The Katiroll Company, Inc. v. Kati Roll and Platters Inc.

Filing 234

OPINION. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 7/26/2012. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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KATI ROLL AND PLATTERS INC.,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________:
THE KATIROLL COMPANY INC.,

Civil Action No. 10-3620 (JAP)
OPINION

PISANO, District Judge:
Plaintiff, The Katiroll Company, Inc., brought this action on March 3, 2010, against
Defendant Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., alleging service mark infringement, trade dress
infringement, and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 [docket
entry no. 1]. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 14, 2011, adding Defendants
Niraj Jivani and Rasik Jivani [docket entry no. 75]. Currently before the Court are five motions:
1) Defendant Rasik Jivani’s Motion for Summary Judgment [docket entry no. 201]; 2) Plaintiff’s
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Infringement and to Pierce the Corporate Veil
against Rasik Jivani [docket entry no. 217]; 3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Defendants’ Invalidity Defenses [docket entry no. 202]; 4) Defendants Kati Roll and Platters,
Inc., and Niraj Jivani’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Comply with Consent Orders [docket entry
no. 215]; and 5) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Hold Defendants Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., and
Niraj Jivani in Contempt [docket entry no. 223]. The Court decides these Motions without oral

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argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant Rasik Jivani’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, Plaintiff’s CrossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment will be granted, Defendants’ Motion to Compel will be granted, and Plaintiff’s CrossMotion for Contempt will be denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiff, The Katiroll Company, Inc., and Defendant, Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., are

both in the business of selling katirolls, a type of Indian street food. The Plaintiff owns United
States Service Mark Registration No. 3,352,040 (“the Mark”) for The Katiroll Company, for
restaurant and carry-out restaurant services in Class 43, and rights in unregistered trade dress.
Plaintiff opened its first location in Manhattan in June 2002, and currently operates two
restaurants in Manhattan and a third in London. Plaintiff’s stores are decorated in an orange
color scheme, including orange signs and menus, and include an exposed brick wall and brown
ceramic floor tiles. They primarily serve take-out customers, and thus have an open glass front
with a counter and limited seating. Plaintiff’s restaurants have received substantial acclaim in
the press and enjoy positive exposure in print and online. The trademark registration was issued
on December 11, 2007.
Payal Saha is the President of Plaintiff company. She met with Defendant Niraj Jivani
and Jivani’s uncle to discuss their proposal to open a branch of The Katiroll Company in New
Jersey, but ultimately rejected this proposal. Niraj Jivani nevertheless proceeded with his plan to
open a restaurant in New Brunswick, New Jersey, naming it Kati Roll and Platters, Inc. The
space that Jivani leased is also a small open store front with a countertop and an exposed brick

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wall in the interior. The interior was painted “burnt orange,” and the Defendant restaurant’s sign
consisted of white lettering on an orange background. In addition to these similarities, the
Plaintiff has put forth evidence to demonstrate actual confusion: customers and others have
shown that they believed the Defendant and Plaintiff restaurants were affiliated through phone,
email, and in-person inquiries directed toward Plaintiff; online restaurant reviews and comments;
and personal inquiries directed toward Saha, the President of Plaintiff company. Jivani himself
created confusion by either posting himself or providing the means for another to post online
publicity for the opening of an “original or official Kati Roll Company” in New Jersey.
Plaintiff brought this action on March 3, 2010 against the Defendant restaurant, alleging
service mark infringement, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition in violation of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051. Plaintiff added individual Defendants Niraj Jivani and Rasik
Jivani on February 14, 2011. On February 1, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction [docket entries no. 72, 73], finding that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on
the merits of its claim for trade dress infringement and unfair competition, but not on its claim
for trademark infringement. Thus, the Defendant restaurant was enjoined from using Plaintiff’s
trade dress, including from using the color orange, and ordered to explicitly disavow any
connection with the Plaintiff on its menus, websites, and advertising materials.
This case began as an infringement action by a successful New York-based chain
restaurant against a single small competitor restaurant in New Jersey, but has nevertheless
resulted in over two years of highly contentious litigation. This is due in significant part to what
the Court views as overzealous advocacy on the part of the Plaintiff. The subject of Defendants’
Motion to Compel and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Contempt, discussed in more detail below,

