DEPAOLA v. NEW BRUNSWICK MUNICIPAL COURT et al

Filing 9

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 5/12/2011. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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:
:
Plaintiff,
:
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v.
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NEW BRUNSWICK MUNICIPAL COURT, :
et al.,
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Defendants.
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:
JAMES DEPAOLA,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-3644 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se and was not incarcerated when
he filed the initial Complaint on July 20, 2010, applies for informa-pauperis relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“Application”).
(Dkt. entry no. 1, Appl.)

The Court will (1) grant the

Application, and (2) deem the Complaint and the Amended Complaint
to be filed.

The Court may now (1) review the Amended Complaint,

and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

THIS IS an action alleging violations of constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) against the defendants, New Brunswick
Municipal Court (“NBMC”), the County of Middlesex, (“County”),
and Middlesex County Adult Correction Center (“MCACC”).
entry no. 2, Am. Compl.)

(Dkt.

THE CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE RFRA are not viable against the
defendants, as they are local entities.

See City of Boerne v.

Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-36 (1997); Riley v. Snyder, 72
F.Supp.2d 456, 461 (D. Del. 1999).

Therefore, the Amended

Complaint insofar as it asserts claims under the RFRA will be
dismissed.

The Court will review the Amended Complaint insofar

as it asserts claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
AS TO NBMC, the plaintiff alleges that it issued “a Bogus
Warrant” (“Warrant”) in 2001 based on “closed” tickets, and that
he was arrested based on the Warrant six years later on September
27, 2007.

(Am. Compl. at 4.)

The plaintiff further alleges that

(1) he had been arrested and incarcerated for other offenses
during that six-year period, and the Warrant was not mentioned to
him, and (2) NBMC set an excessive bail amount after the arrest.
(Id. at 4-5.)

The plaintiff also alleges that (1) upon being

released on October 9, 2007, he was not notified about a court
date, and was arrested again on the Warrant on February 14, 2008,
and that an excessive bail amount was set again, and (2) he was
released again on February 26, 2008, and the Warrant was
eventually dismissed.

(Id. at 5-6.)

THE CLAIMS asserted against NBMC (“NBMC Claims”) are barred.
First, they concern events occurring from September 27 to October
9, 2007, and from February 14 to February 26, 2008, and thus are
barred by the two-year statute of limitations for claims brought
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that accrue in New Jersey.

Dique v. N.J.

State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); Rondon v. Passaic
Cnty. Jail, 374 Fed.Appx. 238, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).1

Second, the

NBMC Claims are barred under the absolute-immunity doctrine, as
New Jersey municipal courts and judges cannot be held civilly
liable for judicial acts, such as setting bail, even when those
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and alleged to have been
done maliciously or corruptly.

See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208

F.3d 435, 437, 440 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Santos v. New Jersey,
393 Fed.Appx. 893, 894 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of
constitutional claim against state court judge based on alleged
excessive bail, as judge was immune).

Municipal courts provide

judicial services, an area in which local governments are treated
as arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and have
the same immunity from an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in federal court as states.

See Callahan v. Philadelphia, 207

F.3d 668, 670-74 (3d Cir. 2000).
AS TO THE COUNTY, the plaintiff alleges that based on his
arrests and incarceration from the Warrant, he is the victim of
“a SCAM that results in a lucrative source of desperately needed
Income for the County Treasury and/or for the personal benefit of
certain Government Officials”.

(Am. Compl. at 4.)

1

The Court can address the statute of limitations sua
sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Alexander v. Fletcher, 367
Fed.Appx. 289, 291 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).
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THE CLAIMS against the County (“County Claims”) are barred.
First, they are barred under the two-year statute of limitations
as discussed above, because they concern arrests and incarceration
that occurred in September 2007, October 2007, and February 2008
from the Warrant.

Second, the County Claims “do not appear to be

based in fact, but merely upon [the plaintiff’s] own suspicion and
speculation”, and thus are frivolous.

