HOBSON et al v. DOUBLE TREE SUITES BY HILTON PHILADELPHIA

Filing 22

OPINION. Signed by Judge Brian R. Martinotti on 7/30/2021. (qa, )

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LENDBERGH HOBSON and SHANEL
HOBSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 2:20-cv-06362 (BRM) (CLW)
OPINION

DOUBLE TREE SUITES BY HILTON
PHILADELPHIA,
Defendant.
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) filed by Defendant Double Tree
Suites by Hilton Philadelphia (“Defendant”) seeking to dismiss pro se Plaintiffs Lendbergh
Hobson and Shanel Hobson’s (“Plaintiffs”) Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (ECF No. 19.)
Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motion and having declined to hold
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below
and for good cause appearing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED and
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
I.

BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the

Amended Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also considers any
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory

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Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194,
1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
This matter arises from Plaintiffs’ stay at Defendant’s hotel during an undisclosed time
(ECF No. 15.) 1 From what the Court can draw from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs are
asserting a negligence claim against Defendant for damages stemming from “bed bug bites,” that
“affect[ed] [their] stay.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs contend Defendant had a “duty to warn” Plaintiffs of
possible bed bug infestation that ultimately led to Plaintiffs’ “damages.” (Id.) Plaintiffs assert the
Court has jurisdiction on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
On May 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed this action. (ECF No. 1.) On October 1, 2020, Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) On September 22, 2020, following a Request for Status
Conference and Proof of Service from Lendbergh Hobson (see ECF No. 7) the Court reviewed the
Complaint “and letters filed thereafter, which indicate Plaintiffs are alleging negligence” over a
defendant “whose citizenship is not alleged and damages in the amount of $25,000,” and
determined the Complaint was “insufficient for the Court to retain jurisdiction over the matter.”
(ECF No. 9) As such, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing “why this matter should
not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (Id.) On October 13, 2020, following a
Response to the Order to Show Cause by Lendbergh Hobson (ECF No. 12), the Court granted
Plaintiffs’ request to amend the complaint which the Court ordered “shall sufficient[ly] set forth
the Court’s basis for jurisdiction over the case and defendants.” (ECF No. 14.) On October 30,
2020, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) On November 4, 2020, Defendant

1

According to Plaintiffs’ first complaint, Plaintiffs stayed at Defendant’s hotel on May 23, 2018.
(See ECF No. 1.)
2

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filed the Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2), or alternatively, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16.) On December 7, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. (ECF
No. 19.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In considering dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a district court’s focus is

not on whether the factual allegations entitle a plaintiff to relief but rather on whether the court has
jurisdiction to hear the claim and grant relief. Maertin v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 241 F.
Supp. 2d 434 (D.N.J. 2002).
“A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a
factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack “challenges
the subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires
the court to ‘consider the allegations of the complaint as true.’” Id. (citing Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). A factual attack, on the other hand, “attacks the
factual allegations underlying the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of
an answer or ‘otherwise present[ing] competing facts.’” Id. (quoting Constitution Party of Pa. v.
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)). A “factual challenge allows a court [to] weigh and
consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, when a factual
challenge is made, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citing
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Rather, “the
plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist,” and the court “is free to
weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id.

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The Third Circuit has “repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits.” Davis, 824
F.3d at 348–49 (collecting cases). “[D]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely
because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is ‘so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Id. at 350 (quoting Kulick v. Pocono
Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987)). “In this vein, when a case raises a
disputed factual issue that goes both to the merits and jurisdiction, district courts must ‘demand
less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage.’” Id. (citing
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 (holding that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would be “unusual” when
the facts necessary to succeed on the merits are at least in part the same as must be alleged or
proven to withstand jurisdictional attacks)). These cases make clear that “dismissal via a Rule
12(b)(1) factual challenge to standing should be granted sparingly.” Id.
Here, the Court sua sponte considers a facial 12(b)(1) challenge before reaching the merits
of the pending motion. Therefore, the Court considers the allegations in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen, 549
F.2d at 891.
III.

