HOLZHAUER v. HAYT, HAYT & LANDAU LLC
Filing
14
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 8/10/2012. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________
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:
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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HAYT, HAYT & LANDAU, LLC,
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Defendant.
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_______________________________ :
JOHN H. HOLZHAUER,
Civil Action No. 11-2336
OPINION
WOLFSON, United States District Judge:
Presently before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff John H. Holzhauer (“Holzhauer” or
“Plaintiff”) for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 15 U.S.C.
§1692k(a)(3). Counsel for Plaintiff, Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. (“K&S” or “Plaintiff’s
Counsel”), seeks fees in the amount of $8,421.50 for 37.2 hours of work. Defendant (“Hayt,
Hayt and Landau” or “Defendant”) opposes Plaintiff’s calculation and contends that the proper
award for fees should be $2,929.00. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s motion, in part, and award attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,536.50.
I.
BACKGROUND
On April 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations under the Federal Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Defendant filed an Answer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint on July 5, 2011. On January 9, 2012, the parties settled this matter for
1
$2,500.00, and agreed that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. 1 On January 10,
2012, the parties discussed the issue of reasonable attorney’s fees during a conference with the
Honorable Douglas E. Alpert, U.S.M.J. Judge Alpert gave Plaintiff until February 10, 2012, to
file a fee petition if the parties were unable to resolve the matter. On February 10, 2012, K&S
filed the instant motion seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,769. Pl. Pet. for Attorney’s
Fees & Costs. K&S subsequently reduced the amount it seeks to $8,421.50 for 37.2 hours of
work. Pl. Reply at 15.
II.
DISCUSSION
a. Standard
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. Pursuant
to the FDCPA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to “the costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The award of
attorney's fees is “mandated . . . as a means of fulfilling Congress’s intent that the FDCPA
should be enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys general.” Graziano v. Harrison, 950
F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991).
Nor do the parties dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing party under § 1692(k). As the
Supreme Court found in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), “plaintiffs may be
considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Id. at
433. This District has adopted the Hensley definition in assessing FDCPA claims and agrees that
Plaintiff is a prevailing party. See Norton v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 218–19
(D.N.J.1999).
1
K&S notes it does not seek $350 it incurred in costs. Pl. Br. at 4.
2
The Supreme Court has also explained how to calculate an award of attorney’s fees: “The
most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The calculation
provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of the lawyer’s
services.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The calculation produces what is referred to as the lodestar
amount. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The prevailing party bears the burden
of proving, through competent evidence, the reasonableness of the hours worked and rates
claimed. Washington v. Phila. Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir.
1996). Any party may oppose a fee application by objecting with “sufficient specificity.”
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Once opposed, “the party requesting fees must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the court that its fee request is reasonable.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d 694 at
703 n.5.
While the lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee, Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035,
either party may seek an adjustment of the lodestar amount, but bears the burden of showing that
an adjustment is necessary. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1990); Mosaid
Techs, Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Corp., 224 F.R.D. 595, 597 (D.N.J. 2004). In deviating from the
lodestar, courts may consider numerous factors, such as the time spent and labor required; the
novelty and difficulty of the legal issues; the customary fee in the community; whether the fee is
fixed or contingent; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
awards in similar cases. See Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185
n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9)
3
The district court ultimately “retains a great deal of discretion in deciding what a
reasonable fee award is.” Bell v. United Princeton Props., 884 F.2d 713, 721 (3d Cir. 1989).
“[I]n determining whether the fee request is excessive . . . the court will inevitably engage in a
fair amount of ‘judgment calling’ based upon its experience with the case and the general
experience as to how much a case requires.” Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346,
362 (3d Cir. 2001).
b. Analysis
Plaintiff seeks $8,421.50 in attorney’s fees. In response, Defendant contends that
$2,929.00 is the appropriate fee award. Specifically, Defendant argues that: (1) the hourly rates
sought by Plaintiff are unreasonable and excessive; (2) the calculation of fees includes hours not
reasonably expended because they were duplicative, excessive, or non-compensable intra-office
communication; (3) Plaintiff seeks to recover fees incurred in bad faith after settlement; 2 and (4)
the Court should adjust the lodestar amount to reflect what Defendant argues is the limited
success of Plaintiff. Def. Opp. at 3-11.
