STEELE v. CHICCHI et al
Filing
205
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 12/9/2013. (eaj) Modified on 12/11/2013 (eaj, ).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
YUSEF STEELE,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-3551 (MLC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN EDMOND CICCHI, et al.,
Defendants.
COOPER, District Judge
Before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment by the
Defendants Warden Edmond Cicchi, Deputy Warden F. Masone, Internal
Affairs Sgt. DeAmicis, and Capt. C. Barth (hereinafter
“Defendants”).
(Dkt. entry nos. 188, 189, 193, 195, Defs.’ Mots.
for Summ. J.)1
The motions for summary judgment are granted in
part and denied in part without prejudice.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the undisputed facts, Plaintiff, Yusef Steele,
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”) is currently a New Jersey state prisoner
serving a twelve-year sentence for resisting arrest by flight
(N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2A(2)) and for possession of a controlled dangerous
1
Defendants collectively rely on the briefing submitted by
the attorneys for Defendant Warden Edmond Cicchi. (Dkt. entry no.
189-1, Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.; see also Defs.’
Mots. for Summ. J. (referencing dkt. entry no. 160, Barth’s Notice
of Mot.; dkt. entry no. 161, Masone’s Notice of Mot.; dkt entry no.
162, DeAmicis’s Notice of Mot.).)
substance within 500 feet of a public housing facility (N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5A, 2C:35-7.1).
(Dkt. entry no. 189-2, Miller Certif., Ex.
B, Pl.’s J. of Conviction; id., Ex. C, Pl.’s Dep. Tr. at 16.)
At the time of the events in question, Plaintiff was a
pretrial detainee at the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center
(hereinafter “MCACC”) following his December 22, 2008 arrest for a
violation of a narcotics restraining order.
(Pl.’s Dep. Tr. at 25;
Miller Certif., Ex. D, Warrant for Pl.’s Arrest.)
2008, Plaintiff’s bail was set at $50,000.
On December 23,
(Pl.’s Dep. Tr. at 29.)
Plaintiff did not initially attempt to “get bailed out.”
30.)
(Id. at
During his stay at MCACC, Plaintiff served as a trustee.
(Id. at 119, 123.)
Plaintiff testified that his duties as a
trustee included, inter alia, collecting laundry, serving meals,
and painting the units when needed.
(Id. at 44.)
Plaintiff’s position as trustee also allowed him to arrange
bail for other inmates.
(Id. at 41.)
Because Plaintiff admittedly
got “locked up a lot,” he had developed a “bond” or “relationship”
with Speedy Bail Bonds (hereinafter “Speedy”) and Speedy’s owner
Jose Vargas.
(Id. at 40-41.)
Speedy had posted bail for Plaintiff
in the past, and Plaintiff testified that he had developed a
payment plan with Speedy to pay back the prior bail money.
40-41.)
2
(Id. at
On February 23, 2009, Robert Gluck (hereinafter “Gluck”), an
attorney representing another pretrial detainee Patrick Betterton
(hereinafter “Betterton”) at the MCACC, contacted Deputy Warden
Masone.
(Miller Certif., Ex. E., Gluck Certif. at ¶¶ 1-2.)
Betterton had been charged with endangering the welfare of
children, and his bail was set at $250,000.
(Id. at ¶ 4.)
Gluck
informed Deputy Warden Masone that he was concerned for Betterton’s
safety because Plaintiff had approached Betterton and threatened to
disclose the nature of his charges to other inmates if Betterton
did not use Speedy to post bail.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5, 6; see also
Miller Certif., Ex. G, DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 4.)
“Child sex offenders
are among the most hated members of an inmate population,” so
Defendant DeAmicis believed that Gluck’s concern for Betterton’s
safety was justified.
(DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 6.)
Gluck indicated
that Plaintiff had shown Betterton a document listing Betterton’s
charges and bail amount.
(Id. at ¶ 5; Gluck Certif. at ¶ 2.)
Following the receipt of this information, Defendants
initiated an investigation into the activities of Speedy and
Plaintiff at the MCACC.
(DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 8.)
Defendants
interviewed Betterton, who provided them with a phone number that
Plaintiff had given him to call to arrange bail, and Defendants
discovered that this phone number belonged to Speedy.
10-11.)
(Id. at ¶¶
Defendant DeAmicis reviewed recorded phone calls from the
3
N-unit, the intake unit in which Plaintiff and Betterton were
housed, and found that there were numerous conversations between
Speedy personnel and Plaintiff in which Plaintiff referenced
inmates and their bail amounts.
(Id. at ¶ 12.)
In the calls,
Plaintiff referred to his ability to get other inmates to use
Speedy to post bail and the credit he expected to receive from
Speedy for the recruited bails.
(Id. at ¶ 13.)
Defendants
believed, on the basis of the foregoing, that Plaintiff was acting
as an agent for Speedy and was receiving some form of compensation.
(Id. at ¶ 14.)
Deputy Warden Masone contacted Speedy on February 23, 2009 and
arranged for a meeting with Speedy at the MCACC on February 25,
2009.
(Id. at ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff testified that prior to
Defendants’ meeting with Speedy, Speedy representatives had
informed him that they had been called in to meet with MCACC
administrators.
(Pl.’s Dep. Tr. at 56-57.)
On February 25, 2009, Defendants Masone, DeAmicis, and Cicchi
interviewed Plaintiff.
(DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff
admitted to arranging bail for other inmates, but he denied
receiving any compensation from Speedy.
(Id.)
Instead, he claimed
that he was doing so “out of the goodness of [his] heart.”
Pl.’s Dep. Tr. at 121.)
(Id.;
During Plaintiff’s interview, corrections
officers searched his cell in the N-unit and discovered lists of
4
inmates, their bail amounts, and phone numbers of their friends and
relatives.
(DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 17.)
Based on this information, Defendants placed Plaintiff in
administrative segregation in the C-pod “to prevent him from
imposing any additional security risks in the facility and to allow
further investigation into Speedy’s activities without his
interference.”
(Id. at ¶ 18.)
On February 26, 2009, Joyce Pirre,
Chief of Social Services, wrote to Plaintiff stating, “The
Classification Committee has reviewed your Housing Status.
were placed in Administrative Segregation.
You
The Classification
Committee will review your Status on a monthly basis.”
(Dkt. entry
no. 197-1, Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n, Ex. E, 2-26-09 Letter from J.
Pirre.)
Plaintiff remained in the C-pod until March 20, 2009 when
he was released on bail.
(DeAmicis Aff. at ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff alleges that, because of restrictions on his ability
to use the phone while in administrative segregation, he was unable
to post bail on March 6, 2009 after his bail had been reduced to
$2,500.
(Dkt. entry no. 197, Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 1, 5; see also
dkt. entry no. 109, Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 49, 50, 63-65.)
Defendants
did not address this allegation and generally denied Plaintiff’s
factual allegations.
(See dkt. entry no. 110, Masone Answer at ¶¶
49, 50, 63-65; dkt. entry no. 112, Cicchi Answer at ¶¶ 49, 50, 6365; dkt. entry no. 113, Barth Answer at 2 (general denial of ¶¶ 16-
5
72 of Am. Compl.); dkt. entry no. 114, DeAmicis Answer at 4
(general denial of ¶¶ 16-72 of Am. Compl.); dkt. entry no. 198,
Cicchi Letter Reply Br.; dkt. entry no. 199, Masone Letter Reply
Br.; dkt. entry no. 200, DeAmicis Letter Reply Br.; dkt. entry no.
201, Barth Letter Reply Br.)
Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendants attempted to coerce him into making a false statement
against Speedy -- specifically that Speedy was paying him -- by
promising Plaintiff that he would be released from administrative
segregation if he did.
(Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 58-59.)
he refused to make such a statement.
He asserts that
(Id. at ¶ 60.)
Defendants
again did not address this allegation and generally denied
Plaintiff’s factual allegations.
