PARROTT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
27
OPINION and ORDER filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King (OHSD) on 4/21/2021. (km)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LATEEFAH PARROTT,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:18-cv-9681
Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King
v.
ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the applications of Plaintiff Lateefah Parrott for
Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.,
and for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381 et seq. Plaintiff appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying those applications. After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire
administrative record, the Court decides this matter pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 9.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court reverses the
Commissioner’s decision and remands the action for further proceedings.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income, alleging that she has been disabled since August 15, 2011. R.
208–17. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. R. 125–36, 147–
52. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. R. 154–58.
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Administrative Law Judge Douglass Alvarado (“ALJ”) held a hearing on February 7, 2017, at
which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational
expert. R. 30–68. In a decision dated April 19, 2017, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from August 15, 2011, the alleged
disability onset date, through the date of that decision. R. 14–25. That decision became the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council declined review on
March 23, 2018. R. 1–6. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF
No. 1. On August 28, 2018, Plaintiff consented to disposition of the matter by a United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. ECF No. 7. 1 On March 12, 2020, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. ECF
No. 26. The matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Standard of Review
In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the
authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to
determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence “does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
1
The Commissioner has provided general consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in cases
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. See Standing Order In re: Social Security Pilot
Project (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018).
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No. 17-2309 , 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018). Substantial evidence is “less
than a preponderance of the evidence, but ‘more than a mere scintilla.”’ Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted); see K.K., 2018
WL 1509091, at *4.
The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot
be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different
conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.”) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)); K.K.,
2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (“‘[T]he district court ... is [not] empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’”) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic
or self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of
social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”);
see Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9,
2016). The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (quoting
Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted));
see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that substantial evidence exists
only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”). Evidence is not substantial if “it is
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overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or
“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114); see
K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The ALJ decision thus must be set aside if it “did not take into
account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict.” Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp.
at 284-85 (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular
format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the
record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000)); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an
expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of
the evidence which was rejected.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705-06; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121
(“Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, [s/]he must give some indication
of the evidence which [s/]he rejects and [the] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.”) (citing
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a
comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short
paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482. Absent such articulation, the Court
“cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Id. at 705. As
the Third Circuit explains:
Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight [s/]he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that [the] decision is
supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.
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Gober, 574 F.2d at 776; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85.
Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court can
enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate if the
record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or contains illogical or
contradictory findings. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is also appropriate if the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a
complete review which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the
record. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
A.B. on Behalf of Y.F. v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2016). A decision to “award
benefits should be made only when the administrative record of the case has been fully
developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is
disabled and entitled to benefits.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221-22 (citation and quotation
omitted); see A.B., 166 F. Supp.3d at 518. In assessing whether the record is fully developed to
support an award of benefits, courts take a more liberal approach when the claimant has already
faced long processing delays. See, e.g., Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000). An
award is “especially appropriate when “further administrative proceedings would simply prolong
[Plaintiff’s] waiting and delay his ultimate receipt of benefits.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 223;
see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 290.
B.
Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through
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four, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92
(3d Cir. 2007)).
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the
plaintiff is not disabled.
At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or
combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the plaintiff does not
have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the
plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of
Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or
combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12
months. Id. at §§ 404.1509, 416.909. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
(f), 416.920(e), (f). If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because
the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in
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the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the ALJ determines that the
plaintiff can do so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be
disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months.
III.
ALJ DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES
The Plaintiff was 31 years old on August 15, 2011, her alleged disability onset date. R.
24. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
that date. R. 16.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, depression, and anxiety disorder. Id. The ALJ also found that
Plaintiff’s diagnosed impairment of HIV-positive was not severe. R. 17.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not suffer an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any Listing. R. 17–
18.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work subject to
various additional limitations. R. 18–24. The ALJ also found that this RFC did not permit the
performance of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a nurse assistant. R. 24.
At step five, the ALJ found that a significant number of jobs—i.e., approximately
90,000 jobs as a ticket tagger; approximately 100,000 jobs as an inspector and packager;
approximately 100,000 jobs as a labeler—exist in the national economy and could be
performed by an individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC. R. 25. The ALJ
therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act from August 15, 2011, her alleged disability onset date, through the date the
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administrative decision. R. 25.
Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at steps three, four, and five and asks that the
decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff’s
Moving Brief, ECF No. 21. The Commissioner takes the position that his decision should be
affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ’s decision correctly applied the governing legal
standards, reflected consideration of the entire record, and was supported by sufficient
explanation and substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF
No. 25.