i. Hourly Rates
In evaluating the reasonableness of the hourly rates asserted by Plaintiff, the relevant
inquiry is the prevailing rate for comparable legal services in the forum of litigation. See, e.g.,
Interfaith Comm. Org., 426 F.3d at 705. Plaintiff bears the burden “of producing sufficient
2
Defendant provides the Court with no documentation or evidence to support its claim that K&S
failed to negotiate in good faith regarding attorney’s fees, nor does it cite any authorities to
support its position that failure to negotiate a settlement should lead to a reduction in the
attorney’s fee awarded to counsel. The Court notes that “[a] party entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees is also entitled to reimbursement for the time spent litigating its fee application.”
Planned Parenthood v. AG, 297 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 2002). K&S claims only 4.8 hours for
time spent after the January 2, 2012, settlement agreement (of which the Court strikes 0.2 hours
for other reasons, stated below), and does not bill for work spent preparing its Reply Brief.
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evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate for the essential character and complexity
of the legal services rendered in order to make out a prima facie case.” Smith v. Phila. Hous.
Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997). A reasonable rate is determined by “assess[ing] the
experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compar[ing] the rates to the rates
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183). The Court has broad discretion to determine an appropriate
hourly rate. See Bell, 884 F.2d at 721.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff requests compensation for its legal professionals based on
their experience: Mr. Kimmel, a named partner, at $325 per hour; Ms. Bennecoff, an associate, at
$250 per hour; Ms. Young, an associate, at $200 per hour; Mr. Ginsburg, an associate, at $200
per hour; Mr. Ferris, a law clerk, at $130 per hour; Ms. Sunchych, Ms. O’Connell, Mr. Ryan, and
Ms. Grob, paralegals, at $125 per hour each. 3 K&S notes that these rates are reduced from what
they contend are their standard rate, perhaps in order to comport with previous decisions from
this District and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In support of its proposed hourly rates,
K&S provides the following: (1) affidavits signed by attorneys Kimmel, Bennecoff, and
Ginsburg detailing their respective qualifications and participation in the present case; Pl. Br. Ex.
3
Plaintiff claims that when the parties disagree as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, the
Court should conduct a hearing. Pl. Br. at 26 n.7. Plaintiffs cite Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d
146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001), which states that if there is a dispute over what are the “reasonable
market rates” then the Court must hold a hearing. The Third Circuit has also said that “[a]
hearing must be held only where the court cannot fairly decide disputed questions of fact without
it.” Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 377 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Drelles v. Metro
Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. Appx. 587 (3d Cir. 2004). Lanni is inapposite because I am not
determining the reasonable market rate, but the reasonableness of K&S’s actual rates. As the
Court may determine the reasonableness of these hourly rates based on the information on the
record, no hearing is necessary.
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B; (2) statements in its motion of the qualifications of each of the legal professionals who billed
hours in this case, including law clerks and paralegals; id. at 16-23; (3) citations to cases in
which Courts have approved hourly rates for K&S similar to the rates K&S proposes in the
present case; id. at 26-27; (4) citations to cases in which Courts have awarded similar hourly
rates to similarly qualified attorneys from other firms in other FDCPA cases; id. at 27-28; and (5)
a print-out from its website which provides the qualifications of some of the legal professionals
who billed hours in the present case. Pl. Br. Ex. C.
The Court finds that the hourly rates proposed by K&S are reasonable. In cases in the
District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, equal or greater hourly rates for
K&S have been approved for similar work in similar cases. 4 E.g., Conklin v. Pressler & Pressler
LLP, No. 10-3566, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21609 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2012); Brass v. NCO Fin.
Sys., No. 11-1611, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98223 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011); Cassagne v. Law
Offices of Weltman, Weinberg & Reis. Co., LPA, No. 11-271, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135207
(D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2011); Levy v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., No. 10-4229, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124226 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2011); Weed-Schertzer v. Nudelman, No. 10-6402, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108928 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2011). Additionally, comparable rates for similarly
experienced attorneys have been approved in other FDCPA cases. E.g., Harlan v. NRA Group
LLC, No. 10-0324, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26841 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2011); (approving rate of
$555 per hour for a partner with a national reputation in consumer law, and a rate of $245 per
hour for a fourth-year associate); Holliday v. Cabrera & Assocs., P.C., No. 05-0971, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 161 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2007) (approving rate of $380 per hour for a partner, and a rate
4
In previous cases, Mr. Ginsburg was a law clerk, and his services were billed at a lower rate.
