CAMILO v. LEOPIZZI et al

Filing 2

OPINION AND ORDER; that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED (ECF No. 1-1); that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order by regular mail upon the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the Administrator of East Jersey State Prison; that, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may submit an Amended Complaint within 45 days of the date of this Order to the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his Complaint; that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail and ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE this matter accordingly.. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 2/16/2021. (ld, )

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSE CAMILO

Civil Action No. 20-14937 (MCA)

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HONORABLE BRUNO L. LEOPIZZI, et

& ORDER

al.,
Defendants.

Pro se Plaintiff Jose Camilo, (“Plaintiff”), a convicted state prisoner presently
incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison, has filed a pro se Complaint alleging violations of his
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1. At this time, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1-1.
Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint for sua sponte dismissal
prior to service, and to dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune
from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons explained herein, the Complaint is
dismissed in its entirety pursuant to the Court’s screening authority.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant Complaint raises civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a civil

conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, arising from an allegedly illegal sentence
imposed in connection with Plaintiff’s 1982 murder conviction (“the illegal sentence claim”).
Plaintiff has also sued the New Jersey State Parole Board for denying parole on several

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occasions (the “parole denial claim”), and the New Jersey State Court Appellate Panel that
affirmed the denial of parole.
Specifically, Plaintiff has sued the Honorable Bruno L. Leopizzi for allegedly abusing his
authority in relying on illegal statements from witnesses and sentencing Plaintiff to an allegedly
illegal extended life sentence on September 15, 1982. See Complaint at 5-6, 10. Plaintiff has
also sued the Honorable Miguel A. De La Carrera, J.S.C. for refusing to vacate the illegal
sentence. In addition, Plaintiff has sued the Honorable Randolph M. Subryan, J.S.C. and the
Honorable Adolph A. Romei for vacating a portion of the illegal sentence but leaving the
remaining illegal sentence intact. See id. at 6, 11, 15. Plaintiff appears to assert that his sentence
is the result of systemic racism. See id. at 12.
Plaintiff faults the New Jersey State Parole Board for relying on “illegal statements,” in
denying parole, and also alleges retaliation and racial bias by the Parole Board:
These [illegal] statements were used in whole and in part to issue
the petitioner an additional twenty (20) year, two-hundred and
forty ( 240) month death sentence. A new sentence and when the
petitioner successfully had the Future Eligibility Term or the New
sentence vacated, the parole board in a retaliatory and racially
biased attempt to seek retribution against the petitioner, issued a
sixteen (16) year and eight month (200 month) Future Eligibility
Term, which at the petitioners current age of sixty-four ( 64) and
the current Covid 19 (Corona Virus) pandemic is in fact a death
sentence.
See id. at 12.
Plaintiff also sues the New Jersey Appellate Division Panel 1 that affirmed the denial of
parole. See id. at 12. He alleges that the panel upheld the allegedly illegal sentence and the
alleged racial bias and retaliatory conduct of the Parole Board. See id; see also Complaint at 15.

1

The New Jersey Appellate Panel and Judge Leopizzi, Judge De La Carrera, Judge Subryan, and
Judge Romei are collectively referred to as the “Judicial Defendants.”

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Plaintiff also appears to sue the prosecutor in his criminal case, Ronald G. Marmo,
because he “never made a written application for a discretionary motion for an extended term of
imprisonment under N.J.C.R. R. 3:21-4(e), which the judge used in his statement of [reasons] to
issue the extended term of confinement. . . . . [and] knew or should have known that the Court
Rule did not apply to petitioner[.]” See id. at 13.
Plaintiff also appears to sue his criminal defense attorney Anthony Fusco Jr. for allegedly
assisting the State and the Court in violating the petitioner’s constitutional rights, as Fusco knew
that the court’s imposition of an extended sentence was illegal because the state had not applied
for an extended term. See id. at 14.
Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages. See Complaint at 8. He does not
specifically seek equitable relief, such a new parole hearing.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the standard for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the Court’s screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially
plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303,
308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III.

