PRALL v. TRENTON MUNICIPAL COURT
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 9/12/2011. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TORMU E. PRALL,
Petitioner,
v.
TRENTON MUNICIPAL COURT,
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 09-2466 (MLC)
O P I N I O N
COOPER, District Judge
The pro se petitioner, Tormu E. Prall, moves for vacatur and
other relief, with respect to this Court’s Opinion and Order
entered on July 27, 2009, which had dismissed this action.
(Docket entry no. 2 and 3.)
Prall submitted his application for
vacatur as to this matter and several other cases that were
dismissed by this Court, namely, Prall v. Superior Court of New
Jersey, No. 09-1831 (MLC) and Prall v. Superior Court of New
Jersey, Civil No. 09-1531 (MLC).
(Docket Entry No. 4.)1
This motion for vacatur, as to the instant matter only, is
decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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These matters were referenced in the caption of the
motion for vacatur submitted here. But Prall has also filed
motions for vacatur in other closed cases, such as: Prall v.
Ellis, No. 08-6050 (FLW); Prall v. City of Boston, No. 09-272
(FLW); Prall v. East Windsor Municipal Court, No. 09-2603 (FLW);
Prall v. Assignment Judge, No. 09-2608 (FLW); Prall v. Burlington
City Municipal Court, No. 09-2615 (NLH); Prall v. Bucks County
Courthouse, No. 09-3088 (FLW); and Prall v. Ellis, No. 09-271
(GEB). In addition, Prall moved for vacatur in Prall v.
Bocchini, No. 10-1228 (FLW).
Procedure 78.
For the reasons stated below, the motion will be
denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his petition, filed on or about May 22, 2009, Prall
sought to litigate the merits of a constitutional defense to
state criminal charges, namely, an unlawful extradition and
wrongful detention claim.
In an Opinion and Order entered on
July 27, 2009, this Court dismissed Prall’s habeas petition.
The
Court found that Prall had not exhausted his state court
remedies, and had failed to allege exceptional circumstances
sufficient to justify federal intervention, pursuant to Moore v.
DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975).
(See July 27, 2009
Opinion, Docket entry no. 2.)
Prall filed this motion for vacatur and other relief, almost
two years after entry of this Court’s Order dismissing the
petition without prejudice.
Prall’s main arguments for vacatur
simply malign the judicial conduct of the District Judges who had
dismissed Prall’s many other actions.
For instance, Prall
contends that the District Judges vilified his character and
reputation, acted as prosecutors assuming his guilt, and failed
to demonstrate integrity and impartiality.
Prall also appears to
suggest that his earlier applications for relief were not
sophisticated.
He continues to argue that his escape (which led
to his contested extradition) were based on the teachings of
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Thomas Jefferson.
(See Petitioner’s Motion, docket entry no. 4.)
Prall provides no basis for these argumentative and conclusory
statements.
II.
ANALYSIS
This Court will construe Prall’s motion for vacatur as a
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Opinion and Order
dismissing the petition.
In the District of New Jersey, Local
Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration.
Bowers v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J.
2001).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek
reconsideration of matters “which [it] believes the Court has
overlooked” when it ruled on the motion.
L.Civ.R. 7.1(i); see NL
Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins., 935 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.N.J.
1996).
The standard for reargument is high and reconsideration
is to be granted only sparingly.
F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994).
See United States v. Jones, 158
The movant has the burden of
demonstrating either: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was
not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need
to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.”
Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677
(3d Cir. 1999).
The Court will grant a motion for
reconsideration only where its prior decision has overlooked a
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factual or legal issue that may alter the disposition of the
matter.
See L.Civ.R. 7.1(i).
operative term in the Rule.”
“The word ‘overlooked’ is the
Bowers, 130 F.Supp.2d at 612.
Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration may address only
those matters of fact or issues of law which were presented to,
but not considered by, the Court in the course of making the
decision at issue.
See SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 727 F.Supp. 876,
878 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989).
Thus,
reconsideration is not to be used as a means of expanding the
record to include matters not originally before the Court.
Bowers, 130 F.Supp.2d at 613; Resorts Int’l v. Greate Bay Hotel &
Casino, 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1992); Egloff v. N.J.
Air Nat’l Guard, 684 F.Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988).
Absent
unusual circumstances, the Court should reject new evidence that
was not presented when the Court made the contested decision.
See Resorts Int’l, 830 F.Supp. at 831 n.3.
A party seeking to
introduce new evidence on reconsideration bears the burden of
first demonstrating that evidence was unavailable or unknown at
the time of the original hearing.
See Levinson v. Regal Ware,
Inc., No. 89-1298, 1989 WL 205724, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1989).
Moreover, L.Civ.R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to restate
arguments that the Court has already considered.
Degnan, 748 F.Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990).
See G-69 v.
Thus, a difference
of opinion with the Court’s decision should be dealt with through
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the normal appellate process.
Bowers, 130 F.Supp.2d at 612;
Florham Park Chevron v. Chevron U.S.A., 680 F.Supp. 159, 162
(D.N.J. 1988); see Chicosky v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 979
F.Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1997); NL Indus., 935 F.Supp. at 516
(“Reconsideration motions ...
may not be used to re-litigate old
matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”).
In other
words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the
parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.”
Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998).
Prall fails to provide any evidence to show that this Court
“overlooked” a factual or legal issue that may alter the
disposition of the matter, which is necessary for the Court to
entertain the motion for reconsideration.
He has not presented
the Court with changes in controlling law, factual issues that
were overlooked, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of
law or fact that would necessitate a different ruling in order to
prevent a manifest injustice.
Rather, Prall asserts obfuscatory
and unsupported allegations regarding the character and judicial
conduct of the District Judges who had dismissed Prall’s various
other petitions, which are wholly unrelated and unresponsive to
the Court’s ruling on the law in this matter.
Consequently,
Prall fails to satisfy the threshold for granting a motion for
reconsideration.
Prall’s only recourse, if he disagrees with
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this Court’s decision, should be via the appellate process.
He
may not use a motion for reconsideration to re-litigate a matter
that has been thoroughly adjudicated.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, Prall’s motion
for vacatur and other relief (docket entry no. 4) will be denied
for lack of merit.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:
September 12, 2011
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