As he is now an associate, an increase to $200 per hour is not unreasonable.
6
of $275 per hour for another attorney). Consequently, the reduced rates proposed by K&S are
consistent with the market rates for similar legal services.
In arguing that the rates proposed by K&S are unreasonable, Defendant relies heavily
upon Levy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124226. Def. Opp. at 5-7. Levy involved another motion
brought by K&S. There the court found the following compensation to be reasonable: Mr.
Kimmel, at $310 per hour; Ms. Bennecoff, at $210; Ms. Young, at $200; Ms. Sunchych, at $110;
Mr. Ryan, at $110; and Mr. O’Connell, at $110. Id. at *25. There are slight differences between
the rates here and the rates allowed in Levy. Ms. Bennecoff’s is $40 more here and all other
rates, except Ms. Young’s, are $15 more. Ms. Young’s rate is the same. Such deviations are
expected, given the broad discretion the Court has in determining an hourly rate, as well as the
fact that rates potentially increase slightly over time as attorneys become more experienced or as
inflation pressures rates higher. See Bell, 884 F.2d at 721.
Additionally, Defendant argues that K&S’s hourly rates are unreasonable and should be
reduced due to the similarity of K&S’s filings in the present case and in previous cases, and
because the present case was “straightforward and did not involve complex legal issues or
analysis, and the case was not litigated in any significant way.” Def. Opp. at 6-8. This argument
is applicable to the number of hours billed, not to the hourly rate. If an attorney has done similar
work in the past, she may use a template to aid her in a similar matter and would therefore spend
fewer hours completing a given task. But the value of her time does not necessarily decrease.
To so hold would mean that an attorney would become less valuable with more experience. This
is a paradoxical result that the Court will not endorse.
Furthermore, Defendant attempts to weaken the value of the cases in which courts have
approved rates similar to the rates that K&S claims in the present case, arguing that the
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defendants in those cases recommended the hourly rates, not K&S. Courts, not litigants, make
law. Whether K&S reduced its rates in the present case because it independently came to the
conclusion that its rates were too high—or because it was repeatedly admonished for proposing
inflated rates—has little bearing on the reasonableness of the rates before me now.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the hourly rates proposed by K&S,
which have been approved for K&S in similar cases and are consistent with the market rates for
similar services, are reasonable.
ii. Hours Billed
A court must “decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the
particular purposes described and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant or otherwise
unnecessary.” Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., 51 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433). Counsel certifies that it has expended a total of 37.2 hours of attorney and support staff
time on this case. This reflects Plaintiff Counsel’s voluntary reduction of its time by 1.6 hours.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s Counsel states that it has expended the following hours on this case: Mr.
Kimmel (3.9 hours); Ms. Bennecoff (15.8 hours); Ms. Young (4.4 hours); Mr. Ginsburg (4.4
hours); Mr. Ferris (1.3); Ms. Sunchych (0.5 hours); Ms. Grob (5.4 hours); Ms. O’Connell (0.2
hours); and Mr. Ryan (1.3 hours). Pl. Br. at 2-3. The Court finds the number of hours expended
to be reasonable in some aspects and unreasonable in others and will reduce the hours billed
pursuant to the analysis below.
1. Fees for Potentially Duplicative Work
Defendant identifies nine entries by K&S that it believes are duplicative, and provides
explanations for three of these entries. Def. Opp. at 9-10; Ex. B. First, Defendant argues that the
0.2 hours that Ms. Bennecoff spent on April 22, 2011, reviewing the facts of the case with
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Plaintiff and confirming their accuracy is duplicative of the April 11, 2011, entry in which Ms.
Young reviewed the facts of the case with Plaintiff to confirm their accuracy. Def. Opp. at 9-10.
The Court disagrees. There are a number of reasons that two attorneys would need to review the
facts. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) demands that counsel conduct a
“reasonable inquiry” to ensure that the representations it makes are accurate. The Court finds
that spending 0.2 hours to double check the facts is not unreasonable. Among other reasons, it
helps ensure compliance with Rule 11 and avoids the possibility of either party wasting time
acting upon inaccurate information, and is therefore not unreasonable.
