DAVIS v. FROEHLICH et al

Filing 74

ORDER denying 72 Motion for Default Judgment; that the Clerk's Office is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 6/6/2023. (ld)(n/m)

Case 2:19-cv-10620-JMV-JBC Document 74 Filed 06/06/23 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 873

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ABDUL DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 19-10620
ORDER

v.
DENNIS BURKE, et al.,
Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for
default judgment as to Defendants Christopher Shaugnessy and Ivelisse Rodriguez (the
“Defaulting Defendants”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), D.E. 72; and it
APPEARING that Rule 55(b) authorizes a court to enter a default judgment against a
properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
However, “[t]he entry of default judgment is not a matter of right, but rather a matter of discretion.”
Allaham v. Naddaf, 635 F. App’x 32, 36 (3d Cir. 2015); and it further
APPEARING that before entering default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b), the court must
ensure (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and personal jurisdiction over the
parties, (2) the parties have properly been served, (3) the complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of
action, and (4) the plaintiff has proven damages. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Tulsipooja Hosp.,
LLC, No. 15-5576, 2016 WL 2605989, at *2 (D.N.J. May 6, 2016). The Court must accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the pleadings as true, except as to damages. Chanel, Inc. v.
Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535-36 (D.N.J. 2008). The Court must also consider (1)

Case 2:19-cv-10620-JMV-JBC Document 74 Filed 06/06/23 Page 2 of 4 PageID: 874

whether the party subject to default has a meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the
party seeking default if default is denied, and (3) the culpability of the party subject to default.
Allaham, 635 F. App’x at 36; and it further
APPEARING that “[w]here the motion for default judgment is made as to only one
defendant in a multi-defendant case, ‘the preferred practice is for the court to withhold granting
default judgment until the action is resolved on its merits against non-defaulting defendants.’”
Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 250, 258 (D.N.J. 2016) (quoting Animal
Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Mins. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849
(D.N.J. 2008)); see also 10A Charles A. Wright et al, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2690 (3d ed. 2015)
(when several defendants have closely related defenses, “entry of judgment also should await an
adjudication of the liability of nondefaulting defendants”). This is because courts do not want to
“create the risk of potentially inconsistent judgments.” Eteam, Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings,
Inc., No. 15-5057, 2016 WL 54676, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2016) (denying motion for default
judgment where allegations against defaulting and nondefaulting defendants were identical); see
also Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Control Bldg. Serv. Inc., No. 14-cv-5651, 2015 WL 7296034, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2015) (explaining that courts interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
“forbid[] the entry of a final judgment against one defendant while others continue to contest
liability in the district court . . . in situations where the liability of one defendant necessarily
depends upon the liability of the others.” (quoting Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 535 F.2d 742, 746
(2d. Cir. 1976))); and it further
APPEARING that Plaintiff asserts claims against multiple law enforcement officer
Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant violated his constitutional rights when executing

2

Case 2:19-cv-10620-JMV-JBC Document 74 Filed 06/06/23 Page 3 of 4 PageID: 875

an arrest warrant and conducting a search at Plaintiff’s residence, see generally TAC ¶¶ 13-19;
and it further
APPEARING that Plaintiff only requests default judgment as to the Defaulting
Defendants. D.E. 72. While it appears that both have both defaulted, see Aff. ¶¶ 2-5, D.E. 72-1,
other Defendants are actively litigating this case. In fact, this Court recently terminated multiple
Defendants’ (the “Moving Defendants”) motion for summary judgment that addressed whether the
Moving Defendants’ conduct was constitutional and if any immunity or abstention doctrines apply
in this matter. D.E. 65. This Court ordered the Moving Defendants to file a new motion for
summary judgment and statement of undisputed material facts. The Court further ordered that any
renewed motion must provide appropriate analysis for each of the Moving Defendants’ arguments,
D.E. 73; and it further
APPEARING that the Defaulting Defendants were involved in the same allegedly
unconstitutional conduct as the Moving Defendants.

The arguments raised in the Moving

Defendants’ terminated and likely renewed motion for summary judgment are directly relevant to
the Defaulting Defendants. Entering a default judgment at this time, therefore, would not be
prudent due to the risk of potentially inconsistent judgments; and it further
APPEARING that Plaintiff should wait and re-file his motion for default judgment after
this matter is resolved on the merits;
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown
IT IS on this 6th day of June, 2023, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to Defendants Shaughnessy
and Rodriguez (D.E. 72) is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

3

Case 2:19-cv-10620-JMV-JBC Document 74 Filed 06/06/23 Page 4 of 4 PageID: 876

ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

____________________________
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

4