ANALYSIS
a. Habeas vs. Civil Rights Actions
Because Plaintiff appears to challenge the results of his criminal proceedings, the Court

begins by explaining when a challenge to a criminal proceeding must be brought in a habeas
action and when it may be brought as either a habeas or civil rights action. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge
“the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see
also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481
(1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Instead, he or she must seek federal
habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78
(2005). These Supreme Court decisions stand for the proposition that prisoners may “use only
habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their
confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly
through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s
custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. As explained by the Court in Wilkinson,
a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in
that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.
Id. at 81–82. Thus, a prisoner’s challenge to a conviction, sentence, or parole proceeding that
necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the prisoner’s confinement are barred under wellestablished Supreme Court precedent.

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Nevertheless, under Wilkinson, parole challenges may be brought in a civil rights action
where the plaintiff seeks “to render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility . . .
or parole suitability” and does not seek an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release
into the community. Id. at 82. (Citations omitted). Such a suit under § 1983 would not
necessarily invalidate the fact or duration of confinement, and at best, would afford a new
eligibility review and speed consideration of a new parole application. See id.
Although Plaintiff purports to seek only damages, success on his illegal sentence claim
would necessarily invalidate the validity of that sentence, and the claim is thus barred under
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487. As to that claim, Plaintiff’s sole remedy is to file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88. His
illegal sentence claim is thus subject to dismissal without prejudice under the Court’s screening
authority and may not be reasserted unless Plaintiff can show that a state or federal court has set
aside the allegedly illegal sentence.
With respect to the parole denial claim, it is not clear if Plaintiff challenges the procedure
used to deny parole, the outcome of the proceeding, or both. Because he does not explicitly seek
release on parole, the Court does not find that it barred by Heck at this early juncture.
b. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986
The Court next considers Plaintiff’s federal claims against the individual Defendants.
Plaintiff characterizes his claims as violations of due process and cruel and unusual punishment,
which the Court construes as civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also
appears to assert a civil conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986.
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of
state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141,
146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but
merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Williams v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand
v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff
must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396
F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s claims against the New Jersey State Parole Board brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 fail because that entity is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. See Madden
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189, 1190 (3d Cir. 1971) (New Jersey State Parole
Board is not person under § 1983); Thrower v. The New Jersey State Parole Bd., 438 F. App’x.
71, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of New Jersey State Parole Board). The § 1983 claims
against the New Jersey State Parole Board are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
claim for relief pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff has sued multiple state court judges in connection with his illegal sentence and
parole denial claims. It is well established that judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for
monetary damages arising from their judicial acts. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, (1991);
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–27 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56
(1978). Courts must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is
applicable. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. “Second, a judge is not immune
for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12.

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With respect to the first inquiry, “the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a
‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Courts must “draw the line between truly
judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done
by judges,” such as administrative acts. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227.
As to the second inquiry, absence of jurisdiction is construed very narrowly. Thus, “[a]
judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he
has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57 (citation
omitted); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (an act “does not become less judicial by virtue of
an allegation of malice or corruption of motive”); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200
(1985) (“Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with
which their judicial acts are performed.”) (citation omitted). Immunity will not be forfeited
because a judge has committed “grave procedural errors,” Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, or because a
judge has conducted a proceeding in an “informal and ex parte” manner. Forrester, 484 U.S. at
227. Further, immunity will not be lost merely because the judge’s action is “unfair” or
controversial. See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 199–200 (immunity applies “however injurious in its
consequences [the judge’s action] may have proved to the plaintiff ”) (citation omitted); Stump,
435 U.S. at 363–64 (“Disagreement with the action taken by the judge ... does not justify
depriving that judge of his immunity.... The fact that the issue before the judge is a controversial
one is all the more reason that he should be able to act without fear of suit.”).