DECISION
While no party challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation,

“federal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. v. Senjuu Pharm. Co.,
836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
Therefore, before considering the parties’ arguments on whether the Court has personal

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jurisdiction over this litigation or on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court must first be satisfied
it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Labs., Inc., 376
F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967) (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (3d Cir.
1963)). Indeed, “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [and] possess only that power
authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S.
546, 552 (2005) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
“They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded
by judicial decree.” United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Kokkonen,
511 U.S. at 377)). Consequently, when a federal court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over an action,
“the only function remaining . . . is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682
F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Multicultural Radio Broad., Inc. v. Korean
Radio Broad., Inc., Civ. A. No. 15-1961, 2017 WL 436250, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2017). Here, the
jurisdictional allegations of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are far from clear. However, because
Plaintiffs are acting pro se, the Court has carefully examined the Amended Complaint and other
submissions to determine whether any basis for federal court subject matter jurisdiction exists in
this case. Plaintiffs here appear to base subject matter jurisdiction on both federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Therefore, the Court will address both grounds for subject matter jurisdiction now.
A.

Federal Question Jurisdiction

A district court has federal question jurisdiction in any case where a plaintiff with standing
makes a non-frivolous allegation that he or she is entitled to relief because the defendant’s conduct
violated the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware

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County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d 1277, 1281 (3d Cir. 1993); Tornabene v. Target Corp., Civ. A.
No. 08-948, 2008 WL 11381586, at *1 (D.N.J. May 5, 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). If
jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the pleader claiming federal jurisdiction simply must
show that the federal claim is not frivolous. Radeschi v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 846 F.
Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Bartholomew v. Librandi, 737 F. Supp. 22, 23 (E.D. Pa.)),
aff’d, 919 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1990). While Plaintiffs have listed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in support of their
invocation of federal question jurisdiction, it is apparent from the face of the Amended Complaint
that this statute is not implicated by the allegations and that the Amended Complaint fails to present
a non-frivolous federal claim.
42 U.S.C § 1983 applies only to state actors. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). Despite Plaintiffs’ contention, 2 Defendant is not a state actor. Parr v.
Colantonio, 844 F. App’x 476, 479 (3d Cir. 2021) (where plaintiff failed to demonstrate private
entity was a state actor, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim would be dismissed); Marinari v. Trump
Plaza Hotel & Casino, Sec. Second Shift, Civ. A. No. 11-7172, 2012 WL 2087735, at *4 (D.N.J.
June 8, 2012) (noting that “regardless of applicable state licenses, hotels are not state actors”);
Bond v. State Farm Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 1:18-00176, 2019 WL 1493698, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4,
2019). As such, Plaintiffs do not state any claim that arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

2

Plaintiffs contend in their opposition that Defendant, along with its attorney, are “state actors”
because of their involvement in the “regulations of the hotel industry as a provision for housing,
the regulation of the insurance industry, and the regulation of the attorneys that represent all the
above.” (ECF No. 19 at 8.)
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B.

Diversity of Citizenship

The principle federal statute governing diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), provides
in pertinent part: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between [] (1) citizens of different states . . . . ”
In the present case, diversity of citizenship between the parties is not questioned. Rather,
at issue, which the Court raises sua sponte, is whether the damages amount alleged in the Amended
Complaint exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. The Court finds that it does not. In
determining whether the claim exceeds this threshold, the Court must assess “the value of the rights
being litigated,” Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993), or “the value of the object
of the litigation.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advers. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see also
Coregis Ins. Co. v. Schuster, 127 F. Supp. 2d 683, 686 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting 14B C. Wright,
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 77 (3d ed. 1998)) (“It is well-settled by
numerous judicial decisions . . . the amount in controversy for jurisdiction purposes is measured
by the direct pecuniary value of the right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect or the value
of the object that is the subject matter of the suit.”). If it appears from the pleadings or other
evidence to a “legal certainty that the claim is really for less” than that required for diversity
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff cannot refute the evidence, the action should be dismissed. St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289
(3d Cir. 1971); Bizzarro v. First Nat’l Bank, Civ. A. No. 1:18-173, 2019 WL 1043257, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 5, 2019), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2020).
Here, on the face of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim “the defendant owes $75,001.
Wherefore as to the collective plaintiffs, defendant owes and should pay minimally $75,001, the

