VAUGHN v. RICCI et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 36 Motion to Amend; Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel 41 is Denied; and Petitioners motion to enforce the Court's 6/17/2019 Order and impose sanctions 51 is denied. (A copy of this Order and accompanying Opinion was sent to Plaintiff via Regular U.S Mail on 11/21/2022). Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 11/17/2022. (jdg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JERMAINE VAUGHN,

Civ. No. 10-1397 (PGS)

Petitioner,

v.
MICHELLE RICCI, et al.,

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

:

Respondents.

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2254. This case was recently reopened after it had been

stayed. (See ECF No. 60.) Presently pending befbre this Court are the following
outstanding motions: (1) motion to amend the habeas petition (ECF No. 36); (2)
motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 41); and (3) motion to enforce this Court’s June
17, 2019 order and to impose sanctions (ECF No. 51). Respondents have filed a
response (ECF No. 67) and Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 68). For the collowing
reasons, all three outstanding motions are denied.
1.1

In March 1999, Petitioner was convicted of the robbery and shooting death
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1 The Court discusses only the background relevant to Petitioner’s-pending-motions.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division summarized the factual background
relevant here as follows:
[Following Petitioner’s arrest,] police advised [Petitioner]
why he was in custody, and a detective administered his
Miranda2 rights. [Petitioner] waived his rights, and
approximately two hours later provided a formal statement
in which he admitted shooting the victim. [Petitioner]
explained the incident as follows: “As we got closer to the
[victim] he saw my gun, and then he got up on me real
quick, grabbed my jacket and pulled me towards him, and
[that is] when the gun went off.”
At [Petitioner’s] 1999 trial, Detective Robert Sheehan of
the Homicide unit testified that after being conveyed to the
Trenton Police Department, [Petitioner] was placed in an
interview room and advised that he was there for an
investigation. Sheehan testified that [Petitioner] appeared
coherent and clear-minded and stated he appeared to be “a
very intelligent young man.” The detective testified that he
advised defendant of his Miranda rights, reviewed the
waiver of rights form with him, and ensured that
[Petitioner] understood his rights. Defendant subsequently
waived his rights by affixing his signature on the signature
line without asking Sheehan for any clarification.
Detective Sheehan testified that after [Petitioner’s]
waiver, he was uncooperative and unwilling to speak, and
made such statements as: “I’m not going to tell you
anything;” “there’s nothing you can do to me;” and “you
don’t have anything on me.” After Detective Sheehan
informed [Petitioner] of the evidence against him
including witness testimony, recovered weapons,
ballistics, and fingerprints, [Petitioner] told Detective
Sheehan that “the guy didn’t have to. be a hero” and that
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2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

Sheehan testified that [he obtained a formal statement
regarding the shooting from Petitioner.]
[Petitioner] testified at trial that after he was conveyed to
the Trenton Police Department, he was advised of his
Miranda rights, and voluntarily waived them. [Petitioner]
testified that he agreed to provide Detective Sheehan with
his statement.
On cross-examination, [Petitioner]
admitted that he was given the opportunity to review his
statement, initialed each page, and did not make any
changes.
.

.

.

On [Petitioner’s] direct appeal, we affirmed [Petitioner’s]
conviction and sentence, but remanded for a Miranda
hearing. We instructed the trial judge to determine whether
defendant had invoked his right to remain silent, an issue
he had not raised either before or during trial. State v.
Vaughn, No. A-6299-98 (App. Div. June 26, 2001) (slip
op. at 12-13).
The remand hearing was conducted by the same judge that
presided over [Petitioner’s] trial. At the hearing, Detective
Sheehan testified that after waiving his Miranda rights,
[Petitioneil was uncooperative and made comments that
there was no evidence against him Detective Sheehan
testified that he informed [Petitioner] of the evidence
against him. On cross-examination, he explained that
When he testified at trial that [Petitioner] was
uncooperative, he did not mean that [Petitioner] stopped
speaking. Rather, [Petitioner] wanted to know what
evidence the police had against him.

