HINTON v. WHITE et al
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 12/6/2012. (gxh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANDREW HINTON,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-3902 (MLC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT JEFFREY WHITE, et al.,
Defendants.
COOPER, District Judge
The pro se plaintiff, prisoner Andrew Hinton, brings this
action against the defendants, Sgt Jeffrey White and Officer
Lorenzo Pettway of the Asbury Park Police Department Street Crimes
Unit (“SCU”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
entry no. 1, Compl.)
(See generally dkt.
Hinton appears to allege that the defendants
violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
(See id. at 5, 7.)
The defendants move for summary judgment in their favor and
against Hinton.
(See dkt. entry no. 19.)1
Hinton has not filed
opposition to the Motion.2
1
The defendants actually move for relief pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (See Mot. at 1.) But
the Motion rests on matters presented outside of the pleadings.
(See, e.g., dkt. entry no. 19-4, White Cert.; dkt. entry no. 19-5,
Pettway Cert.) The Court thus treats the Motion as one seeking
relief pursuant to Rule 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
2
The Motion’s return date was extended from August 20, 2012
to October 15, 2012 to accommodate Hinton’s request for additional
time to file opposition materials. (See dkt. entry no. 21, 8-17-12
Order.) The 8-17-12 Order and related request demonstrate that
Hinton knew of but failed to take the opportunity to oppose the
Motion. (See id.)
The Court now resolves the Motion without oral argument.
See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b).
The Court will (1) grant the Motion, and (2)
enter judgment in the defendants’ favor and against Hinton.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court may not grant an unopposed motion for summary
judgment unless the movants demonstrate, “on the basis of what
[they] put before the court”, that “the facts set forth in the
motion entitle [them] to judgment as a matter of law.”
Anchorage
Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1990);
see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3).
However, the Court may deem the
movants’ factual assertions to be undisputed.
See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e)(2); L.Civ.R. 56.1; Kelvin Cryosys., Inc. v. Lightnin, 252
Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (3d Cir. 2007).
Hinton has not disputed the material facts set forth by the
defendants in the Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SOF”) or
supporting materials.
(See dkt. entry no. 19-3, SOF.)
thus deems those facts to be undisputed.
Cryosys., 252 Fed.Appx. at 472.3
The Court
See L.Civ.R. 56.1; Kelvin
The sole question remaining is
whether the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 176.
3
Even if the record contains facts supporting Hinton’s
position, the burden is on Hinton, not the Court, to cull the
record and affirmatively identify genuine, material factual issues
sufficient to defeat the Motion. See, e.g., Ebron v. Oxley, No.
06-1938, 2007 WL 2140056, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2007).
2
BACKGROUND
Hinton’s claims rise from events taking place on March 17,
2009.
(See generally Compl.; see SOF at ¶ 2.)
On that date, SCU
members White and Pettway were patrolling an apartment complex in
Asbury Park, New Jersey in an unmarked patrol car (“Police Car”).
(See SOF ¶ 2.)
SCU members routinely wear black shirts with the
word “POLICE” appearing on both the front and back in large, yellow
letters, and wear badges on neck chains.
(See Pettway Cert., Ex.
A, Pettway Report at 1; White Cert., Ex. A, White Report at 1.)
White drove the Police Car.
(See SOF at ¶ 2.)
During their patrol, White and Pettway saw Hinton and a male
associate (“the Buyer”) engage in an apparent drug transaction.
(Id. at ¶ 3.)4
Hinton saw the Police Car, said something to the
Buyer, and began walking away from the Police Car.
Buyer walked in the opposite direction.
(See id.)
The
(See id. at ¶ 5.)
White yelled at Hinton to “stop” while Pettway exited the
Police Car and questioned the Buyer.
(See id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)
Hinton
disregarded White’s instruction and began to run from the Police
Car.
(See id. at ¶ 6.)
He turned the corner and ran between a
laundromat and an apartment building.
(See id.)
White, who was still driving the Police Car, followed Hinton.
(See id.)