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statutory amount to end this matter without further proceedings or $400,000 for this matter to go
through full litigation.” (ECF No. 15 ¶ 7.) The amount in controversy is measured “by a reasonable
reading of the value of the rights being litigated.” Id. (citations omitted). As the party invoking the
Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiffs have “the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835
F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 F.3d 495, 506–
07 (3d Cir. 2014)). This burden, however, is “not especially onerous.” Id.
In St. Paul Mercury, the Supreme Court prescribed the standard for determining whether a
plaintiff’s claims satisfy the amount in controversy requirement as follows:
The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases
brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different
rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is
apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to
justify dismissal.
Id. at 288–89 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
In applying the “legal certainty” test established by St. Paul Mercury, the Court of Appeals
has instructed that “dismissal is appropriate only if the federal court is certain that the jurisdictional
amount cannot be met.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir.
1995). In other words, the court retains jurisdiction unless a plaintiff’s claims are facially
“insubstantial” to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885
F.2d 66, 69–70 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974)).
“Accordingly, the question whether a plaintiff’s claims pass the ‘legal certainty’ standard is a
threshold matter that should involve the court in only minimal scrutiny of the plaintiff’s claims.”
Id. Stated differently, the controlling issue, therefore, is whether a reasonable reading of the
Amended Complaint shows that the value of Plaintiffs’ claim exceeds $75,000.00. Angus, 989
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F.2d 142 at 146. “[T]he rule for determining whether the case involves the requisite amount is
whether ‘from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot
recover the amount claimed, or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the
plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount.’” Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
357 F.3d, 392, 392 (3d Cir. 2004); Dolin v. Asian Am. Accessories, Inc., 449 F. App’x 216, 219
(3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and providing that
“[a]lthough we generally accept good faith claims in calculating the amount in controversy, we are
permitted to disregard a claim for jurisdictional purposes if, ‘from the proofs,’ it is a ‘legal
certainty’ that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover on a particular claim”). At this juncture, it is
entirely unclear as to whether the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000.
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely unlikely that the amount of controversy will exceed
$75,000. Plaintiffs have alleged nothing more than their stay was affected by bed bugs. (ECF No.
15 at 2.) The extent to which they were impacted or harmed is entirely absent from the face of the
Amended Complaint. The Third Circuit makes clear, “estimations of the amounts recoverable must
be realistic” and that an estimate of damages “should be objective and not based on fanciful, piein-the-sky, or simply wishful amounts, because otherwise the policy to limit diversity jurisdiction
will be frustrated.” Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 403; see also Nelson, 451 F.2d at 295 (lamenting
federal courts’ reluctance to scrutinize the amount in controversy requirement and noting that this
reluctance contributes to “clogging dockets, monopolizing trial rooms, and committing the
expense and energies of our system to a plethora of cases which do not belong in federal courts”);
see Blankenship v. Xlibris Corp., Civ. A. No. 06-709, 2007 WL 2713219, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14,
2007).

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Critically, because the Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint and
“sufficient[ly] set forth the Court’s basis for jurisdiction over the case and over the defendants,”
(ECF No. 14) and Plaintiffs have still been unable to establish the requisite subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice. See Credico v. CEO
Idaho Nat. Lab’y, 461 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint “without . . . leave to amend as any amendment would have been futile”);
Redmond v. Fresh Grocers Store, 402 F. App’x 685, 686 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); Emerson v. Thiel
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002); IpVenture Inc. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., Civ. A. No. 11-588,
2013 WL 126276, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2013) (choosing to dismiss claims with prejudice after
dismissing the same allegations without prejudice in an earlier action because it was “clear that
[p]laintiff cannot satisfactorily amend its [c]omplaint”); Potter v. City of Chester, Civ. A. No. 122058, 2012 WL 5464970, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) (recognizing that Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff “to request leave to amend a complaint” which “must
be permitted . . . unless it would be inequitable or futile”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. An appropriate order
follows.

Dated: July 30, 2021

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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