JACKSON v. CITY OF HAMILTON et al
Filing
81
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 3/21/2014. (jjc)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Sonny JACKSON,
Civ. No. 10-3989
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
HAMILTON TOWNSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
The present matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendant Hamilton
Township and others (hereinafter, “Defendants”) for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 63).
The Court has issued the Opinion below based upon the written submissions and without
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons stated
herein, Defendants’ motion is denied in part and granted in part.
BACKGROUND
The present factual scenario stems from the police chase and subsequent arrest of
Plaintiff Sonny Jackson (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”). While investigating a string of thefts,
Defendant Michael Everett of the Hamilton Township Police Department noticed
Plaintiff, a suspect in the thefts, driving a car. (Doc. No. 70 at 2). Defendant Everett
pulled Plaintiff over. (Id.). After stopping temporarily, Plaintiff drove away. (Id.).
Defendant Everett began to chase Plaintiff. (Id.).
Once the chase began, Defendant Officer Thomas Clugsten, Defendant Officer
Joseph Wilk, and Defendant Officer Mark Horan joined in the pursuit. (Doc. No. 70 at
3). Eventually, Plaintiff stopped his car and exited. (Id.). Testimony differs as to
1
whether Plaintiff then began to kneel or began to flee. (See Doc. No. 70 at 3; Doc. No.
63 at 1). Additionally, testimony differs as to whether Plaintiff resisted or complied with
police attempts to handcuff and subdue him. (Doc. No. 70 at 3). Plaintiff contends that,
though he was kneeling down, the officers hit him with a car and then proceeded to kick
and beat him. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff sustained various injuries during the event. In
response to the above incident, Plaintiff brought the present suit, claiming violations of
his constitutional rights and a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.
DISCUSSION
The Court will first note the applicable legal standard before examining each issue
raised by the summary judgment motion.
1. Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will “affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law [. . .].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute is “genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact, a court's role is not to weigh the evidence; all reasonable “inferences, doubts, and
issues of credibility should be resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel
Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983). The movant “always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
2
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Then, “when a properly supported motion for
summary judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The non-movant's burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete
evidence in the record;” mere allegations, conclusions, conjecture, and speculation will
not defeat summary judgment. Orsatte v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir.
1995); Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)
(“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat summary judgment.”).
2. Analysis
Defendants’ motion brings up five issues: (1) township liability under Monell; (2)
Plaintiff’s §1983 claims (during the pursuit and during apprehension); (3) the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act; (4) qualified immunity of Defendants; and (5) Plaintiff’s §1985 claims.
a. Township Liability
A municipality “can be found liable under §1983 only where the municipality
itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989); Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).
District Courts must review claims of municipal liability “independently of the §1983
claims against the individual police officers.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d
Cir. 1996); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994).
A municipality may be held liable where its policies or customs are “the moving
force [behind] the constitutional violation.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326
(1981). Therefore, a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom that amounts to
3
“deliberate indifference” to the rights of people with whom the police come into contact.
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. In order to show deliberate indifference in a “failure to
train, discipline or control” claim, a plaintiff must “show both contemporaneous
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents
and circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or inaction could be found to
have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Montgomery v.
De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)
After proving deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
inadequate training caused the constitutional violation. See Grazier v. City of
Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2003). There must be “a direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown
v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). However,
“[a]s long as the causal link is not too tenuous, the question whether the municipal policy
or custom proximately caused the constitutional infringement should be left to the jury.”
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s claims can be broken into two categories: failure to train police officers
on use of force and failure to adequately investigate Internal Affairs claims. The Court
will deal with each in turn.
i. Failure to Train Police Officers
Plaintiff alleges that the municipality and Chief Collins are directly responsible
for his injuries on the grounds that each failed to train and supervise police officers on the
use of force. “In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the level of
4
an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct.
1350 (2011). However, a municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its
most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 822–823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“[A] ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training’” is
“far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation,
than was the policy in Monell.”). Therefore, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360; see also Bryan
Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (policymaker’s “continued adherence to an
approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by
employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—
the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability”).
Here, Plaintiff fails show deliberate indifference with respect to the harm alleged.
