2019. (dam, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
KIM M. MARRAZZO,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
:
SECURITY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
____________________________________:

Civil Action No. 18-2725 (SRC)
OPINION

CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the appeal by Plaintiff Kim M. Marrazzo
(“Plaintiff”) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
determining that she was not disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court
exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of
the parties without oral argument, pursuant to L. CIV. R. 9.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s
decision will be vacated.
In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits,
alleging disability beginning September 1, 2012. A hearing was held before ALJ Leonard F.
Costa (the “ALJ”) on February 16, 2017, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 16,
2017, finding Plaintiff not disabled. After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this
appeal.
In the decision of May 16, 2017, the ALJ found that, at step three, Plaintiff did not meet

or equal any of the Listings. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work, with certain limitations. At step four, the ALJ
also found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant
work as a school secretary. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and the
case remanded on the ground that, at step four, the ALJ improperly disregarded the treating
physician evidence. This Court agrees.
At step four, in making the residual functional capacity assessment, the ALJ stated that
“the claimant has a complicated past medical history of chronic neck and lower back pain.” (Tr.
74.) He reviewed the significant medical evidence, and then turned to the medical opinions
about functional capacity. First, he examined the assessment of state agency reviewer Dr.
Simpkins, dated February 12, 2015, whose assessment was reviewed and affirmed by state
agency reviewer Dr. Feman. The ALJ stated that Dr. Simpkins opined that Plaintiff “is able to
perform light work activity.” (Tr. 76.) The ALJ stated that he gave the opinions of the state
agency reviewers “partial weight.” (Tr. 76.) The ALJ explained that they were not treating
providers and had not reviewed all of the medical evidence. (Tr. 76-77.) The ALJ then stated:
However, their opinion is partially consistent with the medical evidence of record.
The claimant retains the ability to occasionally perform most postural work
activity. However, the claimant is not able to perform work activity at the light
exertional level, as she is only able to lift up to five pounds. Thus, the medical
opinion of Dr. Simpkins and subsequent affirmation by Dr. Feman warrant partial
weight, as these opinions are partially supported relative to her non-exertional
limitations.
(Tr. 77.) Note that the ALJ accepted only the state agency physicians’ opinions as to

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non-exertional limitations.
The ALJ then reviewed the opinions of treating physician Dr. Florczyk, who opined in
2012 that Plaintiff is permanently disabled and unable to perform any work, but stated in 2015
that she was unable to provide an opinion on Plaintiff’s ability to work. The ALJ observed that,
in January of 2016, Dr. Florczyk provided a full functional assessment, which, in short, found
major limitations to her ability to work. The ALJ concluded that he gave the opinions of Dr.
Florczyk little weight because her opinions were inconsistent and unsupported. (Tr. 77.)
The ALJ next discussed the opinions of treating physician Dr. Jutkowski, a neurologist.
The ALJ stated that Dr. Jutkowski had opined in November of 2012 that Plaintiff was totally and
permanently disabled, which he supported with MRI and other testing results. (Tr. 78.) The
ALJ stated that Dr. Jutkowski had also provided a report dated January 2, 2015, in which he
again opined that Plaintiff is disabled; the record shows that, in this report, Dr. Jutkowski
included a detailed description of the MRI results supporting his opinion. (Tr. 78, 439.) The
ALJ concluded that he gave Dr. Jutkowski’s opinions little weight, as they were inconsistent
with the evidence and unsupported by his treatment notes. (Tr. 78.)
The ALJ next reviewed the opinion of Dr. Han, an “acupuncturist,” dated February of
2016. (Tr. 78.) The ALJ stated that Dr. Han opined that Plaintiff was unable to engage in even
sedentary work. (Tr. 78.) The ALJ stated that he gave Dr. Han’s opinion little weight, as it
was internally inconsistent, inconsistent with the medical evidence, and unsupported. (Tr. 78.)
This covers the ALJ’s review of the medical opinions as to functional capacity. The
ALJ also reviewed other medical evaluation, testing, and treatment records.
Plaintiff, on appeal, argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of treating

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physicians, which was contrary to Third Circuit law. This is correct. The Third Circuit has
held:
A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ
accord treating physicians' reports great weight, especially when their opinions
reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's
condition over a prolonged period of time. Where, as here, the opinion of a
treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician,
the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or
for the wrong reason. The ALJ must consider the medical findings that support a
treating physician's opinion that the claimant is disabled. In choosing to reject
the treating physician's assessment, an ALJ may not make speculative inferences
from medical reports and may reject a treating physician's opinion outright only
on the basis of contradictory medical evidence and not due to his or her own
credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion.
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The ALJ’s decision
fails to follow Morales. The ALJ rejected the assessment of exertional functional capacity of
every medical source he reviewed. Although the ALJ stated that he gave the opinions of the
state agency reviewers “partial weight,” as to the opinions about exertional functional capacity,
the ALJ determined that Drs. Simpkins and Feman were incorrect in finding a capacity to
perform light work, as that was premised on what he believed was an incorrect assessment of
Plaintiff’s capacity for lifting. (Tr. 76-77.) Thus, while the ALJ may have given these
physicians’ opinions about non-exertional limitations some weight, he rejected entirely their
opinions about exertional limitations. This is not an inference; this is what the ALJ wrote in the
decision.
Because, as to exertional limitations, the ALJ rejected the functional assessment of every
medical expert whose opinion he reviewed, this Court inquires: on what medical evidence is the
ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination based? The only possible answer is that he
made speculative inferences from medical reports and arrived at his own lay opinion about what
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the medical evidence demonstrated. Thus, the ALJ impermissibly rejected the opinions of the
treating physicians without contrary medical evidence – since, to the extent that the state agency
consultants could be considered to have offered contrary opinions about exertional limitations,
he rejected them. Instead, the ALJ appears to have relied on his own lay opinion of the medical
evidence. This is clear in his repeated rejection of the treating physicians’ assessments as
inconsistent with the medical evidence. The Commissioner has pointed to no medical expert
who stated that opinion. The ALJ came to those conclusions without supporting medical
evidence – except to the extent that he made a lay assessment of the medical records.
Plaintiff is thus entirely correct that the residual functional capacity determination is not
supported by substantial evidence. It is supported only by the ALJ’s lay opinion, which is
neither medical evidence nor substantial evidence. For this reason, this Court finds that the
Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and the Commissioner’s
decision is vacated and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.

s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: April 23, 2019

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