Hinton circled the playground and ran back to the
4
White recognized Hinton from an earlier narcotics
investigation and arrest. (See Pettway Report at 2; SOF at ¶ 4.)
3
street, through the space between the laundromat and the apartment
building.
(See id. at ¶¶ 6-7.)
White continued to follow him in
the Police Car, and Pettway -- who had instructed the Buyer to
leave the scene -- approached the space between the laundromat and
the apartment building.
(See id. at ¶¶ 6-8.)
Pettway met Hinton near the laundromat and attempted to grab
him by the collar.
(See id. at ¶¶ 7-8; Pettway Cert. at ¶ 4.)
But
Hinton pushed Pettway, spun away, and fell into the path of the
oncoming Police Car.
(See SOF at ¶ 8.)
White saw Hinton fall, but
was unable to fully brake before the Police Car struck Hinton.
(See id.; White Cert. at ¶ 6.)
Pettway approached Hinton and saw him throw several bundles of
heroin under the Police Car and into the sewer drain.
¶ 11.)
(See SOF at
He and White worked together to handcuff Hinton.
(See id.)
White then retrieved those bundles that were thrown under the
Police Car.
(See id. at ¶ 12; White Cert. at ¶ 9.)
He also
attempted to search Hinton, but Hinton began to scream.
at ¶ 12.)
White thus called for an ambulance.
(See SOF
(See id.)
The ambulance transported both Hinton and White to Jersey
Shore University Medical Center, where hospital staff removed
Hinton’s clothing and treated his wounds.
(See id. at ¶ 13.)
Hinton’s treating physician determined that Hinton broke a small
bone in his lower leg, and urinalysis demonstrated the presence of
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marijuana and cocaine.
(See id.)
Police discovered three more
bundles of heroin and $217 in Hinton’s jacket.
(See id.)
Hinton was charged with, inter alia, a third-degree violation
of N.J.S.A. § 2C:35-7 for possession with the intent to distribute
a controlled dangerous substance within one thousand feet of a
school.
1.)
(See id. at ¶ 14; White Cert., Ex. C, Offender Details at
He was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of three years.
(See id. at ¶ 15; White Cert., Ex. C, Offender Details at 1.)
Hinton thereafter commenced the action.
Compl.)
(See generally
He alleges that Pettway and White “used the means of
excessive force to arrest on an illegal search and seizure”, and
that “Officer Pettway illegally searched me after Sgt Jeffrey White
ran me over” and that the search occurred while he “was in dire
need of medical attention.”
(Id. at 5, 7.)
Hinton explicitly
alleges that Pettway and White: (1) used excessive force when
attempting to apprehend Hinton; (2) violated his right to be
free of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment;
(3) violated his “Eighth Amendment Rights of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment”; and (4) violated his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(Compl. at 5.)5
5
Hinton actually alleges a violation of his “1st and 14th
Amendment Rights of Due Process”. (Compl. at 5.) Because the
facts underlying the action do not support a claim under the First
Amendment, the Court will not further comment on or analyze
Hinton’s reference to the First Amendment.
5
DISCUSSION
The Motion rests on two grounds.
Pettway and White first
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
entry no. 19-2, Br. in Supp. at 7-13.)
(See dkt.
They also argue that
Hinton’s claims sounding in illegal search and seizure are barred
by the Heck doctrine.
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
(See id. at 13-14.)
See Heck v. Humphries,
The Court will address both arguments.
I.
The Heck Doctrine
The defendants argue that the Heck doctrine bars Hinton’s
Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search and seizure.
Supp. at 13-14.)
(Br. in
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit (“Third Circuit”) has summarized the doctrine.
In Heck, the Supreme Court announced that “in order to
recover damages for . . . harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid,” the plaintiff must, as a threshold matter,
show that there has been a “favorable termination” of
his prior proceedings by demonstrating that “the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S.Ct.
2364. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has explained, the Supreme Court's
rationale in Heck “was based, in part, on a desire to
‘avoid [ ] parallel litigation over the issues of
probable cause and guilt,’ prevent ‘the creation of two
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or
identical transaction,’ and preclude ‘a convicted
criminal defendant [from making a] ... collateral attack
on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.’”
