COLEMAN v. LONG BRANCH POLICE DEPARTMENT ET ALS et al

Filing 151

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (d.e. nos. 131 , 132 ) are GRANTED and this case is CLOSED. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 3/26/2018. (mmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIAM COLEMAN,

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Civil Action No:
10-cv-2613 (PGS)(TJB)

Plaintff

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V.

RAMON CAMACHO, et al.,

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM
AND
ORDER

Presently before the Court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing
Plaintiff William Coleman’s Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 131, 132). Plaintiff asserts a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (ECF No. 21), and Defendants assert

that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars the suit. Initially, Plaintiff claimed that the officers
utilized excessive force to arrest him and, as a result, several of his teeth were dislodged. Plaintiff
could not identify which officer caused the injury to his teeth and, therefore, he listed the nine
officers that were present at the scene. The nine officers sought dismissal based on the fact that
Plaintiff could not identify any of the officers. Since no depositions of Defendants were taken
during discovery, there was little or no evidence of what occurred at the arrest. As such, an
evidentiary hearing on December 11 and 28, 2017 was undertaken,’ and testimony from the
Defendants police officers as well as from Plaintiff was heard.

The police reports and the

testimony are summarized below. Notably, in the Complaint Coleman alleges he lost several teeth;
but at the evidentiary hearing, Coleman concedes that he lost four teeth in a subsequent incident

The testimony is set forth in two transcripts. The December 11, 2017 transcript is referred to as
“iT” and the December 28, 2017 transcript is referred to as “2T”.

in March 2015

—

that incident is not at issue in this case. For the reasons discussed herein,

Defendants’ motions will be granted.
BACKGROUND

In late 2009, Plaintiff William Coleman was under investigation by the Long Branch
Police Department (LBPD) for selling narcotics or controlled dangerous substances (CDS). (ECF
No. 133, “Statement of Material Facts” [SOMFI at ¶ 3). Officers Camacho, Roebuck, Chaparro,
and Coleman participated in the investigation as part of the LBPD’s Street Crimes Unit. (ECF
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No. 133-2, “Camacho Report” at 1). Based on their investigation, Camacho secured a “No Knock”
warrant to search the premises of 232 Edwards Ave Rear, Long Branch, New Jersey, and a warrant
to perform a body search of Coleman. (SOMF at ¶ 4). On December 7, 2009, the LBPD assembled
a team to execute the warrants, which included Officers Camacho, Roebuck, Chaparro, Coleman,
Blamer, Grippaldi, Shamrock, Pilone, and Polk. (Id. at

¶ 5;

Camacho Report at 1). Having been

informed that Coleman was distributing CDS in an apartment located at 468 Second Avenue, Apt.
13., LBPD set up surveillance near that location. (Id. at

¶

6). At approximately, 11:56 p.m.,

Coleman exited a vehicle, carrying a white bag that was later discovered to contain 2470 decks of
heroin, $3,920, two cell phones, and drug paraphernalia. (Id. at ¶J 7, 22).
Here, the parties diverge as to what happened next.

According to Defendants, Polk

confronted Coleman, as he was approaching the front porch of Apartment 13, and shouted, “police
warrant!” (Id at

¶

8). As Polk reached towards Coleman, he took a step back, clenched his fist,

and punched Polk in the face; Coleman then tried to push Polk away, at which point Polk shouted,
“You’re under arrest, stop resisting!” (Id. at

¶J 9-10).

proceeded to punch Polk in the head. (Id. at

¶

2

Coleman then dropped the white bag and

11). As Shamrock arrived to assist Polk, the three

For consistency’s sake, the Court will spell the party’s names as they appear in the police report.
2

fell off the porch step and onto the concrete path; while on the ground, Coleman got on top of Polk
and began choking him. (Id. at ¶ 12-13). After Polk was able to break free from Coleman’s grip,
Coleman rolled onto his stomach and tucked his hands underneath his body, in an attempt to avoid
arrest. (Id. at

¶J

14-15). At this point, the officers feared that Coleman may be armed, since one

of Coleman’s associates was recently murdered, and he believed that he may have been attempting
to retrieve a concealed weapon. (Id. at
hands, which he refused to do. (Id. at

¶J

17-18). As such, Coleman was ordered to show his

¶ 20).

