JOHNSTON v. WARDEN OF MERCER CO. COR. CTR. et al

Filing 16

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 6/20/2011. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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:
:
Petitioner,
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v.
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:
WARDEN, et al.,
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:
Respondents.
:
________________________________:
HIRAM R. JOHNSTON, JR.

Civil Action No. 10-3776 (FLW)
O P I N I O N

APPEARANCES:
Hiram R. Johnston, Jr., Pro Se
#539543
Mercer County Correctional Center
P.O. Box 8068
Trenton, NJ 08650

Christopher C. Josephson, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625-0112
Attorney for Respondents

WOLFSON, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Petitioner’s motions for
reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing (docket numbers 14
and 15).

These motions are being decided without oral argument

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.

For reasons discussed below,

both motions will be denied.
BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

On October 27,

2010, this Court issued an Opinion and Order dismissing the
petition, without prejudice.

Citing Moore v. DeYounq, 515 F.2d

437, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1975) and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), this Court found that

Petitioner did not have jurisdiction under 2241 to bring his
claims, and had not exhausted his claims in the state court.
1.

Motion for Reconsideration
On November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration.

In the motion for reconsideration, Petitioner

argues that this Court misinterpreted the factual background of
his case.

(Motion, p. 1).

Then, he continues to go through the

facts leading up to his arrest on charges of terroristic threats.
He states that he is “alleging that after he was released on bail
on the charge of terroristic threats, his wife, parole officer,
Willingboro police officers and the Willingboro Municipal Court
Judge caused deliberately false charges to be filed against him
for allegedly violating a restraining order for the specific
purpose of obstructing justice to obtain an objective not
intended by law.”

(Motion, p. 3).

He also contends that “New

Jersey invoked parole revocation proceedings against him charging
violations of parole conditions applicable to a New Jersey parole
sentence which expired in excess of seven (7) years ago, which
clearly violated his substantive rights to procedural due process
and equal protection of the law.”

(Motion, p. 4).

Motions for reconsideration are not expressly recognized in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See United States v.

Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999).
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion to

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alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), or as a motion for relief from judgment or order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

See id.

In the District

of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) (formerly 7.1(g)) governs
motions for reconsideration.

See Byrne v. Calastro, 2006 WL

2506722 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006).1
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek
reconsideration by the Court of matters which the party "believes
the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked" when it ruled on
the motion.

See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).

The standard for reargument

is high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.
United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994).

See
The

movant has the burden of demonstrating either: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability

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Byrne states:
. . . in this District, Local Rule 7.1(g)
creates a specific procedure by which a party
may, within 10 days of the entry of an order,
ask either a District Judge, or a Magistrate
Judge, to take a second look at any decision
“upon showing that dispositive factual
matters or controlling decisions of law were
overlooked by the court in reaching its prior
decision.” Consequently, Local Rule 7.1(g) of
the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, rather
than Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, governs motions for
reconsideration filed in the District of New
Jersey.

Byrne, 2006 WL 2506722 at *1 (citations omitted).
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of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its
order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice."

Max’s Seafood Café v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)(citing N. River Ins.
Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where its
prior decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue that may
alter the disposition of the matter.

See Compaction Sys. Corp.,

88 F. Supp.2d at 345; see also L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
‘overlooked’ is the operative term in the Rule."

"The word
Bowers, 130 F.

Supp.2d at 612 (citation omitted); see also Compaction Sys.
Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d at 345.
Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration may address only
those matters of fact or issues of law which were presented to,
but not considered by, the court in the course of making the
decision at issue.

See SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 727 F. Supp. 876,

878 (D.N.J.), aff’d, 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989).

Thus,

reconsideration is not to be used as a means of expanding the
record to include matters not originally before the court.
See Bowers, 130 F. Supp.2d at 613; Resorts Int’l. v. Greate Bay
Hotel and Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 & n.3 (D.N.J.
1992); Egloff v. New Jersey Air National Guard, 684 F. Supp.
1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988).

Absent unusual circumstances, a court

should reject new evidence which was not presented when the court

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made the contested decision.
831 n.3.