6
Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364).
Royal v. Durison, 254 Fed.Appx. 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2007).
This action presents a textbook application of the Heck
doctrine.
Hinton has failed to present evidence demonstrating that
the criminal charges related to the action (i.e., those arising
from his March 17, 2009 arrest) ended in a favorable termination.
See Royal, 254 Fed.Appx. at 165.
The Heck doctrine thus bars
Hinton from now raising his Fourth Amendment claim of illegal
search and seizure, which, if proven, could call into question the
validity of the related state criminal conviction.
U.S. at 486-87; Royal, 254 Fed.Appx. at 165.
See Heck, 512
A contrary holding
would impermissibly allow Hinton to collaterally attack that
conviction.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; Huang, 251 F.3d at 73.
II.
The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
The Third Circuit has recently summarized the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates
government officials who are performing discretionary
functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis
that governs whether an official is entitled to
qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,
121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). We ask: (1)
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the
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violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
right at issue was clearly established at the time of
the alleged misconduct. Id.; Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts may
address the two Saucier prongs in any order, at their
discretion. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129
S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 11-3345, 2012 WL 5954632, at *3
(3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2012).
If Hinton has failed to satisfy either
prong, then the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
See id. (citing Pearson, 555 at 232).
The first question of the Saucier analysis is whether a
constitutional violation occurred.
This “is not a question of
immunity, but whether there is any wrong to address.”
James, 2012
WL 5954632, at *2 (quoting Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174
(3d Cir. 2010)).
Here, the remaining claims raise issues
concerning (1) the alleged use of excessive force, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment; (2) the alleged deprivation of Hinton’s right
to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(3) Hinton’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.
A.
(See Compl. at 5, 7.)
The Excessive Force Claim
A plaintiff will prevail on an excessive force claim if he
demonstrates that: (1) a seizure occurred; and (2) the seizure was
unreasonable under the circumstances.
See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 1828
83 (3d Cir. 2011).
“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts,
however, the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is
an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular
seizure is ‘reasonable’ . . . requires . . . careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”
Brown v. Cwynar, No. 11-1948, 2012 WL 2045764,
at *3 (3d Cir. June 7, 2012) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
In
evaluating reasonableness, the Court must consider the fact that
“police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
Thus, “[t]he reasonableness
of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene; Monday morning quarterbacking is
not allowed.”
Lamont, 637 F.3d at 183 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Carswell v. Bor. of Homestead,
381 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Reasonableness is to be
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evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”)
The Court has thus reviewed the undisputed facts underlying
the action from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene”, and considered “whether the officers’ actions were
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them”.
183.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Lamont, 637 F.3d at
The Court concludes that both defendants are entitled to
judgment on the Excessive Force Claim in their favor and against
Hinton.
The Excessive Force Claim, insofar as it is raised against
Pettway, appears to relate to the moment when he grabbed (or
attempted to grab) Hinton by the collar.
(See SOF at ¶ 7.)
Court considers the following facts to be relevant.
The
On the night
in question, the defendants saw Hinton -- an individual known from
past narcotics investigations -- participate in an apparent drug
transaction.
(See id. at ¶ 3.)
When the defendants attempted to
speak to or otherwise detain Hinton, he fled from the scene.
(See id. at ¶¶ 5-8.)
It thus appears as a matter of law that:
(1) Pettway was aware that Hinton engaged in serious criminal
activity; and (2) Hinton attempted to evade Pettway by flight.
(See id. at ¶¶ 3, 5-8.)
Under those circumstances, Pettway used
justifiable force when grabbing (or attempting to grab) Hinton’s
collar, to detain him.
See Brown, 2012 WL 2045764, at *3; cf.
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Davis v. Beers, 421 Fed.Appx. 179, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2011) (federal
agent did not use excessive force when striking a fugitive “who had
fled from a prosecution for serious drug charges”); Gannaway v.
Karetas, 438 Fed.Appx. 61, 67 (3d Cir. 2011) (police used
reasonable force when chasing after and tackling suspect who
committed a “severe” crime and then fled from the police).
