POWELL v. REGION 2 IV-D AGENCY & PATRICIA RISCH

Filing 22

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jamel K. Semper on 8/30/2024. (wh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MILES POWELL,

Civil Action No. 23-4119

Plaintiff,
v.
REGION 2 IV-D AGENCY & PATRICIA
RISCH,

OPINION
August 30, 2024

Defendant.
SEMPER, District Judge.
The current matter comes before the Court on Patricia Risch’s (“Defendant”) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Miles Powell’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (ECF 1, “Compl.”) pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF 9, “MTD.”) The Court reviewed all submissions in support and in
opposition and decided the motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
Pro se Plaintiff brings this action stemming from the state court garnishment of his wages

for his failure to make child support payments. (ECF 1, Compl. at 2-3.) Plaintiff requested the
closure of his case and decision to withdraw from participation in the IV-D program. (Id.) He
alleges that Defendant, as Director of the Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”), violated his

The allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true solely for purposes of this Motion, except where
conclusory and/or implausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
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constitutional rights by collecting court-ordered child support arrears from him and for not closing
his case upon his request. (Id. at 2-3, 5-6, 10-20.) The Complaint alleges violations of the Fourth,
Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Bill of Attainder Clause pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks removal of arrears against him, a “refund” of $30,000
previously garnished from him for unpaid child support, and “6% interest” on the amount. He asks
this Court to close his family court case and award him compensatory and punitive damages and
costs of suit. (Id. at 20-21.)
Plaintiff filed this suit on July 31, 2023. (See ECF 1, Compl.) Defendant Patricia Risch
filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on January 30, 2024. (ECF 9, MTD.) Magistrate
Judge Almonte entered a series of Orders directing Plaintiff to effectuate proper service of process
on the agency defendant. (ECF 11; ECF 13; ECF 15; ECF 18.) Because Plaintiff failed to effect
service of process, the agency defendant was dismissed from this action with prejudice pursuant
to Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. (ECF 21.) Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant Risch’s
Motion. (Id.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Although Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the instant motion, “the Court must address

unopposed motions to dismiss a complaint on the merits.” Wiggins v. String, No. 12-3176, 2013
WL 1222676, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (citation omitted); Cooper v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP,
912 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (D.N.J. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Greene v. LexisNexis Risk
Solutions Inc., No. 23-3107, 2024 WL 471573, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2024).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to
dismiss a count for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” To withstand a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
complaint is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content “that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability
requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of [his] claims.” Id. at 789.
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not compelled
to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as
factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, after viewing the
allegations in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., No. 10-02945, 2010 WL 5146765, at
*1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010). It is well established that a pro se complaint “however inartfully
pleaded[,] must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court is obligated to construe
pro se claims liberally and afford pro se plaintiffs the benefit of every doubt. Alexander v.
Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2005).

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III.

ANALYSIS
Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the Court will first consider the Court’s

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. A federal district court’s duty to exercise its jurisdiction
conferred by Congress is “virtually unflagging.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S.,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). There are limited circumstances, however, where a court may or must
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.
A. Younger Abstention Doctrine
Abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
is rooted in “a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). “Dismissal on abstention grounds without retention of
jurisdiction is in the nature of a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Gwynedd Properties,
Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1206 n.18 (3d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “courts in
this District have treated [a motion to dismiss on the basis of] Younger abstention as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . in that matters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered.”
Yarborough v. Johnson, No. 18-2688, 2018 WL 6567701, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2018) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Frederick of Family Gonora v. Risch, No. 23-893, 2023
WL 8271932, at *3 n.8 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023).
Federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger abstention
doctrine in three categories of proceedings: “(1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain
civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely
in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S.
Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.

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69, 78-79 (2013)) (quotations and additional citations omitted). If a court finds that the subject
proceeding fits one of the above categories, the court must then consider the additional Middlesex
factors: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims.” Malhan, 938 F.3d at 462 (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81-82 and Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 423).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims appear to stem from ongoing garnishment proceedings. Though
difficult to construe, the Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to close his child support case
and garnished his employment wages. (ECF 1, Compl. at 5, 7, 14-15, 17-19.) Plaintiff also asks
this Court to close his family court case. (Id. at 20-21.)
Importantly, courts in this Circuit have overwhelmingly abstained under the Younger
doctrine when faced with challenges to ongoing child support proceedings. See, e.g., Gittens v.
Kelly, 790 F. App’x 439, 441 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“To the extent that the state court
proceeding regarding [plaintiff’s] child support obligations were ongoing, the District Court
properly invoked the Younger abstention doctrine.”); Dixon In re Burrell, 626 F. App’x 33, 35 (3d
Cir. 2015) (denying petition for writ of mandamus because “[f]ederal courts usually abstain from
deciding civil actions such as [plaintiff’s] where state child support proceedings implicate
important state interests, and the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise
claims.”); DiPietro v. New Jersey Fam. Support Payment Ctr., 375 F. App’x 202, 205 (3d Cir.
2010) (“The District Court correctly found that the requirements for abstention are met” in a case
challenging ongoing child support obligations); Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 556 (3d Cir.
2007) (same); see also Frederick of Family Gonora, 2023 WL 8271932, at *3-5; Spageage
Consulting Corp. v. Porrino, No. 17-6299, 2018 WL 1169133, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2018) (“The

