STEELE v. MANGIONE, ESQ. et al
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jessica S. Allen on 11/29/2021. (bt, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
YUSEF STEELE,
Civil Action No. 19-21120 (BRM)
v.
Plaintiff,
OPINION
LOUIS A. MANGIONE, ESQ., et al.,
Defendants.
Before the Court is the motion of Pro se Plaintiff Yusef Steele (“Plaintiff”) for leave to file
an amended complaint. (ECF No. 14.) No oral argument was heard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
After considering the arguments in support of the Motion, 1 and for good cause shown, and for the
reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action arising from his March 2019
arrest and resulting prosecution on drug charges. See Compl., at 7, ECF No. 1. According to
Plaintiff, in October 2018, he was falsely accused of drug distribution while in a Motel 6 hotel
room wherein law enforcement discovered the presence of drugs. Id. He further alleges that law
enforcement did not have probable cause to arrest or prosecute him. Further, Plaintiff, who is
African American, claims he was unlawfully arrested based on selective enforcement in that the
police did not arrest any of the “white” people who came and went from the hotel room. See
Compl., at 7-10; ECF No. 1. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff filed suit against a Piscataway
police officer, identified as Defendant Alameda, for false arrest; against a state prosecutor,
The remaining named defendant, Carlos Alameda (“Alameda”) has not yet entered an appearance in this
case. Thus, he could not have submitted opposition, if any, to the instant motion.
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identified as Defendant Vitale 2, for malicious and selective prosecution; and against two public
defenders, identified as Mangione (“Mangione”) and Johnson (“Johnson”), for unspecified Section
1983 violations. Id. at 5-8.
On November 23, 2020, the Honorable Brian R. Martinotti, U.S.D.J issued a Memorandum
Order, screening Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (ECF No. 3). In
determining whether to sua sponte dismiss any claim, Judge Martinotti noted the “‘legal standard
for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).’”
Id. at 1 (citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (further internal citation
omitted)). Analyzing Plaintiff’s claims under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Judge Martinotti permitted
Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Alameda to proceed but dismissed the remaining claims
without prejudice against defendants Vitale, Mangione and Johnson. Id.
Concerning the claims against Mangione and Johnson, Judge Martinotti found that, as court
appointed counsel or public defenders acting within the scope of their professional duties as
Plaintiff’s legal counsel, they are “absolutely immune from civil liability under [Section] 1983.”
Id. at 4. As such, Judge Martinotti dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against them. Id. As to Plaintiff’s
cursory reference to an alleged conspiracy by Mangione and Johnson, Judge Martinotti found that
such cursory and bald-faced allegations were insufficient to support a conspiracy claim. Id. at 4
n.1. However, Judge Martinotti stated that Plaintiff could in theory plead sufficient facts indicating
a conspiracy, and thus, dismissed Defendants Mangione and Johnson without prejudice.
With respect to the malicious prosecution claim against Vitale, Judge Martinotti found that
Plaintiff referred to this defendant as “Vitalley” in his original complaint but “Vitale” in the current
motion and proposed amendment. For purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes that Plaintiff is
referring to the same person and will use the “Vitale” spelling of the named defendant herein.
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Plaintiff did not plead his prosecution was terminated in his favor, a necessary element of the
claim. As such, Judge Martinotti concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious
prosecution and dismissed it without prejudice. Id. at 4-5.
Judge Martinotti dismissed Plaintiff’s selective enforcement or prosecution claim without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. Judge Martinotti found that although Plaintiff alleged that he
was treated differently from individuals of another race, he did not plead facts showing that these
individuals were similarly situated to him. Id. at 5. In particular, Plaintiff did not plead that he
and the other individuals entered the motel room; like him, they were connected to the motel room
or were contacted by motel management; or their possessions were stored in the room. Id.
In light of his rulings, Judge Martinotti directed the Clerk of the Court to issue a summons
and the United States Marshall to serve a copy of the Complaint, summons and Court’s Order upon
defendant Alameda, and directed Alameda to file and serve a responsive pleading. (ECF No. 3).
Yet, beginning on January 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed several applications and motions. All appeared
to be different variations of his request to amend his complaint but none of which included any
proposed, red-lined pleading as required by Local Civil Rule 15.1(a)(1). (See ECF Nos. 6-8, 1012.) As such, on May 12, 2021, the Undersigned issued an Order, denying without prejudice all
of Plaintiff’s applications. (May 12 Order, ECF No. 13). The May 12 Order afforded him thirty
(30) days to file a single motion to amend that included a single proposed amended complaint
containing all proposed allegations, claims and defendants, as well as comported with the rulings
and conclusions set forth in Judge Martinotti’s Memorandum Order. Id. at 3.