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serves to illustrate this conclusion. Two consent orders issued in the spring of 2011 required
Defendants to “park” their website until they changed they its color, and to remove their
advertisement from the website scarletmenus.com until it included a prominent disclaimer. Over
one year later, the Plaintiff has refused to allow Defendants to post revised advertising materials,
forcing Defendants to file a Motion to Compel. Plaintiff’s continued refusal and its CrossMotion for Contempt is not based on the Defendants’ failure to comply with the consent orders,
but rather on the timeliness of compliance, unproven allegations of noncompliance, and on new
allegations unrelated to the consent orders. Some of the cited infractions include transmitting
photos of the restaurant and menus to the Plaintiff one day late, and underpaying the Plaintiff’s
attorney by ten dollars. The Court does not condone any non-compliance by the Defendants, but
finds the Plaintiff’s obstructionist tactics to be unjustified. The sheer number of motions that
have been filed in this matter are not consonant with the relatively straightforward facts of this
case, and in fact have delayed its resolution significantly.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
A court shall grant summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party
must first show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Whether or not a fact is material is determined according to the substantive law
at issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the moving party makes
this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that a genuine fact
issue compels a trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party must then offer

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admissible evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, id., not just “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The Court must consider all facts and their logical inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d
Cir. 1986). The Court shall not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” but
need determine only whether a genuine issue necessitates a trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If
the non-moving party fails to demonstrate proof beyond a “mere scintilla” of evidence that a
genuine issue of material fact exists, then the Court must grant summary judgment. Big Apple
BMW v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
III.

Defendant Rasik Jivani’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment for Infringement and to Pierce the Corporate
Veil
Defendant Rasik Jivani is the father of Niraj Jivani. He has filed for summary judgment,

arguing that he has never been actively involved in his son’s business, and in particular that he
never participated in any of the alleged infringing activities. The Plaintiff cross-moved for
summary judgment, asserting that Rasik Jivani directly participated in the Defendant restaurant’s
infringement or may be held secondarily liable under the Lanham Act, and that his relationship
to the business is such that he may be found personally liable for the actions of the corporation
by piercing the corporate veil.
Rasik Jivani is self-employed as a medical doctor with a solo family practice, and
contends that he was not actively involved in the business or marketing decisions of the

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Defendant restaurant, nor its day-to-day operations. Rasik helped his son obtain financing for
the restaurant by co-signing for a line of credit. He held the line of credit checkbook, and wrote
checks to pay for some of the restaurant’s start-up costs. He also occasionally loaned money to
the business, but contends that this was only at his son’s request, and that he was not involved in
the business decisions underlying these purchases. Rasik’s name appears on the lease, the
contract with the architect, and the restaurant’s American Express card application. Rasik was
not present at the negotiations between Niraj and the architect. The architect’s work pursuant to
this contract included piping, lighting and partitions, did not include signage, décor or design,
and lasted until November 2007. The restaurant makes the credit card and rent payments from
its bank account. This account was with Chase Bank until 2010, and Niraj was the principal
signator. Since 2010, the restaurant has used a Bank of America account and Niraj has been the
only signator for that account.
When the business was incorporated in December 2007, Niraj Jivani listed his father as a
Registered Agent at the family home address, and listed himself and his father as members of the
First Board of Directors. Rasik contends that he did not know he was listed as a Board Member.
He was listed as a shareholder during 2008 and 2009, but withdrew on January 1, 2010,
transferring his stock to Niraj. Plaintiff contends that this transfer was ineffective because Rasik
failed to sign the back of the stock certificate, but has presented no evidence that Niraj or Rasik
did not intend to consummate the transfer. The corporate filing for 2009 and 2010 lists Niraj as
the Registered Agent and the only Officer/Director. Rasik Jivani signed the restaurant’s 2009
tax returns as the company’s “President” while his son was in rehab in California, but
Defendants contend that Niraj continued to run the business remotely during that time.

