HAMPL et al v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM and ORDER that the defendants' motion to for summary judgment is GRANTED and that the Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 3/27/2012. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SCOTT HAMPL and
MAUREEN COULOMBE

Civil Action No.:
10-3584 (PGS)

Plaintiffs,
v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.
Defendants.

SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or alternatively a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs,
Scott Hampl and Maureen Coulombe, filed a civil rights complaint alleging that Defendants
violated Hampl’s right under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, with
jurisdiction deriving from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and New Jersey tort law.
Because the Court’s analysis extends beyond Plaintiffs’ Complaint and takes into consideration
evidence submitted by Defendants, the Court will address Defendants’ motion as one for
summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is granted. [Docket Entry No. 32].
I.
Plaintiff, Scott Hampl, a former inmate within the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“NJ DOC”), and his mother Maureen Coulombe (collectively “Plaintiffs”) have brought this
suit against the NJ DOC, the Mountainview Youth Correctional Facility (“Mountainview”), NJ
DOC Officer Thurgood, NJ DOC Officer DeRosa, and Susan Salvatore, the administrator of

Mountainview (collectively, “Defendants”).

Hampl is a former prisoner who had been

incarcerated at Mountainview from May 1, 2008, through August 7, 2008, when he was
administratively transferred to the Mid-State Correctional Facility (“Mid-State”) in
Wrightstown, New Jersey. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Fact ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege that on July 6, 2008,
Hampl told Officer Thurgood at Mountainview that a prison gang intended to attack him. On
July 13, 2008 and again on July 14, 2008, a prison gang at Mountainview attacked Hampl with
homemade weapons in an area of the general population unit. On July 13 and 14, 2008, Officer
Thurgood supervised the general population unit at Mountainview. Officer DeRosa’s shift
immediately succeeded Officer Thurgood’s shift.
Plaintiffs allege that Officer Thurgood acted with deliberate and callous indifference to
the threats against Hampl. Plaintiffs also allege that Officer Thurgood purposely failed to apprise
his supervisors of the threats against Hampl. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants purposely
failed to intervene in the matter. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Thurgood and Officer DeRosa
purposely failed to have Hampl immediately treated for injuries he sustained during the assault.
Hampl maintains that he has permanent injuries that require ongoing medical treatment.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants purposely kept the news of Hampl’s attack from
his mother, causing her anxiety and stress.
On July 13, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the present suit in this Court while incarcerated at
Bayside State Prison. On May 13, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment.
II.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or
alternatively for summary judgment. If, on a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), matters outside
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the pleadings are not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment. When a motion to dismiss has been alternately framed as a motion for summary
judgment and the nonmoving party has submitted evidence extraneous to its pleadings, the Court
need not provide the parties with express notice of conversion. In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec.
Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1999); Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578-79 (3d Cir.
1996). In the instant matter, the Court will analyze Defendants’ motion using the legal standard
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs had notice that Defendants' motion to dismiss was framed in
the alternative as a motion for summary judgment and did not object to the submission of
materials outside of the pleading. Moreover, Plaintiffs submitted their own statement of material
fact pursuant to Local Rule 56.1.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a summary judgment motion, the moving party must show, first,
that no genuine issue of material fact exists Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that a genuine issue of
material fact compels a trial. Id. at 324. A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would
affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “In
considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358
F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004). The non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
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However, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere
allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material
fact for trial. Id. at 248. “[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel
summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990).
Moreover, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing
law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If a court
determines, “after drawing all inferences in favor of [the non-moving party], and making all
credibility determinations in his favor, that no reasonable jury could find for him, summary
judgment is appropriate.” Alevras v. Tacopina, 226 F. App'x. 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Plaintiffs argue that under Section 1983, Hampl’s Eighth Amendment right was violated
when Defendants acted with deliberate and callous indifference in failing to report threats
against him, failed to intervene when he was attacked on two separate occasions, and failed to
have him immediately treated for his injuries. Defendants argue that Hampl did not exhaust his
administrative remedies while in prison. Defendants represent that NJ DOC facilities employ an
administrative grievance process, the Inmate Remedy System Form (“IRSF”), whereby inmates
may raise problems or concerns they may have to prison administrators. The process is outlined
in the NJ DOC Inmate Handbook (“Handbook”).
During his incarceration at Mountainview, Defendants note and Plaintiffs acknowledge
that Hampl did not file any IRSFs to invoke the administrative process. While incarcerated at
Mid-State, however, Hampl filed at least seventeen IRSFs between August 31, 2008 and June 2,
2010. In the IRSFs Hampl filed, he expressed dissatisfaction with his medical treatment in
connection with the July 2008 assaults, but he did not raise any of the complaints that Plaintiffs
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now raise in the instant matter. Accordingly, Defendants argue that summary judgment should
be granted in their favor because of Hampl’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)..
Section 1983 Claim
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