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises a number of challenges to the ALJ’s decision, including, inter alia, that
the ALJ erred at steps three and four of the sequential evaluation as it relates to her physical
impairments. Plaintiff’s Moving Brief, ECF No. 21, pp. 24–26, 35–39. Plaintiff specifically
contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical evidence at steps three and four
when concluding that Plaintiff’s spinal impairments did not meet or medically equal Listing
1.04A,2 which addresses disorders of the spine, and when crafting the RFC determination. Id.
Plaintiff’s arguments are well taken.
At step three, an ALJ considers whether the combination of the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments meets or equals the severity of one of the impairments in the Listing
of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). An impairment meets a
listed impairment if it satisfies “‘all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that
manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.’” Jones, 364
F.3d at 504 (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990)) (emphasis in original). “A
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Plaintiff does not argue that she meets or medically equals Listing 1.04B or 1.04C. Id. at 25 n.8.
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claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing that the overall
functional impact of his unlisted impairment or combination of impairments is as severe as that
of a listed impairment.” Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). “[T]he medical criteria
defining the listed impairments [are set] at a higher level of severity than the statutory standard”
because the “listings define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of his age,
education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just ‘substantial gainful
activity.’” Id. at 532 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a)). Although an ALJ is
not required to use “particular language” when determining whether a claimant meets a listing,
the ALJ’s discussion must provide for “meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (citing
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120). Accordingly, if the ALJ’s decision, “read as a whole, illustrates that
the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion that [the claimant] did not
meet the requirements for any listing,” “[t]his discussion satisfies Burnett’s requirement that
there be sufficient explanation to provide meaningful review of the step three determination.” Id.
Listing 1.04 addresses disorders of the spine (such as herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal
arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, vertebral
fracture) resulting in compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda equina) or the spinal cord.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04. To meet Listing 1.04A, a claimant must demonstrate
the following: (1) “evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic
distribution of pain,”3 (2) “limitation of motion of the spine,” (3) “motor loss (atrophy with
associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and,”
“‘Neuro-anatomic distribution of pain’ is generally defined as complaints of pain directly
generated by the compromised nerve.” McDaniel v. Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-28157, 2016 WL
1271509, at *8 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2016) (quoting Cates v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-111-TLW,
2013 WL 5326516, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(4) “if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and
supine)[.]” Id. at § 1.04A.
Here, the ALJ determined at step three that Plaintiff did not meet or medically equal
Listing 1.04, reasoning as follows:
Concerning Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the spine), the claimant has, at times, had
some of the clinical signs and symptoms needed to establish listing level nerve root
compression (section 1.04A). However, when muscle weakness has been found on
examination, it has not been specifically in a distribution associated with any
specific cervical spine nerve root(s) where imaging showed potential for nerve root
compression (Exhibits 7F at p. 7 and 9F at p. 4). Moreover, in July 2016 at the
most recent examination of the cervical spine the motor findings were grossly
normal (Exhibit 11F, p. 3). Regarding the lumbosacral spine, the record does not
reveal positive straight leg raising tests in the supine and seated positions. The
record does not document spinal arachnoiditis (section 1.04B) or lumbar spinal
stenosis either (section l.04C).
R. 17 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff challenges this evaluation, arguing, inter alia, that the ALJ’s reasoning regarding
muscle weakness constitutes nothing more than the ALJ’s lay medical opinion about where
nerve root compression should cause muscle weakness. Plaintiff’s Moving Brief, ECF No. 21, p.
24. In support of her argument, Plaintiff contends that neither of the ALJ’s two cited exhibits,
i.e., Exhibits 7F at p. 7 (R. 366) and 9F at p. 4 (R. 426), say anything about disharmony between
nerve root compression and findings of muscle weakness. Id. at 24–25 (citing R. 17, 366, 426).
Plaintiff therefore concludes that the ALJ relied solely on his4 own medical opinion to reject a
finding of nerve root compression. Id. at 25.
For his part, the Commissioner argues generally that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s step three determination; however, the Commissioner does not specifically respond to
Plaintiff mistakenly refers to the ALJ, Douglass Alvarado, as a woman. Plaintiff’s Moving
Brief, ECF No. 21, pp. 24–25.
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4
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ relied on his own lay opinion when assessing this medical
evidence. See Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF No. 25, pp. 5–7.
Plaintiff’s argument is well taken. Although the ALJ must consider the medical evidence,
“[a]n ALJ may not make purely speculative inferences from medical reports.” Smith v. Califano,
637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (same) (citations omitted).
“Nor is the ALJ allowed to ‘play doctor’ by using her own lay opinions to fill evidentiary gaps in
the record.” Johnson v. Saul, No. CV 18-1753, 2020 WL 1285836, at *12 (D. Del. Mar. 18,
2020); see also LaMontagne v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV916, 2015 WL 1811681, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
21, 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is not a doctor and must not substitute her own judgment as to medical
issues for actual medical evidence.”).
