WILLIAMS v. LANIGAN et al
Filing
6
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 8/29/2018. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BARRY WILLIAMS,
Civil Action No. 18-9593 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
LINARES, Chief District Judge:
Currently before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff Barry Williams’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) and
application to proceed in jörrna pauperis (ECF No. 5). Based on Plaintiffs application, it is clear
that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is wan-anted in this matter, and the Court will therefore
grant Plaintiffs application to proceed in Jörma pauperis. As the Court is granting Plaintiff in
forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B). Under the statute, this Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims if they are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from a defendant who is
immune. For the reasons set forth below, this Court will dismiss Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety
without prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against three
supervisory officials at East Jersey State Prison and the New Jersey Department of Corrections
for a policy they allegedly produced regarding the prison’s educational programs. Specifically,
Plaintiff seeks to sue Gary Lanigan, the Commissioner of the DOC; Patrick Nogan, the
Administrator of the prison; and Clavig Spires, the Assistant Superintendent of the prison. (ECF
No. 1 at 4—5). The policy Plaintiff challenges was succinctly summarized in a DOC memorandum’
provided by Plaintiff, which states as follows:
Effective[] July 1, 2014, inmates will be awarded institutional job
opportunities,
and
single
cell
housing
based
on
participation/enrollment in the facility’s education program.
Specifically, if [a prisoner is] on the Education Waiver List, and [the
prisoner does] not enroll in school, [the prisoner] will only be
eligible for, and assigned to, the lowest paid, wing based job
opportunities, and double cell housing assignments. However, if
you are on the waiver list, and immediately request to attend school
you will be allowed to keep your current job. School and work
schedules will be coordinated to allow an inmate to pursue the
facility’s educational opportunities, and to remain in a desired
institutional job.
Additionally, any inmate on the waiver list who does not
voluntarily enroll in school shall not be eligible for any incentive
programs. This directive will not affect any inmate who has a high
school diploma, GED, or is currently enrolled in school.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 12). Plaintiff also alleges that there is a second policy, which he does not clearly
define, which makes the education requirement mandatory for those inmates who have a sentence
of less than ten years’ imprisonment. (ECF No. I at 12).
Although Plaintiffs complaint provides numerous details regarding his attempts to fight
these policies through prison grievances and appeals to the Appellate Division therefrom, his
complaint provides few details as to how the policy deprived him of any constitutional rights.
Plaintiff does allege that he was told in April 2015 that he would be subjected to disciplinary
charges if he failed to attend classes by a member of the prison’s education department who is not
named as a defendant, despite his not being subject to the mandatory education requirement as his
Although this memorandum is dated October 16, 2018, it is marked as a reissue of a previous memo (see ECF No.
1-1 at 12), and Plaintiff was apparently aware of the policy as of April 2015. (See ECF No. I at 6, 8). Plaintiff
further alleges in his complaint that he is apparently aware that the prison has been using this policy since July 1,
2014. (Id. at 13).
2
sentence is for twenty-five years to life. (ECF No. 1 at 6, 8). Plaintiff further states that when he
complained to this education department head, he was told by her that he would not be permitted
to withdraw from classes. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges, however, this person was eventually
overruled by Defendant Lanigan who directed her to provide Plaintiff and others with the forms
necessary to waive non-mandatory education requirements. (Id. at 12).
In October 2016. Plaintiff was called to the office of the head of the prison’s food service
department. (Id. at 12). At that time, Plaintiff alleges he suffered “retaliation” when he was told
that “if [he] did not re[-]sign up for the school program” he “would not be allow[ed] to get a job
assignment” in her department because he did not have a diploma or GED. (Id. at 12—13). Later
that month, Plaintiff was also told by a member of the staff of the prison’s law library that he would
lose law library privileges if he failed to resume schooling. (Id. at 14). Later that month, Plaintiff
alleges he was also threatened with a transfer if he failed to cease his complaints by another prison
employee not named as a Defendant in this action. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff was thereafter told once
again in June 2017, this time by Defendant Spires, that his failure to resume his education would
prevent him from getting a prison job. (Id. at 15). Plaintiff was apparently transfelTed to a different
prison. (Id.).
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (“PLRA”), district courts must
review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma paupeuis, see
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), or seeks damages from a state employee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
3
immune from such relief. This action is subject to sita sponte screening for dismissal under 2$
U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff has been granted in/brmapaitperis status.
As the Supreme Court has stated, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashciv/1 v. Iqbal, 556 U.s.
662. 67$ (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twoinblv. 550 U.S. 544. 555 (2007)). To survive
a stta sponte screening for failure to state a claim2, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. fouler v. UPA’IC Shadvside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” fair Wind Sai/ing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 30$ n.3 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Ma/a v.
&own Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against three supervisory prison defendants3 based on
alleged violations of his constitutional rights arising out of East Jersey State Prison’s education
policies. “To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation
of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States that was committed by a person
2
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.
Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 f.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)) Mitchell
v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courtectu v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.a. § 1915A(b)).