Next, Defendant claims that the 0.6 hours that K&S billed for Mr. Ferris’s drafting of the
discovery request is excessive, since Mr. Ferris used a template to draft the letter, and simply had
to change the caption. 5 Def. Opp. at 10. While templates can reduce the time it takes to produce
a document, it still takes time to review a template and tailor the template based on the specifics
of a case. 6 Mr. Ferris presumably had to review the letter to ensure that each request was
5
Similarly, Defendant identifies the April 5, 2011 entry in which Ms. Young spent 1.1 hours
drafting the Complaint as an entry that it claims should be reduced due to the similarity of the
Complaint in the present case and the complaints in Weed-Schertzer and Levy. Def. Opp. at 8.
Defendant claims that because of similarities among these complaints, it should not have taken
K&S 1.1 hours to draft the Complaint. Several of the paragraphs are identical or nearly
identical, and concern allegations regarding things such personal jurisdiction, venue, background
of the FDCPA, and construction of applicable law. The Court notes that it would be
unreasonable for K&S to start from scratch and draft new paragraphs regarding, for example,
venue, and finds that 1.1 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend drafting, reviewing, and
editing the Complaint.
6
K&S has recently sought fees in numerous other FDCPA actions using similar filings as those
submitted in this matter; in those cases, the various courts reduced both the proposed hourly rates
as well as the number of hours expended. See, e.g., Conklin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21609
(reducing K&S’s fees from $28,005.70 to $16,387); Freid v. Nat'l Action Fin. Services, Inc., No.
10-2870, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149668 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2011) (reducing K&S’s fees from
$97,028.59 to $11,944 ); Brass, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98223 (reducing K&S’s fees from
$5,096.50 to $2,457.20). However, in the present case, K&S has billed fewer hours for tasks
9
applicable to the present case. Failure to do so could lead to Defendant wasting time providing
unnecessary discovery, and could expose Plaintiff to sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(b).
Consequently, the Court finds that the 0.6 hours that Mr. Ferris spent completing this task is
reasonable, and will not reduce this entry.
Additionally, Defendant argues that the two August 5, 2011, entries by Mr. Kimmel
which both read “Review file and discuss case with client to arrive at demand; Email to Karen
Wachs demand,” are duplicative of one another. Def. Br. at 10. The Court notes that K&S
voluntarily struck the second of these entries, reducing its number of hours billed by 0.3. Pl.
Reply at 15. The Court agrees that it was prudent for K&S to strike the second entry, but
declines to reduce the first entry by 0.3 hours as Defendant requests.
Finally, Defendant identifies six entries that it claims are duplicative, but provides no
explanation. Def. Opp. Ex. B. The Court has reviewed these entries and finds no reason why
they should be considered duplicative.
2. Potentially Excessive Entries
Defendant identifies 22 entries by K&S that it believes are excessive, and provides
specific reasons for objecting to three of these entries. Def. Opp. at 8; Ex. B. First, Defendant
argues that the one hour that Ms. Young billed for reviewing the file and preparing a prelitigation letter to Defendant on February 16, 2011, is excessive because she used a template, and
only had to write two or three original paragraphs. However, this argument fails to take into
completed with the aid of templates. Compare, e.g., Pl. Br. Ex. A at 3 (K&S claims 0.6 hours for
drafting a discovery request and a Rule 26 disclosure, and sending an E-mail), with Docket Entry
25 Ex. B at 5, Conklin, 2012 Dist. LEXIS 21609 (K&S billed 1.5 hours, which the Court reduced
to one hour, for drafting a discovery request).
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account the time that Ms. Young spent reviewing the file. One hour to draft and review a letter
as well as review the file to prepare the letter is not excessive.
Next, Defendant argues that on July 5, 2011, Ms. Bennecoff spent 0.5 hours reviewing
the Answer and Corporate Disclosure and that this figure should be reduced to 0.3 hours.
Defendant’s Answer is only eight pages long, and contains a significant amount of standard
language. Thus, the Court finds that 0.3 hours is a reasonable amount of time for reviewing the
Answer and the Corporate Disclosure. Thus, this entry will be reduced by 0.2 hours.