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In sum, the analysis of judicial immunity must focus on the general nature of the
challenged action, without inquiry into such “specifics” as the judge’s motive or the correctness
of his or her decision. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and
‘function’ of the act, not the ‘act itself.’ In other words, we look to the particular act’s relation to
a general function normally performed by a judge ....”) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Leopizzi, Judge De La Carrera, Judge Subryan, and
Judge Romei either sentenced him illegally and/or failed to vacate the illegal sentence. Even if
the Court assumes the truth of these allegations, these particular Judicial Defendants are entitled
to judicial immunity for sentencing plaintiff because sentencing is plainly a judicial act and
within their respective jurisdiction as state-court trial judges. Likewise, the Appellate Division
Panel is entitled to judicial immunity for affirming the New Jersey State Parole Board’s denial of
parole, which is also plainly a judicial act within the Panel’s appellate jurisdiction. The fact that
these Judges allegedly had improper motives, such as racial bias, does not defeat judicial
immunity. For these reasons, the § 1983 claims against the Judicial Defendants are dismissed
with prejudice on the basis of judicial immunity pursuant to the Court’s screening authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff also alleges misconduct by the prosecutor in his criminal case. Like judges,
“[p]rosecutors are ordinarily shielded by absolute immunity for their prosecutorial acts.” United
States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 270 (1993) (finding that prosecutors are immune from liability for appearing before a judge
and presenting evidence during a judicial proceeding). Here, the prosecutor allegedly argued for
an extended sentence in Plaintiff’s criminal case, which is indisputably a prosecutorial act. The

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Court will therefore dismiss the Complaint against the prosecutor on the basis of judicial
immunity.
Plaintiff’s civil rights claims against his criminal defense attorney are not actionable
under § 1983. “[P]ublic defenders are generally not considered state actors for § 1983 purposes
when acting in their capacities as attorneys.” Rieco v. Hebe, 633 F. App’x 567, 569 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (alteration in original) (no
state action for the purposes of § 1983 where public defender represented defendant in criminal
matter); see also Introcaso v. Meehan, 338 F. App’x. 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2009). Moreover,
ineffective assistance of appointed counsel in representing a defendant is not actionable under §
1983 to the extent it undermines the defendant’s conviction or sentence and must be brought in a
habeas petition after exhausting state court remedies. See Rushing v. Pennsylvania, 637 F.
App’x. 55, 58 (3d Cir. 2016) (“to the extent that [the plaintiff] was attempting to assert
ineffectiveness of counsel claims against his attorneys, those should have been brought in a
habeas petition” after exhausting the claims in state court). For these reasons, the Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Plaintiff’s public defender, and the
claims against him are dismissed on that basis.
The Court also addresses 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 because Plaintiff’s Complaint
asserts racial bias and mentions these civil rights conspiracy statutes in passing. From the outset,
civil rights conspiracies, whether brought under § 1983 or § 1985, require a “meeting of the
minds,” and to survive screening, a plaintiff must provide some factual basis to support the
existence of the elements of a conspiracy, namely, agreement and concerted action. See Startzell
v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)). Such conspiracies are not limited to persons who act under state law,

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but also reach private conduct that fits the terms of the statute. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 96-101 (1971).
Because Plaintiff alleges that his sentence and denial of parole are the result of systemic
racial bias, his allegations appear to implicate § 1985(3). “Section 1985(3) permits an action to
be brought by one injured by a conspiracy formed ‘for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws.’” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d
Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). The elements of a section 1985 claim are wellestablished and to survive a motion to dismiss a Plaintiff must allege the following: “(1) a
conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive,
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.
1997) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 (1971)). Notably, the Third Circuit has
further explained that a Section 1985(3) plaintiff must establish: “(a) that a racial or other classbased invidious discriminatory animus lay behind the coconspirators’ actions, (b) that the
coconspirators intended to deprive the victim of a right guaranteed by the Constitution against
private impairment, and (c) that the right was consciously targeted and not just incidentally
affected.” Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Spencer v.
Casavilla, 44 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1994)(emphasis supplied)).
Section 1986 is a companion to Section 1985(3) and provides a cause of action against
persons who, knowing that a violation of § 1985(3) is about to be committed and possessing the
power to prevent its occurrence, fail to take action to frustrate its execution. Rogin v. Bensalem

