BAYLISS et al v. TROOPER R. WAMBOLD et al

Filing 12

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 5/12/2011. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAMES BAYLISS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-890 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

THE COURT ordering the plaintiff to show cause why this
action should not be stayed and administratively terminated (dkt.
entry no. 9, Order To Show Cause); and the plaintiff bringing
this action, inter alia, to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. §
(“Section”) 1983 related to his arrest (“Arrest”) by defendants
who are state troopers (“Federal Claims”) (dkt. entry no. 7, Am.
Compl.); and the plaintiff alleging that criminal charges
(“Charges”) were brought against him due to the circumstances
underlying the Arrest (id. at 4); and
THE COURT being concerned that the Charges either remain
pending or currently are the subject of judicial review in state
court; and it appearing — pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) — that (1) the Court must determine whether a Section
1983 claim, “if successful, would have the hypothetical effect of
rendering [a] criminal conviction or sentence invalid”, and (2)
if a judgment for a plaintiff on such a claim would necessarily

imply the invalidity of a conviction, then the claim is barred
until the conviction is overturned, Gibson v. Superint. of N.J.
Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citations and quotations omitted); and
THE COURT thus being concerned that if the plaintiff were
successful on the Federal Claims, then an eventual underlying
state criminal conviction could be rendered invalid; and it
appearing that when a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim
before [being] convicted (or files any other claim
related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending
or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power
of the district court, and in accord with common
practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal
case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); and
THE COURT thus ordering the plaintiff to show cause why the
action should not be stayed and administratively terminated
pending the disposition of the Charges or any related criminal
matter, including any aspect thereof that is the subject of
either an appeal or a review by any municipal or state court at
any level; and the plaintiff in response opposing a stay, but
admitting that the Charges remain pending (dkt. entry no. 10, Pl.
Br. at 2-3); and the Court thus intending to (1) grant the Order
To Show Cause, and (2) stay and administratively terminate this
action pending the disposition of the Charges, including any
aspect thereof that is the subject of either an appeal or a
review by any municipal or state court at any level; and the
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Court advising the plaintiff to refrain from moving to reopen the
action until the Charges are fully resolved, and that he should
submit the proper documentation in support of that potential
motion, e.g., a final order disposing of the proceedings; and
THE PLAINTIFF BEING ADVISED that an order administratively
terminating a federal action is not the equivalent of a dismissal
of a complaint with prejudice, and is issued pursuant to the
Court’s inherent power to control the docket and in the interests
of judicial economy, see Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234,
236 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating administrative termination not final
determination, as it “permits reinstatement and contemplates the
possibility of future proceedings”, and “does not purport to end
litigation on the merits”); and for good cause appearing, the
Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 12, 2011

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