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State Garnishment Order was issued as part of a matrimonial, child custody, and child support
dispute . . . that is ongoing in New Jersey state court.”). Thus, this Court’s intervention is barred
by the Younger abstention doctrine. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s ongoing garnishment
proceeding fits into the third category of cases wherein courts should abstain under Younger:
pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’
ability to perform their judicial functions. See Dormevil v. Domestic Rels. Off. Delaware Cnty.
Pennsylvania Child Support Agency, No. 23-3025, 2023 WL 6144845, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
2023) (“Child support cases fall squarely in the third category of exceptional cases.”).
Because this matter falls into one of the requisite categories, the Court now turns to the
Middlesex factors. Beginning with the first factor, the Court finds that there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature. “State proceedings are pending only if they are initiated
before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Malhan,
938 F.3d at 464. As noted above, the Complaint alleges the existence of a state court proceeding
that appears to be ongoing. (See ECF 1, Compl. at 5.) See DiPietro, 375 Fed. App’x at 204 (finding
that child support proceedings are ongoing because “New Jersey courts are charged with
monitoring, enforcing, and modifying child support obligations throughout the duration of a child
support order” (citing Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2003)); Yarborough, 2018
WL 6567701, at *2 (finding that child support obligations constitute ongoing state proceedings
(citing Anthony, 316 F.3d at 420)).
Regarding the second factor, the Third Circuit has held that “there is no question that state
child support proceedings implicate important state interests.” DiPietro, 375 Fed. App’x at 205;
see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state
concern”). Finally, assessing the third factor, there is a presumption that state courts are equally

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competent and willing to hear federal statutory and constitutional claims. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987). Plaintiff does not allege obstacles to raising his grievances in state
court. As such, there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff would not be afforded adequate
opportunity to raise his claims in state court. See DiPietro, 375 Fed. App’x at 205 (finding that
plaintiff challenging child support obligations was “able to raise his claims in state court and to
appeal adverse decisions through the state appellate system and to the United States Supreme
Court.”). The Court therefore finds that Younger abstention applies. The Court accordingly
declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenges to the ongoing garnishment
proceedings.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless finds that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant fail because Defendant is immune from suit based on the doctrine of
quasi-judicial immunity, and Plaintiff fails to state a bill of attainder claim.
The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity “evolved out of its well-known namesake, judicial
immunity,” which protects judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction. Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018). The fair
administration of justice depends not only on judges, however. Id. Thus, the immunity doctrine
has been extended to “certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial
process,” id. (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985)), including “those who serve
as arms of the court, . . . fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the court’s request,” id. (quoting Hughes
v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted)). The Third Circuit has
explained that quasi-judicial immunity “extends only to the acts authorized by court order, i.e., to

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the execution of a court order,” but not to the manner in which a court order is executed. Russell,
905 F.3d at 250.
Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant liable for OCSS’s role in executing court orders
pertaining to Plaintiff’s garnishment proceedings. (ECF 1, Compl. at 2.) These claims are barred
by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. See Frederick of Family Gonora, 2023 WL 8271932,
at *6; see also Dormevil, 2023 WL 6144845, at *6 (finding that the director and officers of the
office of domestic relations were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions in connection
with child support proceedings).
Finally, Plaintiff also fails to bring a claim against Defendant based on the Bill of Attainder
Clause. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.
Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). The garnishment proceeding challenged
by Plaintiff does not constitute a legislative act. See, e.g., Stanko v. Obama, 434 F. App’x 63, 66
(3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a prisoner’s argument that his disciplinary hearing constituted an
unlawful bill of attainder was a “non-starter” because it is not a legislative act). As such, the Court
finds dismissal with prejudice appropriate and finds it unnecessary to address Defendant’s
remaining arguments.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 9) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order
follows.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper
HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER
United States District Judge

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Orig: Clerk
cc:
José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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