OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 1/28/2025. (dam)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JHESSYCA O.,

Civil Action No. 23-23123 (SDW)
Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.
COMMISSIONER
SECURITY,

OF

SOCIAL

January 28, 2025

Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Plaintiff Jhessyca O.’s (“Plaintiff”) 1 appeal of the final administrative
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) with respect to Administrative
Law Judge Ricardy Damille’s (“ALJ Damille”) denial of Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). (D.E. 1.) This Court has
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Venue is proper under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This appeal is decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
A.

Procedural History

On June 26, 2020, Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging disability beginning on January 1,
Plaintiff is identified only by her first name and last initial in this opinion, pursuant to Standing Order 2021-10,
issued on October 1, 2021, available at https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/ files/SO21-10.pdf.
1

1

2020.

(D.E. 5 (Administrative Record (“R.”)) at 64.)

The Commissioner initially denied

Plaintiff’s claim on March 16, 2021, and upon reconsideration on February 22, 2022. (R. 64, 73.)
On August 9, 2022, ALJ Damille held a telephonic administrative hearing and on November 7,
2022, he issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 17–27.) On October
27, 2023, the Appeals Council denied review (R. 1–3), making the ALJ’s decision the
Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 406.1481; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff then filed
the instant appeal in this Court, and the parties timely completed briefing. (D.E. 1, 6, 10, 11.)
B.

Factual History 2

Plaintiff was born on February 7, 1989 and alleges she became disabled on January 1, 2020
(the “alleged onset date”) at thirty-one years old. (R. 38, 151.) Plaintiff has a limited education
and previously worked as a cashier at McDonald’s, a waitress, and most recently, a telemarketer.
(R. 37, 207, 230.)
1. Medical Record
The earliest documentation of Plaintiff’s mental impairments in the record is from 2019.
(See R. 284–90.) In February 2019 Plaintiff reported she felt “a little depression,” but denied
suicidal or homicidal ideation. (R. 1615.) Progress notes from February 19, March 27, and May
2, 2019 indicate Plaintiff’s past medical history included mood disorder and borderline personality
disorder (“BPD”). (R. 284, 286, 288.) During her May 2, 2019 visit at Zufall Health Center,
Plaintiff was re-prescribed psychiatric medications to help with the BPD after prematurely giving
birth and losing a pregnancy. 3 (R. 284–85, 948.)
On July 11, 2019, Plaintiff, then approximately two months pregnant, visited the Newton
Medical Center (“NMC”). (R. 947.) She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
2
3

This opinion discusses only the portions of the factual record relevant to Plaintiff’s appeal.
Plaintiff stopped taking psychiatric medications during her pregnancy. (R. 284.)

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(“PTSD”), related to the loss of her prior pregnancy, and bipolar affective disorder. (R. 947–48.)
During a later follow-up appointment at NMC, Plaintiff expressed she still felt depressed and was
given samples of Latuda. 4 (R. 913.) In November 2019, Plaintiff inquired about being prescribed
methadone 5 and by early December 2019, she indicated feeling “much better” as a result of the
methadone treatment. (R. 890–91.) The methadone dosages were increased in January 2020. (R.
873.) On February 8, 2020, Plaintiff gave birth. (R. 850.)
On December 28, 2020, Doctor Marc Friedman, Ph.D., conducted a mental status
evaluation of Plaintiff. (R. 1553.) Doctor Friedman concluded Plaintiff showed symptoms
consistent with diagnoses of BPD, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and a learning disorder. (R. 1555.)
Doctor Friedman reported Plaintiff’s social interaction skills were somewhat limited and that her
working memory “appeared to be severely impaired,” but that she could comprehend and follow
multi-step directions. (R. 1555–56.)
Approximately six months later, on June 1, 2021, Doctor Steven Sarner, M.D., completed
a mental residual functional capacity questionnaire. (R. 2379–85.) Doctor Sarner, who has treated
Plaintiff since she was nineteen years old, indicated Plaintiff suffered from “extreme” depression,
anxiety, lack of energy, a low IQ or reduced intellectual functioning, and that her moods fluctuate.
(R.

2381,

2384.)

He

noted

that

at

work,

Plaintiff

“starts off ok” but then her paranoia increases. (R. 2383.) According to Doctor Sarner, Plaintiff
never held a job for more than seven months and her impairments would cause her to be absent
about three days per month. (R. 2383, 2385.) However, he also indicated Plaintiff’s prognosis

4
Latuda (lurasidone) is an antipsychotic medication that can treat mental health conditions like schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder.
Cleveland Clinic, Lurasidone Tablets, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/drugs/19890lurasidone-tablets (last visited Jan. 26, 2025).
5
Methadone is a medication used to treat opioid use disorder and to manage pain. Substance Abuse & Mental Health
Svcs. Admin., Substance Use Disorder Treatment Options, https://www.samhsa.gov/substanceuse/treatment/options/methadone (last updated Apr. 11, 2024).