Defendant also argues that the 0.2 hours that Ms. Bennecoff spent on January 2, 2012,
reviewing an eleven word email from ECF regarding the entry of appearance of Mr. Ginsburg is
excessive, and should be reduced to 0.1 hours. This is a routine filing and requires little to no
analysis. Therefore, the Court agrees, and this entry shall be reduced accordingly.
Finally, Defendant identifies 19 additional entries that it asks the Court to find excessive
and reduce accordingly, but provides no explanations as to why these entries should be deemed
excessive, beyond its general objection that “Plaintiff has provided no evidence or support that
the amount of the time billed was reasonable.” Def. Opp. at 8 (emphasis in original). Defendant
asserts that because “Plaintiff merely submits itemized time entries declaring the amount billed,
but nothing submitted supports the implied assertion that the entries themselves are reasonable,”
id. at 8-9, the Court should strike the entries identified by Defendant as excessive. According to
the Court in Bell:
[T]he adverse party’s [objections] cannot merely allege in general terms that the time
spent was excessive . . . . [Rather], they must generally identify the type of work being
challenged . . . and . . . specifically state the adverse party’s grounds for contending that
the hours claimed . . . are unreasonable.
884 F.2d at 720.
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Defendant is correct in its assertion that Plaintiff has the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the fees it requests. However, Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff has the burden
of providing detailed explanations to justify each and every tenth of an hour it bills, see Def.
Opp. at 8-9, is overstated. While a fee petition should include “some fairly definite information
as to the hours devoted to various general activities . . . , it is not necessary to know the exact
number of minutes nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific
attainments of each attorney.” Washington, 89 F.3d 1031 at 1037-38 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190)). To require a party seeking attorney’s fees to
provide a thorough explanation as to why, for example, it billed 0.2 hours speaking to Defense
counsel, see Pl. Mot. Ex. A at 5, would be an onerous task, and would create more billable hours,
an outcome that Defendant surely wishes to avoid. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed these
entries and finds that none of these additional 19 entries is excessive, and makes no further
reductions for excessive hours.
3. Intra-Office Communication
Defendant also argues that K&S has billed for services that are non-compensable because
they relate to intra-office communication. In support of its position, Defendant cites Citibank,
N.A. v. Hicks, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30432, at *18 (E.D. Pa Aug. 24, 2004). 7 The court in
Citibank said that “when several attorneys bill a large number of hours for strategy and
conferencing, a reduction in the fee request may be appropriate,” 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30432,
at *18 (emphasis added), and relied on Daggett v. Kimmelmann, 811 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir.
7
The court in Citibank exercised diversity jurisdiction and applied Illinois state law to resolve a
dispute over attorney’s fees provided for by contract, not by statute. Nevertheless, as the court in
Citibank relies on Daggett, infra, in reducing the number of billable hours for intra-office
communication, the case is instructive.
12
1987). Citibank, however, does not adequately support Defendant’s argument. It does not hold
that billing for intra-office communication is per se unreasonable and that attorneys may not bill
any hours for intra-office communication. In fact, the court in Citibank “recognize[d] the value
of attorney communication and conferencing in preparation and daily management of a lawsuit.”
Citibank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30432, at *17; see also Rodriguez-Hernandez v. MirandaVelez, 132 F.3d 848, 860 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Careful preparation often requires collaboration and
rehearsal….”). Nevertheless, courts may reduce the number of hours attorneys in a firm bill for
communication with co-counsel if, based on the facts of a particular case, the court finds that the
hours billed are unreasonable. Daggett, 811 F.2d at 797 (finding that excessive communication
among Plaintiffs’ attorneys was one factor which justified the District Court’s decision to reduce
the number of hours that each attorney billed by ten percent); Citibank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30432, at *17 (reducing the 114.4 hours billed by Plaintiff’s Counsel for communication among
attorneys by half, when 524.1 total hours were billed). In the present case, approximately 14.1
out of 37.2 hours billed by K&S relate to intra-office communication. Based on the numbers of
hours billed for intra-office communication, Defendant asks the Court to strike all entries relating
to intra-office communication, which the Court will not do.