Plaintiff alleges that the mandatory semi-annual training in Use of Force and Pursuit was
“wholly deficient.” (Doc. No. 71 at 30). The training consisted of “brief” presentations
on the policies on excessive force that lasted roughly five minutes. (Id. at 31). While
each officer read the policies and attested that he read and understood the policies, (id. at
30), Plaintiff argues that simply reading the policies is insufficient and that several
officers did not understand the policies on force, (Doc. No. 70 at 33). Despite these
allegations, Plaintiff fails to provide proof of a pattern of excessive force or even proof
that Defendants knew the training was inadequate. 1 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360
1
Plaintiff submits a Public Safety Report that criticizes the leadership and supervisory
capabilities of certain Chief Collins and other officers; however, Plaintiff has failed to
show that this Report or a report of this kind is sufficiently probative to the issue of
5
(“Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that
will cause violations of constitutional rights.”).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant Collins or the municipality acted with deliberate indifference. See BeersCapitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2001) (“a successful deliberate
indifference claim requires showing that the defendant knew of the risk to the plaintiff
before the plaintiff's injury occurred”). Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in
Defendants’ favor.
ii. Failure to Take and Investigate Civilian Complaints and
Complaints Regarding Use of Force
Similarly, a custom of failing to investigate citizen complaints may provide a
basis for municipal liability if “a policy-maker (1) had notice that a constitutional
violation was likely to occur, and (2) acted with deliberate indifference to the risk.”
Hernandez v. Borough of Palisades Park Police Dep't, 58 Fed. Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir.
2003).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed to investigate civilian
complaints and use of force claims. (Doc. No. 71 at 21) (“citizen complaints of force
were not investigated or adequately considered”). Plaintiff claims that on a few
occasions officers failed to write “use of force complaints” and Internal Affairs
complaints were not completely investigated. (Doc. No. 71 at 24). Specifically, Plaintiff
whether Defendants had notice that any deficiency in training presented a sufficient risk
of constitutional violations of the kind alleged here. See FRE 401; FRE 403.
6
alleges that Defendant Officer Wilk was accused of excessive force on one occasion, but
his Internal Affairs file was misplaced and there is no proof that he gave an interview.
(Doc. No. 70 at 28). 2
However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts upon which a jury could find
deliberate indifference. Since Plaintiff is not alleging an affirmative policy or custom
that prevented adequate investigation, Plaintiff must show that “the policymaker has
failed to act affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the
agents of the government ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Natale v. Camden County Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The “need to take
some action to control the agents” in this case differs considerably from the “seminal”
failure to investigate citizen complaints case, Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F. 3d 966 (3d
Cir. 1996). In Beck, the Internal Affairs office did not pursue any complaints against an
officer even though the officer received four excessive force complaints and a total of six
citizen complaints in a three-year period. Beck, 89 F. 3d 966 at 969-70. In contrast, to
the “cursory investigation of citizen complaints” in Beck, the Internal Affairs agents in
this case attempted to follow up on complaints and had procedures in place that were
generally followed. See also Brice v. City of York, 528 F. Supp. 2d 504, 520 (M.D. Pa.
2007). Though, Plaintiff alleges that a small number of complaints were not handled
2
Expert testimony also argues that failure to properly take and investigate civilian
complaints led to a tacit approval of the use of excessive force, which ultimately caused
the excessive force used against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 71 at 24). However, the Court does
not reach the causation question.
7
correctly, the allegations here “do[] not depict a ‘sterile and shallow . . . investigation’
procedure.” Id.
Since no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference, summary judgment is
granted in Defendants’ favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (“the adverse party ‘must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’”).
b. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims
For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff’s claims for damages can be divided into
two segments: (1) damages suffered when “eluding” officers; and (2) damages suffered
during and after apprehension.
i. Damages While Eluding Officers
Plaintiff alleges that several officers violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments when they pursued him and he was injured as a result of the
pursuit. Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot bring these claims because the pursuit
does not constitute a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the
actions that occurred during the pursuit do not rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court agrees with Defendants.
“To state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was
unreasonable.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (2003). It is well
established that a police pursuit is not a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). Since no seizure
occurred until Plaintiff was actually stopped by the police, Plaintiff cannot recover
damages under a Fourth Amendment claim for injuries during the pursuit.
8
To prevail under the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must show a
substantive due process violation. To show such a violation, Plaintiff must prove that the
governmental conduct was so arbitrary, brutal or offensive that it “shocks the
conscience.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845-847. “[H]igh speed chases with no
intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to
liability under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 854.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the pursuit was unlawful; however, Plaintiff has
not shown that the actions that occurred during the initial chase and before actual contact
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. The Court grants the motion for
summary judgment to the extent that it precludes recovery for injuries that occurred
during the car chase. 3
ii. Injuries During Apprehension
Plaintiff’s claims for damages during his apprehension stem from alleged Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The Court will first examine the standards for
both violations in the contexts of an actual seizure.
