JORDAN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 25 Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 2/9/2012. (eaj) (Main Document 32 replaced on 2/10/2012) (eaj, ). (gxh).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Brucestan T. JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 08-6088
v.
Edmond C. CICCHI, et al.,
Defendants.
Brucestan T. JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 10-4398
v.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter has come before the Court by way of numerous motions filed by Plaintiff
Brucestan T. Jordan (“Plaintiff”). The Court has decided these pending motions upon
consideration of all of the parties’ submissions and without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motions will be denied.
There are currently pending before this Court two cases in which Jordan is the sole
Plaintiff. The substance of each of these cases is similar in nature; both cases deal with alleged
constitutional violations by certain state actors and others involved in the New Jersey state
criminal justice system. Plaintiff has filed an “Emergency Motion” for a Preliminary Injunction
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 65(a) under both of the above-captioned cases [08-cv-6088 docket #
63; 10-cv-4398 docket # 24]. These motions are identical in substance. In addition, Plaintiff has
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filed under each of the above captioned cases what he has fashioned as a Motion to Supplement
the Pleadings, but what is in actuality supplemental briefing to Plaintiff’s Motions for a
Preliminary Injunction, [08-cv-6088 # 64; 10-cv-4398 # 25].
In Plaintiff’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction, he seeks to have this Court issue a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Defendants Edmond Cicchi, Officer Nortesane, and
Bradley Ferenez, as well against an “Officer Fogarty” who is not named as a Defendant in either
case, barring any of these people from coming within 1,000 feet of the Plaintiff and his family
members. In addition, Plaintiff is “requesting to be removed from the unlawful detainment in
Middlesex County Jail and to be released from detainment imposed by the Superior Court of
New Jersey.” (Pl.’s Br. 1).
Plaintiff has a long history of litigating against the named Defendants in the federal
courts. He has repeatedly tried to get this Court to interfere with ongoing state criminal
proceedings against him. For example, Plaintiff raised similar claims to those that he presses
now in Jordan v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 09-cv-3187, and he earlier petitioned this Court
for a writ of mandamus seeking to have the Court intervene in the same state court proceedings,
a request that this Court recently rejected, (see Order of Dec. 12, 2011) [10-cv-4398 # 17].
These pending motions are only Plaintiff’s latest attempt to get this Court to do what it has
repeatedly indicated that it will not do—i.e., interfere with his state prosecution.
As an initial matter, the Plaintiff does not have standing to request the relief sought as
that relief relates to his family members. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992) (plaintiff must suffer “injury in fact”). Therefore, issuing any sort of restraining
order against the parties as it relates to Plaintiff’s sister or other family members would be
inappropriate, and this Court is without jurisdiction to issue such an order.

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Next, under the Supreme Court of the United State’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), a district court should not interfere with state court criminal proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances not present in this case.

“[T]he Younger doctrine allows a district

court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing
state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”
Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 2009). All three of these requirements are met
here. First, there is an ongoing criminal prosecution of the Defendant. Second, a state enforcing
its criminal code inherently implicates important state interests. Lastly, Plaintiff has the
opportunity to raise any defense in his criminal case that he raises in this pending motion.
Moreover, there are no extraordinary circumstances that would justify federal interference.
Although Plaintiff fashions his request for relief as a protective order, his ultimate goal is to
prevent his prosecution in state court. This Court, however, will not interfere.
In regards to any claims seeking a temporary injunction against any prison officials,
Plaintiff is not likely to prevail on the merits of that claim. Plaintiff complains that he was
placed naked in a cell used for prisoners who are a suicide risk after he refused a required “TB
shot” by prison officials. As Plaintiff readily admits, when the required TB shot is refused,
prison procedure mandates medical isolation until a proper alternative procedure is performed.
(Pl.’s Br. 4). It is well-established that “[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). Moreover, a prison sentence “carries with it the
circumspection or loss of many significant rights.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984).
Thus, Plaintiff is extremely unlikely to prove that placing him in a protective cell was in any
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way unconstitutional. Once placed in this suicide cell, Plaintiff also claims that “Office Fogarty
used excessive force by twisting the undersigned[’s] arm and shoving him into the wall.
Defendant Nortesane shoved the undersigned[’s] head into a half metal half glass window,
injuring and cutting his nose, leaving a huge scar on the left side of his nose.” (Pl.’s Br. 5).
Plaintiff, however, has provided no proof of his alleged injury other than his un-notarized
affidavit in which he swears to the veracity of the claims he makes in his moving papers. This,
however, is insufficient evidence to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits and
preliminary relief is inappropriate.
Finally, as repeatedly pointed out to the Plaintiff, “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff might seek
release, such release is not cognizable under § 1983 because the exclusive federal remedy for an
inmate challenging his confinement is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Op. of Dec. 12,
2011, at 5 (quoting Op. of Mar. 1, 2011, at 7, in turn citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973))). Therefore, Plaintiff’s final request for relief cannot be granted on this motion for a
preliminary injunction.
For these reasons, it is on this 9th day of February, 2012
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [08-cv-6088 docket # 63]
is DENIED; and it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [10-cv-4398 docket # 24]
is DENIED; and it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Pleadings [08-cv-6088 docket #
64] is DENIED; and it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Pleadings [10-cv-4398 docket #
25] is DENIED.

/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
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