FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LEVY et al

Filing 41

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 12/16/2011. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil Action No. 10-3788 (JAP)
v.
:
:
OPINION
JEAN CLAUDE LEVY and
:
SHERRY LEVY,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
PISANO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Jean Claude Levy’s motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s decision entered on September 16, 2011. For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion
will be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND1
On July 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court seeking a declaratory

judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2201. Plaintiff informed Defendant’s counsel of
the commencement of the action and served Defendants at their domicile in France on September
16, 2010. Based upon their failure to appear or answer the Complaint, Defendants were
defaulted on February 8, 2011. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on June
8, 2011. On September 16, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and entered judgment in
its favor.
By way of the instant motion, filed on October 26, 2011,2 Defendant seeks
reconsideration of that decision. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the Court’s decision was in
1

A more detailed recitation of the facts is included in the Court’s Opinion entered on September 16, 2011. See Dkt.
Entry 32.

error because, inter alia, he was never properly served, his wife was improperly named as a
defendant, and Plaintiff and its counsel violated the Federal Rules of Evidence, failed to give him
proper notice, and did not comply with the Hague Convention.
II.

DISCUSSION
Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is normally appropriate only when one

of the following three grounds for relief is established: “(1) an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to correct clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Leja v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 444,
456 (D.N.J. 2010)(citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.
1995)). The party seeking reconsideration bears a heavy burden, and cannot merely “restate
arguments which the court has already considered” or assert a disagreement with the Court’s
decision. Tormasi v. Hayman, Civ. No. 08-05886, 2011 WL 890676, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar. 14,
2011); see also G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990); Carteret Savings Bank,
F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989).
Here, Defendant has not met the high burden of establishing adequate grounds for
reconsideration. In his motion, he does not assert that an intervening change in controlling law
has occurred or that evidence not previously available has become available. See Leja, 743 F.
Supp. 2d at 456. Likewise, he falls far short of establishing “the need to correct clear error of

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The Court notes that Defendant resides in France and submitted the instant motion by way of letter dated October
4, 2011. In correspondence with the Court, Defendant also asserted that he did not receive notice of the September
16 decision until October 4, 2011. Nevertheless, because New Jersey Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) makes clear that
motions for reconsideration “shall be served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the
original motion,” Defendant’s motion is untimely. Indeed, his motion is dated more than 14 days after the Court
entered the Order and Judgment at issue on September 16, and, more significantly, was not filed until October 26—
40 days after the entry date and 22 days after he claims to have received notice of the Court’s decision.
Additionally, he did not seek an extension or leave to file his motion. Accordingly, Defendant’s failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of Rule 7.1 provides justification for denying his motion. See, e.g., In re Hussain,
2011 WL 1322264, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011) (“A motion [for reconsideration] filed untimely may be denied for
that reason alone.”). In any event, as discussed infra, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion on the merits.

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law or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. Instead, his motion amounts to no more than “mere
disagreement with the Court’s decision,” and simply recapitulates the same arguments that this
Court considered and rejected in its Opinion entered on September 16, 2011.3 Leja, 743 F. Supp.
2d at 456 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is
denied. See, e.g., G-69, 748 F. Supp. at 275 (the moving party’s burden requires more than a
mere “recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its
original decision[.]”).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is denied. An appropriate

Order will follow.

/s/ JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
Dated: December 16, 2011

3

Defendant’s arguments with regard to notice, service, and alleged violations of the Hague Convention were
specifically addressed and rejected by the Court in its Opinion. See Dkt. Entry 32, at 2-3 (“Defendants were
properly served in compliance with the Hague Convention . . . Moreover, Defendants’ counsel was made aware of
the commencement of the action . . . and Defendant Jean Claude Levy’s frequent correspondences with both
Plaintiff and this Court demonstrate his actual notice of the claims against him.”). Additionally, in granting
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, the Court made clear that it had considered “all of Defendant’s
correspondence with both Plaintiff and this Court,” including all arguments raised therein and again in the instant
motion. Id. at 4-5.

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