“After multiple commands to stop resisting and to

show the officers his hands, Polk sprayed [Plaintiff] in the facial area with a short burst of [pepper]
spray.” (ECF No. 131, “Roebuck’s SOMF” at

¶ 20).

Eventually, LBPD to handcuffed Coleman

and transported him to Monmouth Medical Center, where he and Polk were treated for injuries
sustained during the confrontation. (Id. at ¶J 21, 27).
Coleman offers a different account of the arrest. At deposition, Coleman claimed that he
was surprised by the police officers’ presence; initially, he thought he was being robbed and
“before [he] knew what was going on,” he “was put onto the ground and punched several times
upon [his] face and head.” (ECF No. 133-4, “Coleman Deposition” at 35:11-13). According to
Coleman, he was unconscious for much of the attack and only regained consciousness once at the
hospital. He claimed that he believed he was being robbed because he had money on him and he
overheard one of the officers say “give it here.” (Id. at 36:14-23). During the struggle, Coleman
claimed he tried to defend himself by covering his face with his hands and, while trying to cover
himself, “was beaten with all kinds of weapons from sticks to batons to gun handles.” (Id. at 40:1241:6, 17-18). However, at no point was he able to identify which officers allegedly attacked him,
or the number of officers that were present during the incident—though he claimed there were
more than ten. (Id. at 35:16-36:7). According to Coleman, it was not until he arrived at the county

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jail that he realized that the alleged “robbers” were police officers. (Id. at 39:14-24). As a result
of the arrest, Coleman claimed in his deposition that he had lost two teeth, suffered a black and
swollen eye, and bruises on his leg, shin and wrist. (Id at 45:1-46:20).
To resolve the issue of qualified immunity, an evidentiary hearing was held on December
11, 2017. Camacho testified first. He explained that, prior to executing the warrant, he had some
concern with confronting Coleman, because Coleman “had prior history of resisting arrest and
attempting to disarm a law enforcement officer.” (iT. at 9:21-25). Camacho then described the
alleged assault. Camacho was positioned across the street from the apartment and, as Coleman
exited the vehicle, observed Polk and Shamrock identify themselves as police officers with a
search warrant. (1 T. 12:8-17). Both were wearing their police uniforms, which Camacho described
as “police pants, uniform, patch, it was blue, patch on the right, patch on the left” and tactical vests
that had “POLICE” lettered across the front. (iT. at 12:20-13:3). By the time Camacho crossed
the street, Coleman had been brought to the ground, with his hands tucked under his waistband.
(iT. 13:12-17). When asked what he did to control the Plaintiff, Camacho explained, “I was
towards like the head, I had a knee on his

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the mid-back of his shoulders

.

.

.

I was by his head

shouting commands to him, ‘we are the police’, ‘we have a search warrant’, ‘you’re under arrest.”
(iT. 14:11-18). The whole struggle took about three minutes. (lT. 14:25).
Polk testified next. Like Camacho, Polk explained that, prior to executing the search
warrants, the officers were briefed on Coleman’s history, and that Coleman had been involved in
multiple fights with officers in the past. (T. at 23:24-24:7). On the night of the incident, both he
and Shamrock were positioned in the shrubs beside the apartment, wearing their police uniforms
and tactical vests. (IT. 24:8-17). Polk then described how the altercation transpired:

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I stepped out from where I was, said, “police”, “search warrant”, and immediately
he struck me on the right [slide of my face with his left hand, and then it was on
from there; me and him traded blows back and forth.
And then Sergeant Shamrock came came from around the rear. and we
tried to get control of him from there, but there were several strikes to my face as
you can see from the photos, several strikes to his face, and then.. we all went to
the ground.
.

—

.

.