To properly state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was
committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994).
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The PLRA requires prisoners asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to first exhaust
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Specifically, § 1997e(a) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

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The exhaustion requirement applies to prisoners who were in custody at the time of filing
the original complaint. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion is mandatory and
“applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532. If
a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is shown, a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment may be properly granted, depending on the circumstances of the case. Terrell
v. Benfer, 429 F. App'x 74, 77 (3d Cir. 2011); Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the court relies on matters outside the pleadings which
demonstrates a failure to exhaust. Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000).
Prisoners must exhaust all available administrative remedies, even where the relief
sought cannot be granted by the administrative process. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734,
739 (2001). Section 1997e(a) contains no futility exception that would excuse a failure to
exhaust. Id. at 741 n. 6. Additionally, Section 1997e(a) requires “proper exhaustion,” as that
term is used in administrative law. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

“Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”
Id. at 90. Compliance with prison grievance procedures is sufficient to properly exhaust. Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). It is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define
the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Id.
The Third Circuit has held that the grievance procedure set forth in the Handbook is an
“administrative remedy” within the meaning of the PLRA exhaustion provision and must be
exhausted before a prisoner may pursue a section 1983 claim involving prison conditions and
incidents. Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1354-55 (3d Cir. 2002). NJ DOC provides
Handbooks for inmates pursuant to N.J. Admin. Code §§ 10A:8–1.1 to –3.6. New Jersey law
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requires NJ DOC prisons to provide inmates with an orientation session within three weeks of
admission “unless compelling security or safety reasons dictate otherwise, or to do so would
adversely affect the orderly operations of the correctional facility.” N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:82.3(a). Mountainview’s Handbook sets forth information about the IRSF, which is used to
provide a confidential procedure for “resolving present issues, concerns, or complaints.” Def.’s
Supp. Br., Dilt’s Decl., Ex. A. Additionally, the Handbook provides that the prisoner may
appeal a staff response to the IRSF within ten days of the date the staff response is returned to
the prisoner. Id. An appeal with a decision rendered completes the process at the institutional
level. The Handbook explicitly states: “You are required to use the Inmate Remedy System
before applying to the courts for relief.” Id.
In the instant matter, federal law and the Handbook required Hampl to exhaust all
available administrative remedies. The record provided by Defendants shows that Hampl did not
file an IRSF with regard to the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Instead, Hampl filed a complaint
in this Court while he was in custody at Bayside State Prison. Hampl asserts that Defendants
never informed him of the administrative procedures to be followed in the event of an assault by
other inmates and even if they had, it was his understanding that once he was administratively
transferred to Mid-State there was no longer any administrative basis or procedure to submit
additional IRSFs regarding an incident at Mountainview. Opp’n Br. 9-10. However, as noted
above, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(2) contains no futility exception that would excuse Hampl’s failure to
exhaust. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n. 6. Moreover, the record demonstrates that a procedure for
administrative relief was not only available but familiar to Hampl, as he filed at least seventeen
grievances over the span of his incarceration. It is undisputed that Hampl did not exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him, as required by the PLRA, to state a viable claim.
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Hampl's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available through the NJ DOC concerning the
attacks at Mountainview bars him from obtaining legal relief on his Section 1983 claim.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). “Where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed
before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless
considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an
affirmative justification for doing so.” Oras v. City of Jersey City, 328 F. App'x 772, 775 (3d Cir.
2009). Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claim, this Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

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ORDER
This matter having come before the Court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment
[Docket Entry No. 32], and this Court having considered the parties’ written submissions and
decided the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78; and for
the reasons stated above;
IT IS on this 27th day of March, 2012,
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to close this case.

s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

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