See Gera v. Pennsylvania,

256 Fed.Appx. 563, 566 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming order dismissing
claim that defendants conspired to have him arrested).
AS TO MCACC, the plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated
there from (1) September 27 to October 9, 2007, and February 14
to February 26, 2008, he (a) “sought Spiritual Guidance and
Fellowship, but such was denied . . . even though Bible Studies,
Prayers, Worship & Spiritual Instruction and Counseling was
occurring in other parts of MCACC” (Am. Compl. at 6), and (b) was
subjected to overcrowding, prolonged lockdowns, and eating meals
over a toilet (id. at 7), (2) March 13 to June 12, 2008, during a
separate period of incarceration, he was blocked from accessing
spiritual instruction, prayer, and counseling, and (3) September
29 to October 7, 2009, during yet another incarceration period, he
was again so blocked.

(Id. at 8.)

As to the period from March

13 to June 12, 2008, he alleges that he filed grievances with
MCACC, and submits exhibits in support.

(See Am. Compl., Ex. G,

Middlesex County Department of Corrections Warden’s Request Form

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(submitted by plaintiff 4-16-08).)

As to the period from

September 29 to October 7, 2009, he again alleges that he filed
grievances with MCACC, but submits no exhibits in support.
THE CLAIMS against MCACC (“MCACC Claims”) insofar as they
concern the periods from September 27 to October 9, 2007, from
February 14 to February 26, 2008, and from March 13 to June 12,
2008, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, as
discussed above.

Also, under the totality of the circumstances,

his allegations on the conditions of confinement in MCACC are not
sufficient to state a claim.

See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d

229, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating housing of three prisoners in
one cell and having some sleep on floor mattresses for seven
months not constitutional violation); Brookins v. Williams, 402
F.Supp.2d 508, 512-13 (D. Del. 2005) (finding no constitutional
violation where over five-day period inmate was placed in cell
with two other inmates, ate near toilet, and not allowed to
exercise).

Therefore, the only claim remaining is the claim that

from September 29 to October 7, 2009, the plaintiff was prevented
from accessing spiritual guidance (“2009 Claims”).
THE 2009 CLAIMS are barred.

First, MCACC is not a “person”

for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus is not amenable to
suit.

See Kinlaw v. Foster, 226 Fed.Appx. 157, 158-59 (3d Cir.

2007); Perdue v. Penalosa, No. 93-6313, 1994 WL 559140, at *1 (4th
Cir. Oct. 13, 1994); Marsden v. Fed. B.O.P., 856 F.Supp. 832, 836

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(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Powell v. Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758
(N.D. Ill.1993); McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F.Supp. 890,
893-94 (E.D. Va. 1992).

Second, the plaintiff has not shown that

he followed the MCACC grievance procedure for the 2009 Claims, as
is required.
81, 83 (2006).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
There appears to be a grievance procedure at

MCACC. See Dubois v. Abode, No. 03-2364, 2006 WL 3069124, at *1-2
(D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2006) (discussing same).

Indeed, the plaintiff

demonstrated that he followed the procedure from March to June
2008.

Third, the deprivation of fellowship for nine days did not

“impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”.

Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, (1995); see McClellan v. Pike Cnty.,
No. 04-2588, 2005 WL 2234645, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2005)
(dismissing claim concerning deprivation of religious services,
as inmate not completely deprived in that he could engage in
individual prayer); Ebersole v. Wagner, No. 99-4526, 1999 WL
1241079, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1999) (dismissing claim where
prisoner was deprived of access to religious services for 6 days,
as he was not kept from practicing religion within his cell, and
reasons were reasonably related to legitimate security concern),
aff’d, 229 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 2000).2
2

All of this analysis concerning the dismissal of the 2009
Claims would also apply to claims concerning denial of spiritual
guidance from March 13 to June 12, 2008, if those claims were not
being dismissed under the two-year statute of limitations.
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THE COURT will dismiss the Amended Complaint for the
aforementioned reasons.

However, the Court will do so without

prejudice to the plaintiff to either (1) reinstate the action in
state court to the extent that the Amended Complaint can be
construed to assert claims pursuant to state law, or (2) move to
reopen the action in this Court, with a proposed second amended
complaint remedying the Amended Complaint’s deficiencies
submitted in support.

The Court will issue an appropriate order

and judgment.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 12, 2011

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