And the this wasn’t your average fight, this was a violent struggle; this
wasn’t he’s just resisting or he’s not —kind of not fighting, he was actively fighting.
When we fell he’s large, so when we fell he fell partially on top of me, he started
grabbing me by the neck, hit me more times; at that time I was able to break free
and I could see where this was going, we still didn’t have him anywhere close to
under control. So I sprayed him, temporarily sprayed myself also.
—

—

(iT. 25:5-23). Polk explained that pepper spray became necessary since initial attempts to subdue
Coleman were ineffective. (iT. 28:3-7). Once Coleman was placed in handcuffs, Polk was taken
to the hospital for treatment of the injuries he sustained during the fight. (iT. 32:9-12).
Photographs of his injuries were also admitted during his testimony, which depict abrasions to the
right side of cheek and jawline, and swelling below his right eye. (iT. 29:2-30:24; Exhibits 4-A
D). On cross-examination, Polk explained that he was the first to hit Coleman, in response to
being punched; however, Polk denied ever hitting him once he was on the ground, though he did
use pepper spray. (iT. 33:5-13).
Like Camacho and Polk, Shamrock testified that, on the night of the incident, he was
wearing his police uniform and tactical vest. (iT. 36:23-25).

Shamrock then explained his

familiarity with Coleman: five years earlier, Shamrock and other LBPD officers attempted to
execute a warrant against Coleman, at which point Coleman proceeded to start fighting another
officer, Defendant Pilone, and attempted to remove Pilone’s gun from his holster. (iT. 37:8-38:6).
Turning to the night in question, Shamrock testified that he was Polk’s cover, and followed behind
him as he approached Coleman at the front porch of the apartment. (iT. 41:21-23). He explained,

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“[a]s Officer Polk tried to stop [Coleman] from getting into the apartment, Coleman just squares
upright away and throw[s] a left hook, and clipped [Polk] in the right side of the face.” (iT. 41:2 123). At that point, Shamrock rushed to Polk’s aid and tried to grab a hold of Coleman’s left arm.
(iT. 42:1-7). According to Shamrock, Coleman shoved him aside and began “teeing off on Officer
Polk,” “[j]ust both hands going back and forth, throwing punches.” (iT. 42:13-18). At this point,
Shamrock took out his baton and struck the back of Coleman’s left leg five or six times, as a
method of pain compliance. (iT. 42:25-43:5). Soon thereafter, Defendant Balmer joined in the
melee, trying to grab Coleman; in doing so, the four fell off the porch and onto the ground. (iT.
43:7-12). Shamrock lost his baton during this scuffle.
Once on the ground, however, Coleman again got a hold of Polk, this time choking him.
(1 T. at 43:13-1 8). Upon seeing this, Shamrock now without his baton began punching Plaintiff
—

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five to six times in the face, which ultimately helped Polk break free from Coleman’s grip. (iT. at
44:11-20). At this point, Coleman spun onto his stomach, tucking his hands underneath his
waistband. (iT. at 44:22-45:2). Like Camacho and Polk, Shamrock was concerned that Coleman
was attempting to locate a concealed weapon; at which point he and Balmer got atop Coleman,
placing their weight on his body, in an attempt to calm him. (iT. at 45:5-46:7). While still
struggling to take control of Coleman, Shamrock was able to retrieve his baton and again struck
the back of Coleman’s leg another four times, in order to pull his hands out from underneath him.
(iT. at 47:5-8). According to Shamrock, the whole incident took three minutes. (iT. at 47:12).
On cross-examination, Shamrock denied ever hitting Coleman anywhere besides his legs with the
baton and conceded that he was the only one to have taken his baton out during the altercation.
(iT. at 50:7-8, 15). Shamrock also conceded that he and Polk were the only two that he recalled

