CARTER v. NEW JERSEY STATE & UNEMPLOYMENT OFFICE et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 10/5/2011. (gxh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AUDREY CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE AND
UNEMPLOYMENT OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 11-1043(FLW)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
AUDREY CARTER, Plaintiff pro se
1701 Salem Road, Apt. N-12
Burlington, New Jersey 08106
WOLFSON, District Judge
Plaintiff Audrey Carter (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), brings
this action in forma pauperis, alleging that the named defendants
discriminated against her while she was waiting in line at the
unemployment office.
(Plaintiff’s Complaint, pg. 1).
The Court
has considered Plaintiff’s application for indigent status in
this case and concludes that she is permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis without prepayment of fees or security thereof, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
However, having reviewed
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and for the
reasons set forth below, this Court finds that this action should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action against the following
defendants: the New Jersey State Unemployment Office; New Jersey
Attorney General Paula Dow; New Jersey Governor Christopher
Christie; unnamed New Jersey Unemployment Security Officer and
Unemployment Supervisor John (last name unknown).
1).
(Compl., pg.
Plaintiff alleges that, on February 16, 2011, the
unemployment supervisor named “John” at the Yard Avenue, Trenton,
New Jersey office, “discriminate[d]” against plaintiff while she
was standing in the line waiting for her number to be called.
Plaintiff states that she had visited the office more than six
times and “John” harassed her each time.
On February 16, 2011,
“John” had a security officer tell plaintiff to leave the
premises “for no reason.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff asks to be awarded damages in the amount of
$600,000.00 for pain and suffering, differential treatment and
discrimination.
(Id.)
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DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
The Complaint by a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is
subject to sua sponte dismissal by the court if the Complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks money damages from defendants who are
immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In
determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must
be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)(following
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
See also United States v. Day, 969
The Court must “accept as true all
of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Court need not, however,
credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal
conclusions.”
Id.
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).
The standard for evaluating whether a
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complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.
Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
See also Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court
reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard
for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint
adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in
discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during
detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,
violated his constitutional rights.
Id.
The Court examined Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).1
Citing its recent opinion in Bell
1
Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
4
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two
working principles underlying the failure to state a claim
standard:
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained that
a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
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Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must
now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 1948.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
allegations of his complaint are plausible.
Id. at 1949-50; see
also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).
Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides
the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
at 210.
Fowler, 578 F.3d
The Third Circuit now requires that a district court
must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when
presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50].
Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
2
In Conley, as stated above, a district court was
permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of
facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion
to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the
claim’s legal elements.
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the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at
1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.
This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
Plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
(2007).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or
futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.
2000).
B.
Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff simply alleges that the unemployment supervisor
“John” discriminated against her, but she fails to allege any
facts to support a claim that the purported discrimination was
based on age, race or gender.
This allegation is nothing more
than a legal conclusion wholly unsupported by any factual
allegation, which is insufficient to state a claim under Iqbal.
See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
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Consequently, the Complaint will be dismissed, in its
entirety, as against defendants, Unemployment Supervisor “John”
and the John Doe Unemployment security officer(s), for failure to
state a claim at this time.
C.
Claim Against Defendants Dow and Christie
It also appears that Plaintiff is asserting a claim of
liability against New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and New
Jersey Attorney General Paula Dow, on the sole basis that they
have a supervisory capacity over the New Jersey State
Unemployment Office employees.
The Complaint fails to allege any
facts in support of a claim based on supervisor liability.
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed as against
defendants Christie and Dow pursuant to Iqbal.
As a general rule, government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior.
See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1948; Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978)(finding no vicarious liability for a municipal
“person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S.
507, 515-16 (1888)(“A public officer or agent is not responsible
for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances,
or negligences, or omissions of duty, of subagents or servants or
other persons properly employed by or under him, in discharge of
his official duties”).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that
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“[b]ecause vicarious or supervisor liability is inapplicable to
Bivens3 and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
S.Ct. at 1948.
Iqbal, 129
Thus, each government official is liable only for
his or her own conduct.
The Court rejected the contention that
supervisor liability can be imposed where the official had only
“knowledge” or “acquiesced” in their subordinates conduct.
Id.,
129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Here, in the instant Complaint, there are no allegations of
any wrongful conduct with respect to defendants Christie and Dow,
other than their supervisory titles as Governor and Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey.
Accordingly, any § 1983
claim must be dismissed as against these defendants.
D.
Claim Against State of New Jersey and Unemployment Office
Finally, the Complaint names the State of New Jersey and the
State Unemployment Office as defendants in this matter.
The
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
3
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
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As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in a
state treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the
state itself or by federal statute.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
See, e.g., Edelman v.
The Eleventh Amendment
protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court regardless of the type of relief sought.
Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Similarly, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal court suits for money damages against state officers in
their official capacities.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
169 (1985).
Therefore, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice,
in its entirety as against defendants, the State of New Jersey
and the New Jersey State Unemployment Office, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim.
E.
Preclusion Order
Alternatively, this Court concludes that this action should
be dismissed because it was filed in violation of this Court’s
September 1, 2009 All Writs Injunction Order.
See Carter v. New
Jersey State, et al., Civil No. 09-3704 (FLW), Docket entry no.
6.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court will dismiss
without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint, in its entirety, as
against defendants, Unemployment Supervisor “John” and the John
Doe Unemployment security officer(s), Governor Christie and New
Jersey Attorney General Dow, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Further, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety as against defendants,
the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey State Unemployment
Office, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to
state a claim.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
S/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: October 5, 2011
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