(See Masone Answer at ¶¶ 58-60;
Cicchi Answer at ¶¶ 58-60; Barth Answer at 2 (general denial of ¶¶
16-72 of Am. Compl.); DeAmicis Answer at 4 (general denial of ¶¶
16-72 of Am. Compl.).)
Speedy representatives in a subsequent interview with
Defendants asserted that Plaintiff was an “associate” of theirs and
that they permitted him to make three-way calls through their
office in exchange for Plaintiff recruiting other inmates to use
Speedy to post bail.
Plaintiff.
(Id.)
(Id. at ¶ 20.)
They denied compensating
Defendants informed Speedy representatives that
Speedy could no longer write bails for MCACC inmates pending
further investigation.
(Id. at ¶ 22.)
6
The investigation
continued, and eventually, the administration contacted “the
Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office and the New Jersey Department
of Banking and Insurance regarding Speedy’s illegal Activities.”
(Id.)
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initially filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 17, 2009.
(See dkt. entry no. 1.)
His complaint was dismissed on July 21,
2009 when the Court denied his application to proceed in forma
pauperis.
(See dkt. entry no. 2, 7-21-09 Order.)
The case was
reopened on April 30, 2010 following Plaintiff’s submission of a
completed application to proceed in forma pauperis.
(See dkt.
entry no. 7, 4-30-10 Order.)
Following several discovery motions and motions to amend the
complaint, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
complaint on May 10, 2012, and Plaintiff filed the amended
complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) that is currently at issue.
(See dkt. entry no. 108, 5-10-12 Order; dkt. entry no. 109, Am.
Compl.)
The Complaint asserts several causes of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983:
(1)
That Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution by placing him in
administrative segregation without any showing of
wrongdoing as required by New Jersey Department of
7
Corrections regulations and the Middlesex County
Department of Corrections Handbook (Am. Compl. at ¶ 10);
(2)
That Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution by failing
to release him from administrative segregation knowing
that his segregation was not justified (id. at ¶ 11);
(3)
That Defendants wrongfully attempted to coerce Plaintiff
to give a false statement against Speedy by promising to
release him from administrative segregation if he gave
such statement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution (id. at ¶¶ 12, 13);
(4)
That Defendants wrongfully and without justification
deprived Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, of the
privilege of using the phone to post bail in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (id. at ¶ 14); and
(5)
That Defendants intentionally withheld material
information from Plaintiff to conceal their actions in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution (id. at ¶ 15.)
Each individual Defendant submitted an Answer to the Complaint.
(See dkt. entry nos. 110-14, Defs.’ Answers.)
Following several discovery motions and motions for summary
judgment that were denied without prejudice based on discovery
issues, the Court ordered that discovery was closed on June 13,
2013.
(See dkt. entry no. 184, 6-13-13 Order.)
moved for summary judgment.
Defendants then
(See Defs.’ Mots. for Summ. J.)
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The standard for a motion for summary judgment is wellestablished.
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is proper if
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
8
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is “proper if, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle
HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).
IV.
A.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Defendants’ Arguments
Defendants initially argue that “Plaintiff’s pleadings are
insufficiently specific and provide inadequate notice to the
Defendants as to the nature of the claims they must defend.”
(Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.)
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that his due-process
rights were violated by being placed in administrative segregation
without a documented reason or a hearing, Defendants assert that
9
“[i]nmates retain no liberty interest in remaining in the general
population” and that prison administrators have discretion to
transfer inmates to “‘more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive
reasons.’”
(1983)).)
(Id. at 15 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468
With respect to pretrial detainees, the existence of a
due-process violation turns on whether the restraints imposed
amount to punishment prior to the adjudication of guilt.
(Id. at
16 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).)
Restraints
that are related to administrators’ interest in maintaining
security do not amount to unconstitutional punishment.
(Id.)
Defendants assert that courts in this Circuit and in other circuits
have approved the use of administrative segregation during
institutional investigations, including for pretrial detainees.
