JOSEPH v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al
Filing
58
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 12/30/2013. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VIOLETTE WHITNEY JOSEPH,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 10-3956 (MAS) (LHG)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
SHIPP, District Judge
Plaintiff Violette Whitney Joseph, an African-American female, alleges that she suffered
unlawful discrimination and other wrongs at the hands of her current employer, the State ofNew
Jersey Civil Service Commission ("CSC"), and its predecessor agency, the State ofNew Jersey
Department of Personnel ("DOP"). In this action, she pursues claims against the CSC and several
former DOP officials (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging various forms of employment
discrimination, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs
claims. (Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 51.) Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion (Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No.
52), and Defendants replied (Defs.' Reply, ECF No. 56.) The Court has carefully considered the
parties' submissions and decided the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule
78.1. For the reasons stated below, and for other good cause shown, Defendants' motion is
granted.
I.
Background
A.
Summary of Plaintiff's Claims
The Court begins with an overview of Plaintiffs allegations. Unless otherwise noted, the
following narrative is drawn from the Complaint.
Plaintiff accepted a temporary position at the DOP in March 2004 with the understanding
that she would be appointed to a permanent civil service position at the conclusion of a sixmonth probationary period. (Compl.
~~
1, 9, 44.) The permanent appointment never materialized.
Instead, Plaintiff claims that Defendants appointed her to a series of temporary or provisional
positions to prevent her from obtaining a permanent civil service title. (Id.
at~~
12, 16, 18, 31.)
At the same time, Plaintiff was shouldering new responsibilities as a result of staff reductions
stemming from a multi-year "restructuring" of the DOP that began in late 2005. (Id. at,[,] 18,
25.) Despite repeated requests from Plaintiff and her immediate supervisor, the DOP's
management failed to appoint Plaintiff to a permanent position with a civil service classification
that was commensurate with her duties and responsibilities. (!d.
at~~
13, 16, 20, 23, 24, 31, 33.)
The imbalance persisted after Plaintiffs unit became part of the Department of Treasury in
2009. 1 (Id. at~ 33.)
Plaintiff claims that two Caucasian males whom the DOP hired within a few months of
her received permanent appointments. (!d. at
~
19.) William Linhart, originally hired into the
DOP, received a permanent position as a Planning Associate in another state agency. (!d.) Frank
Girard, who began working at the DOP six months before Plaintiff, received a permanent
appointment as a Supervising Education Development Specialist in Plaintiffs unit. (Id.)
According to Defendants, the New Jersey legislature dissolved the DOP in early 2009,
dividing its functions between the CSC and the Department of Treasury. (Defs.' Reply 7). In the
Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the CSC as the DOP's "successor agency" (Compl. ,[ 2) but also
makes repeated references to the Treasury (id. at ~~ 33, 34). As a result, it is not clear which
agency Plaintiff worked for following the dissolution of the DOP.
2
Plaintiff alleges that she has acted as project manager for the "statewide implementation
of a Learning Management System" since August 2007. (!d. at 25.) In this role, she has
supervised two Caucasian employees, Dave Smith and Holly Fisher, whose salaries were
"significantly" higher than her own. (!d. at
~~
27, 37.) Plaintiff also alleges that Smith was
assigned to an office that was larger than her own, and that Smith and Foster both received better
office equipment and IT support than Plaintiff. (!d.
at~~
34, 41.)
The charging section of Plaintiffs Complaint contains twelve claims. Counts One, Two,
and Eleven are based on New Jersey state law theories of implied contract and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Counts Three through Ten, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of
race, color and gender discrimination under namely the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"),
29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-3 et seq. Count
Twelve apparently seeks to enjoin the Defendants from further acts of retaliation against
Plaintiff.
B.
Material Facts
In accordance with Local Civil Rule 56.1(a), Defendants submitted a Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF") with their motion for summary judgment. (SUMF, ECF
No. 51-4.) Plaintiff failed to submit a responsive statement. Accordingly, the Court treats each
properly-supported fact in Defendants' submission as undisputed unless Plaintiff cites contrary
evidence in her opposition brief. See Longoria v. New Jersey, 168 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312 & n.1
(D.N.J. 2001). The facts in this case are as follows.
