BRAGG v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 1/20/2010. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY BRIAN KEITH BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER, et al., Defendants. APPEARANCES: Brian Keith Bragg, Pro Se Ann Klein Forensic Center P.O. Box 7717 West Trenton, NJ 08628 PISANO, District Judge Plaintiff, Brian Keith Bragg, confined at the Ann Klein Forensic Center, West Trenton, New Jersey, at the time he filed this civil complaint, alleges violations of his constitutional rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not paid the : : : : : : : : : : :

Civil Action No. 09-3743 (JAP) OPINION

filing fee, and seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Based on Plaintiff's affidavit of indigence, this Court will grant his request. At this time, the Court must review the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). BACKGROUND According to the complaint, Plaintiff was "illegally and involuntarily" transferred to the Ann Klein Forensic Center on July 20, 2009. On July 23, 2009, Plaintiff asked the resident

librarian for a few law books to do legal research to challenge his involuntary commitment. Plaintiff was told that the books

were limited to two law dictionaries, and an outdated New Jersey criminal code book. Plaintiff complained about the lack of legal material, and was told by defendant Rogers, the librarian, that Ann Klein did not have a law library, but that residents were free to call their attorneys. Plaintiff states that he had no counsel due to

his involuntary commitment. Plaintiff asserts that legal materials or a law library should be available to civilly-committed persons seeking to file habeas corpus petitions or civil rights suits, in accordance with Bounds v. Smith, see infra. He argues that the facilities at Ann He

Klein violate his constitutional rights to access to courts. asks for the facility to provide for a law library and for a declaratory judgment against the facility.

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DISCUSSION A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The

Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. See 28 U.S.C.

This action is subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, because plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent. In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). See also United States The Court must "accept

as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower

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Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

The Court

need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Id.

A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears "`beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. See also Erickson, 551 U.S.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

at 93-94 (in considering a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)). However, recently, the Supreme Court refined this standard for summary dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The issue before

the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal's civil rights complaint adequately alleged defendants' personal involvement in discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal's treatment during detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true, violated his constitutional rights. See id. The Court examined

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

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relief."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).1

Citing its recent opinion in

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the proposition that "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two working principles underlying the failure to state a claim standard: First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted). further explained that a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. The Court

Rule 8(d)(1) provides that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 5

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When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausible give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 1948. The Supreme Court's ruling

in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint is plausible. See id. at 1949-50;

see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 2009 WL 2501662, *4 (3d Cir., Aug. 18, 2009). Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides the "final nail-in-the-coffin" for the "no set of facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that applied to federal complaints before Twombly. WL 2501662 at *5. See Fowler, 2009

Now, after Iqbal, the Third Circuit requires

In Conley, as stated above, a district court was permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this "no set of facts" standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the claim's legal elements. 6

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that a district court must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when presented with a motion to dismiss: First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." [Id.] In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not `show [n]'-`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, [129 S. Ct. at 1949-50]. This "plausibility" determination will be "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. Fowler, 2009 WL 2501662, *5. This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff, even after Iqbal. (2007). See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000).

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B.

Section 1983 Actions A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... . Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). C. Access to Courts Claim The constitutional right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. In addition, the

v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).

constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress

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for violations of their constitutional rights.

See Procunier v.

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). See also

Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 n.18 (3d Cir. 1988) (chronicling various constitutional sources of the right of access to the courts). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." to the courts is not, however, unlimited. The right of access

"The tools [that

Bounds] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." (1996) (emphasis in original). Moreover, a prisoner alleging a violation of his right of access must show that prison officials caused him past or imminent "actual injury." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-55 and n.3 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355

(1996); Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997).

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[There is no] abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, [and] an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. ... [T]he inmate therefore must go one step further an demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to file even a complaint. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege facts indicating "actual injury." Furthermore, the facility allows those confined therein to telephone their attorneys for legal advice. Although Plaintiff

states that he does not have an attorney, in New Jersey, all civilly-committed persons are assigned counsel once the temporary commitment order is entered. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(c). In this

case, therefore, Plaintiff's legal access claim fails because he had assignment of counsel and access to counsel over the telephone, and because Plaintiff has not shown "actual injury" for the alleged violation of his right of access to the courts.

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CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's access to courts claim will be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If Plaintiff can correct the deficiencies

of his complaint, he may file a motion to reopen these claims in accordance with the attached Order. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

/s/ Joel A. Pisano JOEL A. PISANO United States District Judge Dated: January 20, 2010

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