See Resorts Int’l, 830 F. Supp. at

A party seeking to introduce new evidence on

reconsideration bears the burden of first demonstrating that
evidence was unavailable or unknown at the time of the original
hearing.

See Levinson v. Regal Ware, Inc., Civ. No. 89-1298,

1989 WL 205724 at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1989).
Moreover, L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to
restate arguments which the court has already considered.
69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990).

See G-

Thus, a

difference of opinion with the court’s decision should be dealt
with through the normal appellate process.

See Bowers, 130 F.

Supp.2d at 612 (citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988); see
also Chicosky v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 979 F. Supp. 316, 318
(D.N.J. 1997); NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Reconsideration motions ...
may not be used to re-litigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.").

In other words, "[a] motion for

reconsideration should not provide the parties with an
opportunity for a second bite at the apple."

Tishcio v. Bontex,

Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998)(citation omitted).
In this case, Petitioner has not presented to this Court any
facts that would justify reconsidering this Court’s Opinion that

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jurisdiction in this case is lacking.

For the reasons set forth

in this Court’s prior Opinion, Petitioner’s arrest on state law
charges needs to be exhausted through the state courts prior to
raising it as a pretrial claim under § 2241.

Although Petitioner

disagrees, the proper recourse is to appeal this Court’s Opinion
to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner has not demonstrated an

intervening change in the controlling law, the availability of
new evidence that was not available when the court issued its
order, or the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice.

Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on his motion under Local Civil Rule 7.1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides, in pertinent
part:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party
or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
“The general purpose of Rule 60(b) ... is to strike a proper
balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must
be brought to an end and that justice must be done.”

Boughner v.

Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir.
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1978) (quoted in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d
262, 271 (3d Cir. 2002)).
A motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) is
“addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
guided by accepted legal principles applied in light of
all the relevant circumstances.” Rule 60(b), however,
“does not confer upon the district courts a
‘standardless residual of discretionary power to set
aside judgments.’” Rather, relief under Rule 60(b) is
available only under such circumstances that the
“‘overriding interest in the finality and repose of
judgments may properly be overcome.’” “The remedy
provided by Rule 60(b) is ‘extraordinary, and [only]
special circumstances may justify granting relief under
it.’”
Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998)
(internal citations omitted).
Relief is available only in cases evidencing extraordinary
circumstances.

See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193

(1950); Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975).

A

motion under Rule 60(b)(6) “must be fully substantiated by
adequate proof and its exceptional character must be clearly
established.”

FDIC v. Alker, 234 F.2d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir.

1956).
To the extent a moving party seeks to relitigate the court’s
prior conclusions, Rule 60(b) is not an appropriate vehicle.
“[C]ourts must be guided by ‘the well established principle that
a motion under Rule 60(b) may not be used as a substitute for
appeal.’

It follows therefore that it is improper to grant

relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if the aggrieved party could have

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reasonably sought the same relief by means of appeal.”
Martinez-McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908,
911 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he satisfies any
of the reasons warranting 60(b) relief.

Petitioner has not shown

entitlement to be relieved from the judgment due to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, see Rule 60(b)(1);
has not presented newly discovered evidence, see Rule 60(b)(2);
and has not satisfied the criteria for Rule 60(b)(3)-(6).

In

this case, nothing presented by Petitioner in his motion
challenges this Court’s determination that jurisdiction is
lacking for Petitioner to challenge his claims here in federal
court, or to justify federal intervention in Petitioner's pending
state proceedings.
Therefore, with regard to a Rule 60(b) motion, Petitioner
has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief from this
Court’s judgment of October 27, 2010.

Nothing Petitioner

presents in his motion convinces this Court that “extraordinary
circumstances” exist which warrant 60(b) relief.

Thus,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) and his
motion will be denied.

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2.

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing
In his motion for evidentiary hearing, Petitioner asks for

an evidentiary hearing due to violations of his constitutional
rights.
As this Court has found that Petitioner’s constitutional
rights have not been violated, Petitioner’s motion for an
evidentiary hearing is denied, as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motions will be
denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: June 20, 2011

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