ROE v. DIAMOND et al

Filing 101

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 4/22/2015. (eaj)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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STEPHEN SIMONI,
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Plaintiff,
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Civil Action No. 10-6798 (FLW)
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v.
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OPINION
EDWARD DIAMOND, et al.
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Defendants.
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WOLFSON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Stephen Simoni (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Jersey Shore University
Medical Center (“JSUMC”), Meridian Health Systems Inc., Meridian Health Inc., Meridian
Hospital Corp., Meridian Health (collectively with JSUMC, the “Hospital”), Health
Professionals and Allied Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO, HPAE Local 5058 (together, the “Union”)
and several individual defendants alleging various labor and employment violations arising from
the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with JSUMC. Presently before the Court is a motion
by Plaintiff for reconsideration of the October 5, 2014 decision of the Hon. Joel A. Pisano,
United States District Judge, 1 denying Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. See
Opinion and Order, ECF Nos. 80, 81. Defendants oppose the motion. For the reasons below, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that reconsideration is
warranted and denies Plaintiff's motion.

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This matter was recently reassigned to the undersigned upon the retirement of Judge Pisano.

I. BACKGROUND
Because the facts of this case are set forth in a number of prior Opinions (see, e.g., Judge
Pisano’s October 5, 2014 Opinion (ECF No. 80) and the Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals filed March 20, 2013 (ECF No. 33-2)), only a brief recitation of the relevant facts is
necessary here.
This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment as a nurse in the cardiac catheterization
laboratory at JSUMC. Plaintiff began working at JSUMC in August 2010. He was terminated
approximately two months later, prior to the expiration of a 90-day probationary period
applicable to new employees.
During the time of Plaintiff’s employment, there was in effect a collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between the Union and JSUMC that governed the conditions of employment
for certain employees. 2 Under the CBA, the Union could initiate a grievance on behalf of an
employee to contest a disciplinary action or discharge. The CBA further provided that the Union
could submit the issue to arbitration if the parties were unable to resolve the grievance.
Following his termination, Plaintiff requested that the Union file a grievance on his
behalf. The Union’s representative did so, but the grievance was denied by the Hospital. The
Union representative then advised Plaintiff that the Union would not be pursuing arbitration on
Plaintiff’s behalf. This action followed.
On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting seven causes of
action: (1) a hybrid Section 301 claim under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (“LMRA”), alleging a breach of the CBA and a breach of the duty of fair representation; (2)
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
28 U.S.C. § 157; (3) violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination; (4) defamation;
2

A key dispute between the parties in this case regards the applicability of the CBA to Plaintiff.

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(5) breach of contract; (6) violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act;
and (7) tortious interference.
In response to the Amended Complaint, the Hospital and the individual defendants
moved to dismiss all but the third cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Union moved
to dismiss the sole claim directed to it, the Section 301 claim. On October 6, 2011, Judge Pisano
granted the motions, dismissed Plaintiff’s federal law claims and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ECF Nos. 27, 28. Judge Pisano
held that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the LMRA because Plaintiff failed to plead
facts sufficient to show that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation. ECF No. 27
at 6-10.

Specifically, Judge Pisano found that the Amended Complaint was lacking in

allegations showing that the Union’s conduct was arbitrary or irrational, which is a necessary
element of a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 7. Further, because
demonstrating that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation was a necessary
predicate to Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim against the Hospital, Judge Pisano dismissed that claim
against the Hospital as well. Turning then to Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, Judge Pisano found it was
preempted and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at
11-12.

With no federal claims remaining in the action, the Court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Plaintiff appealed Judge Pisano’s ruling, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in a decision filed March 20, 2013 (the “March 20th decision”), affirmed in part and reversed in
part. ECF No. 33-2. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, but
reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim and remanded the matter for further
proceedings. The Circuit Court found that the facts pled were sufficient to state a claim for

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breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 9-12. With respect the claim’s requirement that
the Union’s conduct be arbitrary or irrational, the Third Circuit pointed to allegations that the
Union, in declining to pursue arbitration on Plaintiff’s behalf, relied on a “past practice” of
considering probationary employees to be outside the scope of the CBA. Id. at 10. The Circuit
Court found this sufficient to support a claim that the Union acted unreasonably because the
CBA’s integration clause expressly states that “past practices, polices or procedures” do not form
any part of the agreement. Id. The Circuit Court also rejected the Union’s argument that a
“plain reading” of the CBA shows that it does not apply to probationary employees, finding that
there existed a “plausible” interpretation of the CBA which does not exclude probationary
employees from its coverage. Id. at 11.
The matter was remanded to District Court, and Plaintiff subsequently moved for
summary judgment on his Section 301 claim. In support of this motion, Plaintiff relied primarily
on the Third Circuit’s March 20th decision, arguing that “[b]ecause the Third Circuit has ruled
that [Plaintiff] was entitled to all procedural and substantive protections of the CBA” there
remained no factual issues as to whether the Hospital breached the CBA. ECF No. 51-2 at 3. In
his Opinion denying Plaintiff’s motion, Judge Pisano stated that Plaintiff, in basing his motion on
the March 20th decision, misapprehended the standard applied by the Third Circuit in its analysis
of the motion to dismiss. Judge Pisano explained that while that the Third Circuit found that
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the CBA was “plausible” such that Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim
could withstand a 12(b)(6) challenge, the Circuit Court’s decision, which reviewed a motion to
dismiss, did not and could not resolve disputed factual issues. ECF No. 80 at 9. Finding that the
Hospital had produced sufficient evidence to show that genuine issues of material fact existed

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with respect to Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim, Judge Pisano denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff
now moves for reconsideration of that decision.
II. ANALYSIS
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration and requires the moving
party to “set[ ] forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked[.]” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). The burden on the moving party
is quite high and reconsideration is granted very sparingly. To prevail on such a motion, the
movant must demonstrate either: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct [a] clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).
Notably, a motion seeking reconsideration may not be used by a party to “restate
arguments that the court has already considered.” Lawrence v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Civ. No.
11–3569, 2012 WL 5199228, *2 (D.N.J., Oct. 18, 2012). Nor may be such a motion be used “to
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.” NL Indus., Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516
(D.N.J. 1996). In other words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties
with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.” Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511,
532 (D.N.J.1998) (internal citation omitted). Further, where a party merely has a difference of
opinion with the court’s decision, the issue should be raised through the normal appellate
process; reconsideration is not the appropriate vehicle. Dubler v. Hangsterfer's Laboratories,
Civ. No. 09–5144, 2012 WL 1332569, *2 (D.N.J., Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Bowers v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001)).

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Applying the above legal standards, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration must fail. As
an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion essentially repeats the arguments raised in his original
summary judgment motion. He argues, just as he did previously, that the Third Circuit “resolved
with finality” the question of whether the protections of the CBA applied to probationary
employees and, as such, the material facts are undisputed and entitle him to judgment as a matter
of law. ECF No. 82 at 1. However, “[t]o support reargument, a moving party must show that
dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were overlooked by the court in
reaching its prior decision.” Assisted Living Associates of Moorestown, L.L.C., v. Moorestown
Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J. 1998). Here, Plaintiff attempts to meet this requirement by
stating at the outset of his brief that the District Court “appears to have ‘overlooked’” the Third
Circuit’s March 20th decision. It is beyond dispute, however, that Judge Pisano did consider and
apply the March 20th decision in ruling on Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. Rather,
Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Pisano’s interpretation and application of that Third Circuit
decision. However, “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with
the Court’s decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court
before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.’” G–69 v.
Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990) (citation omitted). Plaintiff having failed to carry
his burden here, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED:

April 22, 2015
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.

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