On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to amend, which includes a proposed
pleading as an exhibit (ECF No. 14-7). His motion papers also include a litany of other documents,
comprised of a prior motion to amend and exhibits apparently relating to his state arrest and
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prosecution. Given the leniency afforded to pro se litigants and that Rule 7.1, like other Local
Civil Rules, are subject to relaxation specifically in the case of pro se litigants, the Court has
endeavored to review Plaintiff’s pro se submission liberally and with every permissible
indulgence. Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 n. 1 (3d
Cir.2009) (“[W]e
remain
mindful
of
our
obligation
to
construe
a pro se litigant's
pleadings liberally.”); see L. Civ. R. 7.1. From what the Court can discern, Plaintiff seeks to amend
his Complaint to add the following claims against certain previously dismissed defendants, as well
as add the following new parties and claims:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
claims against Vitale, previously dismissed, for fraud upon the court, spoliation of
evidence, and conspiracy to violate civil rights using a fraudulent lab report;
claims against Mangione, previously dismissed, for fraud and conspiracy;
claims against Wanda Aiken, an attorney with the Public Defender’s Office, for
conspiracy;
claims against a police officer, identified as “K Buco” for denying him access to
personal property;
a claim against a lab technician, identified as Briana Senger, who “conspired” with
unnamed other John Does to create false lab reports;
claims against a New Jersey Superior Court Judge, the Honorable Pedro J. Jimenez,
J.S.C., for fraud, conspiracy, wrongful death, and a violation of due process;
a claim against Defendant Alameda for conspiracy; and
claims against a state prosecutor, Laura Seborowski, for conspiracy and
falsification of evidence.
(See generally ECF No. 14-7 at 1-8.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend the pleading
at any point prior to trial “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Id.
Leave should be freely given by the Court “when justice so requires.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434
F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006). This mandate encompasses a broad range of equitable factors,
including whether there is (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice, (4) failure to cure
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deficiencies through previous amendments; or (5) futility of the proposed amendment. See, e.g.,
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1964). The decision to grant leave rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971).
A proposed amendment is futile if it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, in accordance with “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
12(b)(6).” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). In analyzing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir.
2002)).
Plaintiff’s “obligation [is] to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitlement to relief”; this
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are
plausible “is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The factual
allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
In sum, the Court must first separate the factual elements from the legal arguments of the
claim. Holmes v. Newark Pub. Sch., Civ. No. 13-765 (FSH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171348, at
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*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2013) at *6 (citing Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir.
2009)). Second, the court must determine if the facts as alleged are sufficient to demonstrate a
“‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. (citing Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210).
Finally, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Liberal construction does not “require the
Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Holmes v. Newark
Pub. Sch., Civ. No. 13-765 (FSH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171348, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2013)
(citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s motion identifies certain previously dismissed and newly added defendants as
well as proposed previously dismissed and new claims. However, a common theme throughout
his motion is the use of mere bald allegations, legal labels and unsupported legal conclusions. As
is explained herein, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment suffers from the same deficiencies as his
original complaint in that his amendment is devoid of any well-pleaded facts that would allow this
Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct as required by Iqbal or otherwise plead
facts sufficient to satisfy all the elements of his proposed legal claims. Thus, his proposed
amendments are futile based on failure to state a claim.
A. Vitale
Plaintiff appears to allege that Vitale committed “fraud upon the court” by spoliating and
fabricating evidence, as well as conspired “with other named defendants” to violate his civil rights.
(ECF No. 14-7 at 4, 8). Plaintiff’s proposed fraud claim seems to be premised on the notion that
“fraudulent lab reports” were used in connection with his criminal proceedings and that spoliation
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occurred because a “videotape” was allegedly not preserved. Id. Construed liberally, this appears
to be an attempt to plead Section 1983 claims alleging spoliation and fabrication of evidence.