Although Plaintiff mentions several other prison employees with whom he interacted, he has not named any such
officials, and it appears that his contention here is that the educational policy itself is what denied him his rights.
This Court therefore does not construe the complaint to be raising claims against any other prison employee. To
the extent Plaintiff wishes to raise a claim against individuals other than the three named Defendants, he may do
so by filing an amended complaint.
4
acting
under the color of state law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 792, 806 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Woodvardv. Cnt’t’. ofEssex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) (section 1983 provides “private
citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state [actors]”). “The first
step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right
said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a
constitutional right at all.” Nicini, 212 F.3d at $06 (quoting County of Sacramel?to v. Lewis, 523
U.S. $33, 841 n.5 (199$)). Supervisory defendants, however, may not be held liable for the actions
of their subordinates pursuant to
§
1983 under a theory of vicarious liability. See fqbal, 556 U.s.
at 675-76; Monell v. New York CTh’ Dep ‘t ofSocial Sen’s., 436 U.S. 65$, 691 (1978). Instead, the
supervisory official must himself have been personally responsible for some violation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. In order to raise a claim against a
supervisor based on the issuance of a policy, the plaintiff must allege facts which would show that
the defendant in question was responsible for the promulgation and adoption of a specific policy,
practice. or rule and that this policy directly caused a violation of the plaintiffs federal civil rights.
‘a.
Although Plaintiff in this matter has alleged that the three named Defendants were
responsible for the prison’s educational policies, and appears to believe that this policy is violating
his rights, Plaintiff has utterly failed to identify what rights he believes were impugned by the
adoption of these educational policies, as opposed to misunderstandings of the policy by other
officials. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting that the policy violated his rights insomuch as he was
denied a particular prison job because of his refusal to participate in a prison education, the Court
notes that a prisoner has no right to a prison job or to any particular prison job. See, e.g., Watson
v. Sec’v Pa. Dept of Corr., 567 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014); see also James v. Quintan, $66
5
F.2d 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 1989); Morales
;.
Grondolskv, 2009 WL 1545841, at *3 (D.N.J. May
29, 2009). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff alleges he was denied a particular job because he refused
to comply with the education policy, such a claim would fail to state a claim for relief, either as a
supervisory claim or to the extent he seeks relief against Defendant Spires based on his telling
Plaintiff he would not get a prison job absent participation in education classes.
To the extent Plaintiff is instead trying to assert that his being temporarily forced to go to
education as if it were mandatory under a threat of disciplinary proceedings by a prison employee
despite Plaintiff not being subject to the mandatory education rule, the Court notes that Plaintiff
has specifically alleged that this was in contravention of the policy. By plaintiffs own admission,
the mandatory education policy does not apply to prisoners sentenced to more than ten years, and
the policy encouraging education by requiring a prisoner to get a GED to obtain better prison
employment or a single occupant cell is by its own terms entirely optional. A prisoner may not
enjoy having poor employment prospects and being forced to share a cell, but the policy Plaintiff
has identified did not require his attendance at the educational classes, and thus the policy cannot
be said to have actually caused the issues Plaintiff alleges he faced when he wished not to attend
classes. As the policy did not cause the alleged issue in that case, it cannot form a basis for
supervisory liability.4 Monell, 436 at 690-91.
Having reviewed the remainder of Plaintiffs allegation, this Court is aware of no specific
constitutional right which has been impugned by the two educational policies Plaintiff has
“ Even
if the policy did require him to attend, it is doubtful Plaintiff could state a claim for relief based on mandatory
education requirements as a convicted state prisoner has no federally protected right not to be put to work during
his imprisonment. See Tourscherv. McCttllough, 184 f.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); Plcdsance v. Phelps, 845 f.2d
107, 108 (5th Cir. 198$); Omasta v. TVctinwright, 696 f.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d
314,315 (9th Cir.), ccii. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963); see ct/so Thyant v. Lcmigan, No. 15-3205, 2015 WL 5562828,
at *23 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2015); Shctbazz v. New Jersey Comm ‘r ofDep ‘t of Corr., No. 13-4968, 2014 WL 2090688,
at *2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2014). Thus, to the extent that the education requirement could be construed as equivalent
to requiring a prisoner to work, there would likely be no right not to be required to attend classes and work towards
some educational end.
6
identified. As Plaintiff has failed to identify any cognizable violation of his rights catised by these
policies, and has failed to provide any allegations which would establish an alternative basis for
supervisory relief against the three Defendants named in this matter as well as failed to plead any
claims for relief based on the three named Defendants’
own
direct actions, Plaintiff has not pled a
cognizable claim for relief against any of the three currently named Defendants.
Plaintiffs
complaint must therefore be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief
may be granted at this time.
Because this Court will dismiss Plaintiffs complaint without
prejudice, however, this Court will permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint addressing the
deficiencies identified in this opinion within thirty days.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs application to proceed in/brrnapauperis is granted,
his complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety, and Plaintiff shall be granted
leave to file an amended complaint, if he so chooses, within thirty days. An appropriate Order
follows this Opinion.
Dated: August L’/c’2Ol8
United States District Court
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?