(Id. at 17 (citing cases involving inmates and pretrial detainees
in prisons outside of New Jersey).)
Defendants argue that there is no dispute of material fact “as
to whether Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation at
the MCACC exceeded the purpose of ensuring security for which it
was intended.”
(Id. at 19.)
Administrators were justifiably
concerned about the safety of other inmates based on Plaintiff’s
extortion of inmates to use Speedy to post bail, and administrators
needed to conduct an investigation into Speedy’s illegal activities
without Plaintiff’s interference.
10
(Id. at 19-20.)
Plaintiff
admittedly received notice of his change in status, and his
segregation was not unduly lengthy because he bailed out of the
MCACC less than a month after being placed in segregation before
his placement could be reviewed by the Classification Committee.
(Id. at 20.)
As to Plaintiff’s invocation of the Eighth Amendment, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United States
Constitution, Defendants argue that, as a pretrial detainee,
Plaintiff was not eligible for Eighth Amendment protections.
at 21 (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989).)
(Id.
Rather,
a conditions-of-confinement claim by a pretrial detainee is
measured based on whether the restraints amount to punishment prior
to adjudication of guilt, and here, Plaintiff’s segregation was not
punitive.
(Id.)
Defendants similarly assert that “[t]here is
nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint to suggest that his claim has
anything to do with the protections contained in [the First]
Amendment.”
(Id. at 13 n.2.)
Defendants’ final argument is that they are protected by
qualified immunity because their actions were objectively
reasonable “[g]iven the wide latitude to which corrections
officials are entitled in this context.”
11
(Id. at 23-25.)
B.
Plaintiff’s Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the MCACC has a handbook of inmate
guidelines that reference the New Jersey Administrative Code,
specifically N.J.A.C. 10A:4 Inmate Discipline, and N.J.A.C. 10A:5
Close Custody Units.
(Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n at 6.)
He argues that
these guidelines provide procedures to be followed in the
administration of inmate discipline.
(Id. at 7.)
Decisions from
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit establish that a
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest can arise from state
rules and regulations when they establish substantive predicates
that must be met in order for an inmate to be placed in restrictive
custody.
(Id. (citing Layton v. Beyer, 953 F.2d 839 (3d Cir.
1992)).)
Plaintiff asserts that the New Jersey Department of
Corrections regulations N.J.A.C. 10A:4 and N.J.A.C. 10A:5 have
mandatory language that creates such substantive predicates that
must be met.
(Id. at 8, 15.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
failed to follow these predicates because they did not prepare a
disciplinary report with a finding of guilt, which would have
provided Plaintiff with notice of the reason for his placement in
administrative segregation.
(Id. at 9-15, 22-23, 26-28.)
Plaintiff claims that, as a prisoner, he has the right to written
notice of the basis of his removal from the general population and
12
an opportunity to rebut the charges or a hearing; however, he was
never provided with a written record.
(Id. at 16, 30.)
Plaintiff further argues that pretrial detainees are presumed
innocent and may not be subjected to punishment.
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535).)
(Id. at 17
He contends that New Jersey case
law establishes that administrative segregation is the same as
disciplinary confinement.
(Id. at 24 (citing Perez v. Neubert, 611
F.Supp. 830, 837 (D.N.J. 1985)).)2
He argues that, as a pretrial
detainee, his placement in administrative segregation without an
adjudication of guilt was a punishment and that he was kept in
custody longer than necessary because he was unable to post bail on
March 6, 2009 after his bail was reduced.
(Id. at 31.)
As a
result of the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity because they placed a pretrial
detainee in administrative segregation without abiding by the
applicable rules and regulations.
(Id. at 34-36.)
Plaintiff additionally argues that Defendants’ assertion that
the purpose of his administrative segregation was security is a
2
The Court does not read this case to suggest that
administrative segregation is the same as disciplinary confinement.
Rather, the Perez court explained that the case law has confused
the nomenclature. 611 F.Supp. at 837 n.4. The court assumed the
conditions of confinement are the same for both administrative
segregation and disciplinary segregation. Id. at 837. However,
the court noted that while the purpose of disciplinary segregation
is punitive, the purpose of administrative segregation is
nonpunitive and is instead imposed for security reasons. Id.