Based on his findings, by order and opinion dated June 7,
2002, the trial judge held that [Petitioner] had not invoked
his right to remain silent and that his confession was
properly admitted. [The Appellate Division] affirmed
[Petitioner’s] conviction on appeal, State v. Vaughn, No.
A-3921-01 (June 7, 2004) (slip op. at 10), and the Supreme
3

Court denied certification, State v. Vaughn, 182 N.J. 143
(2004).
[Petitioner] then filed a petition for PCR.
[Petitioner]
did not raise any issue that his Miranda rights were
violated.
.

.

.

At [Petitioner’s] 2006 PCR hearing, Detective Sheehan
testified that he retired from his position with the Trenton
Police Department in July 2004. Prior to retiring, the
detective testified that he suffered a brain seizure in May
or June of 2004 that caused him to suffer from memory
loss. Because of his memory loss, Detective Sheehan did
not have any independent recollection of his investigation
or the trial and had to testify from his reports. Sheehan
denied having any medical issues during the trial and the
prior hearings that would have affected his ability to
rewllect.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied [Petitioner’s] PCR petition by order and opinion
dated January 10,2007. [The Appellate Division] affirmed
the judge’s denial of PCR. State v. Vaughn, No. A-287706 (App. Div. October 14, 2009) (slip op. at 8).
Vaughn,2018WL3614346at* 1-5.
Petitioner filed his §2254 petition on March 15, 2010. (ECF No. 1.) This
matter was stayed two separate times, while Petitioner pursued post-conviction relief
in state court. (See ECF Nos. 32, 54, 55.) Along with the second stay, the Court also
terminated Petitioner’s pending motions to amend, for appointment of counsel, and
—t-enfoce- the Gourt’ June 17, 2019

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55.)

4

(EtFNs. 54ad

Following a request from Petitioner, this matter was reopened by the Court on
March 9, 2022. (ECF No. 60.) The Court ordered Respondents to respond to
Petitioner’s outstanding motions tO amend, for appointment of counsel, and to
enforce the Court’s June 17, 2019 order and impose sanctions. (ECF No. 63.)
Respondents oppose all three motions. (ECF No. 67.) Petitioner has replied. (ECF
No. 68.)
II.

A. Motion to Enforce and Impose Sanctions
Petitioner filed a motion to enforce this Court’s June 17, 2019 discovery order
and to impose sanctions. (ECF No. 51.) Petitioner seeks the sanction of preventing
from opposing Petitioner’s motion to amend and motion for
appointment o counsel, due to their failure to comply with the Court’s discovery
order in a timely fashion. (Id.)
The following background led to this Court’s June 17, 2019 discovery order.
Subsequent to the filing of Petitioner’s habeas petition, Petitioner filed a second PCR
petition and application for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence of
Detective

Sheehan’s medical condition.” Vaughn, 2019 WL 3614346 at

*

5. On

September 26, 2014, the Court stayed the instant matter, in order to permit Petitioner
to exhaust

his state court remedies. (ECF No. 32.)

5

On December 11, 2014, the PCR judge found that “because Detective
Sheehan suffered his seizure a couple of months before July 2004, ‘[t]his in
absolutely no way had any impact on his testimony and memory in 1999, when
[Petitioner was] convicted and sentenced.” Vaughn, 2019 WL 3614346 at

*

5. The

Appellate Division affirmed the judge’s denial of Petitioner’s second PCR petition
on July 30, 2018. Id. On March 8, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme court denied
certification. State v. Vaughn, 237 N.J. 157 (2019).
On April 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion in this Court asserting he had
exhausted his state court remedies and wanted to reopen his federal habeas petition.
(ECF No. 35.) On the same day, Petitioner filed a motion for discovery, seeking the
earliest recorded dates when Detective Sheehan notified his employers at Trenton
Police Department of his memory loss. (ECF No. 37.) The Court granted the motion
to reopen the proceedings on April 17, 2019. (ECF No. 39.)
On May 30, 2019, this Court held a teleconference regarding Petitioner’s
pending motions and at the conference Respondents agreed to provide Petitioner
with the discovery sought, namely the earliest recorded dates when Detective
Sheehan notified his employers at Trenton Police Department of his memory loss.
(See ECF No. 37-1, 43.) On June 17, 2019, this Court ordered Respondents to
provide Petitioner with th.e discovery and to respond to Petitioner’s motion to amend
by September 4, 2019. (ECF Nc. 44.) On September 10, 2019, Respondents
6