In March 2004, Plaintiff accepted a temporary appointment to a position in the Human
Resource Development Institute ("HRDI"), a division of the DOP tasked with training
3
government employees. (SUMF
~~
2-3, 6.) Plaintiffs position carried the title "Supervising
Program Development Specialist" and an annual salary of $59,431.85. (Id. at
~
4.) In June,
William Linhart joined HRDI as an "Education Program Specialist" with a starting salary of
$69,861.16. (Id.
at~
23; Defs.' Mot., Exh. L.) After approximately six months, Linhart left the
DOP for another agency, where he became Planning Associate. (SUMF
~
25.) Plaintiff remained
at HRDI, where her salary increased steadily, rising to $61,155.37 in June 2004, $63,919.39 in
March 2005, and $65,198.33 in June 2005. (!d.
at~
11; Pl.'s Opp'n, Exh. 20.)
In 2005, budget cuts forced HRDI to downsize and restructure its workforce. (SUMF
~~
7-8.) As part ofthis process, Plaintiff was appointed to the title of "Contract Administrator 2"
in August 2005. (!d.
at~~
9, 15.) The appointment was "pending open-competitive examination,"
which meant that Plaintiff would not be eligible for permanent status until she took a publically
announced civil-service examination. (!d.
at~
10; Exh. G). To prevent a reduction in Plaintiffs
income-she was then earning $18,000 more than the Contract Administrator 2 pay range
allowed-HRD I "red circled" Plaintiffs salary. (SUMF
~~
12-13.) As a result, Plaintiffs salary
remained fixed at $65,198.33 until December 2006, when it increased to $65,409.96. (Pl.'s
Opp'n, Exh. 20.)
In February 2007, Plaintiff submitted a written complaint to DOP Commissioner Rolando
Torres, Jr. (SUMF
~
16; Pl.'s Opp'n, Exh. 7.) In it, Plaintiff asserted that the DOP's failure to
appoint her and her colleague, Wanda McNeill, to permanent positions violated the terms of
"oral agreement[s]" made at the time both women were hired. (!d.) The complaint made no
reference to race, color or gender. (See id.)
Plaintiffs employment status changed again in July 2007, when HRDI moved her to the
unclassified title of "Government Representative 3" and increased her salary to $67,372.19.
4
(Pl.'s Opp'n, Exh. 20.) At around the same time, Plaintiff became project manager for the
"Learning Management System" or "LMS." (SUMF ~ 18.) In this role, Plaintiff supervised Dave
Smith, a Supervising Training Technician who had worked for the DOP since 1986, and Holly
Foster, an Administrative Analyst who joined HRDI in 1993. (!d.
at~~
19-21; 34-36). In June
2008 and June 2009, Plaintiff applied for and received two "salary adjustment[s]" of $3,935.50
and $2,30 1.20, respectively. (!d. at ~~ 31-32; Pl.'s Opp 'n, Exh. 24.) These payments reflected the
additional responsibilities Plaintiff had acquired with regard to the LMS project. (SUMF ,I 31.)
Plaintiffs title and salary remained unchanged when she and her remaining HRDI
colleagues were reassigned to the New Jersey Department of Treasury in early 2009. (!d. at
~
38.)
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). In evaluating the evidence,
the Court is "required to view the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir.
2002) (internal quotations omitted). However, where the party opposing summary judgment
ultimately bears the burden of proof as to a dispositive issue, that party "bears the burden of
production under Rule 56 to 'designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."' Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986)).
5
III.
Analysis
A.
Federal Equal Pay Act Claim
A burden-shifting analysis applies to claims under the Federal Equal Pay Act ("EPA").
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000). First, the claimant must demonstrate
that employees of the opposite sex were paid differently to perform '"equal work'-work of
substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility, under similar working conditions." Id.
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Delaware Dept. of Health and Soc. Svcs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413-14 (3d Cir.
1989)). Once claimant has made this prima facie showing, the employer must establish a genderneutral basis for the disparity in its workers' salaries. Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107 & n.6; see
§ 206(d)(l) (providing that an employer may escape liability if the disparity in its employees'
wages is based on seniority, merit or "any other factor other than sex").
