WALLIS v. MONMOUTH COUNTY JAIL
Filing
7
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 11/15/2011. (eaj) (eaj, ).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GREGORY WALLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONMOUTH COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 10-5887 (PGS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff pro se
Gregory Wallis
Southern State Correctional Facility
Delmont, NJ 08314
SHERIDAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Gregory Wallis, a prisoner confined at Southern
State Correctional Facility in Delmont, New Jersey, seeks to
bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
Based on his
affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying
dismissals within 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s
Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.
Plaintiff was previously confined at Monmouth County Jail.
He asserts that, while there, the jail permitted grease to build
up on the floor in the area where he worked.
He alleges that the
jail failed to provide any warning about the slippery floor.
He
also alleges that the jail failed to provide non-slip footwear.
Plaintiff alleges that he was seriously injured in an
accident resulting from the slippery floor.
He seeks
compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000.00.
The only
named defendant is Monmouth County Jail.
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time,
certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions
brought with respect to prison conditions).
2
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).
The standard for evaluating whether a
complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.
Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
In addition, any complaint must comply with the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”
A complaint must plead facts sufficient at least to
“suggest” a basis for liability.
218, 236 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
“Specific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
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While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106
S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to
dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level ... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held, in the
context of a § 1983 civil rights action, that the Twombly
pleading standard applies outside the § 1 antitrust context in
which it was decided.
See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“we decline at this point to read
Twombly so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to
the antitrust context”).
Context matters in notice pleading. Fair notice under
Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case -- some
complaints will require at least some factual
allegations to make out a “showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Indeed, taking Twombly and the
Court’s contemporaneous opinion in Erickson v. Pardus,
127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), together, we understand the
Court to instruct that a situation may arise where, at
some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so
undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the
type of notice of claim which is contemplated by
Rule 8. Put another way, in light of Twombly, Rule
8(a)(2) requires a “showing” rather than a blanket
assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that
without some factual allegation in the complaint, a
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claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she
provide not only “fair notice,” but also the “grounds”
on which the claim rests.
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, when
assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must
distinguish factual contentions -- which allege behavior on the
part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or more
elements of the claim asserted -- and “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Although the Court must assume the veracity of the facts asserted
in the complaint, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Id. at 1950.
Thus,
“a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Therefore, after Iqbal, when presented with a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
district courts should conduct a two-part analysis.
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should
be separated. The District Court must accept all of
the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may
disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District
Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in
the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff
has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such
an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d
at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
Id.
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the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party must state its claims ... in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a
single set of circumstances. ... If doing so would
promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence ... must be stated in a
separate count or defense.
Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but
must permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Shane
v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
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rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
Local government units and supervisors are not liable under
§ 1983 solely on a theory of respondeat superior.
See City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.8 (1985); Monell v.
New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 69091, 694 (1978) (municipal liability attaches only “when execution
of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury” complained of); Natale v.
Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d
Cir. 2003).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.
Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations
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omitted).
Accord Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1293-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 119091 (3d Cir. 1995).
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff
must show that an official who has the power to make policy is
responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy
or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.”
Bielevicz v. Dubinon,
915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990), quoted in Blanche Rd. Corp. v.
Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 269 n.16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 915 (1995), and quoted in Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v.
Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2000).
A plaintiff must
demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the moving force behind the plaintiff’s injury.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
A policy is made “when a decisionmaker possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to the action issues a final proclamation,
policy or edict.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212
(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452
(1986) (plurality opinion)). A custom is an act “that
has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread as to have
the force of law.” [Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan
County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).]
There are three situations where acts of a
government employee may be deemed to be the result of a
policy or custom of the governmental entity for whom
the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable
under § 1983. The first is where “the appropriate
officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable
statement of policy and the subsequent act complained
of is simply an implementation of that policy.” The
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second occurs where “no rule has been announced as
policy but federal law has been violated by an act of
the policymaker itself.” Finally, a policy or custom
may also exist where “the policymaker has failed to act
affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some
action to control the agents of the government ‘is so
obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’”
Natale, 318 F.3d at 584 (footnote and citations omitted).
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
Monmouth County Jail
A jail is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
See Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity amenable to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757,
758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not a “person” under
§ 1983); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F. Supp.
890, 893-94 (E. D. Va. 1992) (local jail not a “person” under
§ 1983); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (county department of corrections is an agency
of the county and cannot be sued separately from the county under
§ 1983); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(county department of corrections not a suable entity separate
from the county).
Accordingly, all claims against Monmouth
County Jail must be dismissed with prejudice.
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B.
The “Slip and Fall” Claim
Here, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as an
attempt to state a claim arising out of dangerous conditions of
confinement at Monmouth County Jail.
To the extent Plaintiff was a convicted and sentenced
prisoner at the time of the acts complained of, he is protected
by the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment; pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535, n.16, 545 (1979); City of Revere v. Massachusetts
General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Hubbard v. Taylor,
399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005); Natale v. Camden County Correctional
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003); Fuentes v. Wagner,
206 F.3d 335, 341 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000); Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346
n.31 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
With
respect to medical care and prison conditions, however, pretrial
detainees retain at least those constitutional rights enjoyed by
convicted prisoners.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545; Hubbard,
399 F.3d at 165-66; Natale, 318 F.3d at 581-82; Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1993).
1
Plaintiff does not state, in the Complaint, whether he was
a pre-trial detainee or a convicted and sentenced prisoner at the
time of his fall.