requested an extension of time to comply with the Court’s order. (ECF No. 46.) In
their request for an. extension, Respondents indicated that Petitioner had filed a third
PCR petition on May 31, 2019. (Id.)
Based on Respondents’ letter, the Coirt filed an Order to Show Cause as to
why the Petition should not again be stayed pending state court exhaustion. (ECF
No. 49.) Following the Court’s Order to Show Cause, the Clerk’s office docketed
Petitioner’s motion for entry of order to enforce the Court’s June 17, 2019 discovery
order and impose sanctions. (ECF No. 51.) Although the motion to enforce was dated
two days prior to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, it was not docketed, until after
the Court’sorder.
On November 5, 2019, following a hearing, the Court ordered this matter
stayed pending the outcome of Petitioner’s state court proceedings. (ECF No. 54,
55) The order also terminated Petitioner’s motions to amend, for appointment of
counsel, and to enforce the Court’s June 17, 2019 order and impose sanctions. (Id.)
On April 4, 2022, this Court reopened this matter and ordered Respondents to
respond to Petitioner’s outstanding motions. (ECF No. 63.) Respondents requested
one ninety-day extension of time (ECF No. 65), which the Court granted. (ECF No.
66.) Respondents argue that because the Court stayed the matter following their
September 10, 2019 motion for extension of time, which was not ruled upon prior to
the stay, and provided Respondents with a 90 days extension upon the reopening of
7

the matter, they are sti!.l withinthe reasonably granted time to respond to Petitioner’s
motion. (ECF No. 67 at 2-10.) Respondents also argue that the discovery sought
does not exist. (Id. at 8-9.)
Once the Court ordered this matter stayed on November 10, 2019, the matter
was administratively terminated. Respondents’ request for an extension of time to
provide the discovery was still outstanding. Although administrative termination
does not close the matter, it removes it from the Court’s active docket. See Papotto
v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co, 731 F.3d 265, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2013). As such,
Respondents need to respond to the Court’s discovery order was also stayed pending
the reopening of this matter. Considering the administrative termination of this
matter and the 90 day extension Respondents were granted upon the reopening of
this matter, Respondents are still within time to provide Petitioner with the discovery
sought. As such, Petitioner’s motion to for sanctions based on Respondents’ failure
to provide the discovery in the given time is denied.
Regarding the discovery sought by Petitioner, Respondents assert that the
discovery does not exist. Respondents were ordered to provide Petitioner with
records indicating the earliest recorded dates when Detective Sheehan notified his
employers at Irenton Police Department of his memory loss. Respondents have
submitted a certification from counsel, indicating that the Director’s Office at the
Trenton Police Departit is the CustodiawofPersonne[Reords and niaimains
8

-

personnel files for current and former officers employed by the Trenton Police
Department, including Detective Robert Sheehan (retired). (ECF No. 67-i ¶2.) The
certification from counsel indicates that the Director’s Office has informed counsel
that Detective Sheehan’s personnel file contains “no documentation and flC) evidence
that he reported to anyone at the Trenton Police Department that he suffered from
memory loss during his tenure as a Trenton Police Officer.” Jd.

¶ 4.)

Based on the certification from Respondents’ counsel, the Court is satisfied
that the discovery sought by Petitioner regarding when Detective Sheehan informed
the Trenton Police Department does not exist. As such, Petitioner’s motion to
enforce this Court’s June 17, 2019 discovery order is denied.
B. Motion to Amend

On April 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his Petition to include
the following claim:

•

The PCR court improperly denied Petitioner’s motion for
•a new trial based upOn newly discovered evidence in
regards to Detective Sheehan’s 2006 PCR testimony
admitting to suffering from memory loss, thus violating
Petitioner’s state and federal constitutional rights to due
process and a fairtrial.