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The Plaintiff argues that Rasik is liable for infringement under the Lanham Act both
directly and under theories of secondary liability: joint tortfeasor liability, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability. However, “participation in activities merely related to the
infringing act is not enough” to find personal liability for the infringement. Parker v. Google,
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 503 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d 242 Fed. Appx. 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Omega, S.A. v. Giftland, Co., Civ. No. 03-5808, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17043, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 11,
2005)). “[A]lthough ‘a person who knowingly and significantly participates in another’s act of
trademark infringement is himself guilty of infringement,’ there does not appear to be any aider
and abetter liability under the Lanham Act.” Id. (quoting Omega, Civ. No. 03-5808, at *3). In
Donsco, Inc. v. Kasper Corp., on the other hand, the Third Circuit found that personal liability
for infringement was warranted against the “central figure” of the infringing entity who
“authorizes and approves” the infringing act. See also Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Active Wear of Fl.,
Inc., 931 F. 2d 1472, 1478 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The individual liability standard does not ask
whether the individual participated . . . in some infringing acts, instead it asks if he actively
participated as a moving force in the decision to engage in the infringing acts and otherwise
caused the infringement as a whole to occur.”).
Evidence that Rasik Jivani financially supported his son’s business—even by signing the
checks that purchased allegedly infringing materials—is insufficient to warrant granting Plaintiff
summary judgment on Rasik’s personal liability for alleged infringement by the business.
Plaintiff argues that the Lanham Act creates strict liability for infringement, and an affirmative
duty not to cause confusion. This is irrelevant to the question of whether any such duty attached
to Rasik Jivani in the first place. The evidence shows that Niraj made all of the design and

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marketing decisions that constitute the alleged infringement, and that Rasik was not involved
enough in the business to be held responsible for the actions of the corporation.
Plaintiff also argues that this case is analogous to cases where secondary liability was
found under the Lanham Act. However, the Plaintiff did not plead that Rasik Jivani was liable
under any such theory of secondary liability. In any event, the facts in this case do not support it;
all of the cited cases discuss imposing liability on parties with much more direct involvement in
the alleged infringing acts. For example, Plaintiff argues that American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994), supports
joint tortfeasor liability for Lanham Act infringement in this case. In fact, that case simply held
that common-law theories of secondary liability are available under the Lanham Act, and
remanded the matter to the district court to determine whether or not a corporation and its
president could be held responsible for the infringing actions of its employees under a theory of
common-law agency. Here, neither the corporation nor Niraj Jivani ever acted as Rasik Jivani’s
agent. The Plaintiff’s factual averments do not show that Niraj held himself out as an agent of
his father, but rather that he acted on behalf of the Defendant corporation. Rasik’s actions also
do not meet the elements of contributory infringement as laid out in AT&T:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily responsible . . . .
AT&T, 42 F.3d at 1432 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854
(1982)). The Third Circuit recognized that secondary liability is not limited to the relationship
between manufacturer and distributor, but Rasik Jivani certainly did not intentionally induce
infringement, and neither did he take any action akin to a manufacturer knowingly supplying its
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product to one who is engagement in infringement. In a similarly distinguishable case, the
landlord found to be liable in Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concessions Services, Inc., 955
F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992), was directly involved in selling and promoting the infringing products
sold on its properties.
The Supreme Court has also “explicitly . . . held that secondary liability for trademark
infringement must be drawn more narrowly than secondary liability for copyright infringement,”
under which a defendant may be found “vicariously liable . . . if it has ‘the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.’”
AT&T, 42 F. 3d at 1441. (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 439 n.19 (1984)) (quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). Rasik Jivani’s involvement in the alleged
infringement would likely not even meet the lower threshold for copyright infringement.
Plaintiff also argues that Rasik may be held personally liable for the actions of the
corporation by piercing the corporate veil. Plaintiff believes that the corporate veil may be
pierced because Rasik comingled corporate and personal funds and expenses, because he failed
to observe corporate formalities, and because he acted as an officer of the corporation. However,
piercing the corporate veil is a remedy that is granted sparingly pursuant to a case-by-case
analysis. Comingling of funds and the failure to observe corporate formalities are only two of
the factors a court may consider in making a case-by-case analysis. These factors also happen to
be common in small, closely-held corporations. Moreover, the failure to observe corporate
formalities in this case only serves to highlight Rasik’s lack of involvement in the business. He