13
farce because Betterton posted bail prior to February 23, 2009, and
therefore, security was not the true concern when Defendants placed
Plaintiff in administrative segregation on February 25, 2009.
(Id.
at 18-21 (citing dkt. entry no. 197-3, Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n, Ex. Q,
Pl.’s Decl.).)
Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that neither
Betterton nor any other inmates were placed in “keep separate
status” from Plaintiff.
(Id. at 20-21.)
With respect to his First Amendment claims, Plaintiff argues
that his placement in administrative segregation violated his
freedom-of-association rights to interact with other inmates as a
trustee and help them post bail.
(Id. at 32-33.)
Plaintiff concludes that material facts are in dispute.
In
particular, during discovery Plaintiff had requested the N-unit log
book for February of 2009, which would have provided Betterton’s
bail dates and an accounting of any incidents between Plaintiff and
Betterton.
(Id. at 39-40, 44-45.)
Plaintiff also claims to have
requested information from Defendants regarding what was heard in
the recorded phone calls they reviewed.
(Id. at 40.)
Plaintiff
asserts that this information is essential to his ability to
14
challenge Defendants’ assertions that the purpose of the
segregation was related to security concerns.
C.
(Id. at 41.)3
Defendants’ Reply
Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s counter statement of
material facts should not be considered because he failed to cite
to the record in support of these facts and that Plaintiff’s brief
exceeds the 40 page limitation found in New Jersey Local Civil Rule
7.2.
(See Cicchi Letter Reply Br.; DeAmicis Letter Reply Br.;
Barth Letter Reply Br.)
With respect to Plaintiff’s legal arguments, Defendants
contest Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants failed to abide by
New Jersey regulations and argue that Plaintiff cites the wrong
regulations.
(Cicchi Letter Reply Br. at 3.)4
Specifically, under
N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.1, N.J.A.C. 10A:1 through 10A:30 -- the
regulations cited to by Plaintiff -- explicitly apply only to State
3
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery
relating to Betterton has been addressed numerous times by the
Magistrate Judge. Most recently, the Magistrate Judge stated, “The
Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to any additional
information regarding Mr. Betterton. This Court has already found
Defendants’ production to be adequate as outlined in Defendants’
responses and Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to more
information, or that such information would be likely to lead to
relevant evidence.” (6-13-13 Order.) Discovery in this case
closed on June 13, 2013. (Id.)
4
Defendants Barth, DeAmicis, and Masone join the legal
arguments contained in Defendant Cicchi’s Letter Reply Brief. (See
Masone Letter Reply Br.; DeAmicis Letter Reply Br.; Barth Letter
Reply Br.)
15
correctional facilities; N.J.A.C. 10A:31 through 10A:34 are the
regulations that apply to municipal and county correctional
facilities.
(Id.)
MCACC is a county facility, so Plaintiff’s
citations to N.J.A.C. 10A:1 through 10A:30 are irrelevant.
(Id.)
Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did in fact receive
notice from Chief of Social Services Joyce Pirre that his status
was changed by the Classification Committee to administrative
segregation, and Plaintiff posted bail prior to the monthly review
scheduled by the Committee.
(Id.)
Defendants concede that States, through statutes and
regulations, can create liberty interests that may be protected by
the Due Process Clause.
(Id. at 4.)
However, “‘these interests
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . .
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).)
(Id. (quoting Sandin
Under Third Circuit
precedent, administrative segregation, even for fifteen months,
does not impose such a hardship.
(Id. (citing Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703, 708-09 (3d Cir. 1997)).)
With respect to Plaintiff’s assertion that he has not received
adequate discovery regarding Betterton, Defendants argue that the
Magistrate Judge has already ruled that Plaintiff is not entitled
to more discovery.
(Id. at 4-5 (citing 6-13-13 Order).)
16
D.
