HOHSFIELD v. TOWNSHIP OF MANCHESTER et al

Filing 17

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 8/29/2011. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DAVID HOHSFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
TWP. OF MANCHESTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 09-5377 (AET)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
DAVID HOHSFIELD, #567841A, Plaintiff Pro Se
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center
8 Production Way 7-L-D
Avenel, New Jersey 07001
THOMPSON, District Judge:
David Hohsfield, a prisoner incarcerated at Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, filed
a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court dismissed the Complaint, without prejudice to
the filing of an amended complaint stating a cognizable claim under § 1983. Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint on March 4, 2011. Having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations, this
Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint, without prejudice to the filing of a second and final
amended complaint stating a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND
The original Complaint sought damages against the Township of Manchester, Manchester
Police Department, unknown officers of Manchester Police Department, the Community Medical

Center of Toms River, and unknown employees of the Community Medical Center. Plaintiff
asserted the following facts in the original Complaint:
On or about Oct. 20, 2007 Plaintiff was removed from his place of
residence by officers of the Manchester Police Dept. who had
received a call from plaintiff’s then girlfriend informing them that
plaintiff had overdosed on sleeping medication, when he had not.
Officers responding to the call did not give plaintiff the choice of
voluntarily going to hospital or refusing medical treatment. Instead
plaintiff was told that “either I sign the consent form to be
transported to the hospital for treatment of I will be forced to go,
either way your going.” Plaintiff admits taking sleeping
medication that was prescribed by a doctor, however was never in
danger of an overdose and therefore should have not been
pressured by police to sign a consent form to be transported to the
hospital against his will, and thereafter admitted for observation by
person(s) unknown at this time . . . . Plaintiff now asserts that he
should not have been removed from his residence by threat nor
coercion of police officer(s) that took advantage of the late hour
and plaintiffs medicated condition at 3:00 am. Furthermore,
plaintiff asserts that he should not have been involuntar[il]y
committed to the hospital for observation especially when medical
tests proved that plaintiff was not overdosing on medication . . . .
Thereafter on or about Nov. 2, 2007 plaintiff was charged and
indicted for possession of CDS . . . which was administratively
dismissed by the state on Feb. 21, 2008. As the result of plaintiff
being restrained against his will and deprived of his liberty by
defendants, as well as prosecuted for a crime he did not commit he
incurred $13,500 of hospital costs that were unnecessary and
avoidable.
(Dkt. 1 at 6-7.)
By Order and accompanying Opinion filed September 14, 2010, this Court dismissed the
Complaint. This Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim based on Plaintiff’s involuntary
commitment on October 20, 2007, because the ex-girlfriend’s telephone call alerting police that
Plaintiff had overdosed on sleeping pills and Plaintiff’s admission that he had in fact taken
sleeping pills were sufficient to give the police probable cause to believe that, in the absence of
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an evaluation, Plaintiff may have been in danger of death through overdose. This Court further
found that the Complaint did not assert a substantive due process claim because, given the
girlfriend’s call and the fact that Plaintiff had taken sleeping medication, the conduct of the
police did not shock the conscience. This Court ruled that the procedural due process claim
failed because the Third Circuit has held that, “in an emergency situation, a short-term
commitment without a hearing does not violate procedural due process.” Benn v. Universal
Health System, Inc., 371 F. 3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004).
In the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 16), Plaintiff asserts as follows:
Defendant Hemhouser is sued in his professional as well as
personal capacity as the arresting officer with respect to the C.S.L.
offense against plaintiff. Count One is a § 1983 claim for false
arrest/illegal detention against all Defendants except the 2 mental
health screeners, the claims against them are illegal detention.
Claiming that the time between being detained at the hospital and
his arrest violated his 4th Amend. right of freedom from illegal
search and seizure. Count Two is a § 1983 claim of Malicious
Prosecution against all Defendants, except the 2 mental health
screeners at the hospital. Claiming the imprisonment of Plaintiff
pursuant to the warrant issued, that was later dismissed, was
Malicious Prosecution. Count Three is a § 1983 claim of
unlawful/unreasonable search against all defendants but the 2
mental health screeners at the hospital. Claiming that the search of
his room was illegal, and warrantless. Count Four is a § 1983
claim of unconstitutional invasion of privacy and deprivation of
substantive Due Process against all the defendants except the 2
mental health screeners, based upon the same searches previously
mentioned. Claim Five is a § 1983 claim denial of equal protection
against all defendants but the 2 mental health screeners, Claiming
that defendants engaged in profiling, pursuing and arresting
plaintiff solely due to being a registered sex offender residing in a
senior citizen community where the community had sent letter to
plaintiffs employer stating that “either the plaintiff goes or you
both will go.”