“To state a successful [Section] 1983 claim for knowingly falsified evidence, a plaintiff
must show a reasonable likelihood that, absent that fabricated evidence, [he/she] would not have
been criminally charged, Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016), or
convicted, Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2014).” Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police,
747 Fed. Appx. 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotes omitted). However, “[i]f establishing these
elements would necessarily imply that the conviction [or charges] were invalid, the claims are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey until such time as the conviction is reversed, expunged by executive
order, [or] declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination.” Id. at
79 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)); see also Dickerson v. City of Atl. City,
2020 WL 4364349, at *2 (D.N.J. July 29, 2020). The Supreme Court’s Heck decision also bars
Section 1983-based spoliation of evidence claims when there remains a valid, underlying
conviction. See Brookman v. Twp. of Hilldside, 2009 WL 4730197, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2009)
(Section 1983 related claims, including spoliation of evidence claim, barred by Heck).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been reversed, expunged or declared
invalid by any state tribunal. As a result, any spoliation of evidence or fabrication of evidencebased Section 1983 claims against Vitale are futile. See Ebuzor-Onayemi v. Union County Police
Department, 736 Fed. Appx. 44, 46-47 (3d Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff’s attempt to plead a “conspiracy” claim against Vitale is also futile. It appears
that Plaintiff is attempting to plead a Section 1985 3 conspiracy involving Vitale and others,
Under the jurisdiction section of his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff refers to “1985 conspiracy”
as a “different or additional” basis for jurisdiction in addition to the Section 1983 claims alleged. (See ECF
No. 14-7 at 2.) The Court presumes Plaintiff is referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“Section 1985”).
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including prosecutors, attorneys, and public defenders, relating to the lab reports and other
evidence. (See ECF No. 14-7 at 4.) To plead a Section 1985 conspiracy, “a plaintiff must plead
facts indicating a meeting of the minds between the alleged conspirators, bald allegations of
conspiracy [are] insufficient.” (Memorandum Order dated November 23, 2020, at 4 n.1 (citing
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Judge Martinotti dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s attempt to plead a conspiracy
claim in this case because he did not plead any “facts indicating any conspiracy. . . .” Id. Plaintiff’s
proposed amended complaint does not cure this deficiency. Indeed, Plaintiff simply refers to
Vitale “conspiring with other defendants” to “spoliate evidence” and “utter fraudulent lab reports.”
(ECF No. 14-7 at 4.) These are bald assertions and unsupported legal conclusions are deficient for
the same reasons articulated by Judge Martinotti in his Memorandum Order. Further, Plaintiff’s
conspiracy-based allegations cannot support a viable claim because they appear to ultimately
challenge the validity of Plaintiff’s conviction, which remains valid at this point. See Heck, 512
U.S. at 487. Accordingly, plaintiff’s proposed claims against Vitale are futile.
B. Mangione
Plaintiff seeks to add fraud, conspiracy, and civil rights claims against his public defender
Mangione, 4 including, again, the claim that fraudulent lab reports were used at Plaintiff’s trial in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 14-7 at 4, 10.) As it relates to fraud based or
any similar Section 1983 claims, Judge Martinotti previously explained that “criminal defense
attorneys, ‘including public defenders and court-appointed counsel, acting within the scope of their
Based on this Court’s review of the proposed amendment, it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to assert
the same proposed claims against public defender Johnson, who Judge Martinotti previously dismissed
from this case. This uncertainty is of no moment. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to add Johnson again
and assert the same fraud, conspiracy, and civil rights claims against Johnson, the Court finds any such
proposed amendments are futile for the same reasons that the proposed claims against Mangione are
deemed futile.
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professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability’ under Section 1983.”
(Memorandum Order at 4 (quoting Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Therefore, any such claims stemming from alleged conduct committed while serving as Plaintiff’s
legal representative are futile. Plaintiff’s proposed Section 1985 conspiracy claim based on
Mangione’s alleged fabrication of evidence is futile for the same reasons that Plaintiff’s conspiracy
claim again Defendant Vitale fails.
C. Wanda Akin
Plaintiff purports to assert a conspiracy claim against a new defendant, attorney Wanda
Akin. However, again, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations to support a
conspiracy claim. Instead, he simply states that Akin is conspiring with the prosecutor to keep
him in prison and withhold evidence that supports a selective enforcement claim. (ECF No. 14-7
at 5). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege selective enforcement, it is not clear how such
a claim could apply to a defense attorney. Putting that aside, Judge Martinotti already dismissed
Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claims because he did not plead sufficient facts showing that he
and other individuals were “similarly situated.” In other words, beyond his own conclusory
assertions, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that these individuals were connected to
the motel room, contacted by hotel management, and/or had possessions stored in the same room
occupied by Plaintiff. (See Memorandum Order at 5.) Plaintiff’s proposed pleading does not
remedy this deficiency, and thus, the proposed amendments to add Akin as a defendant and assert
a conspiracy claim are futile.