3

was “good” and that Plaintiff could manage benefits in her own best interest. (R. 2385.)
On September 14, 2021, Doctor Felix Geller, M.D., diagnosed Plaintiff with adjustment
disorder with depressed mood; opioid use disorder; opioid withdrawal; post-traumatic stress
disorder (past history); and bipolar 1 disorder. (R. 2390.) Thereafter the record contains weekly
psychotherapy progress notes from September 2021 to August 2022. (See generally R. 2393–
2530.)
Doctor Jane Esposito, Psy.D., conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on February
4, 2022. (R. 2332–34.) Doctor Esposito’s recorded impressions were: PTSD; major depressive
disorder, recurrent and mild to moderate; generalized anxiety disorder; and opioid dependence, in
full remission. (R. 2334.) Doctor Esposito noted Plaintiff had “some difficulty with her thought
processes,” but that her short-term and long-term memory, as well as her insight, judgment, and
impulse control, appeared to be “fair.” (Id.)
Lastly, the record contains a Function Report from Plaintiff, dated July 14, 2020, and a
Third-Party Function Report from Plaintiff’s mother, Catherine Owens, dated July 17, 2020. (R.
213–29.) Plaintiff describes struggling with behavioral problems since she was a child. (R. 220.)
She indicated she had “severe racing thoughts” and difficulty focusing, such that she has never
held a job longer than seven months. (R. 213.) She described feeling “out of whack” until taking
her medicine on a daily basis. (R. 214.) In her Third-Party Report, Plaintiff’s mother indicated
Plaintiff had “severe ups and downs,” a short attention span, a difficult time following directives
when emotional, and that her moods affected her time management. (R. 221.) She reported
Plaintiff cooks and cleans and that these activities are helpful when Plaintiff has “racing
thoughts/anxiety.” (R. 223.) Plaintiff’s mother noted Plaintiff does not handle stress well and that
change gives her anxiety. (R. 227.) Plaintiff’s mother disclosed Plaintiff has struggled with her

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mental health since she was eight years old. (R. 229.)
2. Administrative Hearing
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing held on August 9, 2022.
(R. 32, 34.) ALJ Damille heard testimony from Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert Joseph
Young. (See generally R. 32–60.)
Plaintiff testified as to how her background and the alleged mental impairments affect her
daily living, as well as what she believed stops her from being able to work. Throughout her
testimony Plaintiff either alluded to or directly described abusive or traumatic experiences she
went through as early as her childhood. For example, she mentioned witnessing her mother be in
a “really bad domestic relationship,” undergoing therapy as a child, and being sexually abused
when she was twelve years old. (R. 43, 52.) She explained she had been seeing Doctor Sarner
since she was eighteen years old. (R. 45–46.) At the time of the hearing Doctor Sarner was treating
Plaintiff for her PTSD, anxiety, and depression. (R. 45.) She also explained she received
individual therapy, saw a psychiatrist, and had a “medical marijuana doctor.” (Id.)
Plaintiff described how her depression “affects everything,” with every day being like
“Russian Roulette” when she wakes up. (R. 44, 49.) She explained she had been taking methadone
for almost three years and that she “pretty much rel[ied] on it to feel normal.” (R. 49–50.)
However, she expressed she still has flashbacks and panic attacks—including when at work—but
could not identify any specific triggers. (R. 51–52.) She also stated she takes Gabapentin for her
anxiety and depression and used to take Lexapro and Trileptal—which helped with her moods—
until she became pregnant. (R. 46–47.)
Plaintiff stated she has “a really hard time” concentrating, focusing, and staying on task
when ALJ Damille asked her what stopped her from being able to work. (R. 39.) Plaintiff admitted

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to walking out on the job three to four times while employed at McDonald’s due to her “very
aggressive” boss. (R. 43.) She also admitted she was “late a lot” because she “had a hard time
with time management.” (R. 44.) Plaintiff described experiencing “at least three” panic attacks
per week while on the job and explained when she had a panic attack or flashback, she would ask
her boss to take a small break. (R. 42, 51–52.)
VE Young opined that an individual the same age and with the same education and work
experience as Plaintiff could not perform Plaintiff’s past work with no exertional restrictions. (R.
55.) However, he opined such an individual could handle work involving few workplace changes
and occasional decision-making and interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. (Id.)
According to VE Young, this person would be capable of performing the jobs of cleaner I,
industrial; merchandise marker; and routing clerk. (R. 55–56.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court exercises

plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ and upholds factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence. Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024); 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (“The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)).