In both Daggett and Citibank, the courts focused on the number of hours billed for
communication among attorneys, not between attorneys and other legal staff. See Daggett, 811
F.2d at 797-98; Citibank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30432, at *17-18. In the present case, only
approximately 4.8 hours out of the 37.2 total hours are billed for communication between K&S
attorneys. The remaining 9.3 hours billed for intra-office communication are billed for
communication between attorneys and paralegals. Communication between attorneys and
paralegals facilitates delegation, which allows a law form to conduct its business at a lower cost,
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as paralegal services are billed at a significantly lower hourly rate. In fact, courts must not
“approve [of] the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily
delegable to non-professionals or less experienced associates.” Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719
F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983). Thus, the lodestar amount may be reduced when an experienced
attorney bills hours for work that could have been completed by non-attorney staff. See id. at
677 (“A Michelangelo should not charge Sistine Chapel rates for painting a farmer’s barn.”).
Consequently, the Court finds that it is reasonable that approximately 12% of K&S’s
billable hours involve communication between K&S’s attorneys. Cf. Citibank, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30432, at *17 (halving the number of hours billed for communication among attorneys
when 21.8% of the hours billed were billed for communication among attorneys). As a result, no
entries will be struck or reduced solely based on the rationale that they involve intra-office
communication.
Nevertheless, numerous entries are non-compensable because they involve intra-office
communication related to administrative tasks. 8 “As a general rule, time that would not be billed
to a client cannot be imposed on an adversary. Thus, administrative tasks, which are not the type
normally billed to a paying client, may not be recovered by a party through a fee petition.”
Alexander v. NCO Fin. Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64211, at *19 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2011)
(citations omitted). Indeed, certain administrative tasks not normally billed to clients such as
8
Defendant terms no entries “administrative.” But an objection to a fee need only be sufficiently
specific to “raise a material fact issue as to the accuracy of representations as to hours spent, or
the necessity for their expenditure,” so as to put the other party on notice that it must defend its
fee position. Bell, 884 F.2d at 719-20 (quoting Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d
262, 267 (3d Cir. 1985)). Defendant’s characterization of certain entries as non-compensable
intra-office communication was sufficient to put K&S on notice that it needed to defend its
position. Furthermore, K&S is aware that it may not bill for administrative tasks, as it claims
that it omitted administrative entries from its invoice. See Pl. Br. at 4 n.5.
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“opening a file in a database, mailing letters, and copying documents to a CD,” may not be
recovered by a party through a fee petition. Id., at *20; see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hospital, 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The fact that private lawyers may perform
tasks other than legal services for their clients, with their consent and approval, does not justify
foisting off such expenses on an adversary under the guise of reimbursable legal fees.”).
However, tasks such as “discussions with a client, creating a factual summary, and preparing an
outline of linked events, have been included in calculations . . . even if performed by a
paralegal.” Brass, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98223, at *16.
Here, the Court finds that the following billed hours are administrative and will reduce
the hours billed for the following entries by the amount noted:
Date of Entry Entry
Legal
Professional
Mr. Kimmel
Amount of
Reduction
0.1
Oct. 18, 2010
Prepare a note in Amicus
Apr. 22, 2011
Receipt of email from Pay.gov confirming
payment for complaint, saved in Amicus
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1 9
Apr. 22, 2011
Email to SY re: question regarding
notation on file; Review response
Ms. Bennecoff
0.2
Apr. 22, 2011
Review and respond to ALB email
regarding notation on file
Ms. Young
0.2
May 6, 2011
Prepare Copies of Complaint and Cover
Sheet to send to Defendant, Prepare copies
of Notice and Waiver for File
Ms. Sunchych
0.1
July 29, 2011
Email to DG to send to Defendant’s
Counsel and Calendar
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
9
In this entry, K&S bills 1.5 hours at a rate of $250 per hour. This should total $375, but
Plaintiff’s Counsel only bills $300. Whether a mistake or a reflection of what K&S believes is
reasonable, the Court will award K&S only $300 for this entry.
