ARIAS v. HARHUT et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 4/2/18. (DD, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANGELA ARIAS,
Plaintiff
Civil Action No. 18-2976
V.
OPINION
CHESTER HARHUT and MARJORIE
BARLOW,
Defendants.
John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Angela Arias (“Plaintiff’ or “Arias”) seeks to bring this action informa paliperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1915. D.E. 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiffs application to proceed informa pauperis but the Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to 2$ U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a claim.
Under Section 1915, this Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment of fees when the
litigant “establish[esj that [s]he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Walker v. People Express
Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiff sufficiently establishes her inability to
pay, and the Court grants her application to proceed informa pauperis without prepayment of fees
and costs.
However, when allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must review
the complaint and dismiss the action if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune. 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2). When considering dismissal under
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the Court must apply the same standard of
review as that for dismissing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). To state a claim that survives a Rule
1 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009).
Because Plaintiff is proceedingpro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and holds
them to a less stringent standard than those filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). “The Court need not, however, credit apro se plaintiffs ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions.” D’Agostino v. CECOMRDEC, No. 10-4552, 2010 WL 3719623, at *1 (D.N.J.
Sept. 10, 2010).
The allegations in this case are not clear. Plaintiff repeatedly stylizes her Complaint as a
“motion to set aside judgement fraud [sic] upon the court rule 60(b)(3) extrinsic fraud.” See, e.g.,
D.E. 1 at 6. The Complaint seems to allege some wrongdoing by Chester Harhut and Marjorie
Barlow in a child custody proceeding in the “Trial Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna
County,” but Plaintiffs specific allegations are largely incomprehensible. As best as the Court
can tell, Harhut is alleged to be a Pennsylvania state judge and Barlow is an attorney. The Court
believes that the Pennsylvania matter concerned child custody or visitation issues but it is not
entirely clear.
The Complaint allege the following:
Court Officers [sic] Chester Harbut trespasses of the Law and
Trespasses the defendant Angela Arias legal rights. Causing Harm,
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Emotional distress and Loss of Statutory Entitlement a Judicial
Proceeding Rights and Loss of the constitutional Contract-Law
Rights and loss of 14t11 Amendment Due Process a Judicial
Proceeding Rights and a violation of Oaths of Justice also a Judicial
Rights Proceedings Deprive [sic].
Id. at 11. On the same page, Plaintiff also claims that “Marjorie Barlow trespasses on defendant
legal rights by not performing her judicial function.” Id. Later, Plaintiff states that “[t]he court
Officers Marjorie Barlow and Mr. Harhut encouraged Ms. Veronica Stewart not to return the
child.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff also indicates that she brings suit pursuant to the following
Civil-Action Penalties 1171.5 1171.11—15 U.S.C. 45 for
Trespassing of certain protection [sic],” “and [rights] guaranteed to
her by the first, Fifth, Eight, ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
(select which apply) to the federal Constitution, by the Plaintiff
claim under 2$ U.S.C. §1343-U.S. Code—Annotated title 2$
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 1343 rights and elective franchise
& Involves the obtaining of property from another under color of
official right. It is the wrongful taking by a Public Officer of
property not due to him. 42 U.S. Code §1985 (2017) Extortion
under color of Official Right Legal—Law.
Id. at 16.
The Complaint continues with additional statements about different laws and legal
doctrines. Plaintiff also repeatedly cites to different judicial canons as well as Pennsylvania
municipal law. She also includes employment law and respondeat superior allegations. Later, in
attachments to her Complaint, Plaintiff seems to allege that her custody over a child was terminated
and that the termination was unlawful. See D.E. 1-4 at PagelD: 73.
Even construed liberally, the Court cannot ascertain any clear alleged federal causes of
action in the Complaint. To be sure, the Complaint cites numerous constitutional provisions as
well federal statutes, but their bearing on the limited factual allegations is unclear. Reading the
Complaint as liberally as possible, Plaintiff appears to allege (in part) that there was some
wrongdoing by court employees, including Harhut and Barlow, during a custody proceeding.
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Beyond that allegation, the Court is unsure of Plaintiffs legal theories. Therefore, Plaintiff fails
to plausibly plead any cause of action and her Complaint is dismissed.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court informs her that if she is attempting to
bring a constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 concerning ajudge’s rulings in an official
court proceeding, she should be aware of the doctrine of judicial immunity. See, e.g, Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355—56 (1978) (recognizing that “judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess
of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”); figueroa v.
Blackburn, 208 f.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine ofjudicial immunity is founded upon
the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or
her convictions without threat of suit for damages.”). Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff is
seeking to overturn a state court’s family law ruling, Plaintiff needs to be aware of the BookerFeldman doctrine. “The Booker—Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments because such appellate jurisdiction rests
solely with the United States Supreme Court.” In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006)); see also Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC,
765 f.3d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit has ruled that the doctrine applies once four
elements are met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘cornplain[s] of
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the
federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state
judgments.” Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3 d 159, 166 (3d Cir.
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2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Coip. v. Saudi Basic Inthis. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). If the
Rooker-feidman doctrine applies, this Court will abstain from hearing Plaintiffs claims.’
When dismissing a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, a court must decide whether the
dismissal will be with prejudice or without prejtidice, which affords a plaintiff with leave to amend.
Grayson v. Mavview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-li (3d Cir. 2002). The district court may
deny leave to amend only if(a) the moving party’s delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated
by bad faith, or prejudicial to the non-moving party or (b) the amendment would be futile. Adams
v. Gould, Inc., 739 f.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). At this point, the Court cannot conclude that
Plaintiffs claims are futile primarily because the Court cannot determine what the claims are.
Therefore, the Court shall provide Plaintiff thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint2 that
cures the deficiencies set forth herein, including a clear recitation of pertinent facts, setting forth a
specific cause (or causes) of action, and indicating which alleged facts support the cause(s) of
action. If Plaintiff does not submit an amended complaint curing these deficiencies within thirty
days, the dismissal will then be with prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice means that Plaintiff
will be precluded from filing any future suit against Defendants concerning the allegations in the
Complaint. An appropriate form of Order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: April 2, 2018
John Michael Vazqezi.S.D.J.
Plaintiff should also consider whether any applicable statute(s) of limitations under
Pennsylvania law may bar her claims.
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If Plaintiff does file an amended complaint that the Court finds sufficient, Defendants are not
precluded from filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court’s role at this stage
is to perform a screening function. The Court’s ruling does not prejudice Defendants from
litigating the matter as they see fit.
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