STEELE v. CHICCHI et al
Filing
236
MEMORANDUM OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 9/4/2014. (kas )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
YUSEF STEELE,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-3551 (MLC)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
WARDEN EDMOND CICCHI, et al.,
Defendants.
COOPER, District Judge
Before the Court are the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (see dkt. entry no.
224), motion to vacate judgment (see dkt. entry no. 225), and motion to correct the
record. (See dkt. entry no. 223.) The Court will deny each motion.
BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history are detailed in this Court’s December 9, 2013
Memorandum Opinion. (See dkt. entry no. 205 at 1-8.) On May 23, 2014, this Court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (See dkt. entry no. 221, Mem.
Op.; dkt. entry no. 222, Order & J.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion for Reconsideration
The plaintiff moves for reconsideration under the “local rules.” (See dkt. entry no.
224.) Local Civil Rule 7.1 permits the moving party to file a motion for reconsideration
“within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion by the
Judge or Magistrate Judge.” L.Civ.R. 7.1(i). This Court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on May 23, 2014. (See Mem. Op.; Order & J.) The plaintiff
apparently dated the appended certificate of service on June 1, 2014, however, the prison
mailed the motion on June 11, 2014. (See dkt. entry no. 224-2.) Because the plaintiff is
pro se, the Court will apply the mailbox rule and assume that the plaintiff delivered the
motion to the prison authorities on June 1, 2014. Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758,
761 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that under the mailbox rule, which was specifically designed
for pro se prisoners, the filing date is “the date on which a prisoner transmitted
documents to prison authorities”). Accordingly, the Court will not deny the motion for
reconsideration as untimely. Martin v. Keitel, No. 06-5798, 2007 WL 1175736, at *1
(D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2007) (“Taking into account plaintiff’s pro se status…the Court will
exercise its discretion to consider the out-of-time motion.”); see also L.Civ.R. 83.2(b)
(stating local rules may be relaxed if adherence would cause surprise or injustice).
Even assuming the motion was timely filed, reconsideration is not warranted
because the plaintiff fails to raise any new argument. See Arista Records v. Flea World,
356 F.Supp.2d 411, 416 (D.N.J. 2005); Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Serv., 111 F.Supp.2d
542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000). A motion for reconsideration is “an extremely limited
procedural vehicle” that is granted sparingly. Tehan, 111 F.Supp.2d at 549 (internal
citation and quotation omitted); see also Cataldo v. Moses, 361 F.Supp.2d 420, 433
(D.N.J. 2004). Reconsideration is generally limited to correcting manifest errors of law
or analyzing newly-discovered evidence. See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc.
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
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A court may grant a motion for reconsideration when the movant shows at least
one of the following: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear
error of law or fact, or will prevent manifest injustice. See id.; Cataldo, 361 F.Supp.2d at
432-33. Reconsideration is not warranted, however, where: (1) the movant merely
recapitulates the prior cases and arguments; or (2) the movant’s apparent purpose is to
express disagreement with the court’s initial decision. See Flea World, 356 F.Supp.2d at
416; Tehan, 111 F.Supp.2d at 549-50 (stating “[m]otions for reconsideration will not be
granted where a party simply asks the court to analyze the same facts and cases it had
already considered in reaching its original decision”). Rather, the motion is reserved for
situations where the district court failed to consider facts or controlling legal authority.
Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Court, 238 Fed.Appx. 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007).
The Court, having carefully reviewed the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration,
finds that the plaintiff fails to establish that this Court overlooked facts or controlling
legal authority. (See dkt. entry no. 224.) Rather, the majority of the motion reiterates
facts and argument that the Court has already considered. (See id. at 6-7.) See Mauro,
238 Fed.Appx. at 793-94; Flea World, 356 F.Supp.2d at 416, 430; Tehan, 111 F.Supp.2d
at 549. The plaintiff, for example, continues to assert that “summary judgment cannot be
in favor of the defendants” without raising additional facts or points of law. (See, e.g.,
dkt. entry no. 224 at 3-5 (“I was placed in Administrative Segregation as punishment by
just being friends with Speedy Bail Bonds.”).) The Court, however, previously addressed
such arguments. (See, e.g., Mem. Op. at 3 (“Defendants then placed Plaintiff in
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administrative segregation ‘to prevent him from imposing any additional security risks in
the facility and to allow further investigation into Speedy’s activities without his
interference.’”).) Accordingly, the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration as meritless.
II.
Motion to Vacate Judgment
The plaintiff moves to vacate judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60, although he does not specify the provision of the rule upon which he relies.
The Court will assume he moves under Rule 60(a), however, because the plaintiff
references alleged clerical errors in support of the motion. (See dkt. entry no. 225 at 34.)1 Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he did not receive notice to oppose the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and a delay in entering his motion for
discovery and to amend the complaint on the docket. (See id.)
The plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment warrants no relief. Even assuming the
alleged clerical errors occurred, the remedy is not to vacate the order resolving the
motion for summary judgment. Tuskegee N. Advocacy Grp. v. Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, No. 09-5011, 2010 WL 1558715, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2010)
(denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate due to insufficient “evidence that the Clerk's
Office deliberately withheld the Order from plaintiff” and the “alleged clerical errors
[had] nothing whatsoever to do with the court’s decision”); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Rule 60(a) permits courts to “correct a clerical mistake…on motion or on its own” for errors
that are “mechanical in nature, apparent on the record, and involving an error of substantive
judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a).
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Barness, 484 F.Supp. 1134, 1141 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (exercising the court’s power under
Rule 60(a) and denying the defendant’s motion to vacate because typographical and
clerical errors are not grounds for a court to vacate judgment). Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment will be denied.2
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, motion to vacate judgment, and motion to correct the record. The Court
will issue an appropriate order.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
.
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated: September 4, 2014
Because the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and motion to vacate
judgment, the plaintiff’s separate motion to correct the record will be denied as moot.
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