TAKACS v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY
Filing
76
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni on 12/19/2013. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JUSTIN WENNAH and BRIAN
STIANCHI, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIDDLESEX COUNTY, EDMOND
CICCHI, MIDDLESEX COUNTY
BOARD OF FREEHOLDERS and JOHN
DOES 1-100,
Civil Action No. 08-694 (FLW)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Justin Wennah and Brian Stianchi,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), request for leave to file a
Third Amended Complaint [Docket Entry No. 70] to conform their complaint to the
requirements of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, 132 S.Ct. 1510
(2012). Middlesex County, Edmond Cicchi and Middlesex County Board of Freeholders
(“Defendants”) oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend [Docket Entry No. 72]. The Court has fully
reviewed and considered all arguments made in support of, and in opposition to, Plaintiffs’
motion. The Court considers Plaintiffs’ motion without oral argument pursuant to Loc.Civ.R.
78.1(b). For the reasons set forth more fully below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Paul M. Takacs initially filed a class action complaint against Middlesex County on
1
February 7, 2008 alleging that Middlesex County’s blanket strip search policy violated the
Fourth Amendment and laws of New Jersey. The class is currently defined as follows:
All persons who have been placed into custody of the Middlesex County Jail after being
charged with non-indictable offenses (such as disorderly persons offenses, traffic infractions,
child support warrants and/or civil commitments) and were strip searched upon their transfer and
entry into the Middlesex County Jail. The Class period commences on or about February 5,
2006, and extends to the date on which the Defendant is enjoined from or otherwise ceases from,
enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip-searches absent
reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the class are Defendant and any and all of its
respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
Plaintiffs’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. at 1.
Brian Stianchi later filed a separate complaint (Civil Action No. 09-362) against
Middlesex County making the same allegations and claims. A Second Amended Complaint was
subsequently filed adding Brian Hode and Justin Wennah as Plaintiffs. [Docket Entry No. 41]
By later Consent Orders, the claims of Paul M. Takacs and Brian Hode were dismissed with
prejudice. [Docket Entry Nos. 46 and 47] By consent of the parties, Mr. Takac’s and Mr.
Stianchi’s complaints were consolidated. On January 19, 2010, the Court entered an order
staying the proceedings until disposition of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
Burlington County. The United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Florence on April
2, 2012. Plaintiffs filed this motion to amend on June 20, 2013.
A. Florence Decision
Plaintiffs’ are seeking to file a Third Amended Complaint in order to conform their
complaint to the requirements of the recent Supreme Court decision in Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). In Florence, Petitioner was
arrested during a traffic stop after he failed to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine. He was
initially detained in the Burlington County Detention Center and later in the Essex County
2
Correctional Facility, but was released once it was determined that the fine had been paid.
Petitioner was strip searched at both facilities. Petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983
against the government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses cannot
be subjected to invasive searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of
weapons, drugs or other contraband. The Court granted summary judgment, ruling that stripsearching non-indictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment.
The Third Circuit reversed and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s
decision. The Supreme Court held that “the search procedures at the county jails struck a
reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions, and thus the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not require adoption of the framework and rules petitioner
proposes.” Id. at 1511.
Plaintiff’s specifically rely on Justice Alito’s concurrence in which he states, “The Court
does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard to the offense or the reason for
detention, to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a
judicial officer. The lead opinion explicitly reserves judgment on that question. In light of that
limitation, I join the opinion of the Court in full.” Id. at 1525. Chief Justice Roberts also noted
the importance of the possibility of an exception in his concurrence when he stated, “it is
important for me that the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it
announces.” Id. at 1523.
The Supreme Court further noted in the majority opinion that “the circumstances before the
Court, however, do not present the opportunity to consider a narrow exception of the sort Justice
3
Alito describes, which might restrict whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been
reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and who can be held in available facilities
removed from the general population, may be subjected to the types of searches at issue here.”
Id. at 1523.
B. Plaintiffs’ Argument
Plaintiffs argue that the motion to amend should be granted because they were each arrested
and detained for minor matters and had not seen a judge prior to being strip-searched. Mr.
Stianchi was arrested for child support arrears and Mr. Wennah was arrested for failing to appear
at a municipal proceeding. In their proposed Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the
following new class definition which has been accepted in three other post-Florence cases:
All persons who have been (1) detained at and/or placed in custody of the Middlesex County
Adult Correction Center (“MCACC”) or any facility under the authority of Middlesex County
(2) as a result of being arrested and/or charged with non-indictable offenses such as: civil
enforcement offenses, i.e., child support enforcement arrears, traffic offenses, petty disorderly
offenses, disorderly persons offenses, misdemeanors, contempt proceedings, failure to pay
financial fines, penalties and/or costs in like matters as set forth above, and/or failure to appear at
any court proceedings on like matters above; (3) were strip-searched upon their entry into
detainment and/or custody at the MCACC and/or were strip-searched prior to an appearance
before a judge or judicial officer who had the authority to release the person as referred to above
from detainment and/or custody at the MCACC and/or persons who appeared before a judge or
judicial officer in the matters referred to above who were not released from detainment and/or
custody and were strip-searched as set forth above, and (4) the strip-search was conducted and/or
performed according to Middlesex County’s blanket strip-search policy, that is, without
reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause based on objective and articulable facts that the
aforesaid person or persons possessed controlled dangerous substances, weapons, and/or
contraband. The Class period commences on or about November 8, 2005 and extends to the date
on which Middlesex County and the MCACC are enjoined from, or otherwise cease to stripsearch the person or persons referred to above.