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff earned less than at least two male HRDI
employees. (Defs.' Br. 28-29.) To shift the burden to Defendants, then, Plaintiff need only
present evidence that the tasks Plaintiff performed were substantially equal to those assigned her
better-compensated male coworkers. See Heller v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., 182 F. App'x
91, 94 (3d Cir. 2006); Dubowsky v. Stern, Lavinthal, Norgaard & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 985, 990
(D.N.J. 1996) ("The main determining factor in the substantial equality of the jobs is whether the
jobs involve a common core of tasks.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff falls
short of her burden.
Although Plaintiff makes general assertions about her job function-claiming, for
instance, that her duties were "consistent" with those associated with more desirable job titles
(Pl.'s Opp'n 16)-she fails to provide a factual basis for a comparison of her duties to those of
her male colleagues. In short, the record before the Court furnishes only the vaguest impression
6
of the work Plaintiff actually performed. See Brobtst v. Columbus Svcs. Int., 761 F.2d 148, 155
(3d Cir. 1985) (stating that "relevant issue" under the EPA "is not the name under which [a]
position was classified but what [work] was actually done"). In the absence of this information,
no rational factfinder could conclude that Defendants violated the EPA. Accordingly, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Count Seven of the Complaint.
B.
Status-Based Discrimination & Retaliation Claims
The Court now turns to Plaintiffs allegations of status-based discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII and NJLAD. The same analysis applies to the federal and state law
claims. See Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Analysis of a
claim made pursuant to the NJLAD generally follows analysis of a Title VII claim."). The Court
will therefore divide the claims into two groups. The first consists of Plaintiffs charges of race,
color and gender discrimination, that is, Counts Three, Four, Five, Eight and Nine of the
Complaint. The Court will then examine Plaintiffs retaliation claims in Counts Six and Ten.
It is undisputed that the three-stage analysis illustrated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to all of these claims. See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d
331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII retaliation claim);
Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 105 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII status-based
discrimination claim). At the first stage, claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie
claim of employment discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. At the second
stage, employer must produce evidence that, if believed, would establish a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for its treatment of claimant. See id. at 804-05. If employer meets
this burden, claimant must then submit evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder
that employer's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination or retaliation. See id.
7
1.
Discrimination Claims
The Court's analysis of Plaintiffs status-based discrimination claims begins and ends
with the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. A prima facie claim of employment
discrimination consists of evidence from which a rational jury could conclude (1) the claimant is
a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified for the position sought; (3) he or she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred "under circumstances that
could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination." Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205,
214 (3d Cir. 2008).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish an adverse employment action because
she continues to be employed and has received periodic increases in both her salary and job
responsibilities. (Defs.' Br. 17 -21.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (Pl.'s Opp 'n 9, 16.)
However, she claims Defendants "demoted" her three times during the first four years of her
employment at the DOP-in April 2004, August 2005, and March 2008-and that these
demotions supply the adversity element of her prima facie claim. (Pl.'s Opp'n 8-9.)
At the outset, the Court notes that there is no question that "employment decisions such
as transfers and demotions may suffice to establish the third element of a plaintiffs prima facie
case." Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1999). It is, however, equally
clear that the prima facie analysis imposes "an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement."
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). In other words, Plaintiff must do more
than assert that Defendants demoted her; she must also present evidence to substantiate this
claim. This she fails to do.
Plaintiffs claim that she was demoted in April 2004 is wholly unsubstantiated. She
asserts, with no citation to the record, that Defendants "reduced [her] from a grade 30 position to
8
a grade 29 position" in April 2004. (Pl.'s Opp'n 9.) Plaintiffs failure to identify evidence
supporting this claim indicates that no such evidence exists. DeShields v. Int 'l Resort Props. Ltd.,
463 F. App'x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) ("If factual support for [a] claim exist[s] in the record, it
[is] incumbent upon [party opposing summary judgment] to direct the District Court's attention
to those facts."). Moreover, even if Plaintiff produced this evidence, the Court would have no
basis to conclude that a "grade" reduction constitutes "action ... [that is] 'serious and tangible
enough to alter a [Plaintiffs] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."'
Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas v. Massey,
269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)).
