HOHSFIELD v. POLHEMUS et al
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 2/22/2012. (eaj)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DAVID HOHSFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM POLHEMUS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 11-3007 (FLW)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
DAVID HOHSFIELD, Plaintiff pro se
# 567841-A
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center
8 Production Way
P.O. Box 190 8-L
Avenel, New Jersey 07001
WOLFSON, District Judge
Plaintiff, David Hohsfield, a state inmate confined at the
Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey, at the
time he submitted the above-captioned Complaint for filing, seeks
to bring this action in forma pauperis.
Based on his affidavit
of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time, this Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether the
pleading should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court
concludes that this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, David Hohsfield (“Plaintiff” or “Hohsfield”),
brings this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
the following defendants: William Polhemus, Sheriff of Ocean
County; Theodore Hutler, Warden of the Ocean County Jail; John
Does 1-5, Ocean County Freeholders; and Jane Roes 1-5, Ocean
County officials.
(Complaint, Caption and ¶¶ 5b-c).
The
following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and
are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has
made no findings as to the veracity of plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his
constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, by levying and collecting fees from
him as an inmate housed at the Ocean County Jail for housing
costs without affording him due process or a hearing prior to the
alleged “seizure” of his funds.
(Compl., ¶ 8).
Plaintiff seeks the return of all confiscated funds, as well
as compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $250.00 per
day for every day that he was confined at the Ocean County Jail.
(Compl., ¶ 9).
in this action.
He also asks for appointment of pro bono counsel
(Docket entry no. 1-3).
2
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity.
The Court is
required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
28 U.S.C. §§
This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) an
§ 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
(2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
See also United
The Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Court
need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”
or “legal conclusions.”
Id.
3
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).
The standard for evaluating whether a
complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.
Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
See also Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court
reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard
for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint
adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in
discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during
detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,
violated his constitutional rights.
Id.
The Court examined Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).1
Citing its recent opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two
working principles underlying the failure to state a claim
standard:
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained that
a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
1
Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
5
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must
now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 1948.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
allegations of his complaint are plausible.
Id. at 1949-50; see
also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).
Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides
the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
at 210.
Fowler, 578 F.3d
The Third Circuit now requires that a district court
must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when
presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50].
2
In Conley, as stated above, a district court was
permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of
facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion
to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the
claim’s legal elements.
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Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at
1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.
This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
Plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
(2007).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or
futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.
2000).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that the imposition of a booking fee and a
$20.00 “housing fee” per day on pretrial detainees, such as
Plaintiff at the time he was housed at the Ocean County Jail, was
a violation of due process and his right against unreasonable
seizures.
Plaintiff objects to the “pay to stay” fee assessed against
him and other inmates housed at the Ocean County Jail to cover
the daily living expenses while confined.
“User fees”, similar
to the one at issue here, have been determined to be nominal
surcharges and non-punitive, and therefore, they do not violate
due process.
(D.N.J.
See Tinsley v. Del Rosso, 2008 WL 2236598, *5
May 30, 2008); Fuentes v. State of New Jersey Office of
Public Defenders, 2006 WL 83108 at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2006).
Myrie v. Commissioner, N.J. Dep't. Of Corrections, 267 F.3d 251
In
(3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit held that N.J.S.A. 30:4-15.1,
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effective July 1998, which required all state inmates to pay a
10% surcharge on commissary purchases in order to fund the
Victims Crime Compensation Board (“V.C.C.B.”), was valid.
The
court found that the surcharge was not so punitive in purpose or
effect to constitute “punishment” in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause or Bill of Attainder
provision of the Constitution.
The surcharge was not excessive
and was rationally related to legitimate governmental interest of
“bridging the funding gap for the crime victims compensation
program,” and did not offend constitutional due process
guarantees.
Myrie, 267 F.3d at 255-263.
More significantly, the Third Circuit considered a similar
challenge, as made by Plaintiff here, in Tillman v. Lebanon
County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000).
Like
Plaintiff, the plaintiff in Tillman challenged the legality and
constitutionality of a $10 per day fee for housing costs imposed
on prisoners in the Lebanon County Prison.
That plaintiff
complained that the prison lacked the authority to implement a
Cost Recovery Program; however, the Third Circuit held that the
County was vested with the power to govern and manage
correctional institutions, which included the power to impose a
housing fee.
Id., 221 F.3d at 423.
The Tillman court stated,
“[a]lthough we have not uncovered a statute explicitly providing
for the deductions at issue here, the Cost Recovery Program was
duly promulgated, not by the state, but by the county prison
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board, which has “exclusive” authority regarding “the government
and management” of the facility.”
Id. (citing 61 Pa. Cons.Stat.
§ 408(a)(1)) (current version at 61 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1731).
That statute states in part that, “[t]he board ... shall provide
for the safekeeping, discipline and employment of inmates and the
government and management of the correctional institution.”
