MCDANIEL v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Filing 2

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 5/26/2011. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL PAUL MCDANIEL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 11-0267 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

COOPER, District Judge
Michael Paul McDaniel petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, without prepaying his filing fee
and without submitting an in forma pauperis application.

In no

ambiguous terms, McDaniel’s Petition indicates that his criminal
proceedings are still pending.

[Dkt. entry no. 1, at 1.]

A state prisoner applying for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court must first “exhaust[] the remedies available in the
courts of the State,” unless “there is an absence of available
State corrective process[] or . . . circumstances exist that
render such process ineffective”.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)

(“AEDPA”); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); Lambert
v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding Supreme
Court precedent and AEDPA “mandate that prior to determining the
merits of [a] petition, [a court] must consider whether
[Petitioner] is required to present . . . unexhausted claims to
the [state’s] courts”).

The exhaustion requirement allows state courts the first
opportunity to pass upon federal constitutional claims, in
furtherance of the policies of comity and federalism.

See

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Rose, 455 U.S. at 51618.

Exhaustion also has the practical effect of permitting

development of a complete factual record in state court, to aid
the federal courts in their review.

See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.

A petitioner exhausts state remedies by presenting federal
constitutional claims to each level of the state courts empowered
to hear those claims, either on direct appeal or in collateral
post-conviction proceedings.

See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838 (1999) (“requiring state prisoners [in order to
fully exhaust their claims] to file petitions for discretionary
review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review
procedure in the State”); Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513 (collateral
attack in state court not required if petitioner’s claim has been
considered on direct appeal); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (“applicant
shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented”).

Once a

petitioner’s federal claims have been fairly presented to the
state’s highest court, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.
See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Castille v.
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989).
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The petitioner generally bears the burden to prove all facts
establishing exhaustion.
(3d Cir. 1993).

See Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987

Where any available procedure remains for the

applicant to raise the question presented in the courts of the
state, the applicant has not exhausted the available remedies.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
The Petition here states that McDaniel’s criminal proceedings
are still pending.

Therefore, he could not have exhausted his

claims for the purposes of § 2254 review, and his Petition shall
be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to meet the
exhaustion requirement.
Moreover, while the Court can re-qualify the Petition into
an application submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, such
application would too be subject to dismissal as unexhausted.
Addressing the question whether a federal court should ever
grant a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held:
(1)

federal courts have “pre-trial” habeas corpus
jurisdiction;

(2)

that jurisdiction without exhaustion should not be
exercised at the pre-trial stage unless extraordinary
circumstances are present . . .;

(3)

where there are no extraordinary circumstances and
where petitioner seeks to litigate the merits of a
constitutional defense to a state criminal charge, the
district court should exercise its “pre-trial” habeas
jurisdiction only if petitioner makes a special showing
of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted
state remedies.

Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1975).
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McDaniel has alleged no extraordinary circumstances here.
Accordingly, habeas relief would not be warranted as to his
challenges even if the Petition were construed as a § 2241
application.
As jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this
Court will determine whether a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) should issue.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a COA, an appeal may not be taken
from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A COA

may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Slack v.

Here, jurists of reason

would not find it debatable whether this Court is correct in its
ruling.

Accordingly, no COA shall issue.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 26, 2011
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