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Tp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). “[T]ransgressions of
§ 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of § 1985.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d
1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994). In addition to establishing the existence of a Section 1985
conspiracy, a plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1986 must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant
had actual knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, (2) the defendant had the power to prevent or aid
in preventing the commission of a § 1985 violation, (3) the defendant neglected or refused to
prevent a § 1985 conspiracy, and (4) a wrongful act was committed.” Id.
Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations arising under §§ 1985 and 1986 are premised on bald
allegations in his Complaint. Although Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion his sentence and
denial of parole are the result of systemic racial bias and retaliation, he fails to provide any wellpleaded facts supporting the “the principal element of [a civil rights conspiracy], which is an
agreement between the parties ‘to inflict a wrong against or injury upon,’ and ‘an overt act that
results in that damage.’” Russo v. Voorhees Twp., 403 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (D.N.J. 2005) (citing
Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 882 (7th Cir.1983)). 2 The Complaint also provides no facts
from which the Court could find that “an invidious discriminatory animus lay behind the
coconspirators’ actions” and that the Defendants consciously and intentionally discriminated
against him on the basis of his race. See Brown, 250 F.3d at 805. For these reasons, the Court
dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s race-based conspiracy claims brought pursuant to §
1985(3).
Because “transgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of §
1985”, Clark v. Claybaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (1994), and Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded

2

The Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff also alleges a conspiracy under § 1983, he does not
sufficiently allege agreement and concerted action with respect to any of the Defendants.

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a violation of § 1985, the Court also dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims
under § 1986. See Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 841 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Having failed to state
a claim under s 1985(2), a fortiori appellants failed to state a claim under s 1986.”).
The Court will permit Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint, see Fletcher-Harlee
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that in civil
rights cases, the Court must allow amendment, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile), to
the extent he can provide facts to cure the deficiencies in his claims. Because the illegal sentence
claim is barred by Heck, the Court will not permit Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint with
respect to his illegal sentence claim unless he is able to show that the sentence at issue has been
set aside by a state or federal court. Plaintiff may not assert § 1983 claims against any of the
Judicial Defendants or the New Jersey Parole Board, but he may name the individual members of
the parole board to the extent he challenges parole procedures or suitability and seeks a new
parole hearing (rather than damages). 3
For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants
Plaintiff’s IFP application, and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS, THEREFORE, on this 16th day of February 2021,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED
(ECF No. 1-1); and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint shall be filed; and it is further

3

Plaintiff is also free to file a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in a separate action
to the extent Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies as to his most recent denial of
parole.

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ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and for purposes of account deduction
only, the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order by regular mail upon the Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey and the Administrator of East Jersey State Prison; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is assessed a filing fee of $350.00 and shall pay the entire filing
fee in the manner set forth in this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2), regardless of
the outcome of the litigation, meaning that if the Court dismisses the case as a result of its sua
sponte screening, or Plaintiff’s case is otherwise administratively terminated or closed, § 1915
does not suspend installment payments of the filing fee or permit refund to the prisoner of the
filing fee, or any part of it, that has already been paid; and it is further
ORDERED that pursuant to Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 632 (2016), if Plaintiff
owes fees for more than one court case, whether to a district or appellate court, under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provision governing the mandatory recoupment of filing fees,
Plaintiff’s monthly income is subject to a simultaneous, cumulative 20% deduction for each case
a court has mandated a deduction under the PLRA; i.e., Plaintiff would be subject to a 40%
deduction if there are two such cases, a 60% deduction if there are three such cases, etc., until all
fees have been paid in full; and it is further
ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), in each month that the amount in
Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall assess, deduct
from Plaintiff’s account, and forward to the Clerk of the Court payment equal to 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account, in accordance with Bruce, until the
$350.00 filing fee is paid. Each payment shall reference the civil docket numbers of the actions
to which the payment should be credited; and it is further

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ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further
ORDERED that the § 1983 claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE as to the New
Jersey State Parole Board and it is further
ORDERED that the § 1983 claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE as to the Judicial
Defendants on the basis of judicial immunity; and it is further
ORDERED that the illegal sentence claim brought pursuant to § 1983 is dismissed
without prejudice on the basis of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994), and Plaintiff may
not reassert this claim unless he can show that the allegedly illegal sentence has been set aside by
a state or federal court; and it is further
ORDERED that the remaining claims and Defendants are dismissed WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff may
submit an Amended Complaint within 45 days of the date of this Order to the extent he can cure
the deficiencies in his Complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail and ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE this
matter accordingly.

s/Madeline Cox Arleo
Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo
United States District Judge