(ECF No. 36.) Petitioner contends Detective Sheehan may have been experiencing
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regarding the waiver of Petitioner’s Miranda rights. (Id.) Respondents oppose
Petitioner’s motion to amend his habeas petition. (ECF No—67 at 10-17.)
9

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing pleading amendments, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15, also applies to motions to amend habeas corpus petitions. Mayle v.
Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654-55 (2005). This rule provides that “[t]he court should freely
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Generally, a
petitioner should be afforded the opportunity to test his claim on the merits unless
there is an “apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing part)’ by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1964).
After filing his habeas petition here, Petitioner filed a second PCR petition
and application for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence of Detective
Sheehan’s medical condition.” Vaughn, 2019 WL 3614346 at

*

5. On December 11,

2014, the PCR judge found that “because Detective Sheehan suffered his seizure a
couple of months before July 2004, ‘[t]his in absolutely no way had any impact on
his testimony and memory in 1999, when [Petitioner wasj convicted and
sentenced.” Vaughn, 2019 WL 3614346 at * 5. The Appellate Division affinned the
judge’s denial of Petitioner’s second PCR petition on July 30, 2018. Id. On March
8, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme court denied certification. State v. Vaughn, 237
N.J. 157 (2019).

10

As explained above, Respondents have now submitted a certification from
counsel informing the Court that there are no notations in Detective Sheenan’s
personnel file that indicate that Detective Sheenan reported memory loss prior to his—--2004 stroke and retirement. The PCR court found Detective Sheehan’s 2004 seizure
had no impact on his 1999 testimony and memory. Vaughn, 2019 WL 3614346 at

*

5. Petitioner has not shown that the PCR court erred in not granting Petitioner a new
trial, as there is no record that Detective Sheenan suffered memory loss prior to his
stroke. The Court is required to defer to the state court’s factual findings that
Detective Sheehan’s 2004 seizure did not have an impact on his 1999 testimony and
memory. The Appellate Division’s adjudication of Petitioner’s claim was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. As a
result, Petitioner’s motion to amend be denied because the claim is futile. Foman,
371 U.S. at 182.
C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
On April 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF
No. 41.) Respondents oppose the motion. (ECF No. 67 at 17-20.)
A petitioner does not have a constitutional right to counsel in habeas
proceedings. See Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263 (3d Cir. 1991), superseded
on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C.

§

2254. However, 18 U.S.C.

§

3006A(a)(2)(B) provides that the court has discretion to appoint counseEwheretfre

11

court determines that the interests of justice so require.

.

.“

The relevant factors in

this inquiry include “(i) the likelihood of success on the merits(ii) the complexity
of the legal issues raised by the complaint; and (iii) the ability of the prisoner to
investigate and present the case.” Neeld v. New Jersey, 2012 WL 603293, *1 (D.N.J.
Feb. 22, 2012) (quoting Paul v. Attorney Gen. ofState ofN.i, 1992 WL 184358, *1
(D.N.J. July 10, 1992)). “Where these issues are ‘straightforward and capable of
resolution on the record,’ or when the petitioner has ‘a good understanding of the
issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions,’ the court
would not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel.” Biggins v. Snyder,
No. 99-18, 2001 WL125337, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 8, 2001) (quoting Ferguson v.
Jones, 905 F.2.d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1990); La Mere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s habeas petition and Respondents’
answer. It does not appear that the issues raised by Petitioner in his habeas petition
are overly complex in nature. Additionally, Petitioner has demonstrated a good
understanding of the process so far and an ability to present his case. A.s such,
Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

12

ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on the (1) motion to amend the
habeas petition (ECF No. 36); (2) motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 41); and (3)
motion to enforce this Court's June 17, 2019 order and to impose sanctions (ECF
No. 51), brought by Petitioner;· the Court having considered the motions;
Respondents' respons.e (ECF No. 67); and Petitioner's reply (ECF No. 68); and for
the reasons expressed above,
IT IS on this 17th day of November, 2022;
ORDERED that Petitioner's motion to amend (ECF No. 36) is DENIED;
Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 41) is DENIED; and Petitioner's
motion to enforce this Court's June 17, 2019 order and to impose sanctions (ECF
No. 51) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk •Shall serve this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail.

PETER G. SHERIDAN
United States District Judge

13