DOE v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 11/25/2024. (qa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-9531 (BRM) (MAH)

v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ERNESTO
ESCOBAR, and JOHN AND JANE DOES,

OPINION

Defendants.
HAMMER, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed
under pseudonym and to file under seal. Mot. for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonym, Sept. 30,
2024, D.E. 3. The motion is unopposed, and Defendants have yet to answer Plaintiff’s
Complaint. The motion has considered Plaintiff’s submission, applicable caselaw, and the
record, and decides the motion without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L. Civ. R. 78.1.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that she was sexually
assaulted by a corrections officer while she was incarcerated at Edna Mahan Correctional
Facility for Women (“EMCF”). Compl., Sept. 30, 2024, D.E. 1, ¶¶ 1, 16. Plaintiff brings this
action under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:2-2, et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1346, et seq.,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Eighth and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Compl., ¶ 4.
Plaintiff filed the instant application concurrently with her Complaint. Mot. for Leave to
Proceed Under Pseudonym, D.E. 3. Plaintiff contends that because she is the victim of sexual

crimes and there is an inherent risk of retaliation, proceeding in this action anonymously is
necessary. Id. at 3. Further, Plaintiff is willing to disclose her identity under seal. Id. at 4. Thus,
Defendants will not be prejudiced if Plaintiff is permitted to proceed under a pseudonym. Id.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

A core component of the American judicial system is that judicial proceedings should be
conducted in public. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011). As such, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that all parties identify themselves in pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(a). However, courts have recognized that under limited circumstances a party may proceed
via pseudonym “where disclosure of the litigant’s identity creates a risk of ‘extreme distress or
danger[.]’” Doe v. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. 100, 102 (D.N.J. 2014).
The Third Circuit has adopted a nine-factor test to evaluate whether a party should be
permitted to proceed anonymously referred to as the Provident Life factors. Megless, 654 F.3d at
408, 410 (citing Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
The court must determine whether “a litigant’s reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the
public’s interest in open judicial proceedings.” Id. The six factors that, if found, weigh in favor
of anonymity include:
(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept
confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or
sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the
magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal
nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically
weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities; (5) the
undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party
and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of
being publicly identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue
pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.
Id. at 409. It is not enough “[t]hat a plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic harm.” Id.
(citing Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008)); see Liberty
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Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, No. 11-10802, 2011 WL 5161453, at *7 (D.
Mass. Oct. 31, 2011) (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted) (stating that “mere
embarrassment is not sufficient to override the strong public interest in disclosure”). The three
factors weighing against proceeding anonymously include:
(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities
of litigants; (2) whether, because of the subject matter of this
litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise,
there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s
identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained;
and (3) whether opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public,
or the press is illegitimately motivated.
Id. Because “each case presents a slightly different list of factors for courts to consider,” these
factors are not exhaustive. Id. at 408.
Courts must exercise their discretion in weighing the strong public interest in open
litigation with the need for a litigant to proceed anonymously. “Exceptional circumstances
justify the use of a pseudonym when a reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the strong
public interest in open litigation.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 20-4352, 2020 WL 3962268, at
*2 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020). Proceeding under a pseudonym is generally permitted in matters
involving “abortion, birth control, transsexuality, mental illness, welfare rights of illegitimate
children, AIDS, and homosexuality” as well as cases involving victims of sexual assault.
Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. at 467 (quoting Doe v. Borough of Morrisville, 130
F.R.D. 612, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
In light of these principles, the Court addresses each factor in turn.
A.

Factors Weighing in Favor of Anonymity

As to the factors weighing in favor of proceeding anonymously, Plaintiff has
demonstrated “the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the

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substantiality of these bases” and that the circumstances warrant Plaintiff proceeding under a
pseudonym.
In considering the first factor, the Court must examine the extent to which Plaintiff’s
anonymity has been maintained. See Megless, 654 F.3d at 407, 410. This factor does not
support granting a motion to proceed anonymously where Plaintiff’s identity has not been kept
confidential. Id. (finding that plaintiff’s identity had not been kept confidential because prior to
the litigation defendant shared plaintiff’s name and other characteristics on a flyer). Plaintiff’s
identity has been confidential, here, from the onset of this litigation. It is apparent that Plaintiff
has made a significant effort to maintain her anonymity. Doe v. Rutgers, No. 18-12952, 2019
WL 1967021, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019) (concluding that this factor weighs in favor of
plaintiffs “who ‘make substantial efforts to maintain anonymity’ and ‘[l]imit disclosure of
sensitive information to few other people’”). Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs
for Plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym.
The second factor examines the substantiality of Plaintiff’s fear of public disclosure. See
Megless, 654 F.3d at 410. This factor heavily weighs in favor of Plaintiff’s request given the
nature of her claims. Plaintiff is alleging she was sexually assaulted by a corrections officer
while she was incarcerated and worked in the cafeteria at EMCF. Compl., D.E. 1, ¶¶ 15-16.
Requests to proceed anonymously are granted in only exceptional circumstances, as is the case
here. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. at 102. For example, in Doe v. Princeton University, this District
determined that this factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff because of his status as an alleged
victim of sexual assault. Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 19-7853, 2019 WL 5587327, at *4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 30, 2019); see also Doe v. Trishul Consultancy, LLC, No. 18-16468, 2019 WL 4750078, at
*4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019) (finding this factor weighs in favor of granting anonymity because