D. K. Buco
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “K. Buco” – a Piscataway Police officer – denied his “right
to gain access to my property,” and “exercise my right as a free man to have access to my own
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property,” referencing the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 14-7 at 5.)
Rule 8(a) requires, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. Here, Plaintiff has
not sufficiently articulated what property he is referring to; how he was entitled to it; or why he
was denied access to it. In short, the pleading does not satisfy Rule 8’s requirement that defendant
be placed on reasonable notice of the claim asserted against it. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. Nor
does the pleading enable to the Court to sufficiently assess the context or viability of any claim for
deprivation of property. As a result, the claim as presently alleged violates Rule 8 and thus any
amendment to add K. Buco as a defendant and assert a claim is futile.
E. Briana Senger
As best can be gleaned from the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a stateemployed lab technician, identified as Briana Senger, “conspired” with others to create false lab
reports. (ECF 14-7 at 6-10.) Plaintiff appears to allege that the lab reports are fraudulent because
they are not dated and do not have a “color change” test, and that by “uttering these documents . .
. as true,” Senger allegedly engaged in a conspiracy. (Id. at 6.) Again, to plead a Section 1985
conspiracy, “a plaintiff must plead facts indicating a meeting of the minds between the alleged
conspirators, bald allegations of conspiracy [are] insufficient.” (Memorandum Order dated
November 23, 2020, at 4 n.1 (citing Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir.
2008))). Absent a more coherent pleading, any Section 1985 claim of conspiracy fails to raise a
plausible right to relief and is futile. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Finally, any Section 1983 claim
alleging falsification of evidence against Senger is futile due to Plaintiff’s still-valid conviction.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
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F. Honorable Pedro J. Jimenez, J.S.C.
Plaintiff appears to allege that a New Jersey Superior Court Judge, the Honorable Pedro J.
Jimenez, J.S.C., engaged in fraud and violated his due process rights. (ECF No. 14-7 at 6-7.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Jimenez is liable for the “wrongful death” of his fiancé, who
apparently died of a drug overdose in that had Judge Jimenez reopened his detention hearing and
granted Plaintiff’ bail he would have been able to prevent the overdose. Id. Judges are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity for conduct pursuant to their roles as judicial officers. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, any claims against Judge Jimenez are futile. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations are not
only based on speculation but are merely conclusory assertions, which do not state a claim for any
relief. Thus, any such claims against Judge Jimenez are futile on this independent ground.
G. New Claims against Alameda
Plaintiff appears to assert a 1985 conspiracy claim against Defendant Alameda. It appears
that his claim is based on a conclusory allegation that Alameda was involved in suppressing a
videotape. However, as Judge Martinotti explained in his November 23 Memorandum Order, to
plead conspiracy, a plaintiff “must plead facts indicating a meeting of the minds between the
alleged conspirators, bald allegation of conspiracy [are] insufficient.” (November 23 Order at 4
n.1.) Plaintiff’s proposed pleading does not contain such allegations. As such, Plaintiff has failed
to plead a viable conspiracy claim against Alameda.
H. Laura Seborowski
As best can be discerned from the proposed amendment, it appears that Plaintiff attempts
to allege that a prosecutor, identified as Laura Seborowski (“Seborowski”), has been conspiring
“to withhold video footage” because she was “aware” of a subpoena seeking the information.
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(ECF No. 14-7 at 8.) He also accuses Seborowski of “fraud upon the courts” and violating his
“14th Amendment rights” by attempting to use the supposedly false lab reports in court. Id.
As with his attempts to plead conspiracy against other defendants, Plaintiff makes
unsupported legal conclusions about a conspiracy that fail to satisfy the Iqbal/Twombly pleading
standard, and the standard reiterated in Judge Martinotti’s Memorandum Order. Moreover, as
explained previously, Plaintiff remains incarcerated; therefore, any attempt to assert a fabrication
of evidence-based Section 1983 claim involving lab reports against Seborowski is futile. See Heck,
512 U.S. at 487.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile. Accordingly,
the motion to amend [ECF No. 14] is DENIED.
Dated: November 29, 2021
cc:
s/ Jessica S. Allen___________
Jessica S. Allen
United States Magistrate Judge
Hon. Brian R. Martinotti, U.S.D.J.
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