Under the substantial evidence standard, the threshold for evidentiary

sufficiency is not high. Id. An ALJ’s decision cannot be set aside merely because this Court
“acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,

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804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986). So long as the ALJ’s decision sufficiently develops the record
and explains its findings to permit meaningful review, the ALJ need not “use particular language
or adhere to a particular format” when conducting the analysis. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,
505 (3d Cir. 2004).
B. The Five-Step Disability Test
To make a disability determination, the ALJ follows a five-step, sequential analysis. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–03 (3d Cir. 2019). The
ALJ determines whether the claimant: first, is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity
(“SGA”); second, has a “severe” and “medically determinable” impairment; and third, has an
impairment, or combination thereof, that is equal to or exceeds one of those included in the Listing
of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Appendix”). 20 C.F.R. §§
416.920(a)(4)(i)–(iii). Prior to reaching the fourth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), which is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her]
limitations,” as it relates to meeting “the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.
Id. §§ (a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). Then, at step four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can
still do his or her past relevant work 6 by comparing his or her RFC to the “physical and mental
demands” of that work. Id. §§ (a)(4)(iv), (f). Lastly, at step five the ALJ decides whether the
claimant “can make an adjustment to other work” considering his or her RFC, age, education, and
work experience. Id. § (a)(4)(v). The claimant bears the burden of proof at all steps except step
five, where the burden is on the Commissioner. Hess, 931 F.3d at 201.
III.

DISCUSSION
A. The ALJ’s Decision

Past relevant work is work performed by the claimant “within the past five years that was substantial gainful activity
and that lasted long enough” for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1)(i).

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On November 7, 2022, ALJ Damille issued a decision concluding Plaintiff was not disabled
under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. 7 (R. 27.) At step one, ALJ Damille found Plaintiff had
not engaged in SGA since June 26, 2020. (R. 19.) At step two, the ALJ concluded the following
impairments were severe and significantly limited Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work
activities: carpal tunnel syndrome, a depressive disorder, an adjustment disorder, an anxiety
disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder, and history
of drug abuse. (R. 20.) ALJ Damille determined the evidence did not establish severe impairments
involving dyslexia, asthma, and hepatitis C. (Id.)
At step three, ALJ Damille concluded Plaintiff’s impairments, individually or in
combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of those listed in the Appendix. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ explained, did not meet the criteria of the
neurological listings under section eleven of the Appendix. (Id.) Similarly, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s moderate limitations 8 related to her mental impairments did not equal the criteria of
listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, 12.11, and 12.15. (Id.) He found that neither the paragraph B or C
criteria of the mental impairments listings were met. (R. 21.)
As to Plaintiff’s RFC, ALJ Damille concluded Plaintiff can “perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels,” save some non-exertional limitations. (R. 22.) First, he considered
whether the evidence in the record demonstrated a medically determinable mental impairment that
could reasonably be expected to produce Plaintiff’s symptoms. (R. 23.) ALJ Damille noted
Plaintiff had a “history of substance abuse” and “treated with methadone maintenance,” relying on
Section 1614(a)(3)(A) provides in relevant part: “[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of
this subchapter if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
8
After reviewing the record ALJ Damille found Plaintiff had moderate limitations in: understanding and applying
information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and adapting or maintaining pace.
(R. 21.)
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8

Doctors Friedman and Geller’s notes in which the doctors took record of Plaintiff’s past struggles
with heroin and her sustained remission since 2019 with the use of methadone. (Id.)
After taking into account the doctors’ diagnoses and accompanying notes, ALJ Damille
found that although there was evidence of mental impairments, there was no evidence of Plaintiff
needing “any recurrent emergency room visits, inpatient hospital admissions, crisis intervention
or participation in a partial hospitalization program due to an exacerbation of her symptoms.” (R.
25.) Plaintiff’s treatment records from September 2021 to August 2022 indicated unremarkable
mental status examinations. (Id.) Further, based on Plaintiff’s own testimony, the ALJ pointed
out Plaintiff could “perform a number of fully functional activities of daily living, despite her
mental impairments.” (Id.) Second, based on the evidence the ALJ found Plaintiff could not
perform a full range of work due to her impairments. (Id.) However, he determined she could
perform “the simple tasks of unskilled work in a low contact environment,” such as tasks that
“involve no more than frequent handling, fingering and feeling with the dominant right upper
extremity.” (Id.)
ALJ Damille explained how he considered the medical opinions and prior administrative
medical findings in coming to his RFC determination. (R. 25.) He found the prior administrative
findings “persuasive overall,” as they were “generally consistent with the medical evidence,”
including most of the doctors’ examinations and Plaintiff’s reported daily activities. (Id.) The
ALJ noted both Doctors Friedman and Esposito did not provide a medical opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activity. (Id.) He found Doctor Sarner’s mental RFC
questionnaire opinion unpersuasive, as it was unsupported by the evidence of benign mental
examinations and symptom response with treatment from the Center for Assessment and