15
July 29, 2011
Email correspondence to DG re: reserving
conference room for dep
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
July 29, 2011
Sent Discovery Requests to Defendant’s
Counsel via email and Regular US Mail;
Copied to Amicus; Calendared response
date; Reserve conference room
Ms. Grob
0.3
July 29, 2011
Review email from DG indicating
discovery requests have been sent to
Defendant
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
July 29, 2011
Review email from DG indicating that the
deposition notice was sent to Defendant
and room reserved for dep
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
Aug. 1, 2011
Calendar Deposition Date
Ms. Grob
0.1
Aug. 3, 2011
email to DG to return her call
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
Sept. 12, 2011
Calendared follow-up
Ms. Grob
0.1
Sept. 29, 2011
Email to DG adjourn or get via telephone
die [sic] to preplanned vacation day
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
Oct. 7, 2011
Email to DG to follow-up with
Defendant’s counsel about the status of
discovery responses and to reschedule dep
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
Oct. 7, 2011
Email from ALB about following up on
discovery responses and rescheduling
deposition in this matter
Ms. Grob
0.1
Nov. 15, 2011
Faxed continuance letter to court &
defendant’s counsel
Ms. Grob
0.1
Jan. 18, 2012
Email to DG to make sure fee petition
calendared
Ms. Bennecoff
0.1
Jan. 18, 2012
Email communication from ALB re:
calendaring fee petition due date; Calendar
same
Ms. Grob
0.1
Feb. 19, 2012
PDF motion, brief, COS, TOA, TOC; Efile
Ms. Bennecoff
0.2
16
TOTAL
REDUCTION
2.5
As a result, this time will be subtracted from the time submitted by K&S as indicated above.
iii. Proportionality of Attorney’s Fees to Settlement Amount
Defendant contends that the Court should reduce the lodestar amount to reflect what
Defendant argues is a proportional discrepancy between the attorney’s fees that K&S requests
and the $2,500 settlement amount. The Court disagrees. In Hensley, the Supreme Court held
that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (remedies for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), “the extent
of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of
attorney's fees.” 461 U.S. at 440. This holding also applies when determining attorney’s fees
under the FDCPA. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 114; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424 (“[T]he
standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has
authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”). However, in Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561 (1986), the Court declined to extend Hensley to “adopt a strict rule that attorney’s fees . . .
be proportionate to damages recovered.” Id. at 483-84.
In general, reasonable attorney’s fees are “adequate to attract competent counsel, but . . .
do not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. AT&T
Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1448 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Congress’ inclusion of the
attorney’s fee provision of the FDCPA sought to ensure that “the Act . . . be enforced by debtors
acting as private attorneys general.” Graziano, 950 F.3d at 107. Absent the attorney’s fees
provision, attorneys would be less inclined to take on FDCPA cases, and the rights of debtors
wronged by creditors in violation of the FDCPA would not be protected. Consequently, the
17
purpose of the statute, deterring abusive debt collection practices, see 18 U.S.C. 1962(e), would
be frustrated.
Additionally, in the present case, the ratio of attorney’s fees to the award amount, 3.0 to
1, is consistent with other FDCPA cases in this District and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
involving K&S. E.g. Conklin, 2012 Dist. LEXIS 21609 (7.8 to 1); Brass, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98223 (2.4 to 1); Cassagne, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135207 (5.4 to 1); Levy, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124226 (5.8 to 1); Weed-Schertzer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108928 (3.4 to 1).
Consequently, the Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden of proving that the
lodestar amount is unreasonable, see Rode, 892 F.2d at 1180, and declines to adjust the lodestar
amount based on the amount of Plaintiff’s recovery.
iv. Lodestar Calculation
Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that the following hourly rates and the
following number of hours are reasonable:
Legal Professional
Hourly Rate
Hours Worked
Total Fee
Mr. Kimmel
$325
3.8
$1,235
Ms. Bennecoff
$250
14.4
$3,600
Ms. Young
$200
4.2
$840
Mr. Ginsburg
$200
4.4
$880
Mr. Ferris
$130
1.3
$169
Ms. Sunchych
$125
.4
$50
18
Ms. Grob
$125
4.6
$575
Ms. O’Connell
$125
.2
$25
Mr. Ryan
$125
1.3
$162.50
34.6
$7,536.50
TOTAL
As a result, the total amount to be awarded is $7,536.50 in attorney’s fees.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees. An appropriate order shall follow.
Dated: August 10, 2012
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J.
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