Plaintiffs’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. at 3-4.
Plaintiffs argue that this since this amendment was accepted in three previous decisions,
they should be permitted to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs cite Haas v. Burlington County in
4
which a Court in this District stated that “[a]lthough the exception to the Florence holding has
not been defined, at a minimum it appears to include a situation where a person was arrested for
a “minor” offense, she/he has not been admitted to the general population, and there was no
reasonable suspicion she/he was carrying contraband. Haas, 2012 WL 5497941 at 3 (D.N.J.
2012). Plaintiffs also cite Allen v. Union County which allowed an amended complaint that
“specifically alleges that UCJ’s blanket policy of strip-searching misdemeanor arrestees who
could be segregated from the general population prior to being seen by a judicial officer, absent
some particularized suspicion, is unconstitutional under the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution and article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Allen, Civil Action
No. 08-711. Plaintiffs also rely on Moore v. Atlantic County in which the Court noted that “to
fall within the exception of Florence, plaintiff must have been arrested for a minor offense, not
been seen by a judicial officer prior to the strip search, and the jail must be capable of housing
[these] arrestees separate from the general population. Moore, Civil Action No. 07-5444 (citing
Florence at 1524-1525).
Plaintiffs further argue that they should be permitted to amplify their complaint, or in the
alternative relate the state law statutory claim back to the original filing. Plaintiffs note that
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B), an amendment will relate back to the original pleading when it
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the
original pleading. They cite Cruz v. City of Camden which stated that “the major issue under
Rule 15(c) is whether the original pleading gave the opposing party fair notice of the general fact
situation involved in the amended pleading. Cruz, 898 F. Supp. 1100, 1117 (D.N.J. 1995).
Plaintiffs note that this case has always been about strip searching, they are merely trying to
5
identify the specific statute.
C. Defendants’ Argument
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Submit a Third Amended Complaint
should be denied as futile. Specifically, Defendants’ allege that the class complaint claims
should be barred as futile because they fail to state a claim that is plausible on its face.
Defendants’ Brief in Opp’n at 6. Defendants argue that it is undisputed that arrest warrants
authorize the arrest of a person and commitments authorize the confinement of a person to an
adult correctional facility. Id. Defendants assert that Florence does not require a detainee to be
“seen by a judge” rather the Court required the detention to be “reviewed by a judicial officer”.
Id. at 7 (citing Florence at 1524). Defendants state that Mr. Stianchi was arrested and confined
pursuant to an Order executed by The Honorable Fred Keiser, J.S.C. and that Mr. Wennah’s
commitment was authorized during judicial review of his arrest. Id. Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition improperly attempts to expand the Alito exception to require
a personal appearance before a judge or judicial officer. Id. at 8.
Defendants also argue that certain claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants
note that in New Jersey, the statute provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claims. Defendants note that Plaintiffs are asserting causes of actions for violations of Mr.
Wennah’s constitutional rights for alleged violations that occurred on March 6, 2006. The
Second Amended Complaint first naming Mr. Wennah was filed on June 19, 2009, more than
two years after his cause of action arose. Id. at 13. Defendants futher note that Mr. Stianchi’s
complaint was filed on January 23, 2009 but did not name any Middlesex Defendants until May
1, 2009. Defendants argue that any claims prior to May 1, 2007 are also time barred. Id.
6
II.
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a)(2), leave to amend the pleadings is generally granted
freely. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d
Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the Court may deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Id. However, where there is an absence of
undue delay, bad faith, prejudice or futility, a motion for leave to amend a pleading should be
liberally granted. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion is not the product of bad faith, dilatory motive or
undue delay. Plaintiffs have not repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed as they are seeking to amend the complaint to conform to the requirements of Florence
which had not yet been decided at the time of the previous amendments.
In addition, the Court finds that the proposed Third Amended Complaint is not futile. An
amendment is futile if it “is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient
on its face.” Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Imp., Inc.,, 133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To evaluate futility the District Court uses “the
same standard of legal sufficiency” as applied for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). “Accordingly, if a claim is vulnerable to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend generally must
be granted unless the amendment would not cure the deficiency.” Id. The Court finds that
whether certain claims are barred by the statute of limitations and whether Justice Alito’s
7
exception required a personal appearance before a judge are fact issues that should be decided by
the District Judge.
The Supreme Court stated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly that “[a]sking for plausible
grounds does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, it simply calls for
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support
Plaintiffs’ claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The Court finds that the
facts as alleged in Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint set forth a plausible claim for relief.
The Court further finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are comprised of sufficient factual allegations,
which when accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, raise Plaintiffs’
right to relief above the speculative level. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ have
included sufficient detail to put Defendants on notice of the precise violations being alleged. As
a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs proposed Third Amended Complaint would survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and is not futile.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is GRANTED. An
appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 19, 2013
s/ Tonianne J. Bongiovanni
HONORABLE TONIANNE J. BONGIOVANNI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?