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disclosure of the sexual assault victim’s identity carries a concrete risk of severe emotional harm
and revictimization). Plaintiff is alleging she is a victim of sexual assault and is thus within a
vulnerable class worthy of protected status, thus the second factor weighs in her favor. See Doe
v. Princeton Univ., 2019 WL 5587327, at *4 (stating that a plaintiff’s claim against the defendant
included “allegations in which he is a victim of sexual assault” and thus determined the third
factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff).
With respect to the third factor, the Court must consider the magnitude of the public
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity. Megless, 654 F.3d at 410.
Specifically, the Court must determine whether “if this litigant is forced to reveal his or her
name, will other similarly situated litigants be deterred from litigating claims that the public
would like to have litigated.” Id. Indeed, the public may have an interest in preserving “when
the litigant belongs to a particularly vulnerable class, when the subject matter is highly personal,
or when undesirable consequences will flow from revealing the identity of a litigant.” Doe v.
Princeton Univ., 2020 WL 3962268, at *4. Thus, this factor weights in favor of granting
Plaintiff’s motion.
The fourth factor considers “whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues
presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s
identities.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 409; see also L.A. v. Hoffman, No. 14-6985, 2015 WL 4461852,
*2 (D.N.J. July 21, 2025) (finding it appropriate to grant plaintiffs’ request to proceed
anonymously where plaintiffs raised a constitutional challenge to a statute as it applied generally
to a class of people, a purely legal question, rather than how the statute applied to each plaintiff
based on the facts and circumstances of each plaintiff). Conversely, where a claim is
predominantly fact-dependent, this factor weighs against anonymity. See Doe v. Rider

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University, No. 16-4882, 2018 WL 3756950, *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018) (finding this factor weighs
against anonymity because unlike Hoffman, plaintiff’s claims were fact-dependent). Plaintiff’s
claims are largely fact dependent. Thus, the Court cannot find that this factor weighs in favor of
granting Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym.
Turning to the fifth factor, the Court must determine whether “the undesirability of an
outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to [her] refusal to pursue the case at
the price of being publicly identified.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 409. In other words, if the Court
denies Plaintiff’s motion to proceed anonymously, will Plaintiff continue to pursue her claim so
that it can be decided on the merits or will she drop her claim. Megless, 654 F.3d at 410.
Plaintiff did not specifically address this factor. Plaintiff states that she “is highly concerned
about the risk of retaliation for challenging the aforementioned violations.” Br. in Supp. of Mot.
to Proceed Under Pseudonym, D.E. 3-1, at 3. Because Plaintiff does not state that she will drop
this case if she is not permitted to proceed anonymously, the Court finds that this factor does not
weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
With respect to the sixth factor, this Court finds that there is no evidence to demonstrate
that Plaintiff is seeking to use a pseudonym for an illegitimate or ulterior motive. Megless, 654
F.3d at 411. Plaintiff contends that she fears retaliation given the nature of her claims.
Considering Plaintiff’s allegations, these fears are reasonable. The Court finds no reason to
believe that Plaintiff has an illegitimate or ulterior motive in seeking anonymity. Accordingly,
this factor has no bearing on this Court’s determination. See Megless, 654 F.3d at 411.
B.

Factors Weighing Against Anonymity

As to the factors weighing against proceeding anonymously, the Court first considers
whether “the universal level of public interest in access to the” litigants’ identities. Megless, 654

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F.3d at 409. The public generally has a high level of interest in knowing litigants’ identities. See
Princeton Univ., 2019 WL 5587327, at *6 (citing Doe v. Temple Univ., No. 14-4729 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 3, 2014)). Publicness is an essential aspect of any judicial proceeding. Megless, 654 F.3d
at 408. Indeed, people have a right to know who is using their courts. Id. Thus, this factor
weighs against granting Plaintiff’s motion.
Next, the Court considers “whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the
status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in
knowing the litigant’s identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained.”
Megless, 654 F.3d at 409. Unfortunately, the subject matter of this litigation is common. See
Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 16-4882, 2018 WL 3756950, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018). Further,
Plaintiff is not a public figure. There is not a heightened public interest beyond the public’s
typically strong interest in public proceedings. Thus, the Court cannot find that this factor
weighs against Plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously.
Lastly, the Court considers “whether opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public or
the press is illegitimately motivated.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 409. As discussed, Defendants have
not submitted an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. Thus, this factor has no bearing on the Court’s
analysis.
Considering the Provident Life factors, the Court concludes, on balance, the factors weigh
in favor of allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously through the use of a pseudonym. Plaintiff
claims that she is a victim of sexual assault and, in turn, fears retaliation. This District has
previously found that circumstances, such as these, outweigh the importance of open judicial
proceedings. See Rutgers, 2019 WL 1967021, at *4; Princeton Univ., 2019 WL 5587327, at *6.
Thus, Plaintiff shall continue to be referred to as “Jane Doe.”

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym and to file
under seal is granted. Plaintiff shall be referred to as “Jane Doe” in this matter and any filings
which contain Plaintiff’s identity shall be filed under seal. An appropriate order shall accompany
this Opinion.

s/ Michael A. Hammer
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: November 25, 2024.

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