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had no duties as a corporate officer or shareholder, and has terminated both of these nominal
positions.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Rasik shared an identity of interest with the
corporation. In order to prove alter ego liability, a plaintiff must meet a “notoriously difficult”
burden, overcoming by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that two separate entities
exist. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 485 (3d Cir. 2001); Kaplan v. First
Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994). There is much evidence that Rasik
paid various start-up costs for the restaurant, and that he was listed as a board member and
shareholder (the exact date at which his status as a board member was terminated is a matter of
some dispute). If financial support, shareholding, and board membership were sufficient to
pierce the corporate veil, the limited liability provided by incorporation would be meaningless.
There is no fraud or exceptional circumstance that would justify piercing the corporate veil in
this case. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003). Thus, Plaintiff’s
summary judgment motion will be denied.
Considering all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds
that there is no issue of material fact relevant to the question of Rasik Jivani’s personal liability.
The evidence shows that Rasik was merely a passive financial supporter of his son’s business
venture, and that there is no basis for holding Rasik personally liable for the actions of the other
Defendants. Plaintiff has pointed to specific instances of financial support provided by Rasik for
his son’s business, and to his former positions as board member and shareholder, but these facts
are immaterial. Liability cannot be based on his own actions in furtherance of the infringement,
because there is no evidence of such actions. Rasik Jivani is employed full-time as a medical

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doctor, and there is no genuine factual dispute between the parties as to his lack of involvement
in the business or marketing decisions of the restaurant. Mere financial support, without any
decision-making authority, does not create liability for infringement. Liability also cannot be
based on piercing the corporate veil. As described above, Rasik’s involvement in the business is
not nearly at the level that would allow the Court to pierce the corporate veil. Thus, the Court
will grant Rasik Jivani’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Invalidity
Defenses
Defendants have alleged affirmative defenses against the Plaintiff’s infringement claim,

seeking to attack the validity of Plaintiff’s trademark. Plaintiff owns United States service mark
Reigstration No. 3,352,040, for The Kati Roll Company for “restaurant and carry-out restaurant
services” in Class 43. The mark was issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) on December 11, 2007, based on use dating back to June 2002. The PTO’s registration
creates a presumption of validity that Defendants must overcome to prevail on their affirmative
defenses. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a). The Court finds that the Defendant’s allegations
challenging the validity of the mark go to the ultimate issue of infringement, rather than to the
mark’s validity. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on these affirmative defenses.
Defendants challenge the validity of Plaintiff’s mark primarily on the grounds that “kati
roll” is a generic term that refers to a type of common Indian street food. This challenge,
however, belies the nuances of trademark registration. Importantly, names including generic
terms may meet the legal standard for registration. “Courts classify the distinctiveness or
conceptual strength of a mark as either (1) generic . . . ; (2) descriptive . . . ; (3) suggestive . . . ;

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or (4) arbitrary or fanciful.” Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 185 (3d
Cir. 2010). Generic marks are never protected, and descriptive marks are only protected where
they have acquired “secondary meaning” through the registrant’s use. Interstate Net Bank v.
NetBank, Inc., 221 F.Supp.2d 513, 517-18, 525-26 (D.N.J. 2002). The PTO found that
Plaintiff’s mark was descriptive, and had also acquired distinctiveness, or “secondary meaning.”
Defendants claim that the Plaintiff’s mark is generic, or at most descriptive with no
secondary meaning. In order to succeed in this defense, they must overcome a “strong
presumption” that a PTO-registered trademark is not generic or descriptive. Interstate Net Bank,
221 F.Supp.2d at 517-18 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)). Defendants claim that they can overcome
this presumption, because generic or descriptive trademarks are subject to challenge and
cancellation under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064, and only become “incontestable . . . after
the owner files affidavits stating that the mark has been registered, that it has been in continuous
use for five consecutive years, and that there is no pending proceeding and there has been no
adverse decision concerning the registrant’s ownership or right to registration.” Fisons
Horticulture, Inc., v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 .7 (3d Cir. 1994). However, the
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants cannot meet their burden under the applicable presumption,
not that the mark is incontestable. The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s characterization of the
facts prevails, and that Defendants’ invalidity defenses cannot survive this Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Defendants primarily attack the registration of the term “kati roll” as too generic because
it is a type of food. This argument is legally flawed for two reasons. First, it ignores that the
Plaintiff’s mark is for restaurant services, and not for the type of food sold. Second, it fails to