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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the individual states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the states from inflicting “cruel and
unusual punishments” on those convicted of crimes.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-46 (1981).
Rhodes v.
This proscription against
cruel and unusual punishments is violated by the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of
decency.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
It is
well settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison
and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”
Id. at 31.
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must
allege both an objective and a subjective component.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
Wilson v.
The objective component
mandates that “only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities’ ... are sufficiently
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. at 32 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
346).
This component requires that the deprivation sustained by
a prisoner be sufficiently serious, for only “extreme
deprivations” are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment
claim.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
The subjective component requires that the state actor have
acted with “deliberate indifference,” a state of mind equivalent
11
to a reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.
See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
A plaintiff may satisfy the objective component of a
conditions-of-confinement claim if he can show that the
conditions alleged, either alone or in combination, deprive him
of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and
personal safety.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-48; Young v. Quinlan,
960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992).
However, while the Eighth
Amendment directs that convicted prisoners not be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment, “the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
To the extent
that certain conditions are only “restrictive” or “harsh,” they
are merely part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.
Id. at 347.
An inmate may
fulfill the subjective element of such a claim by demonstrating
that prison officials knew of such substandard conditions and
“acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of harm to inmate health or safety.”
Ingalls v.
Florio, 968 F.Supp. 193, 198 (D.N.J. 1997).
Pre-trial detainees and convicted but unsentenced prisoners
retain liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
F.3d 150
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399
(3d Cir. 2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341
(3d Cir. 2000).
Analysis of whether such a detainee or
unsentenced prisoner has been deprived of liberty without due
process is governed by the standards set out by the Supreme Court
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at
157-60, 164-67; Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 341-42.
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions
or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate
only the protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, we think that the proper
inquiry is whether those conditions amount to
punishment of the detainee. For under the Due Process
Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law. ...
Not every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to “punishment” in the constitutional
sense, however. Once the government has exercised its
conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it
obviously is entitled to employ devices that are
calculated to effectuate this detention. ...
A court must decide whether the disability is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is
but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to
punish on the part of detention facility officials,
that determination generally will turn on “whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a
2
A liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause may
arise from either of two sources: the Due Process Clause itself
or State law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983);
Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir.
1999).
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particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction
or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees. ...
441 U.S. at 535-39 (citations omitted).
The Court further
explained that the government has legitimate interests that stem
from its need to maintain security and order at the detention
facility.
“Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not,
without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee
would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting
trial.”
441 U.S. at 540.
Whether analyzed under the Eighth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding slippery floors in his work area amount to
nothing more than allegations of negligence, or possibly gross
negligence, which fail to state a claim for a constitutional
deprivation.
Slippery floors present neither a substantial risk
of serious harm nor a qualitatively intolerable risk.
While the rainwater may have been a “potentially
hazardous condition, slippery floors constitute a daily
risk faced by members of the public at large. Federal
courts from other circuits have therefore consistently
held that slippery prison floors do not violate the
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Eighth Amendment.” Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028,
1031-32 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding standing water in
shower did not pose substantial risk of serious harm,
even though plaintiff was on crutches); see also Bell
v. Ward, 88 F. App'x 125, 127 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that wet floor in common area of cell block, resulting
in four-stitch injury to inmate, did not pose
substantial risk of serious harm, noting that he and
others had previously crossed wet floor without
slipping); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that shackling inmate during
showers was not sufficiently unsafe, noting “slippery
prison floors ... do not state even an arguable claim
for cruel and unusual punishment”); Santiago v.
Guarini, 2004 WL 2137822 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept.20, 2004)
(holding toilet and sink leak in cell, causing slip and
fall, did not present substantial risk to inmate's
safety and were not objectively serious conditions).
The rainwater on Forde's cell floor also fails to
constitute a denial of life's necessities to meet the
first prong of a conditions of confinement claim.
Forde does not suggest that the water in his cell rose
to any significant level other than that which caused
him to slip. “[P]uddles are unpleasant but not
unconstitutional.” Smith v. Melvin, 1996 WL 467658 at
*2 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming lower court's dismissal
of complaint, holding leaky toilet and standing water
on cell floor was not extreme deprivation); see also
Eley v. Kearney, 2005 WL 1026718 at *5 (D.Del. Apr. 25,
2005) (holding that accumulation of rainwater at top of
stairs was not a sufficiently serious deprivation);
Jackson v. Taylor, 2008 WL 4471439 at *5 (D.Del. Sept.
26, 2008) (holding excessive humidity in kitchen,
causing inmates to routinely slip and fall, was not a
sufficiently serious deprivation); ... .
“Simply put, ‘[a] ‘slip and fall,’ without more,
does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment....
Remedy for this type of injury, if any, must be sought
in state court under traditional tort law principles.'”
Reynolds, 370 F.3d at 1031 (citation omitted).
Forde v. Fischer, 2009 WL 5174650, *3-4 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2009)
(Eighth Amendment).
See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) (claim arising out of a fall from pillow left on prison
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stairs is a claim of negligence, not actionable under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See also DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)
(“the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... as we
have said many times, does not transform every tort committed by
a state actor into a constitutional violation” (citations
omitted)).
The allegation that the slippery conditions may have
existed for some time does nothing to move this claim from a
state-law tort claim to a constitutional deprivation.
Accordingly, regardless of the named defendant, this claim
must be dismissed with prejudice.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c),
for failure to state a claim.
It does not appear that Plaintiff
could cure the defects in the Complaint by amendment.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
November 15, 2011
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