9

Treatment. (Id.) Lastly, ALJ Damille considered Plaintiff’s mother’s Third-Party Statement. (R.
26.)
At step four, ALJ Damille concluded Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work as a
telemarketer “as actually or generally performed,” based on the VE’s testimony. (Id.) Considering
Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, ALJ Damille concluded at step five that
Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id.) More
specifically, he found she could work as a cleaner, merchandise marker, or as a routing clerk. (R.
26–27.) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act during the relevant
period. (R. 27.)
B. Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff seeks reversal or remand of the Commissioner’s decision. (D.E. 6
(“Mov. Br.”) at 26.) Plaintiff contends ALJ Damille committed legal error in his analysis of Doctor
Sarner’s medical opinion by failing to evaluate the opinion for persuasiveness, apply the
supportability and consistency factors, and explain why he rejected the opinion. (Id. at 19–20.)
As to supportability, Plaintiff argues Dr. Sarner “described his clinical findings including results
of mental status examination that he relied on to determine the severity of [Plaintiff’s] mental
impairments.” (Id. at 21.) Regarding consistency, Plaintiff submits Doctor Sarner’s opinion is
consistent with Doctor Friedman and Doctor Esposito’s findings, Plaintiff’s testimony and
Function Report, and Plaintiff’s mother’s statement.
ALJ Damille has the exclusive responsibility of making an RFC determination and
examines “all of the relevant medical and other evidence” to do so. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.945(a)(3) &
416.946(c); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.2d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The ALJ—not
treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability

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and RFC determinations.”). An ALJ can “accept some medical evidence and reject other evidence,
provided that he provides an explanation for discrediting the rejected evidence.” Zirnsak v. Colvin,
777 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive
explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would
probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981).
When considering medical evidence, a treating physician’s opinion “does not bind the ALJ
on the issue of functional capacity.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). In
conducting his analysis, the ALJ must simply “articulate how [he] considered the medical opinions
or prior administrative medical findings from [a] medical source together in a single analysis”
considering the eight factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c). Id. Of the eight factors, however,
supportability 9 (factor one) and consistency 10 (factor two) are the most important and must be
addressed; factors three to eight may, but need not, be addressed. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2).
ALJ Damille’s analysis of Doctor Sarner’s medical opinion is satisfactory and does not
amount to legal error. ALJ Damille was not required to give greater weight to Doctor Sarner’s
findings just because he treated Plaintiff since she was a young adult. See Chandler, 667 F.2d at
361. ALJ Damille explained that he found Doctor Sarner’s opinion unpersuasive as it was
unsupported by the other medical evidence in the record—properly addressing both the
supportability and consistency factors. See Barnhart, 364 F.3d at 505 (explaining that an ALJ
does not need “to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis,” but must simply ensure “there is sufficient development of the record and explanation

“The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are
to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1).
10
“The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2).
9

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of findings to permit meaningful review.”). More specifically, ALJ Damille noted that despite a
past medical history of PTSD, depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, and BPD, there was no
evidence Plaintiff “required any recurrent emergency room visits, inpatient hospital admissions,
crisis intervention or participation in a partial hospitalization program due to an exacerbation of
her symptoms.” (R. 25.) ALJ Damille’s analysis comported with the requirements of 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(b)(2) and even considered other factors consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(5). 11
This Court is satisfied with ALJ Damille’s analysis of Plaintiff’s claim and will not reweigh the evidence. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the
evidence or impose their own factual determinations.”). After reviewing the record this Court
agrees that there is scant evidence demonstrating Plaintiff’s mental impairments, either
individually or in combination, equal the severity of the Appendix’s listed impairments. This
Court finds there is substantial evidence supporting ALJ Damille’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s
RFC. ALJ Damille properly concluded Plaintiff is not disabled because she can perform jobs
existing in the national economy notwithstanding her non-exertional limitations. (R. 22, 26.)
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

An

appropriate order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
cc:
Parties

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(5) provides in relevant part: “We will consider other factors that tend to support or
contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding . . . When we consider a medical source’s
familiarity with the other evidence in a claim, we will also consider whether new evidence we receive after the medical
source made his or her medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding makes the medical opinion or prior
administrative medical finding more or less persuasive.”

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