Determining whether the force used to effect a seizure is “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of “the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests” against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (citations
omitted). The right to make an arrest carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968). “Because the test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
3
Moreover, Plaintiff appears to now concede that the pursuit did not rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation. (See Doc. No. 70 at 19-20).
9
mechanical application,[] its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9 (the question is “whether
the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure”).
In order to find a substantive due process violation under the 14th Amendment, a
plaintiff must prove that the officer’s conduct was “arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (citations
omitted). “What is shocking to the conscience inevitably depends to a degree on whose
conscience is being tested; so, to put it mildly, the standard has some give in it.” Evans v.
Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 660 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Lewis, 523
U.S. at 847 (noting that the measure of what “shocks the conscience” is not precise);
Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he
question of whether a given action shocks the conscience has an elusive quality to
it”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[C]onduct intended to injure” is the “most likely to rise to the conscienceshocking level.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted). “Conscience-shocking
behavior may also arise in the form of injuries produced by deliberate indifference,
although, where the conduct was not intentional, it is a ‘closer call.’” Evans v. Sec'y
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 660 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
Here, there are genuine issues of material fact as to the amount of force necessary
to subdue Plaintiff, the amount of force used on Plaintiff, and the reason force was used
10
on Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment with respect to this claim is inappropriate.
See e.g., Abraham, 183 F.3d at 290 (“reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
should frequently remain a question for the jury”).
c. New Jersey Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of Defendants violated the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act, (“NJCRA”). N.J.S.A. 10:6-1. “NJCRA was intended to serve as an analog to
[§ 1983]; it was intended to ‘incorporate and integrate seamlessly’ with existing civil
rights jurisprudence.” Slinger v. New Jersey, 2008 WL 4126181 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2008)
rev'd in part, 366 F. App'x 357 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, all claims under NJCRA are
treated the same as the comparable § 1983 claims. Therefore, Plaintiff’s NJCRA claims
for damages that occurred prior to seizure fail to the same extent that Plaintiff’s claims
for damages that occurred prior to seizure under § 1983. See Baklayan v. Ortiz, 2012 WL
1150842 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2012).
d. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is intended to shield government officials performing
discretionary functions, including police officers, “from liability from civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). A defendant has the burden to establish that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. See Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n. 15 (3d Cir. 2001).
A ruling on qualified immunity must be undertaken using a two-step inquiry. See
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001). First, the court must consider whether the
facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer's
11
conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. at 201. “If the plaintiff fails to make out a
constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the officer is entitled
to immunity.” Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
If, however, “a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties'
submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “The relevant dispositive inquiry” in making this determination
is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. “If it would not have been clear to a reasonable
officer what the law required under the facts alleged, then he is entitled to qualified
immunity.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004)
Here, the accounts of both Parties differ materially. Taking the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that a reasonable officer would know that the
kicking and beating of the kind alleged here was unlawful. See Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
Since issues of material fact remain, summary judgment is denied.
e. §1985
42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides a cause of action for individuals deprived of their
federal rights by conspiracies. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir.
1980). The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are the following: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and
(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his person
or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Farber
12
v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s arguments for conspiracy under §1985 fail. Plaintiff claims that
Defendants were acting under color of state law and subjected him to excessive force.
However, Plaintiff fails to show an agreement made for the purpose of depriving
Plaintiff’s rights.
Plaintiff also fails to show that an agreement was entered for the purposes of
violating Plaintiff’s federal rights. Plaintiff alleges that the Mobile Video Recorder on a
police car was intentionally disabled or tampered. (Doc. No. 70 at 15-17). Plaintiff also
alleges that an Officer named Frank Burger was involved in the chase but did not fill out
a Pursuit Form in connection with this event. (Doc. No. 70 at 11). However, Plaintiff
must show that the Officers reached an agreement before the violation, the excessive
force, occurred. See Mazloum v. D.C., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (plaintiff
must prove “facts which would indicate that either of the officers had previously devised
a plan”). Plaintiff also alleges that the officers communicated and coordinated with each
other during the chase. Plaintiff does not show that this coordination constituted an
agreement, much less an agreement to violate Plaintiff’s rights.
Also, with respect to Defendants’ purpose, Plaintiff argues that the entire incident
“smacks” of racial animus. Plaintiff shows that Plaintiff is African American and the
officers are Caucasian. However, Plaintiff provides insufficient information to support a
reasonable inference that Plaintiff was injured because he was black. See Gatling v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1978)( mere fact that plaintiff is black
13
and defendants are white is insufficient to support a finding of racial animus).
Accordingly, this claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in
part.
/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?