MULLIN v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 94

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 8/2/2012. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOAN MULLIN, ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF ROBERT MULLIN,
deceased, and JOAN MULLIN,
individually,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-247 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.

THE PLAINTIFF, Joan Mullin, earlier moved before the
Magistrate Judge for leave to amend the Complaint to, inter alia,
add “Officer Dimler” (“Dimler”) and “Beatrice Teel, R.N.” (“Teel”)
as defendants to the action.

(See dkt. entry no. 31, Motion for

Leave to Amend; see also dkt. entry no. 35, Second Motion for Leave
to Amend.)

The Magistrate Judge, upon review of both the Motion

for Leave to Amend and the Second Motion for Leave to Amend (“the
Motions”), denied the Motions insofar as Mullin thereby sought to
add Dimler and Teel as defendants to the action.
dkt. entry 43, 11-28-11 Order.)

(See generally

The Magistrate Judge explained

that that Mullin failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations
to support the proposed claims raised against Dimler and Teel.
(See generally id.)

MULLIN timely moved for reconsideration of the 11-28-11 Order.
(See dkt. entry no. 46, Motion for Reconsideration.)

The

Magistrate Judge, upon reconsideration, again concluded that Mullin
failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations relating to the
proposed claims raised against Dimler and Teel.
no. 80, 6-19-12 Order at 13-14.)

(See dkt. entry

The Magistrate Judge explained

Mullin failed to set forth “factual assertions [of Dimler and/or
Teel’s] personal involvement or wrongdoing” in the conduct
underlying the action, “let alone conduct that led to the
deprivation of [Robert] Mullin’s constitutional rights”, and thus
failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations such that the
proposed claims raised Dimler and Teel were “plausible on [their]
face”.

(Id. at 13.)

The Magistrate Judge, concluding that Mullin

“essentially ask[ed] the Court to take a leap of faith”, thus again
denied the Motions insofar as they sought to add Dimler and Teel as
defendants to the action.

(See id. at 14, 17.)

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE, however, denied the Motions without
prejudice.

(See id. at 14.)

The Magistrate Judge recognized that

“discovery may illuminate the circumstances surrounding [Robert]
Mullin’s death and provide additional information” that might
support a later motion for leave to amend the Complaint to add
Dimler and/or Teel as defendants to the action.

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(Id.)

MULLIN now appeals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72 and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) from the 6-19-12 Order, insofar as
the Magistrate Judge denied Mullin’s requests to add Dimler and
Teel as defendants to the action.
94-5, Mullin Appeal Br.)

(See dkt. entry nos. 94-4 &

Mullin argues on appeal that the factual

allegations set forth in the proposed amended complaint
sufficiently support the proposed claims raised against Dimler and
Teel.

(See id.)

It appears that the defendants oppose the Appeal.

(See dkt. entry no. 93, Defs.’ Opp’n);1
THE COURT resolves the Appeal without oral argument pursuant
to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b).
IT APPEARS that a motion for leave to amend a pleading is not
dispositive, and thus, may be entered by a magistrate judge.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

See

The Court, in reviewing a magistrate

judge’s order in a non-dispositive matter, including an order
denying a motion for leave to amend a pleading, may modify, vacate,
or reverse the order only if it was “clearly erroneous or contrary

1

The Court acknowledges that the opposition papers docketed
at entry 93 technically relate to a motion pending before the
Magistrate Judge. The Court notes, however, that the motion
pending before the Magistrate Judge also seeks to amend the
Complaint to add Dimler and Teel as defendants to the action.
The defendants, in those opposition papers, state that the
Magistrate Judge, in the 6-19-12 Order, “properly denied
plaintiff’s motion to add . . . Dimler and Teel”. (Defs.’ Opp’n at
2.) The Court accordingly treats those opposition papers as
relating to the Appeal.
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to law”.

Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1113 (3d

Cir. 1986); see also Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 45 Fed.Appx. 163, 166
n.7 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649
F.Supp.2d 309, 315 n.5 (D.N.J. 2009) (“the clearly erroneous or
contrary to law standard of review is applicable to a motion to
amend on appeal from a magistrate [judge’s] decision”).

“[A]

finding is clearly erroneous ‘when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’”

Schering Corp. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 09-6383,

2011 WL 3651343, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (citations omitted).
A ruling is contrary to law if a magistrate judge has
misinterpreted or misapplied applicable law.

See Gunter v.

Ridgewood Energy Corp., 32 F.Supp.2d 162, 164 (D.N.J. 1998); see
also Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F.Supp.2d 503, 517 (D.N.J. 2008).
THE COURT has reviewed the Motion for Leave to Amend, the
Second Motion for Leave to Amend, Mullin’s proposed amended
complaint, and the 6-19-12 Order.

The Court concludes that the

Magistrate Judge neither committed an abuse of discretion nor an
error of law by denying the Motions, insofar as Mullin therein
sought to add Dimler and Teel as defendants to this action.

The

few factual allegations set forth in the proposed amended complaint
that relate to Dimler and Teel, as noted by the Magistrate Judge,

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do not allege “personal involvement or wrongdoing” in the conduct
underlying the action, “let alone conduct that led to the
deprivation of [Robert] Mullin’s constitutional rights”.

Mullin

may, pursuant to the 6-19-12 order, move anew for leave to amend
the Complaint if discovery reveals such facts.
THE COURT will issue an appropriate Order.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
.
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

August 2, 2012

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