Plaintiff’s “Sur-Reply”
In response to Defendants’ reply briefing, Plaintiff submitted
what he refers to as a “Supplemental & Amended Brief in Support of
Opposition.”
(See dkt. entry no. 202, Pl.’s Supplemental Br.)
Defendants argue that the Court should not consider this brief
because it is actually a sur-reply, and Plaintiff did not obtain
permission from the Court to file such a brief as is required by
Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(6).
(Dkt. entry no. 203, Barth’s 10-22-13
Letter; dkt. entry no. 204, Cicchi’s 10-23-13 Letter.)
The Court
need not resolve the propriety of Plaintiff’s filing, as it does
not alter the Court’s result.
The Court will briefly summarize the
contents of this filing to the extent that such arguments were not
presented in Plaintiff’s original brief.
Plaintiff provided factual citations for his counter statement
of material facts in response to Defendants’ reply briefing.
(Pl.’s Supplemental Br. at 1-2.)
Plaintiff also responds to
Defendants’ argument that he relies on the wrong regulations and
argues that, according to the MCACC’s Handbook, N.J.A.C. 10A:4 and
10A:5 apply to inmates at the MCACC.
(Id. at 3-4.)
He concedes
that the regulations dictate that N.J.A.C. 10A:31 through 10A:34
apply to county facilities, but he counters that “there is no
statement or citation in the [MCACC] inmate handbook showing it
applies[.]
[T]he only administrative code is 10A:4 and 10A:5.”
17
(Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff additionally argues that the “atypical and
significant hardship standard” from Sandin applies to sentenced
inmates, not pretrial detainees.
(Id. at 8.)
V.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff in this matter is unrepresented by counsel.
For
this reason, the Court holds his Complaint “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Despite of the Court’s liberal view of Plaintiff’s
submissions, this leniency can only go so far.
While Plaintiff has
asserted claims for violations of his First and Eighth Amendment
rights, nothing in the submissions suggests that his claims have
anything to do with the freedoms protected by these Amendments.
The Complaint and submissions are entirely directed at Defendants’
failure to provide him due process when placing him in
administrative segregation.
For this reason, the Court will grant
the motions for summary judgment in part as they apply to
Plaintiff’s claims for First and Eighth Amendment violations.
(See
Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 15.)
The Court finds that Defendants have failed to carry their
burden of demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff’s due-process claims.
The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause does not in and of itself create a
18
liberty interest in an inmate remaining part of the general prison
population as opposed to being confined to “less amenable and more
restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons.”
466-68.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at
Nevertheless, “[s]tate regulations having the force of
law, as well as state statutes, may create a liberty interest.”
Layton, 953 F.2d at 845.
The Third Circuit has found that the very
regulations cited by Plaintiff, specifically N.J.A.C. 10A-5.25,
“create[s] a liberty interest in remaining part of the general
prison population, or, more particularly, remaining free of the
restrictive confinement” of administrative segregation.
846-47.
Id. at
However, shortly after the Third Circuit’s recognition of
this liberty interest, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for
finding a liberty interest based on a state statute or regulation.
In order for a due-process violation to arise based on a statecreated liberty interest, the restraint must “impose[] [an]
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
Plaintiff correctly notes that Sandin applies to sentenced
prisoners, not pretrial detainees.
See id.
With respect to the
constitutionality of restraints on pretrial detainees’ liberty
interests without due process of law, “the proper inquiry is
whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee” or
whether the restrictions are incidental to “some other legitimate
19
government purpose.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 538.
This standard
balances the rights of detainees with the need of prison
administrators to maintain security and with the wide-ranging
deference courts afford to prison administrators.
Id. at 546-47.
Sandin affirmed that the punitive standard articulated in Bell
remains the law with respect to pretrial detainees, and stated that
“[t]he punishment of incarcerated prisoners, on the other hand,
serves different aims than those found invalid” with respect to
pretrial detainees.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 485.
The circumstances in Bell are distinguishable from the facts
of this case.
Bell did not involve state regulations that created
liberty interests.