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consider the mark as a whole, which is “The Kati Roll Company.” The meaning of the term
“kati roll” is relevant to the validity of the mark, but that term does not displace the mark as a
whole. The name “The Kati Roll Company” functions to identify a particular source of
restaurant services for consumers, and thus has acquired secondary meaning. See E.T. Browne
Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods., 538 F.3d 185,198-99 (3d. Cir. 2008) (discussing secondary
meaning; Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d
Cir. 2000) (same). The PTO found that this was true in registering the mark, and the Defendants
do not present any conflicting evidence that is relevant to this determination.
The fact that consumers may understand a kati roll to be a generic type of food is not
relevant to the validity of the mark itself. Whether “Kati Roll and Platters” is likely to cause
consumer confusion with “The Kati Roll Company” goes to the ultimate issue of infringement:
specifically, the scope of protection provided by Plaintiff’s mark. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment on Defendants’ invalidity defenses.
V.

Defendants Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., and Niraj Jivani’s Motion to Compel
Plaintiff to Comply with Consent Orders and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Hold
Defendants Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., and Niraj Jivani in Contempt
On April 5, 2011, a consent order was entered which forbade the Defendants from

displaying the Defendant restaurant website while such website continued to use Plaintiff’s trade
dress violation of the Preliminary Injunction Order. Another consent order of June 20, 2011
prohibited Defendants from advertising on the scarletmenus.com website until the parties could
agree that the disclaimer was sufficiently prominent. Defendants have since obtained a new web
designer to change the color of the website, and have proposed a green menu with a disclaimer

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for advertisement, in order to conform with the Preliminary Injunction order of February 1, 2011.
Defendants have brought this Motion to Compel compliance with these two orders, claiming that
the Plaintiff has refused to allow Defendants to use the new website and advertisement until they
change the name of their restaurant. Plaintiff brings a Motion for Contempt in response,
claiming that Defendants have not complied with the Preliminary Injunction and thus have not
earned the right to re-post their website or advertisements.
There is no question that the Defendants were not required by the Preliminary Injunction
Order to change the name of their restaurant, or that such a name change was required by either
of the consent orders. Thus, any claim that Defendants have not complied on that basis must fail.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the Defendants are still in violation of the orders. For example,
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have created new facebook pages without the disclaimer
required by the Court’s orders, that the menus in the restaurant do not do not contain the required
disclaimers, and that they have not demonstrated to the Plaintiff or to the Court that the proposed
new website and menus will be in conformity. Plaintiff also seeks to punish the Defendants for
its tardiness in complying with the orders, regardless of their current state of conformity with
those orders. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants are in contempt for their failure to make
timely payments to Plaintiff’s attorney as ordered in the June 20, 2011 consent order.
The Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated “substantial compliance” with the
relevant orders, and thus the Motion for Contempt will be denied, and the Motion to Compel will
be granted. The Defendants also must be allowed to “unpark” their revised website and post
appropriate new advertisements. The Defendant has offered proof to the Court that it has
endeavored to comply with the consent orders and to obtain the Plaintiff’s approval of the

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required changes regarding the website and online menu advertisement. Plaintiff refuses to grant
such approval based on the timeliness of compliance, new allegations that the Defendant
continues to create confusion, and the unrelated issue of the restaurant’s name. The Court finds
that these allegations are unrelated to the specific terms of the consent orders. Thus, Plaintiff has
not justified its refusal to allow Defendants to re-post their new advertising materials.
Defendants may advertise their services to the public online in the limited manner contemplated
by the Preliminary Injunction Order.
The Court further finds that Defendants’ proof of substantial compliance, and the relative
insignificance of Plaintiff’s allegations, must result in the denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Contempt. The Plaintiff’s allegations are either unrelated to the Preliminary Injunction,
unsubstantiated, or simply insufficient in severity to justify holding the Defendants in contempt.
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Rasik Jivani’s Motion for Summary Judgment will

be granted, Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted, Defendants’ Motion to Compel will be
granted, and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Contempt will be denied. An appropriate Order
follows.
_/s/ Joel A. Pisano________
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
Dated: July 26, 2012

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