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Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1731(a)(3).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit highlighted other court
decisions that upheld similar policies finding no “barriers to
the promulgation of such programs by prisons.”
Tillman, 221 F.3d
at 423 (citing Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 170, 183 (3d
Cir. 1997)(upholding program that was created by county prison);
Mastrian v. Schoen, 725 F.2d 1164, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1984)
(upholding programs instituted by correctional officials).
Accordingly the Third Circuit held that the Lebanon County Prison
Board had the authority to promulgate the Cost Recovery Program.
Here, there is broad authority granted to county boards of
chosen freeholders by the New Jersey Legislature under N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 30:8-19 and 30:8-23,3 which could include the right to
3
N.J. Stat. Ann.. § 30:8-19 states, “[i]t shall be lawful
for the board of chosen freeholders of any county in this state
to assume and thereafter to exercise the custody, rule, keeping
and charge of the county jails in their respective counties, and
of the prisoners therein ...” Furthermore, N.J. Stat. Ann. §
30:8-23 states,
When the board of chosen freeholders of any county shall
have assumed the custody, rule, keeping and charge of the
county jail of such county pursuant to section 30:8-19 of
this title, such board shall prescribe rules and regulations
for the management and conduct of such jail, and the
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impose such an housing fee.
Furthermore, the Tillman court
recognized the right of the Lebanon Valley Correctional Facility
to charge inmates a housing fee based on similar legislative
authority.
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the user fee is
imposed as an impermissible penalty.
The Third Circuit has
clearly announced that daily assessments like the one at issue
here, do not constitute a penalty, and that a cost recovery
program is more properly understood as a transfer of funds than a
way to regulate prison behavior or as a punitive measure.
Tillman, 221 F.3d at 420.
The Tillman court reasoned that: “A
prisoner’s term of incarceration cannot be extended, nor can he
be reincarcerated, for failure to pay a negative balance ... the
fees can hardly be called fines when they merely represent
partial reimbursement of the prisoner’s daily cost of
maintenance, something he or she would be expected to pay on the
outside.”
Id. at 420.
Therefore, this Court finds that the Ocean County Jail user
fee is a nominal and non-punitive charge.
This Court further concludes that imposition of the user fee
in this case does not violate any due process rights of
Plaintiff.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
employment, maintenance and keeping of the prisoners therein
...
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process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
In order to bring
a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed
within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or
property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide
due process of law.
2000).
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.
The Third Circuit has established that inmates have a
property interest in funds held in prison accounts.
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997).
Reynolds v.
“Thus, inmates are
entitled to due process with respect to any deprivation of this
money.”
Id. (citing Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1061 (1997)).
Thus, the Court is left to consider the adequacy of the
procedural safeguards made available to inmates in the Ocean
County Jail.
In considering a due process claim, the Court must
balance the private interest, the governmental interest, and the
value of the available procedure in safeguarding against an
erroneous deprivation.
(1976).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
In some cases, takings of property by the State require
pre-deprivation notice and a hearing.
But where the State must
take quick action, or where it is impractical to provide
meaningful pre-deprivation process, due process will be satisfied
by a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.
Tillman, 221 F.3d at
422(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)).
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Here, Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance with
respect to the user fee and was provided a copy of the resolution
and policy and procedures regarding the fee collection process.
Pursuant to general state prison policy, inmates have an
opportunity to challenge the deductions from their inmate
accounts through the general internal inmate grievance procedure
provided for them.
See Barney v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 5103206, *7, 8 (D.N.J.
Dec 17, 2009)(NO. CIV. A. 08-4115).
See also Tillman, 221 F.3d
at 422.
In Tillman, the plaintiff challenged the adequacy of
procedural safeguards in place when the prison only provided the
opportunity for a post-deprivation hearing.
In that case, the
Third Circuit stated that the procedures afforded by the prison
satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process.
Specifically, the Tillman court stated that,
It is impractical to expect the prison to provide
predeprivation proceedings under these circumstances.... The
assessments and takings pursuant to the program involve
routine matters of accounting, with a low risk of error. To
the extent that mistakes such as erroneous assessments or
incorrect takings might occur, they may be corrected through
the prison’s grievance program without any undue burden on a
prisoners’ rights. On the other hand, to require
predeprivation proceedings for what are essentially
ministerial matters would significantly increase transaction
costs and essentially frustrate an important purpose of the
program, which is to reduce the county’s costs of
incarcerating prisoners.
Id. at 422.
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Here, the Court finds that the general inmate grievance
procedure in place at Ocean County Jail also adequately protects
the rights of prisoners without creating an unfair burden on the
government.
Inmates are afforded adequate notice and the
opportunity for hearing as required under the Constitution.
Therefore, the user fee does not violate due process guarantees,
and this claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety, as against all named
defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
Plaintiff’s application for appointment of counsel
(Docket entry no. 1-3) will be denied as moot.
An appropriate
order follows.
s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: February 22, 2012
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