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punching Coleman; however, he also claimed he was not aware that Coleman’s teeth were
damaged during the incident. (iT. at 50:21-22).
Finally, Roebuck provided essentially the same testimony as that described above.
Roebuck was positioned on the northwest side of the apartment, with Balmer. (iT. 58:4-6). Upon
seeing Polk and Shamrock engaged in a fight with Coleman, the two officers joined in; according
Roebuck, as Balmer attempted to grab Coleman’s legs and waist, they all then fell to the ground.
(iT. 59:4-8). As the struggle continued on the ground, Roebuck yelled for an officer to spray
Coleman; however, he could not recall if Polk sprayed him before or after he made this order. (iT.
59:16-21). This being said, Roebuck testified that he never struck Coleman, that Coleman never
lost consciousness, and that he did not notice that Coleman’s teeth had been knocked out. (iT.
59:22-23; iT. 60:15-16; and iT. 63:21-22).
Coleman testified that, on the night in question, he arrived at Apartment 13 for purposes of
selling and using drugs. (2T. 5:10-16). As he was walking towards the apartment, he claims that
he was attacked from behind, tackled to the ground, and kicked and punched with hard objects.
(2T. 6:2-13). According to Coleman, at no point did any of the officers identify themselves as
police or that he was under arrest; he also claims that he lost consciousness after five minutes. (2T.
6:7-10, 22-24). For the bulk of the confrontation, Coleman claims he was positioned on his back,
with his hands covering his face. (2T. 7:3-5, 17-18). Plaintiff avers that he was never told to “stop
resisting,” he never reached for his waistband, he did not have any weapons on him, and he never
fought back. (2T. 9:1-15). When asked to identify the injuries he sustained, Coleman claimed his
eyes were swollen, his back and legs were bleeding, and he lost one tooth. (2T 8:11-20). On cross
examination, Coleman conceded that he had previously fought with LBPD officers. (2T. 11:2-3).
He also denied ever punching Polk. (2T. 12:12-13).

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Based on Coleman’s deposition testimony, the Court was under the impression that he had
sustained significant injuries including the loss of two teeth. However, at the evidentiary hearing,
Coleman conceded that he did not report this injury when he arrived at the hospital for treatment,
and the medical records do not reflect any loss of teeth. (2T. 13:13-25).
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) when the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence
establishes the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v, Catrett,
477 U.s. 317, 322-23 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the
outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In considering a
motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage
in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s evidence “is to be believed and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241,
247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must
establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey
Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment
cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine
issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier
Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1995). “[U]nsupported allegations.. and pleadings
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are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654, 657

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(3d Cir. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. p. 56(e) (requiring nonmoving party to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”).
Moreover, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under
governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If a
court determines, “after drawing all inferences in favor of [the non-moving party], and making all
credibility determinations in his favor. .that no reasonable jury could find for him, summary
.

judgment is appropriate.” Alevras v. Tacopina, 226 F. App’x 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS

“Section 1983 authorizes a person to file a private cause of action against state actors for a
deprivation of rights protected by a federal statute or the United States Constitution.” Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...
Id. To sustain a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) “that they have been
deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and the laws’ of the United States”; and (2) that
the defendant “deprived them of this right acting ‘under color of any statute” or state law. Flagg
Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). Here, neither party disputes that Defendants acted
under the color of state law. As such, the sole issue before the Court is whether Defendants
violated a protected right. In moving for summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim, Defendants seek to invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiff responds,
contending that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity since they used excessive force
and acted unreasonably in their arrest.
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Qualified immunity shields government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The
principle applies if the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)
(citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978)). In determining whether qualified immunity
applies, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) “do the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right”; and (2) was this right “clearly established” at the time of
the alleged misconduct. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may address the
elements in whichever order they see fit. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009). At
the summary judgment stage, the burden remains on the party claiming the qualified immunity
defense, here being Defendants. Halsey v. Pfeffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014); see also,
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010). In determining whether Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, the Court first examines Coleman’s Section 1983 excessive force
claim.
The Supreme Court has held that claims alleging excessive force must be analyzed “under
the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
388 (1989). Through this “objective reasonableness” lens, courts must consider the circumstances
from the officer’s “on-scene perspective,” not “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at
205. Under Section 1983, excessive force exists “when a law enforcement officer uses force so
excessive that it violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend,nents.” Groman v. Twp. ofManalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1995). A police officer must use reasonable force in order to

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effectuate an arrest. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-97. To determine reasonableness, courts should
consider:
(1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others,” (3) “whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,” [Graham, 490 U.S.] at 396, (4) “the
possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or
dangerous,” (5) “the duration of the action,” (6) “whether the action takes place in
the context of effecting an arrest,” (7) “the possibility that the suspect may be
armed,” and (8) “the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend
at one time.”
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 82 1-22 (3d Cir. 1997). The inquiry should be objective, viewed
from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 3 95-97. As noted
above, the Court is to assess the objective reasonableness of the Officers by considering the eight
factors listed above. Each factor is discussed below.
1.