Here, there admittedly exists a regulatory
scheme that provides rules and procedures for administrative
confinement.
Moreover, the rationale for the creation of the
punitive standard in Bell does not appear to be implicated in this
case.
The concern in Bell, as explained by Sandin, was that “a
State would attempt to punish a detainee for the crime for which he
was indicted via preconviction holding conditions.”
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).
Id. at 484
But here, Plaintiff does not
argue, and the undisputed facts do not suggest, that the purpose of
the administrative segregation was to punish Plaintiff for his
indicted crimes -- resisting arrest by flight (N.J.S.A. 2C:292A(2)) and possession of a controlled dangerous substance within
20
500 feet of a public housing facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5A, 2C:357.1).
Plaintiff has failed to acknowledge these differences from
the circumstances in Bell.
This does not mean, however, that Defendants have successfully
framed the issue.
Even if the Court were to assume that Bell is
inapplicable given these distinctions and that Sandin governs,
Defendants have not addressed Plaintiff’s allegation that he was
unable to post bail on March 6, 2009 because he was could not
freely use the phone while in administrative segregation.
fact might have significance under Sandin.
This
In determining that the
restraint in Sandin was not an atypical and significant hardship,
the United States Supreme Court noted that the restraint upon the
inmate did not “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
Here, Plaintiff had not been sentenced at
the time of his administrative segregation, but he alleges that the
segregation prevented him from posting bail several weeks earlier.
Defendants have not addressed this allegation in their submissions.
Thus, while the parties have correctly identified the standards
from Bell or Sandin, they have not adequately framed the issue or
briefed their positions with recognition of the particular facts at
issue here.
The parties have additionally failed to adequately address
what, if any, state-created liberty interests exist in this case.
21
Defendants accurately state that the regulations explicitly provide
that N.J.A.C. 10A:4 and 10A:5 -- the regulations found to create a
liberty interest in Layton and the regulations relied upon by
Plaintiff as the basis of his due-process rights -- apply only to
state facilities.
N.J.A.C. 10A:2-1.
MCACC is a county facility.
Thus, these regulations, and any liberty interest created by them,
do not, without more, apply to the MCACC.
See Selobyt v. Keough-
Dwyer Corr. Facility of Sussex Cnty., 375 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App.
Div. 2005) (“[T]here are differences between the [Department of
Corrections] rules for county correctional facilities and those
that pertain to state correctional facilities.”).
Plaintiff has argued in response that the MCACC’s Handbook
applies these regulations to inmates in the MCACC.
Plaintiff has
provided excerpts from this Handbook to the Court.
While Plaintiff
truthfully cites from these excerpts, the Court cannot rule on the
precise contours of any due-process rights created by the Handbook
without viewing the Handbook in its entirety.
For example, it is
unclear from the excerpts whether the citations to N.J.A.C. 10A:4
and 10A:5 in the excerpts are merely an effort by prisoner
administrators to make the Department of Corrections regulations
generally available to inmates, or whether they are intended to
extend the application of the regulations for state facilities to
the MCACC as well.
Moreover, while Defendants argue that the
22
regulations applicable to a county institution such as the MCACC
are N.J.A.C. 10A:31 through 10A:34, Defendants have failed to brief
what, if any, state-created liberty interests arise from these
regulations or from the MCACC’s Handbook, specifically with respect
to a pretrial detainee rather than a sentenced inmate.
The briefing by the parties is deficient.
Should the parties
desire to refine their briefing based on the foregoing, the Court
will entertain another motion for summary judgment.5
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, and for good cause showing, the Court
will (1) grant the motion for summary judgment with respect to the
First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims and (2) deny the motion
for summary judgment without prejudice with respect to Plaintiff’s
claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated: December 9, 2013
5
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s attempts to create
a disputed issue of fact with respect to his lack of discovery
related to Betterton. The Magistrate Judge has addressed these
concerns. (See 6-13-13 Order.) Discovery is closed, and Plaintiff
is not entitled to additional information on Betterton. (Id.)
23
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