Here, neither Exhibit 7F at p. 7 (R. 366) nor Exhibit 9F at p. 4 (R. 426) explicitly refers to
a disconnect between nerve root compression and the muscle weakness associated with that
compression. See R. 366, 426. In addition, it is unclear on what “imaging” the ALJ intended to
rely when he found that Plaintiff’s established muscle weakness and nerve root compression
were not sufficient to meet Listing 1.04A. R. 17, 366, 426. It therefore appears to this Court that
the ALJ’s assessment in this regard reflects his own lay opinion. See Fuoti v. Saul, No.
3:18CV1119, 2020 WL 1244371, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020) (“Considering the ALJ relied
on medical evidence that neither discusses the plaintiff’s physical limitations nor clearly
contradicts the opinion of the plaintiff’s treating physician, we must conclude that it is his ‘lay
opinion’ and interpretation of the plaintiff’s medical records.”).
Notably, the Court cannot conclude, based on this record, that the ALJ’s error in this
regard is harmless. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that
error that would not affect the outcome of the case is harmless). Because the ALJ appears to have
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relied on his own lay opinion when determining that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 1.04A, the
Court cannot find that substantial evidence supports his step three determination. Cf. Knier v.
Berryhill, No. 3:16CV457, 2017 WL 2882289, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (“Instead of using
resources available to him, the ALJ independently assessed plaintiff’s abilities, thereby filling the
evidentiary gap with his own opinions unsupported by the medical record. This mistake is
reversible error.”); Simmonds v. Astrue, 872 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358–59 (D. Del. 2012) (“If the
conclusion was based on the ALJ’s own medical judgment (as it appears to have been), that
would be improper. The ALJ may not ‘play[ ] doctor.’”) (citing Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d
627, 629 (7th Cir. 2006)). This is true even if, ultimately, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that
she meets the requirements of Listing 1.04A. Cf. Gamret v. Colvin, 994 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698
(W.D. Pa. 2014) (“‘Even if enough evidence exists in the record to support the decision, [the
court] cannot uphold it if the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and
logical bridge between the evidence and the result.’”) (quoting Hodes v. Apfel, 61 F.Supp.2d 798,
806 (N.D. Ill. 1999)) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, as previously discussed, the ALJ’s
decision must contain “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to
permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Here, where the ALJ appears to have
improperly relied on his own lay opinion when assessing Plaintiff’s spinal disorders at step three,
it is unclear to what extent that error infected the ALJ’s consideration of the medical evidence at
step four when determining the RFC. R. 17–24. Accordingly, the Court cannot meaningfully
review the ALJ’s RFC finding and determine whether substantial evidence supports this finding
at step four. See Murphy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-20122, 2020 WL 7022746, at *6
(D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2020) (“The ALJ’s reliance on this misconception, along with other
unsupported mischaracterizations of Plaintiff’s physical abilities . . . permeates the ALJ’s
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decision. As stated above, these errors cannot be separated from the ALJ’s analysis of other
record evidence such that the Court may determine whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s RFC analysis.”); Belfon v. Berryhill, No. CV 1:17-490, 2018 WL 4691049, at *3 (D. Del.
Sept. 28, 2018) (“[W]hen incorrect evidence is relied upon, even if other appropriate reasons are
given, it is impossible for the court to determine how much the error corrupted the ALJ’s
determination.”) (citations omitted). This Court will not speculate as to how the ALJ reached his
decision but will instead remand the matter for further consideration even if, upon further
examination of these issues, the ALJ again concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits. See
Jiminez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-12662, 2020 WL 5105232, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 28,
2020) (“Once more, the ALJ did not provide an adequate explanation that would enable
meaningful review, and the Court once more cannot determine what role lay speculation played
in the ALJ’s rejection of this detailed functional assessment from Dr. Marks.”); Cassidy v.
Colvin, No. 2:13-1203, 2014 WL 2041734, at *10 n.3 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2014) (“Nevertheless,
that the ALJ may have misinterpreted or misunderstood Dr. Kaplan’s findings with regard to
Plaintiff's postural activities does not absolve her of her error. Rather, it highlights the need for
an ALJ to fully explain her findings. Otherwise, the district court is left to engage in this sort of
speculation about how an ALJ arrived at her decision.”); cf. Zuschlag v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 18-CV-1949, 2020 WL 5525578, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2020) (“On remand, the
ALJ may reach the same conclusion, but it must be based on a proper foundation.”). 5
Plaintiff asserts a number of other errors in the Commissioner’s final decision. Because the
Court concludes that the matter must be remanded for further consideration of Plaintiff’s spinal
disorders at steps three and four, the Court does not consider those claims.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS
the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
The Court will issue a separate Order issuing final judgment pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: April 21, 2021
s/Norah McCann King
NORAH McCANN KING
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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