The severity of the crime at issue

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Here, the search warrants were issued because

Coleman was allegedly distributing controlled dangerous substances from a Second Avenue
apartment. This is a very heinous crime.
2.
—

Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others

Here, Polk was advised, at a briefing before the stake-out, that Coleman had been involved in

multiple fights with police. The officers feared that Coleman may have been armed, since one of
Coleman’s associates was recently murdered. Shamrock also recalled another fight involving
Coleman, where he attempted to remove a fellow officer’s (Pilone) handgun from his holster.
Based on that known history, Coleman was considered to be a threat to the safety of the officers.
3.

Whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight

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Here,

Coleman actively resisted by punching Officer Polk and wrestling him to the ground. Although
Coleman claims this is untrue, there are photos and a hospital report documenting Polk’s injuries.

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4.
or dangerous
5.

The possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent
The facts disclosed in paragraphs one and two above apply here.

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The duration of the action

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Several of the officers indicated that the fight lasted

about three minutes. The encounter quelled the incident. It certainly was not a brutal beating by
the officers over an extended period of time.
6.

Whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest Here, the police
—

were effecting two warrants, one to search the apartment and another to search Coleman.
7.

Whether there is the possibility that the suspect may be armed

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Here, as noted in

paragraph two above, the police feared that Coleman may have been armed, based on his prior
encounters with LBPD, and the recent murder of one of his associates.
8.

The number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time

—

This is not a factor here.
Based on the above analysis, the police acted with objective reasonableness under the
circumstances. Moreover, no lethal weapons were used, and the moderate increase of force after
Coleman’s resistance to pepper spray and baton was appropriate, given all of the adverse
circumstances discussed above. “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that
the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968)). In sum, when considering the totality of the circumstances, no
trier of fact, if presented with this record, could reach any conclusion but that Polk and Shamrock’s
conduct, as well as the remaining officers, was objectively reasonable as well. The officers are
entitled to qualified immunity, and summary judgment is granted as to the claims against them.

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With regard to Officers Camacho, Roebuck, Chaparro, Coleman, Balmer, Grippaldi, and
Pilone, the record fails to demonstrate any conduct that would be considered unreasonable or
excessive. First, as it relates to Defendants Chaparro, Coleman, Grippaldi, and Pilone, there is no
evidence presented that suggests that any of these officers made physical contact with Coleman,
let alone used force. Second, with regards to Defendants Camacho, Balmer, and Roebuck, the
force allegedly used, was restricted to placing a hold of Coleman and pinning him to the ground,
in an attempt to effectuate the arrest.

However, when considering the fact that the officers

suspected Plaintiff of dealing illegal drugs, along with his violent history with the LBPD and the
possibility that he may have been armed, the Court is satisfied that no reasonable factfinder would
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believe this conduct to be unreasonable or excessive.
ORDER

IT IS on this 26th day of March, 2018,
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 131, 132) are
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the clerk of the court is directed to close the case.

(?L
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s response to the extent he now argues that Defendants remain liable
based on a failure to intervene theory. Neither the Amended Complaint nor Plaintiff’s deposition
alleged that Defendants were in a position to intervene, yet declined to do so. More importantly,
this Court’s prior decision narrowed the issue presented to whether Defendants were liable for
using excessive force. (ECF No. 109 at 2). As such, Summary Judgment will not be denied based
on Plaintiff’s newly minted failure to intervene theory. See Carr v. Gillis Associated Indus., 227
F. App’x 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Courts have broad discretion to disallow the addition of new
theories of liability at the eleventh hour.”).
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