The remaining two instances in which Plaintiff claims to have been "demoted" occurred
in August 2005, when Defendants changed her title to "Contract Administrator 2," and in March
2008, when she received the "Government Representative 3" title. While it is undisputed that
Plaintiffs title changed, there is no evidence that these changes had any adverse impact on the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of [Plaintiffs] employment." !d. In fact, the evidence is to the
contrary-Plaintiff acknowledges that her salary and responsibilities have only increased since
she began working at the DOP in 2004. Under these circumstances, no rational factfinder could
conclude that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to an adverse employment action. As a result,
Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
Plaintiffs failure to satisfy her initial burden obviates the last two steps of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis. The Court observes, however, that Plaintiff also fails to rebut the non-
discriminatory motivation proffered in Defendants' papers. (Defs.' Br. 23-25.) Defendants
produce evidence tying the changes in Plaintiffs' title to the large reduction in HRDI's staff that
occurred during the "restructuring" of the DOP. (!d.) Plaintiff does not deny the staff cuts, but
9
apparently suspects that at least some of her former colleagues transferred into better positions
than the one she now occupies at the CSC. (Pl.'s Opp'n 12.) Plaintiff fails, however, to "point to
some evidence" that could persuade a rational factfinder to share these suspicions. Fuentes v.
Perslde, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, even if Plaintiffs succeeded in establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, her claim would fail at the third-step of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts Three, Four, Five,
Eight and Nine ofthe Complaint.
2.
Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants retaliated against her after she voiced concerns about
workplace discrimination. Once again, Plaintiffs retaliation claims under NJLAD and Title VII
are subject to the same analysis. To make out a prima facie claim, claimant must produce
evidence from which a jury could conclude "(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the
employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection
between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Moore,
461 F.3d at 340-41 (internal quotation marks omitted). The term "adverse employment action" is
broader in the context of a retaliation claim. To satisfy her burden, Plaintiff need only show that
Defendants did something to her that "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Moore, 461 F.3d at 341 (quoting Burlington
N & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
With respect to the first element, Plaintiff alleges that she voiced the issue of
discrimination to her superiors as early as mid-2005. (Pl.'s Opp'n 15.) Although this claim finds
little support in the record-the earliest memoranda and e-mail messages cited in Plaintiffs
10
papers date back to February 2007 (Pl.'s Opp'n, Exhs. 7 & 22)-the Court will accept it for
purposes of its analysis.
Plaintiff claims the August 2005 and March 2008 changes in her job were retaliatory
demotions aimed at discouraging her from raising the issue of discrimination. The Court rejects
this assertion. Even in the retaliation context, the alterations in Plaintiffs job titleunaccompanied by a change in the terms and conditions ofPlaintiffs employment or a tangible
diminution in her status within the organization-do not constitute "adverse employment
actions." Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants' supposed "denial" ofher June 2, 2009 request for
a salary adjustment was retaliatory. (Pl.'s Opp'n 16.) The evidence Plaintiff herself relies upon,
however, shows that Defendants approved her June 2009 request for a salary adjustment. (See
Pl.'s Opp'n, Exh. 24.) Thus, it appears that the outcome of Plaintiffs request was anything but
adverse.
In the absence of proof that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to an adverse employment
action, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either state or
federal law. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Counts Six and Ten of
the Complaint.
C.
Common Law Breach of Contract and Tort Claims
Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs common law
contract and tort claims because Plaintiff failed to provide the notices required under New
Jersey's Contractual Liability Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:13-5, and Tort Claims Act, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 59:8-3. (Defs.' Br. 9-10, 14-16.) Plaintiff has not opposed this portion of Defendants'
motion. The Court has reviewed evidence proffered in support of Defendants' motion and
concluded that summary judgment is appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (where motion is
11
unopposed, "the court may order ... summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials .
. . show that the movant is entitled to it"); Ventura v. Montclair State Univ., No. 08-5792, 2011
WL 550720, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2011) (granting summary judgment under nearly identical
circumstances). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted with respect to Counts One, Two
and Eleven of the Complaint.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, and for other good cause shown, it is hereby ordered that
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Counts One through
Eleven ofthe Complaint. Count Twelve is dismissed as moot. An appropriate order follows.
Dated:
{ I'\
v--
MICHAEL A. S . IP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
(3() /;3
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?