The Excessive Force Claim, insofar as it is raised against
White, relates to the moment when the Police Car struck Hinton.
(See Compl. at 5, 7; SOF at ¶ 8.)
The Court is mindful that White,
like Pettway, was reacting to circumstances in which: (1) he was
aware that Hinton engaged in serious criminal activity; and
(2) Hinton attempted to flee from the police.
5-8.)
(See SOF at ¶¶ 3,
The Court also considers it highly relevant that Hinton, in
his efforts to evade detention: (1) pushed Pettway; (2) spun away
from Pettway; and (3) stumbled into the path of the moving Police
Car.
(Id. at ¶ 8.)
The undisputed facts demonstrate that White
attempted to stop the Police Car before it struck Hinton.
(Id.;
White Cert. at ¶ 6.)
The Court is mindful police officers “are often forced to make
split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving”.
397.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at
White was forced to make such a judgment.
While driving the
Police Car in pursuit of Hinton -- a suspect who fled the scene of
a serious crime, and continued to actively evade police custody -11
he saw Hinton stumble into the path of the Police Car.
¶¶ 3, 5-8.)
(See SOF at
White then attempted to do something objectively
reasonable; he attempted to stop the car before it struck Hinton.
(See id. at ¶ 9.)
See Lamont, 637 F.3d at 183 (question before the
Court is whether defendant officer’s actions were objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
him).
The fact that White could not fully stop the Police Car
before it struck Hinton does not render his actions unreasonable,
and does not transform the incident from an unfortunate accident
into a cognizable constitutional claim.
B.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
It appears that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim relates
to the Police Car striking Hinton, and Hinton’s resultant injuries.
(See Compl. at 7.)
Hinton alleges in the Complaint that:
I was run over from behind . . . [.] When I awoke I had
no leg movement and bruises and abrasions. . . .
[N]umerous officers . . . were trying to move me when I
was in dire need of medical attention. One of my legs
where [sic] severely broken while the other was bruised
and contused due to injury[.]
(Id.)
However, Hinton is ineligible for relief under the Eighth
Amendment.
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after
the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions. . . . [T]he State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is
concerned until after it has secured a formal
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adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law.
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)
(citation omitted); see Navolio v. Lawrence Cnty., 406 Fed.Appx.
619, 622 (3d Cir. 2011)
Because there had been no formal adjudication of guilt against
Hinton at the time he required medical care, the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the action.
See City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244.
The Court will thus grant judgment on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Claim against Hinton and in the defendants’ favor.
C.
The Substantive Due Process Claim
It appears, however, that Hinton’s allegations relating to his
wounds and need for treatment are properly considered as a
substantive due process claim.
See id.; A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.
Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 584 (3d Cir. 2004.)
Failure to provide medical treatment to an individual in police
custody may constitute a violation of the individual’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
637 (3d Cir. 1995).
But such a failure only rises to the level of
a constitutional violation if it demonstrates a deliberate
indifference to the individual’s serious medical needs.
See id.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the defendants were not
deliberately indifferent to Hinton’s medical needs.
After the
Police Car struck Hinton, both the defendants handcuffed Hinton,
13
secured bundles of heroin that Hinton had thrown away from his
person, and attempted to search his body.
(See SOF at ¶¶ 11-12.)
At that point, Hinton began to scream, and White requested an
ambulance. (See id. at ¶ 12.)
Because the undisputed facts
demonstrate that the defendants ceased their search and called for
an ambulance when it was apparent that Hinton was injured, the
Court concludes that they did not act with deliberate indifference.
Cf. Groman, 47 F.3d at 637 (“The record clearly establishes that
the police offered [the plaintiff] medical assistance . . . .
Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to [the plaintiff’s]
medical needs.”).
CONCLUSION
The Court, for the reasons stated above, will: (1) grant the
Motion; and (2) enter judgment in favor of the defendants and
against Hinton on all counts.
The Court will issue a separate
Order and Judgment.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
.
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date:
December 6, 2012
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