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Claim Six is a § 1985 claim of conspiracy against all defendants
except the 2 mental health screeners. Claiming that the defendants
conspired to pursue, arrest, and then prosecute plaintiff based upon
him being an unwanted type of person living within a senior citizen
community, ie, a sex offender. Claim Seven is a § 1986 claim
against all defendants except the 2 mental health screeners.
Claiming that the defendants failed to prevent the conspiracy under
42 U.S.C. § 1986. Count Eight is a § 1983 claim against
Supervisors 1-3 except the 2 mental health screeners. Claiming
that they had failed to adequately train their employees as a matter
of custom and practice which resulted in the above-mentioned
constitutional violations against plaintiff. Count Nine is a claim
against all the above-mentioned defendants except for the 2 mental
health screeners for claims of state law civil rights violations
against plaintiff that resulted in malicious prosecution, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent failure to properly train law enforcement
officers. Claim Ten is a § 1983 claim against the Two (2)
unknown mental health/medical screeners who were responsible
for the unlawful detention of plaintiff at Community Medical
Center in Toms River, NJ. Claiming that they had failed to follow
proper procedure to have plaintiff held for observation against his
will, further claiming that screener had informed plaintiff that if he
choose not to sign consent form that he would be involuntarily
committed beyond the 72 hour period and that it could take up to if
not more then a month to be released from the hospital. It should
be known that plaintiff did in fact sign consent form, however it
was done under protest with the request of speaking to his attorney
prior to signing the consent form. Claim Eleven is a State Claim
pursuant to NJSA 2C:52-6; Plaintiff seeks the Expungement of this
arrest due to the arrest not leading to any conviction, but being
dismissed in it’s entirety by the state.
(Dkt. 16 at 5-6.)
II. STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court, prior to docketing or as soon as
practicable after docketing, to review a complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff is

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proceeding in forma pauperis or a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental agent or entity.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. The PLRA requires the Court to sua sponte dismiss any
claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
A claim is frivolous if it "lacks even an arguable basis in law" or its factual allegations
describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); see
also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990). To withstand dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

U.S.

, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A district court may exercise original jurisdiction over “Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority.” U.S. Const. art. III., § 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1983
of Title 42 of the United States Code authorizes a person such as Plaintiff to seek redress for a
violation of his federal civil rights by a person who was acting under color of state law. Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person
deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1107 (3d Cir. 1989).
The problem with the Amended Complaint is that it merely lists 11 legal claims, but sets
forth no facts whatsoever. Moreover, included in the list of claims are the claims this Court
dismissed in its prior Opinion, i.e., Fourth Amendment seizure claim based on the commitment
on October 20, 2007, substantive due process, and procedural due process. As the Iqbal Court
explained,
the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed
factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the Amended Complaint before this Court sets forth claims but no facts, it does
not satisfy the pleading standard under Iqbal and will be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. However, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will
grant him 30 days to file a second and final amended complaint alleging facts stating a
cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As Plaintiff evidently seeks to state a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, this
Court will outline the elements of such a claim. A claim of malicious prosecution for a particular
crime under § 1983 “alleges the abuse of the judicial process by government agents.” Gallo v.
City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1998). “To prove malicious prosecution under
section 1983 when the claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the
defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or
for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation
of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F. 3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted); see also Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Baker v. Wittevrongel, 363 Fed. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2010); Kossler
v. Crisanti, 564 F. 3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2009). If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint
asserting unconstitutional malicious prosecution, however, he must specify what happened,
including who did what to whom, where, when, and under what circumstances.1
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If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he should be aware that to state a claim under §
1983 against an individual, “plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
(continued...)
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint, without
prejudice to the filing of a second and final amended complaint. The Court will enter an
appropriate Order.

/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

Dated: August 29, 2011

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(...continued)
through the official’s own actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
Moreover, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell,
436 U.S. at 694. To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the amended complaint “must
identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was,” McTernan v.
City of York, PA, 564 F. 3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009), and specify facts showing a “direct causal
link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation, Jiminez v.
All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F. 3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). “[A] single incident of police misbehavior by a single
policeman is insufficient as sole support for an inference that a municipal policy or custom
caused the incident.” Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F. 3d 263, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 832 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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