COLEMAN v. LONG BRANCH POLICE DEPARTMENT ET ALS et al

Filing 13

OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 4/11/2011. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
LONG BRANCH POLICE DEPT., et :
al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
WILLIAM COLEMAN,

Civil Action No. 10-2613 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

APPEARANCES:
WILLIAM COLEMAN, Plaintiff pro se
Monmouth County Correctional Institution
1 Waterworks Road, Freehold, New Jersey 07728
COOPER, District Judge
Plaintiff, William Coleman, an inmate at Monmouth County
Correctional Institution, seeks to bring this action in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The Court will grant the

application to proceed in forma pauperis and, for the reasons
expressed below, dismiss the federal claims and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts violations of his constitutional rights by
the Long Branch Police Department and 100 John and Jane Does.
Plaintiff asserts the following facts:
On December 7, 2009 at or about 11:50 pm the Long Branch
Police Departments (Street Crimes Unit) approached me on
2nd Avenue near 468 at the Matilda Terrace Apartments.
As I approached the apartments I was swapped [sic] by
over 15 police officers. Before I knew what was going
on I was put onto the ground and punched several times

upon my face and head. At this point I believed I was
being robbed and truly became fearful of my life. At
this point I was trying to get away from these assumed
robbers. At no time did these officers announce who
they were. And because they were not in uniform or had
their shields in view I continued to try and defend
myself. I was no match for these police officers
therefore they brutally beat me. I was beaten with all
kinds of weapons from stick to batons to gun handles.
In the course of this beating I had several of my teeth
knocked out, a suffered a black and swollen eye, the
bruises on my body were bleeding and still these
officers continued to beat me. At some point I blacked
out and lost consciousness. When I woke up I was in the
Monmouth County Medical Center. While at the hospital I
was informed by the nurse that I was out for 6 hours and
that it was reported to them that I was a victim of an
assault but the police did not tell them they were the
abusers.
I now suffer extreme depression, I have nightmares
about this beat[ing], and I still suffer extreme pain
in my mouth as well as terrible migraine headaches.
(Docket Entry #1, pp. 7-8.)
For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages.

(Docket Entry #1, p. 8.)
II.

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL

The Court, before docketing or as soon as practicable after
docketing, must review a complaint in a civil action in which a
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a prisoner seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.

See 28 U.S.C.

The Court must sua sponte dismiss any

claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id.

A claim is frivolous if it “lacks even an arguable basis in
2

law” or its factual allegations describe “fantastic or delusional
scenarios.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); see

also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990).
The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined in Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

The United States Supreme Court has stated:

Two working principles underlie our decision in
Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . . Rule 8
marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only
a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . .
. be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedbut it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a
motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50 (citations omitted).
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible
3

on its face.’

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint

under the pleading regime established by Iqbal and Twombly,
a court must take three steps: First, the court must
“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally,
“where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010);
see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009)
(stating complaint “must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief”, and must “‘show’ such an entitlement with
its facts”).

But the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must

still be construed liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, even after
Iqbal.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
III.

A.

DISCUSSION

Federal Claims
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show

that:

(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law.
4

See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099,
1107 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Court reads the Complaint as attempting to assert an
excessive force claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim of excessive force by law

enforcement officials in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989); Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997).

“To state

a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred
and that it was unreasonable.”
288 (3d Cir. 1999).

Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279,

Proper application of the reasonableness

standard “requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”

Id. at 289 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); accord

Baker v. Monroe Tp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193-93 (3d Cir. 1995).
Aside from 100 John and Jane Does, the only named defendant
in this Complaint is the Long Branch Police Department.

5

However,

a police department is not a “person” that may be found liable
under § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978).

See Petaway v.

City of New Haven Police Dep’t, 541 F.Supp.2d 504, 510 (D. Conn.
2008); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep’t, 832 F.Supp.
808, 825-26 (D.N.J. 1993).
Construing the defendant to be the municipal entity of Long
Branch, this Court nevertheless must find that the Complaint
fails to state a claim against the entity.

“[A] local government

may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by
its employees or agents.

Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or act may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.”
(1978).

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694

A policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final

authority to establish policy as to the conduct issues a policy
or edict.

See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Fac., 318 F.3d 575,

584 (3d Cir. 2003).

A custom is an act that has not been

formally approved by the policymaker but that is so widespread to
have the force of a rule or policy.

Id.

Plaintiff here does not assert facts showing that the
alleged use of excessive force during his arrest resulted from
the execution of a custom or policy of Long Branch.

6

This Court

will accordingly dismiss the claims against Long Branch for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Plaintiff names 100 John and Jane Does, but fails to
even explain why 100 persons are being sued when only 15 police
officers were allegedly involved in the assault.

Furthermore,

the Complaint fails to plead enough factual matter to state a
claim as to even one specific Doe defendant.

For example,

Plaintiff indicates that he resisted arrest because the officers
did not identify themselves, but he does not say what he did to
defend himself.
arrested for.

Moreover, he does not specify what crime he was
As previously explained, application of the Fourth

Amendment reasonableness standard “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

This Court does not

expect Plaintiff to know the names of all of his alleged
assailants, or to specify in detail, for instance, that John Doe
#1 did this and John Doe #2 did that.

However, “Rule 8 . . .

does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.”

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Because “each Government official . . . is only liable for his or
her own misconduct,” id. at 1949, “a plaintiff must plead that

7

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Id. at 1948.

Because the Complaint does not “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” against the 100 John and Jane Does, id. at
1949, the Court is constrained to dismiss the claims against the
100 John and Jane Does for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
B.

Claims Arising Under New Jersey Law
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims arising

under state law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims because all federal claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction are being dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis, dismisses the federal claims asserted in the Complaint,
and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims.

The Court will issue an appropriate order and

judgment.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

April 11, 2011

8